Value of the language of rights in Christian ethics, with particular reference to reproductive rights by Cronin, Kieran James
The Value of the Language of Rights in Christian Ethics,
With Particular Reference to Reproductive Rights





The language of rights has become highly respectable in
Church circles and in the works of Christian ethicists,
especially since the end of the Second World War. The
literature on this subject is immense, yet much of this
writing avoids the basic analytical issues presented by
this form of moral language. This thesis begins with the
conviction that theologians can learn a good deal about
the value of the language of rights from recent
literature on the subject in moral philosophy and in
jurisprudence or legal philosophy.
Once one begins to study the analytical issues
connected with the language of rights, one is confronted
with the possibility of a radical scepticism regarding
its value. Thus, the opening chapters of this work
attempt to show forth this scepticism and to overcome it.
In doing so one is challenged to clarify the concept of
rights with the help of various useful distinctions, e.g.
between 'human rights' and 'special moral rights',
'mandatory' and 'discretionary' rights; and a 'cluster'
of legal concepts borrowed from Wesley Hohfeld and
applied in the moral sphere: 'Claims',
'liberties','powers' and 'immunities'. These
clarificatory distinctions (and many others introduced in
the text) help to overcome scepticism and provide a
flexible form of moral language, useful both to
philosophers and theologians.
If philosophy is the 'handmaid of theology' in helping
analyse and clarify the language of Christian ethics, it
must be recognised that the Christian tradition has much
to offer in understanding the proper significance of the
human need to claim what is due. Although this thesis is
primarily methodological and metaethical, I insist on
uncovering basic normative ethical positions underlying
the language of rights. In particular, I stress the
Christian understanding of human dignity as the
foundation of the language of rights.
In the second part of my thesis I try to show how the
clarification of the language of rights helps in
discussing the issues involved in the area of
reproductive rights. This includes some analysis of the
values associated with human procreation and the
normative relationships expressed by the language of
rights and duties. The complexity of rights-language is
shown in the context of a discussion of controversial
subjects, from population control to treatment for
infertility.
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This is an age in which human society has become
accustomed to the use of the language of rights. Such
language appears to be both morally and intellectually
respectable. Yet this appearance conceals many problems
which have been the subject of concern for moral
philosophers and legal philosophers, especially in recent
decades. Some of the problems associated with rights-
language concern the analysis of the concept of rights
within moral and legal language, and much of this thesis
will be taken up with an examination of this discussion.
Put in a more technical way, the emphasis in this
thesis will be on 1metaethical' issues rather than on
issues arising in normative ethics, and on methodological
issues rather than on substantive moral issues. Not that
these approaches to ethics can be separated radically; in
fact, it seems that they are closely related. A. Gewirth
(1960) points out some of the connections between
metaethics and normative ethics. For instance, in "the
work of R.M.Hare, according to Gewirth, there is a move
from metaethics to normative ethics in the discussion of
methods of justifying moral decisions (cf.Hare,1952).
Gewirth says of Hare, 'that his metaethical or logical
analysis is at the same time normatively ethical, in that
it distinguishes between what he himself regards as
morally good and bad.' (Gewirth,1960:194) . A clear
example here is the way in which the 'principle of
universalizability' , which is so stressed by Hare,
straddles the alleged divide between metaethics and
normative ethics. The principle of universalizability
enables one to distinguish between properly moral and
non-moral uses of terms like 'good' and 'ought'; it
establishes a basic criterion for the recognition of
moral language, and as such is metaethically useful. But
this principle, which Hare borrows from Kant, is also a
possible basis for a normative ethical system, since it
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involves as well a principle of justice, fairness, or
equity, i.e. 'treat like persons and situations alike'.
Another example of the relationship between metaethics
and normative ethics concerns the way metaethical
theories colour one's choice of normative ethical
systems. For instance, if one holds an emotivist theory
of the meaning of moral language, like A.J.Ayer (1946)
and C.L.Stevenson (1944), this may influence the way one
makes moral decisions and the way one discusses moral
issues with others. In fact, rational discussion seems to
be practically impossible in emotivism because of the
highly subjective nature of 'moral' positions.
Regarding the language of rights, then, there is a
two-way influence between metaethical and normative
approaches to its use. One comes to the metaethical stage
with normative positions already in mind, for who can be
totally neutral regarding rights-issues? However,
metaethics, in turn, enables one to recognise some of the
problems related to the use of the language of rights-in
normative contexts.
What relevance has all this for Christian ethics? The
most obvious response is that Christians use the language
of rights like nearly everyone else and they are equally
prone to abuse moral language by being vague in their
understanding of the complex relationships between moral
terms. Even Christian theology can be accused of ignoring
to a great extent the analysis of the language of rights
at the metaethical level. I can find only a handful of
Christian ethicists writing in the English language or
translated into English who treat of the metaethical
issues surrounding the concept and language of rights. It
is odd that Christianity has moved from a situation of
hostility to this form of language to one of almost naive
and unquestioning acceptance. John Henley (1986) speaks
of 'the naivety with which some theologians and church
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leaders concerned about human rights have understood the
relation between theoria and praxis.'(Henley,1986:367)
And he goes on, 'This has meant that the cause of human
rights has been virtually taken "for granted in certain
circles, especially those of the World Council of
Churches, and little critical attention has been paid to
such matters as its foundations.' (ibid.).
In the first part of my work, then, I attempt to
introduce some of the complexities involved in using the
language of rights, borrowing wholesale from the
voluminous literature in philosophy and jurisprudence. I
face up to two kinds of scepticism concerning the use of
rights-language: one kind being properly metaethical, and
the second, normative. (If there is any recognition of
scepticism about rights at a popular level, it is to be
found at the normative level, especially in relation to
the amazing proliferation of rights-claims in recent
years. Thus, Lisa Sowle Cahill (1980) mentions as well as
the Quinlan case, where a 'right to die' was in question,
the case of 'an eighty-year-old Japanese sandalmaker
[who] had won the "right to sunshine" (asserted against
the construction of skyscrapers) from the Tokyo District
Court, and the Fiji Island gold miners [who] were seeking
"the right to a sex break" during their lunch
period.'(Cahill,1980:277).)
Having considered the contribution which philosophy
and jurisprudence might pay to Christian ethics, I next
turn to the contribution which the Christian theological
tradition can pay to the secular ethical approach to
rights. This includes an examination of the application
of rights-language to the relationship between believers
and God and the central notions of human dignity and
human creation in God's image.
The second part of my thesis begins with a summary of
the main issues involved in applying the language of
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rights to particular areas of human flourishing, with
special reference to the goods associated with human
procreation. In the final chapters I attempt to analyse
some problematic areas within the sphere of reproductive
freedom where conflicts arise at various levels, for
instance: at the level of competing goods and interests;
the identification of possible right-holders in relation
to the central values inherent in procreation; the
normative relationship between right-holders and
potential duty-bearers; and the contribution of Christian
ethics to the general debate concerning these topics. I
hope to show that the initial radical scepticism about
rights and right-language can give way to the position
which accepts their moral respectability.
What is novel about this thesis is the change of
emphasis from the traditional concentration (especially
in Roman Catholic moral theology, but also in secular
ethics) upon duties and obligations to the language of
rights. Kevin Kelly (1967) underlines the preoccupation
with duty and obligation in the traditional manual
approach to moral theology or Christian ethics by quoting
from the traditional Roman Catholic manuals. Let me give
one example: 'Moral theology is that part of theology
which treats of the ordering of human acts to their final
supernatural end by the observance of the commandments'
(Aertyns-Damen,1939:vol.1,xvii; Kelly,1967:121). A con¬
centration on rights, however, begins from a different
angle, from the point of view of the person who is in a
position to claim something from others. One might say
that such an approach is in fact more fundamental than
the emphasis on obeying commandments and rules, since
these latter moral realities are usually imposed for the
sake of rights.
It is my contention in the following pages that the
language of rights in Christian ethics provides a
different approach to moral living and ethical study than
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is to be found in the more traditional preoccupation with
obligations and right action. In particular I shall show
how the language of rights is important from the point of
view of its ability to introduce a degree of flexibility
into normative relationships in which people find
themselves naturally (natural rights), or into which they
enter by free decision (special moral rights). And yet,
when important goods are at stake, the language of rights
can be as strict and as demanding as any moral system
which stresses absolute obligations and principles.
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Part 1:
Analytical Issues and the Refutation of Scepticism
Individuals have rights, and there are things no
person or group may do to them (without violating
their rights).
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia,(1974),
p. ix.
At present, it is difficult to live with and without
"rights-talk".
David Little, 'Human Rights: An Exuberant Disarray',
Hastings Center Report,1988,18/2,p.40.
As much as I value a respect for human beings, all
human beings great and small, good and bad, stupid
and reflective, as much as I would like to see the
United Nations Declaration on Human Rights become a
reality, i.e., be implemented and respected by all
nations, it seems to me quite evident that we do not
know that there are any universal human rights.




Initial Elucidation of Rights-Language
1.1 Introduction
This chapter attempts to clarify the language of rights,
first of all at a general level, not quite the level of
everyday usage, but still at a relatively unspecialised
and untechnical level of discourse. Thus, I begin by
concentrating on terms that are widely regarded as being
practically synonymous with rights, e.g., 'claim',
'entitlement', 'power', and 'liberty'.
From this general level I proceed to elucidate the
concept of rights at a specialised level - the level at
which legal and moral philosophers discuss the terms
mentioned above. At this stage it should have become
clear that clarity in elucidating rights-language does
not automatically do away with controversy. Indeed, it
will be seen how debate on the subject of rights involves
differences of opinion at the metaethical level as well
as at the normative level. In other words, there is
disagreement not merely on the question of what rights
people have (a normative question), but also concerning
questions of the analysis of the concept of 'right' (a
metaethical question).
Having pointed out some of the areas of controversy at
both general and specialised levels, I turn my attention
to the discussion of two basic theories of rights. This
will lead to the central question of the essential value
of rights-language. These theories must be kept in mind
throughout the course of my work.
I see the attempt to clarify the language of rights in
this manner as useful in a number of ways. First, clarity
is a response to that scepticism which accuses rights-
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language of being incurably vague. Second, this analysis
is a step towards the provision of a useful set of tools
for working on the question of human dignity, as well as
helping in the area of moral and legal casuistry.
Finally, the clarification of rights-language at this
basic moral and legal level is a necessary foundation for
the construction of a theological analysis of the
concepts expressed in the language of rights.
1.2 General Analysis of Rights-Language
A. Rights as 'Claims'
It is quite common in moral and legal philosophy to
associate rights with 'claims' (cf. Feinberg,1970:149
1974:159; Gewirth,1984:1; Wasserstrom,1964:10; Mayo,
1965: 221). The work of Joel Feinberg is especially
associated with the development of the idea of rights as
claims, so I will follow some of his argument in what
follows. ""
In his article, 'The Nature and Value of Rights',
Feinberg distinguishes different uses of the terminology
of claiming. For instance, a person may 'make claim to
something'. Or a person may 'claim that' something or
other is the case. Or then again a person may, according
to Feinberg, 'have a claim' (Feinbergf1970:149).
The first instance - 'making claim to' - Feinberg
argues, is typified in those cases where a right-holder
demands his due; often when something is acknowledged to
be his, e.g. 'something borrowed, say, or improperly
taken from him' (ibid.,150). Frequently, a person makes a
claim in such circumstances by presenting a chit, or
ticket, or I.O.U., in order to prove the basis of the
claim or right. Feinberg further characterises this use
of the term 'claim' as 'performative claiming' (ibid.).
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The second use mentioned by Feinberg - 'claiming
that'- is given the title 'propositional claim'
(ibid.,150). Clearly, Feinberg sees this use as weaker
than the first type, 'making claim', for he argues that
One important difference then between making legal
claim to and claiming that is that the former is a
legal performance with (Tirect legal consequences
whereas the latter is often a mere piece of
descriptive commentary with no legal force (ibid.).
(Though Feinberg makes the point above in relation to
legal claims, I think there is a sense in which this can
be adapted to cover moral claims as well.) The
comparative weakness of 'claiming that' is exemplified by
Feinberg when he states that, 'Anyone can claim, of
course, that this umbrella is yours, but only you or your
representative can actually claim the umbrella.' (ibid.).
The third use of 'claim' underlined by Feinberg -
'having a claim' - is explained as follows: 'I would like
to suggest that having a claim consists in being in si
position to claim, that is, to make claim or claim that.'
(ibid.,151). In speaking thus Feinberg is actually being
critical of this way of speaking, since he goes on to
say:
If this suggestion is correct it shows the primacy
of the verbal over the nominative forms. It links
claims to a kind of activity and obviates the
temptation to think of claims as things , on the
model of coins, pencils, and other material
possessions which we can carry in our hip pockets
(ibid.).
Over all then, Feinberg's position on rights as claims
stresses the activity of claiming, the 'performative'
sense in which people actually demand their due. At a
later stage I shall have to return to Feinberg's emphasis
on claiming, and in the following sections some of the
problems with the notion of rights as claims will be
mentioned, but for now I shall remain content with the
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statement of the uses of the language of claiming. In the
next section I deal with a closely related concept -
'entitlement1.
B, Rights as 'Entitlements'
For the elucidation of the notion of rights as
'entitlements' it will be useful to turn to the work of
the Australian philosopher, H.J. McCloskey. This author
rejects the association between rights and claims, and
insists instead on the close link between rights and
entitlements (McCloskey,1965; 1976).
What is wrong with thinking of rights as claims?
According to McCloskey, a right may provide a ground for
claiming something, but it is not a claim in itself. He
takes the example of the legal right to marry,
My legal right to marry consists primarily in the
recognition of my entitlement to marry and to have
my act recognised. It indirectly gives rise to
claims on others not to prevent me so acting, but it
does not primarily consist in these claims
(McCloskey,1965:116).
Another example found in McCloskey concerns the
fundamental right to life. This, he says, is not a right
against anyone, though it may imply duties on the part of
others to refrain from killing me. ' But it is
essentially a right of mine, not a list of claims,
hypothetical and actual, against an infinite number of
actual, potential, and as yet nonexistent beings.'
(ibid.,118). Thus, McCloskey seems to think of rights as
entitlements in the sense of possessions, as opposed to
Feinberg's emphasis on the verbal form of claim. In
effect, McCloskey's 'entitlements' are closely akin to
Feinberg's third use of claim - 'having a claim'.
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I think it is important at this stage to question this
distinction between rights as claims and rights as
entitlements. It is my feeling that 'claims' and
'entitlements' are closer in meaning than McCloskey is
willing to admit. For instance, another author who
defines rights in terms of entitlements, G. Marshall, has
this to say: 'A right, it would be safe to say, is
obviously a form of entitlement arising out of moral,
social, political, or legal rules.' (Marshall,1973:228).
And immediately after this definition Marshall informs
his reader that the term 'entitlement' is to be preferred
to that of 'claim', because claims are not always valid
or justified.
Both McCloskey and Marshall have a point here, but it
is a point that Feinberg and others who use the language
of claim have in fact taken on board in their analysis of
rights. Both Feinberg and Wasserstrom tend to use the
terms 'claim' and 'entitlement' as practically
synonymous. For instance, Wasserstrom moves back and
forth between the two terms, as in the following,
Perhaps the most obvious thing to be said about
rights is that they are constitutive of the domain
of entitlements. They help to define and serve to
protect those things concerning which one can make a
very special kind of claim - a claim of right
(1964:10).
Feinberg, too, appears to use 'claim' and
'entitlement' interchangeably, as in the following,
Generally speaking, only the person who has a title
or who is qualified for it, or someone speaking in
his name, can make claim to something as a matter
of right. It is an important fact about rights (or
claims), then, that they can be claimed only by
those who have them (1970:150).
So Feinberg has to make a further distinction between
mere claims that are not justified or valid, and valid or
19
justified claims. This should answer the anxiety of
Marshall at least, since he was concerned that the
ordinary use of the term 'claim' does not guarantee that
the claim is always justified or valid. Feinberg sees
the need to distinguish clearly between a claim
understood as a demand and a valid claim where the demand
is justified.
A claim conceded even by its maker to have no
validity is not a claim at all, but a mere demand.
The highwayman, for example, demands his victim's
money; but he hardly makes claim to it as rightfully
his own (ibid.,152)
It seems reasonable to me at this stage to identify
'entitlement' with a special kind of claim - a 'valid
claim'. And a right can be elucidated in terms of either
'entitlement' or 'valid claim'. The notion of
'entitlement' is not necessarily opposed to the notion of
'claim', but the former does help to point out the
ambiguity in the latter concept, an ambiguity cleared up
by the addition of the qualification 'valid' or
'justified'. (Cf. Beauchamp & Childress,1983:50, and
Gillon,1985:54 who use the language of 'justified
claims'.)
Before passing on to another term which elucidates the
concept of rights, I must mention a further point where
Feinberg's analysis of rights in terms of claims is an
improvement on McCloskey's emphasis on entitlements.
Feinberg insists that claims are always 'to' something
and 'against' someone. But McCloskey's view of
entitlement seems to play down the role of claims against
others and to over-emphasise the role of claims to
something. The drawback here is that this view of
McCloskey's undermines to a great extent the important
doctrine of the correlativity of rights and duties, a
doctrine which insists on the fact that rights always
involve a claim of some kind against another, a claim
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which is experienced by the other in the form of a duty.
However, McCloskey's viewpoint does help to remind one of
the difficulty of connecting rights to particular duties
and duty-bearers (cf. McCloskey,1965:118; Feinberg,1970:
154-155). In other words, McCloskey's stress on
entitlements directs attention to some 'untidiness' in
the correlativity between rights and duties. This is one
of the major areas of controversy in the analysis of
rights-language, to which I shall return before long.
C. Rights as 'Powers'
A philosopher who elucidates rights in terms of 'powers'
is J.P. Plamenatz (1968). In his opinion,
A right is a power which a creature ought to possess
because its exercise by him is itself a good, or
else because it is a means to what is good, and in
the exercise of which all rational beings ought to
protect him (Plamenatz,1968:82).
But what kind of power is involved here? McCloskey,
who has already been seen as an opponent of claim-
language, is also highly critical of attempts to
elucidate rights in terms of 'powers'. For instance, he
declares that the right to vote is an entitlement to
vote, but does not necessarily imply the actual 'power'
to vote. Think of a laxly policed state, he argues,
where the 'power' to vote is merely notional and cannot
be practised.(McCloskey,1965:116).
One could answer this criticism by pointing out in
Plamenatz's quotation above that 'A right is a power
which a creature ought to have'. It is not necessarily a
power that one actually has. So Plamenatz could argue
that the right to vote must include protection of
citizens as they attempt to exercise their franchise.
Such protection is a condition of the citizen having a
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'power' to vote. Plamenatz shows in this quotation that
he is primarily interested in the 'exercise' of rights as
powers. But one must note here the distinction between
'exercising' a right and 'having' a right. In the matter
of voting in an anarchic or insecure state, citizens have
the right to vote, but find it difficult to exercise the
right. Put in the language of 'powers' there is one
sense in which the citizens have no power to vote, that
is, no physical power to arrive safely at the polling
booth; but there is still a sense in which these people
have a power to vote, namely, a moral and legal power,
which 'cries out' for recognition and protection. This
point is brought out well in the following words of
Michael Bertram Crowe (1978):
A man's right to life can be described as his moral
power to claim or demand that no one takes his life
away. Normally, of course, a man is able to support
this claim by physical force; he may repel an
attack, using physical force to fight off his
attacker. But we would easily recognise that the
ability to fight off an attack is not the basis for
his right to life. A champion boxer or a trained
commando may be well able to use physical means to
defend his life. But a handicapped or otherwise
defenceless person, an infant, an old person, one
who is paralysed for example, although unable
physically to defend himself, has every bit as much
a right to life as the strong man. What both the
weak and the strong have in common is the moral
power (that is, the right). And this moral power is
far more important than the difference in their
physical strength (Crowe,1978:4-5).
Exercising a right in the sense of achieving some
particular justified end depends on one having a moral or
legal power, that is a justification for acting in that
particular way. And here I find myself back with the
previous worked-out concepts of 'claim' and
'entitlement'. Indeed, Crowe mentioned in the quote above
that 'A man's right to life is his moral power to claim
or demand that no one takes his life away.' Thus, is
added a further elucidation of the concept of right:
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rights give a person a power to claim, where claiming is
based on an entitlement to do something or have something
done for one. 'Entitlement', 'valid claim', and 'moral or
legal power' appear then to be practically synonymous on
this analysis.
The concept of right as 'power' will come up again
shortly, when I treat of an important theory of rights -
the 'Choice' or 'Will' Theory.
D. Rights as 'Liberties'
There is much historical backing for seeing a connection
between rights and 'liberties'. Alan White (1985),
having mentioned in this regard the works of Hobbes and
Spinoza, goes on to state:
The plausibility of an equation of rights and
liberties is strengthened by the fact that most of
the famous Bills of Rights from Magna Carta to the
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights mention
and list, seemingly indifferently, both rights and
liberties. Furthermore, the history of most
struggles for human rights is largely an account of
a fight for freedom against oppressive laws and
governments (White,1985:134) .
In speaking of the relationship between rights and
'liberties' or 'freedoms' it is important to distinguish
between liberties as the objects of certain rights and
liberties as part of the elucidation of the concept of
rights. It makes sense to say that people have rights to
certain liberties or freedoms, for instance, freedom of
conscience, freedom to receive a decent education, and so
forth. But in this section I am more interested in the
sense in which the notion of right is elucidated by the
notion of 'liberty/freedom' . By this I mean that a right
can be understood as a freedom in the sense of an
opportunity to achieve some particular value, as seen in
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relation to the freedom of others.
Thus, I would see the concept of 'liberty' or
'freedom' in a special light pretty much related to the
notions of ' power','entitlement', or 'claim'. Returning
to McCloskey's example of the 'right to vote', this right
seen as a 'liberty' has similar meaning to the notion of
a 'power' to vote, an 'entitlement' to vote, a 'claim' to
vote. Again, such a right is not to be taken as a de
facto physical freedom to get to the polling station and
cast one's vote, though this freedom is also sought, but
as a moral or legal freedom which has a special power of
its own, if only to challenge the consciences of others.
Where a person's freedom or liberty in a particular area
is justified, that person is free to claim, has a power
to claim, and is entitled to claim, some value or good.
This section of general clarification and elucidation
has been an effort to show important links between the
various terms used in the everyday language of rights.
Although some philosophers have their preferences for
some specific uses, and are critical of other uses, my
position has involved an attempt to harmonise the various
meteaethical treatments, such that in analysing the basic
terms in a certain way they are seen as mutually
complementary in drawing out the meaning of rights-
language .
1.3 Specific Analysis of Rights-Language
It is a major aim of this thesis to suggest that
Christian ethics can benefit greatly from paying
attention to the detailed analysis of rights-language
which is to be found in moral philosophy and
jurisprudence or philosophy of law. This is the main
reason why this first chapter has been so heavily
analytical. My next step is to take some of the terms
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already elucidated in a general manner, and to look at
them in a more technical context. Firstly, I shall note
the technical meanings given to the terms 'claim',
'liberty', 'power' and 'immunity' within the legal
sphere, especially in the work of the distinguished
American jurist, Wesley Hohfeld (1919). Then, secondly, I
shall attempt to translate these specialised terms into
the moral sphere, since it is the reality of moral rights
that concerns me most in this thesis.
A. The Hohfeldian Distinctions
In an article published in 1977, T.D.Perry suggests that
Hohfeld's work on the analysis of rights-language is 'A
Paradigm of Philosophy' (Perry,1977). 'A paradigm', he
says, 'gives exactness of analysis and solving or
illuminating power' (Perry,1977:41). What is paradigmatic
about Hohfeld's analysis of rights? The answer seems to
be given by Samuel Stoljar (1984) in his analysis of the
Hohfeldian distinctions:
Hohfeld was certainly not the first to recognise
'right' as a very ambiguous word, but his was the
first attempt to sort out the meanings
systematically. Arranging rights according to their
various correlatives and opposites, he divided them
into two squares: one based on claims and liberties,
the other comprising powers and immunities
(Stoljar,1984:51).
It is generally agreed that, for Hohfeld, the square
consisting of claims and liberties was of primary
importance (Hohfeld,1919:36ff. ) . 'Claims' are in fact
'rights' in the strict sense, and must be distinguished
carefully from 'liberties' as well as from the other
legal concepts, 'powers' and 'immunities'. A person has a
claim to something against another in so far as the other
person has a duty to the right-holder regarding that
object. John Finnis expresses this point technically
25
when he states that, 'to assert a Hohfeldian right is to
assert a three-term relation between one person, one act-
description, and one other person.' (Finnis,1980:199).
Another way of stating Hohfeld's formulation of 'right-
claims' is to say that he holds the strictest doctrine of
the correlativity of rights and duties here.
If claim-rights are rights in the strict sense, what
then of the other half of the square - liberty-rights, or
what Hohfeld called 'privileges'? I shall let Stoljar
explain the difference: 'Now rights and liberties are
distinguished because they are rights with different
correlatives and opposites.' (Stoljar,1984:51). Claims
are correlative with duties in a strict sense, but this
is not the case with liberties, as Stoljar explains:
In the case of a liberty, the respective incidents
are different. Instead of asserting a right in X
together with a duty in Y, we rather assert, Hohfeld
thinks, that X has a right to do p in the sense of
having a liberty to do what he is doing without X
having any corresponding claims against Y since Y is
under no correlative duty toward X (op.cit.,51-52) .
Let me give some examples of each kind of right to
illustrate the differences between them. A typical
claim-right would be any of the so-called 'special moral
rights' (cf. Hart,1955:84), those rights which arise from
entering into an agreement with another person either by
promise or contract. If I borrow some money from a
friend and agree to repay it within a certain period,
then I give my friend a right to expect the return of
the loan. He can claim against me, and, correlatively, I
have a duty to repay as I promised I would. In other
words, I have no liberty to refrain from repaying the
loan so long as my friend holds me to my duty. My
freedom is strictly limited by my friend's claim-right.
Similarly in the category of rights which are called
'human rights' (Hart calls these 'general rights' to
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distinguish them from 'special rights', 1955:87), the
values involved are so important that the link between
right and duty is usually regarded as quite strict. In
fact, human rights are often said to be 'inalienable',
that is, they cannot be waived by the right-holder, and
the correlative duty-bearer cannot be released from his
duty or obligation.
Turning now to liberty-rights, one sees at once that
the connection between the right-holder and others
regarding the value sought by the former is much looser
than in the case of strict rights or claims. For
instance, my right to look at my neighbour over the
garden wall is a common liberty-right. I have no duty in
ordinary circumstances to refrain from looking at my
neighbour. However, my neighbour has no correlative duty
to make himself available to be looked at by me; he can
stay indoors if he so wishes. Furthermore, my neighbour
can obstruct my liberty to look at him, again within
reason, by, for instance, erecting a screen beside his
--wall. Other common examples of liberties involve
situations such as two persons seeing a sum of money on
the ground, such that each has the liberty-right to pick
it up. Each person has 'no duty not to' pick up the
money, and neither person is obliged to give way to the
other in attempting to possess the object (cf.
Hart,1955:81).
This last case is important, since it provides an
example where liberty-rights are most useful in everyday
life. The area involved is that of 'economic
competition'. As Hart puts it, 'The moral propriety of
all economic competition implies this minimum sense of 'a
right' in which to say that 'X has a right to' means
merely that X is under no 'duty' not to.' (ibid.).
Consider, for instance, economic competition between
shop-keepers. If I open up a shop in a certain line of
business near another shop involved in the same kind of
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trade, I may (if I am efficient enough) damage my fellow
shop-keeper's business. However, I am at liberty to do
so, given the rules of fair competition. Presumably, of
course, one has no intention to damage another from
personal, malicious motives; one simply goes about one's
own work, and other businesses in the vicinity suffer as
a result of one's legitimate efforts. Competitors cannot
complain that fellow-competitors are failing in their
duties in the very activity of being in competition, once
this is kept within certain limits, because there is no
duty to avoid entering into competition in the normal
course of events. So, paradoxically, there is a right
which people have in certain circumstances which actually
permits them to harm others in going about their
legitimate business.
It was in fact an example from this sphere of economic
competition which Hohfeld concentrated upon in
criticising legal confusion between claims and liberties.
In the case of Quinn v Leathern (1901) A.C.,495,534
(Hohfeld,1919:42-43), the plaintiff, Leathern was" a
butcher who was pressurised by a trade union (represented
by Quinn) to sack all his non-union members and to employ
in their place unionised workers. The union tried to
achieve this end by pressurising a customer of Leathern's
not to deal with him, as a result of which Leathern
suffered financial damage, for which he demanded and
received compensation.
Lord Lindley gave as reason for judging in favour of
Leathern the general right everyone has to pursue whatever
lawful business or employment he or she chooses.
According to Lindley, this right implied a correlative
duty on the part of others not to interfere in another's
legal business without lawful justification. Hohfeld,
however, argued that the 'right' in question was not a
claim-right but a liberty-right. Thus the defendants had
no right against Leathern that he refrain from going about
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his lawful business, but this did not include a positive
duty committing them to non-interference.
Stoljar explains the fallacy Hohfeld considered had
been made in this judgement as follows:
Hohfeld's view was that the court here confused the
plaintiff's liberty with his right to carry on
business; the court committed a non sequitur in
concluding that because the plaintiff undoubtedly
had a liberty to pursue his business, he therefore
had a right to pursue it; the fallacy was to
transform a liberty, the correlative of which was
only a no-right, into a right with a corresponding
duty not to interfere (1984:52-53).
There is some doubt whether Hohfeld was correct in
this interpretation of the court's decision, but I shall
allow his interpretation to stand for the present, simply
as an illustration of the distinction between a claim and
a liberty in practice.
As well as distinguishing between claim-rights and
liberty-rights, Hohfeld presented another square, this
time including the distinction between 'powers' and
'immunities' (op.cit.,50-64). Again, as in the square of
claims and liberties, this is a square of jural
opposites and correlatives. Claims are correlative with
duties, and are opposed to no-rights. Liberties are
correlative with no-rights, and are opposed to duties.
What then of powers and immunities?
J.W.Harris (1980) gives a short account of the
elements of this second square:
To say that A has a power entails that he can by his
voluntary act change the legal relations of some
other person, B, who has the correlative liability;
and that it is not true that A has a disability as
against B's legal relation, correlating with an
immunity of B (Harris,1980:77).
The main example which Harris gives of these relation-
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ships in practice is that of a man, A, sending a letter
to B. The context of this letter from A to B is a
previous letter from B to A making A a specific offer.
A's letter is an acceptance of the offer in the form of a
contract. In this way, A has a power to enter into the
contract and B has a correlative liability to have
certain contractual relations created. It also follows
that if A has a power to enter into a contract, he must
not suffer from any disability in doing so - this is one
of the jural opposites. And if B has a liability
correlative to A's power, B cannot have an immunity
against A. Unless one voluntarily enters into a contract
or makes a promise, one has an immunity-right against
others not to take on the contractual relations. This
right protects one in particular from the paternalistic
interventions of others.
B. An Ethical Translation of the Hohfeldian Distinctions
The question now to be faced is how the legal
distinctions just discussed can be translated into the
moral sphere? After all, this thesis is mainly concerned
with moral rights, though much of the analysis so far
covers material which is a basic common denominator
underlying all rights-talk. Can the Hohfeldian
distinctions be applied morally? One philosopher who
answers affirmatively is Carl Wellman. Here is a brief
summary of his approach to this question:
Just as a legal right is a complex system of legal
advantages, so an ethical right is a complex system
of ethical advantages, a cluster of ethical
liberties, claims, powers and immunities. At the
centre of every ethical right stands some unifying
core, one or more ethical advantages that define the
essential content of the right. Thus, at the centre
of my ethical right to dress as I please is my
ethical liberty of wearing in public any decent
clothing I wish, and the core of my ethical right to
protection of the laws is my ethical claim against
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the state that its legal system afford me just as
much protection as it affords any other individual
subject to it. Around the core of any ethical right
cluster an assortment of associated ethical
liberties, claims, powers and immunities. What ties
these ethical elements together into a single right
is the way in which each associated element
contributes some sort of freedom or control to the
possessor of the right. Because freedom and control
are two aspects of autonomy, any ethical right can
accurately be thought of as a system of ethical
autonomy (Wellman,1978:55).
The terms 'core' and 'cluster' bring out the central
features of Wellman's theory. A situation which involves
rights cannot usually be reduced to one legal or ethical
relationship, but typically I may isolate some core
concept or relation which is primary and around which the
other legal or ethical relationships cluster in support.
The core concept of a right tells me the kind of
protection I can expect for my interests in that area.
Thus if someone owes me a sum of money, the core right is
a claim against that person. Then if that person refuses
to repay me, I may exercise my ethical power to seek
compensation, either through the legal system or thrdugh
moral suasion. Furthermore, I can argue that no other
party has the ethical power to stop me from from
claiming or using my ethical power to seek redress -
this is what is called an ethical immunity. Then again, I
may have the ethical liberty to waive the payment of the
sum of money.
Each of the Hohfeldian distinctions, with its
correlative and opposite, can be translated into the
ethical sphere. Ethical claims are correlative with
ethical duties, and their opposites are no-rights.
Ethical liberties are correlative with no-rights, and
their opposites are duties. Ethical powers are
correlative with liabilities, and opposed to
disabilities. Immunities are correlative with disabil¬
ities, and are opposed to liabilities. In these cases it
becomes clear that the essence of a right is some kind of
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relationship of advantage before another. No wonder
Wellman can say that:
No one who has studied Hohfeld can imagine for a
moment that the content of the right to life is
simply life. He forces us to ask whether the right
to life is essentially the liberty to defend one's
life when under attack or the claim against being
killed by another or the power to sue in the courts
for legal protection of one's life or all of these
or none of them (ibid.51).
Yet often when one reads literature on the subject of
rights the impression is given that the content of rights
is simply the good or value in need of protection, when
the emphasis should be placed on the kind and degree of
protection that is sought, and the appropriateness of
such protection for that particular value. This point
will be made again and again in this thesis; in fact, it
has already been made a number of times, as in Feinberg's
insistence that rights are both claims to something and
claims against somebody; and recall Finnis's remark that
rights 'assert a three-term relation between one person,
one act-description, and one other person (Finnis, 1980:
199).
1.4 Some Controversies in the Analysis of Rights
Already in section 1.2, the general analysis of rights-
language, some disagreement was noted concerning the
appropriateness of certain common terms used to elucidate
rights. In section 1.3, the more technical analysis of
rights-language in terms of the Hohfeldian distinctions,
I held back from including the disagreements on the
appropriateness of these legal and ethical concepts.
This was done in order to avoid making the section too
long and to avoid confusion over technical terms. At
this stage, however, it may be worthwhile to mention a
few difficulties regarding the analysis of rights and
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rights-language given so far.
A The Correlativity of Rights and Duties
The centrality of this doctrine in discussions of rights-
language has been hinted at already. Feinberg's 'claims
against' seem to suggest some binding force concerning
others in relation to one's interests. Hohfeld's 'claim-
rights' are said to be rights 'in the strict sense', and
are defined in terms of another's obligation or duty.
Downie and Telfer state that 'rights and obligations are
opposite sides of the same coin: if there is a duty to
treat people in a certain way they thereby have a right
to be so treated.' (Downie & Telfer,1980:41). There are
many other examples of both philosophers and theologians
taking this correlativity for granted, for instance,
Raphael,1965:206; Benn & Peters,1959:Ch.4; Grisez,1983:
264-265; Knudsen,n.d..:179. However, this doctrine has
also been heavily criticised in recent years.
Before actually discussing some of the problems of
correlativity I must warn the reader of further
complications which arise from the point of view of
duties and obligations. In first place, some
philosophers distinguish between 'duties' and
'obligations'. For instance, C.H.Whitely (1953) argues
that the moral philosophical sense of both duty and
obligation is related to the right thing to do in the
sense of the best thing to do, or what a virtuous man
would do. But, he argues, there is another sense in
which duties and obligations are related to particular
roles; think of the duties of one's station or one's
state in life, what society expects of one. The two
meanings are not synonymous, since there is no
contradiction in saying that a person ought not to do his
duty in one sense of that word. This is the case because
sometimes what is expected of people in certain roles is
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judged to be morally wrong (Whitely,1953:95-104; and cf.
White,1984:Chs.3&4, especially 51-53).
To make matters more complicated, Alan White (1984)
insists that one make further distinctions between
'having an obligation', 'being obliged', and 'ought'
(White,1984:Ch.4). Feinberg, in one of his studies of
the correlativity of rights and duties, reminds the
reader of the complexity of the concept of duty as well
as that of right, since he gives nine different types of
duty, and attempts to relate them to rights
(Feinberg,1966:137-144). Hart, too, recognises the need
to distinguish between 'duty' and 'obligation'. He
declares that ' 'duty', 'obligation', 'right', and 'good'
come from different segments of morality, concern
different types of conduct, and make different types of
moral criticism or evaluation.'(Hart,1955:80,note 7). For
my purposes here I shall ignore the distinctions between
duties and obligations, and between the notions of
'ought', having an obligation', and 'being obliged', as
they are not central to the kinds of criticism I shall'be
mentioning with regard to correlativity of rights and
duties.
The strictest correlativity between rights and duties
would hold that for every right there is a duty and for
every duty a right. I think that such a doctrine would
be difficult to defend. In my opinion, the stronger
correlativity lies between rights and duties rather than
between duties and rights. In other words, all rights
involve some duty on the part of another or others, but
not all duties entail rights on the part of others.
What duties do not entail correlative rights? One
example might be duties of beneficence or of charity.
These are sometimes called duties of 'imperfect
obligation'. John Stuart Mill (1861) explains this
reality:
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Now it is known that ethical writers divide moral
duties into classes, denoted by the ill-chosen
expressions, duties of perfect and of imperfect
obligation; the latter being those in which, though
the act is obligatory, the particular occasions of
performing it are left to our choice; as in the case
of charity or beneficence, which we are indeed bound
to practise, but not towards any definite person,
nor at any prescribed time. In the more precise
language of philosophical purists, duties of perfect
obligation are those duties in virtue of which a
correlative right resides in some person or persons;
duties of imperfect obligation are those moral
obligations which do not give birth to any right
(Mill,1861:304-305).
It seems to me that Mill's distinction applies well
enough to the relationship between citizens of developed
lands and their poorer brothers and sisters in the so-
called 'developing countries'. Those who are reasonably
well-off in the Western world seem to have some duty to
share at least part of their surplus earnings with the
poor of the Third World, but given the number of people
and the number of regions in need at any one time, it is
practically impossible to situate a strict relationship
of duty and right between a householder in Britain, say,
and a refugee in the Sudan or Ethiopia. The only
exception I can think of to this rule would be in cases
where a wealthy country developed its wealth partly from
a poor country during a colonial era, and now owes some
restitution (cf.O'Neill,1986:110-113).
There are other examples, too, of duties which do not
appear to be correlated with rights, though some of these
cases are controversial. One might argue for instance
that humans have duties to animals, while denying that
animals have rights. Some philosophers have stood in
favour of the 'rights' of animals (Regan,1985:13-26;
Feinberg,1974:159-184), while others have denied the
attribution of rights to animals (Grice,1967:147-148;
McCloskey,1965:123-124; Finnis,1980:194-195). One way
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of getting around the duty/right correlation here might
be to use McCloskey's distinction between 'duties to' and
'duties concerning' (McCloskey,1965:122,note). I can have
a duty to someone, but not to an animal. Here, the 'duty
to' concept involves a personal relationship which is
characteristic of the duty/right correlation. However,
I can have a duty concerning an animal (and McCloskey
includes things,eg. paintings and art) which would not
entail a correlative right, because of the impossibility
(by definition) of having an interpersonal relationship
with an animal.
Other examples of duties without correlative rights
are given by White, some of which are decidedly odd and
unconvincing. Thus, he says that the judge has a duty to
punish an offender, but this does not entail a
correlative right. True enough, it would be odd to say
that an offender has a right to be punished, but it is
quite sensible to say that a judge has a duty to punish
someone which is correlative to the rights of citizens to
be protected from criminal elements (White,1985:60-61).
He also says that a prisoner of war's duty to escape does
not imply his captor's right to help him to escape, but
this is to miss out on the fact that the escapee's right
is most likely against fellow prisoners who might be
opposed to the escape plan and in favour of submitting to
the enemy regime (ibid.,61).
Perhaps there is more sense in his examples of a duty
to bury the dead - with no correlative right on the part
of the dead? And he thinks that a person's duty to
himself does not have a correlative right (White,1985:62;
cf. McCloskey,1965:122, who criticises the notion of a
duty to oneself). If one has a duty to oneself, does
this mean that one can waive one's right against oneself?
This seems very odd indeed. Nevertheless, such examples
do suggest that there will be difficulties often in
correlating duties with rights, at least in a one-to-one
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correspondence.
One final example confirms this: in the case of
Johnson v Phillips [1975] 3 All ER 682, it was judged
that 'the duty of the police to promote free flow of
traffic was a reason for holding that a constable could
(in an emergency) order a man to drive the wrong way down
a one-way street.' (Harris,1980:82-83). Here a general
duty is hardly correlative with a general right to drive
down one-way streets the wrong way, and in the particular
case of a police officer ordering someone to do this, the
'right' of the driver is a most unusual privilege or
permission.
From the point of view of rights correlative with
duties, there have been some voices of dissent from the
strict view that all rights entail duties. One such
voice has been that of David Lyons, who points out that
correlativity works well enough in cases of Hohfeldian
claim-rights, but not so well in cases of Hohfeldian
liberty-rights (Lyons,1970).
For Lyons, claim-rights are exemplified in contracts
and promises which give rise to special moral rights.
These rights are the paradigm of correlativity, according
to Lyons, because of the relation between the content of
the right and the content of the duty:
Rights and duties not only connect ordered pairs (or
sets) of persons; they also have contents. By
"contents" I mean, what it is that A has a right to
and what it is that B has a duty or obligation to
do. These also must have a definite relation if we
are to be able to infer the right or the obligation
from the other directly, and a fortiori if rights
and duties are to be regarded, even in this limited
class of cases, as conceptual correlatives
(Lyons,1970:47) .
An example of the connection between the contents of a
right and a duty is where one person owes a sum of money
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to another. In a case like this Lyons would say that 'the
content of the right is related to the expression of the
content of the obligation as the passive is related to
the active voice.' (ibid.,48). In respecting the right
of A, B gives the money to A (active voice), and A
receives the money from B (passive voice), who thus
discharges his duty to A.
Once the paradigm of correlativity is understood,
Lyons considers cases that fall away from this paradigm.
Most obviously this occurs, he thinks, in the case of
liberty-rights. He takes what he considers to be a
typical liberty - the 'right' to freedom of speech. A
liberty-right is defined in terms of a person having no
duty not to do something, and the correlative entails
that others have no right that the right-holder refrain
from so acting if she wishes. But Lyons' s point is that
the freedom to speak is not supported by a real right
against others, since others have no duty to listen to a
stranger speak (but note the position of Paul Ramsey
(1950:360-361) where he holds that 'Individuals haVe a
right to speak freely because society has a right to hear
freely from all its members', and he follows this by
claiming that 'Any right is also a duty.' Thus, Ramsey is
claiming that there is a strict correlativity between the
right of free speech and the duty to listen.).
In fact, the general possession of this liberty seems
to allow for others to heckle and interrupt one's speech
if they so wish. Surely there is some protection of this
liberty in terms of correlative duties? Surely, a person
speaking in public in ordinary circumstances cannot be
gagged forcibly? Indeed, a person has a right not to be
gagged or assaulted; in fact, this a strict claim-right
rather than a liberty. The point about this, however, is
that such a claim-right has little to do directly with
the liberty-right to speak freely. Lyons argues that the
right not to be gagged or assaulted is part of a general
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right not to be attacked, and this could conceivably
remain as a right if the right to freedom of speech were
withdrawn. So there seems to be no strict duty
correlative to the right of freedom of speech as such,
and the content of that liberty-right is not mirrored by
the content of a particular duty towards the right-
holder,as is supposed to occur for strict correlativity
to exist.
In reply to Lyons, David Braybrooke makes a number of
points. In fact, the title of his article, 'The Firm but
Untidy Correlation of Rights and Obligations' reveals
something of his basic position on this question. He says
of Lyons's position:
There are clear signs in Lyons's work of a tendency
to take for real the tidy consequences that would be
features of social life if men's actions and
institutions fulfilled certain ideals of logical
economy (Braybrooke,1972:352).
Braybrooke insists that Lyons has missed out on.._the
'open texture' (a terminology borrowed from F. Waismann
(1949),cf. Hart,1983:274-275) of the concept of the
correlativity of a right and an obligation. For instance,
in relation to the right to freedom of speech, there are
corresponding obligations that can be worked out in a
normative ethical system. And these obligations are not
simply to refrain from assault; they also could include
the duty to avoid extravagant heckling, or jamming
loudspeakers. He asks if flying a sky-writing airplane
might not be considered as a violation of this liberty-
right, or, in the case of an indoor meeting, turning up
the thermostat (Braybrooke,1972:358-360 ; for an opposing
opinion on these points, cf.Frey,1983:78)? Braybrooke
argues that this open texture with regard to the content
of obligations correlative with rights may be an
advantage by allowing further precedents to be entered
into the legal system. Clearly, rights like that of free-
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dom of speech are more complicated in their operation
than the right to be repaid a loan. In the latter case
either the sum of money is repaid or withheld, whereas in
the former case the freedom to speak may be respected or
not respected in various degrees, simply because each
person has an equal right, a fact which leads to the
problem of arbitrating between conflicting freedoms or
liberties.
It is worth noting here Braybrooke's argument for the
firm correlation between rights and duties, a correlation
which remains firm in spite of the untidiness of the
connection. Any right must involve some protection for
the right-holder, and duties provide such a protection.
Consider, he says, a person testifying that N has the
right to do X, e.g. to speak in public freely. The
witness is asked to consider all sorts of actions
interfering with N's right: threats, assaults,
extravagant heckling, and so forth. In every case she
denies that people acting in that way fail in their duty
to N. In effect, the witness refuses to agree that ffhey
ought to refrain from interfering with N. But in saying
all this she makes the original claim concerning N's
right empty (ibid.,361). Hence every right must have some
correlation with some duty, even though the exact
correlation may be difficult to establish.
Earlier, I mentioned duties of beneficence or of
charity and the difficulty of linking these to individual
rights. Looked at from the angle of rights this also
presents a problem of correlation. Feinberg, for
instance, argues that statesmen often use the term
'claim' in a special sense, a 'manifesto sense' of
'right'. As he puts it,
The manifesto writers on the other side who seem to
identify needs, or at least basic needs, with what
they call "human rights," are more properly
described, I think, as urging upon the world com-
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munity the moral principle that all basic human
needs ought to be recognised as claims (in the
customary prima facie sense) worthy of sympathy and
serious consideration right now, even though, in
many cases, they cannot yet plausibly be treated as
valid claims, that is, as grounds of any other
people's duties (1970:153).
I am not sure that I agree with Feinberg when he says
that these 'manifesto rights' are not valid claims. It
seems to me that they are valid, but that these rights
cannot be exercised at present. Morally speaking basic
human needs ought to be fulfilled, and insofar as they
are not at present fulfilled it is arguable that human
injustice is a contributory factor. It seems quite
appropriate to me that manifesto rights to food in the
face of starvation entail some duties on the part of the
so-called 'Superpowers' who spend so much human resources
on weapons of destruction. And if this remark sounds too
general, I think it may be made more specific and applied
to individual citizens of the developed countries - to
put pressure on politicians to consider the poor of the
world, and not just narrow national issues. If democracy
means anything, surely it requires this kind of
responsibility. However, all this said, it will have to
be recognised that many of the poorer inhabitants of the
world will not be able to exercise their manifesto rights
for some time, due in part to the unwillingness of people
in the developed lands to recognise correlative duties.
It takes some degree of wisdom to see how individual
duties here in the West are correlated with rights in the
Third World.
B. The Value of Liberties
The sense of 'liberty' I want to discuss here is again
the technical Hohfeldian one, whereby a party has no duty
not to do something. The correlative is usually seen as
a 'no-right', in the sense that others have no claim
against me if I act in accordance with my liberty. The
shopkeeper next door has no right against me if I start a
business in competition with his; each of us has an equal
liberty-right in the eyes of the law, and it is simply a
question of co-existing or 'Let the best man win'.
There have been some criticisms levelled at this
statement of 'liberty-rights'. Firstly, Hohfeld is often
criticised for entitling liberty-rights 'privileges'.
Glanville Williams (1956) explains that in the usual
sense of the term a privilege is a permission given to a
single person or a few people, it cannot be given to all;
but a liberty may be possessed by all, e.g. freedom of
speech (Williams,1956:1131-1132) . Secondly, the
correlatives and opposites mentioned by Hohfeld regarding
liberties/privileges have been corrected. Where Hohfeld
stated that a liberty was correlative with a no-right and
opposed to duty, Williams corrects this, saying that the
correlative of liberty is in fact a 'no-right-not', while
the opposite of liberty is not necessarily a duty, since
a party may have a liberty to do his duty (ibid.,1135ff).
An example of the correlation between liberty and no-
right-not is a father's right to chastise his child. This
is a liberty-right in that the father has no duty not to
chastise his child. But the correlative to this in the
case of the child is that the child has no right not to
be chastised. Regarding the relation between liberty and
duty, it is not always the case that these are opposed.
Williams tells his readers that there is a different use
of the term 'liberty' between law and philosophy. In
legal circles a liberty may not involve any choice: 'the
lawyer can accept as a liberty what is simply an absence
of duty to act otherwise.' (Williams,ibid.,1139). And he
insists that it follows that there is a liberty to
perform a legal duty.
I believe that in moral philosophy and in moral
theology there may be a similar liberty to do just one
thing, the right thing, and that this involves the basic
choice between good and evil. In fact, by definition a
liberty involves having no duty not to do something and
this is perfectly compatible logically with having a duty
to do the same thing. My duty to respect the life of
others is compatible with my having no duty not to do
this. Thus, there seems to be two different senses of
liberty: one is the usual sense of liberty of
indifference in which it does not matter whether I do X
or not; the other being the sense in which I must do X
if I am to respect my moral and/or legal freedom. If
this sounds rather abstract, let me mention another
example from Williams to make the distinctions concrete.
When a prisoner has completed his sentence, the warden
may say to him 'You are at liberty to go'. On one hand
this means that the prisoner has no duty not to leave; he
will not be committing a criminal offence by leaving.
But in addition to this he has no right to stay on at the
state's expense. He is not free to stay. In such a case
liberty is not opposed to duty but implies both absence
of duty (to stay) and positive duty (to leave)
(ibid.,1140ff.).
Hohfeld framed his distinctions, not as an academic
exercise, but in order that judges and lawyers might use
the distinctions in practice, thus bringing a certain
uniformity and clarity into legal language in the courts.
In this context he criticised the decision in Quinn v
Leathern for its supposed confusion of claims as strict
rights with liberties. However, this criticism has
itself been criticised as ill-founded. Stoljar has said
that Hohfeld was attacking what he thought was a fallacy,
namely, 'to transform a liberty, the correlative of which
was only a no-right, into a right with a corresponding
duty not to interfere.' (Stoljar,1984:52-53). Now Stoljar
goes on to give his verdict on Hohfeld's position:
But, looking again, there was in fact no fallacy.
The court was not at all concerned with liberties,
whose correlatives are no-rights, but with liberties
alias rights whose correlatives are duties. What
purpose would have been served to identify a no-right
rather than a duty? The question was whether the
union officials had or had not broken a duty by doing
something injurious...(ibid.,53).
In this passage it seems to me that Stoljar has either
moved from the technical sense of liberty to the more
general sense I used earlier, or else he is denying there
is any real distinction between liberties and claims in
the Hohfeldian, technical sense. In my opinion, the court
in this case recognised Leathern's right as more than a
liberty-right. The judgement seems to recognise his
claim-right to pursue his business against the union.
And this makes sense because the union was judged to have
transgressed the limits of its own duty to improve the
conditions of its members. Claim-rights and Liberty-
rights to carry on one's lawful business only work when
one operates within certain limits. Within these limits
one can even harm another to an extent indirectly, as a
result of fair competition. But if one oversteps these
limits of just competition, one violates not merely the
liberties of others but their claim-rights. Remember in
this case that Leathern eventually agreed with the union
that his workers could become unionised, but the union
demanded that his workers be sacked as an example to
others , while already unonised workers took over their
jobs. This point, together with the pressure put on
Leathern's customers to support the union, convinced the
judges that the union had far transgressed the limits of
its right. As a result, the court felt itself justified
in using the strict language of claims, though this
technical sense of the word was not actually used (cf.
Hudson & Husak,1980:45-53).
This discussion of claims and liberties brings me to a
more basic problem - the value of liberties in the first
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place. If rights are supposed to protect one's freedom to
act or not to act, what protection do liberties really
give? The legal case just discussed brings into question
the value of liberties as protection. If my liberty
means that others have no real duty of non-interference
in my regard, and even have permission to harm me
indirectly in following out their own projects, what
advantage is there in calling a liberty a right.
Some efforts have been made to attach protection to
liberties. H.L.A. Hart, for instance, has suggested that
liberties have a 'protective perimeter' which gives some
'security against the cruder forms of interference,' e.g.
assault or trespass (Hart,1973:179-180). He mentions
Bentham's distinction between 'naked rights' and
'vested/established rights': the former are liberties
without the perimeter of protective obligations; the
latter are liberties with this perimeter (ibid.,181). A
somewhat similar distinction is found in Williams's
article cited already. There he distinguishes between a
'protected liberty' and a 'bare liberty': the former is
exemplified in situations where a statute expressly
enacts that it will be lawful to do something; the latter
refers to situations where the statute book simply
refrains from from forbidding the conduct in question
(op, cit.,1150). In the legal world, then, the language
of liberty is used in a strong and a weak sense from the
point of view of limiting the freedom of others.
The danger here, it seems to me, is that the strong
sense of liberty may easily become a claim-right with
correlative duties, while, on the other hand, the weak
sense loses the meaning of a right altogether because of
the absence of any real protection for the liberty-
holder. Still, there is some sense in maintaining the
language of liberty-rights, for application to certain
situations of competition and conflict, where each party
is justified in pursuing his or her own projects to the
45
detriment of others. It is very much a laissez-faire
type of legal and moral reality, since my liberty offers
me a minimum of protection vis-a-vis others. However,
this minimum is still important; it amounts to a basic
claim against others to permit me to carry on my project
within set limits. It does not, however, amount to a
claim that others help me in my projects or that they
refrain from harming me indirectly in their own pursuit
of similar goods.
C. Some Problems with Powers and Immunities
I shall not spend much time on these Hohfeldian
distinctions, mainly because they are widely regarded as
secondary to the the square involving claims and
liberties. (I shall show the importance of powers and
immunities in more detail in the second part of this work
in relation to marriage and parenthood.) Hohfeld clearly
saw powers and immunities as very different from strict
rights and liberties. The main difference can be seen in
the case of powers, where unlike rights, which have to do
with basic relations, they have to do with changes in
legal relations brought about by a party with some sort
of superior control in the situation (cf.
Stoljar,1984:59 ; Hohfeld,1919:50-60) . Many of Hohfeld's
examples centre on disposal of property by the owner:
either abandoning it, or selling it, or giving it away.
But Hohfeld does not want to speak of these legal
relations as rights. Stoljar criticises this position.
He cannot see why the power to abandon one's property
should not be called a right. He argues that 'a right of
disposition, a general jus disponendi , is implied in the
right of property, the proprietor having a right rn rem
against interference whatever he does with his own res,
in his own interest.' (Stoljar,1984:59). Thus, it seems
to me that the concept of 'power' can be understood as a
right, a capacity to change a relationship legally or
morally. For instance, the moral and legal capacity a
person has to enter into marriage, and afterwards to
found a family, can be entitled a 'power'. It is
typically a capacity to enter into further moral and
legal relationships, involving claims, liberties, and
immunities.
Some criticism has been levelled at Hohfeldian
analysis of powers based on the insistence that
liabilities are incurred only through the exercise of
powers understood as voluntary acts of another. Harris
finds fault with this; he gives the example of a tree on
one's property struck by lightning, and which 'brings
about a new duty to take care'. He then asks, 'Before the
lightning struck, was I not subject to a 'liability'
which did not correlate with a 'power'?'
(Harris,1980:81). In other words, the correlation between
powers and liabilities is not as tidy as Hohfeld made it
out to be. Moreover, the term 'liability' seems decidedly
odd when used in situations where a person receives an
inheritance. This person is 'liable' to have his legal
relations changed by some other's 'power' . This' is
another example of legal language diverging from common
usage.
Finally, a brief word to note that the concept of
'immunity' is not totally free from controversy or
disagreement concerning its proper analysis. An immunity
is supposed to be the opposite of a liability. It means
that a party has protection against having her legal
relations changed. The correlative legal relation is
supposed to be a 'disability', the opposite of a power.
But note here that the correlative disability is in fact
a 'duty not' to interfere in a person's legal relations.
If this is the case, then an immunity-right appears to be
a type of claim-right, rather than a distinct legal
relationship. Thus Stoljar admits that 'In this light
the word disability seems highly expendable; normatively
it can indeed be given up without qualms.' (op. cit.,62).
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As in the case of liberties discussed above, it would
appear that immunity-rights involve some kind of claim in
certain restricted circumstances. Later in this thesis,
there will be some application of this right-type in
relation to legal and moral paternalism.
1.5 Two Theories of Rights
Let me introduce these basic theories of the essence of
rights by means of one further criticism sometimes voiced
against Hohfeld. As Harris expresses it:
In particular, it can be urged that Hohfeld's
analytic squares fail to bring out the essence of
the concept of a legal right. He says that we
should distinguish four senses in which the word
'right' is sometimes used - right, privilege, power,
immunity - but does not pose the question whether
there is some underlying idea which explains all
these uses. He does not take sides in the time-
honoured debate between those who favour a 'will' or
an 'interest' conception of 'right'. These schools
are represented in modern British legal philosophy
by Professor Hart and Professor MacCormick
(Harris,1980:85 ) .
A The Choice Theory
Hart presents his 'Will' or 'Choice' theory in these
words:
The idea is that of one individual being given by
the law exclusive control, more or less extensive,
over another person's duty so that in the area of
conduct covered by that duty the individual who has
the right is a small-scale sovereign to whom the
duty is owed (1973:192).
Hart then goes on to say that the fullest measure of con¬
trol over the duty of another comprises three elements.
First, the right-holder may waive or extinguish the duty,
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or leave it in existence. Second, after a breach or
threatened breach of duty, the right-holder may leave it
unenforced, or she may enforce it by suing for
compensation. Third, the party may waive or extinguish
the obligation to pay the compensation to which the
breach gives rise (ibid.,192-193). The emphasis, then,
is on the control of another's duty, such that duties
with their correlative rights 'are a species of normative
property belonging to the right-holder' (ibid.,193).
A major advantage of this approach to rights is that
it allows for some flexibility in the normative
relationship between persons, segments of whose lives are
joined by rights and duties (cf. Melden,1977:ch.2). The
concept of waiving a right is of utmost importance,
especially in view of the reality of frequent conflicts
of rights.
Unfortunately, however, the disadvantages of the
'Choice' or 'Will' theory are quite serious, so much so
that Hart has moved away from this position in recent
years (cf.Hart,1983:17; Waldron,1985:292). Some of these
disadvantages have been listed by G. Marshall (1973). For
one thing, Hart's theory seems to apply more to the
sphere of civil law than to criminal law, since in the
latter one's freedom to waive rights is limited by the
legal system (Marshall,1973:234). Another example are the
rights one has in playing certain games, where rights
follow on from specific regulations. Thus, the football
player cannot waive his right not to be tripped
(ibid.,236). There are some things, then, which one does
not feel ought to be a matter of free choice. There are
important values which one must respect in one's own life
as well as in the lives of others. Sometimes such values
are said to be the objects of 'inalienable rights',
rights that one cannot waive or relinquish (for a dis¬
cussion of inalienable rights, cf. Frankena,1955 ;
Richards,1969).
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Finally, Hart's theory does not cater for the rights
of children and the severely mentally handicapped, since
these have no capacity to control the duties of others in
their regard. Interestingly, Carl Wellman takes the
Choice theory to its logical extreme in his discussion of
consent to medical research on children (Wellman,1979).
He denies that very young children have moral or human
rights, and states that parents' consent to research on
their offspring is really a matter of their waiving their
own right that others not interfere in the process of
caring for their children. As he puts it, 'Parental
consent is not a proxy consent for the child, but an act
of waiving the parent's own right that others not
interfere with the parental activity of caring for the
child.' (Wellman,1979:103). (Cf.Grice,1967:147-148, who
concludes that 'It is an inescapable consequence of the
thesis presented in these pages that certain classes
cannot have natural rights: animals, the human embryo,
future generations, lunatics, and children under the age
of,say, ten.')
B The Benefit Theory
The 'Benefit' or 'Interest' theory of rights has been
associated with the names of a number of philosophers and
legal thinkers, especially N. MacCormick (1976), J.
Raz,(1984), D.Lyons (1969), and in the past with Bentham
(cf. Hart,1973). This is how MacCormick expresses the
theory:
To ascribe to all members of a class C a right to
treatment T is to presuppose that T is, in all
normal circumstances, a good for every member of C,
and that T is a good of such importance that it
would be wrong to deny it or withhold it from any
member of C (MacCormick,1976:311).
MacCormick uses the example of children's rights to
apply his theory in practice. He holds that 'at least
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from birth, every child has a right to be nurtured, cared
for, and, if possible, loved, until such time as he or
she is capable of caring for himself or herself.'
(MacCormick,1976:305). But what of the 'Choice Theory'
which says that talk of children's rights makes no sense
because of their inability to release others from duties?
Could there be a case for children's rights based on the
idea of proxy waivers? He points out that the British
legal system has the power to take children from parents
who do not fulfil their duties of care for them.
But this is not an example of the state waiving the
children's right to care, or releasing the parents from
their duty, since the parents may in fact be punished for
not carrying out their duty, and, anyway, in all cases it
is the interests of the children that are in question,
not the question whether the children can release their
parents from their duties. A strong case can be made out
for the state claiming rights for children in place of
their parents, but the case for the state and others to
waive the rights of children is more difficult "" to
establish.
Indeed, it may be the case that children, like adults,
have some inalienable or absolute rights which no one can
waive for them (cf. the debate on the right to ex¬
periment on children in recent years, R.McCormick,1976;
Ramsey,1976; Nicholson,1986). N. MacCormick concludes
that 'powers of waiver or enforcement are essentially
ancillary to, not constitutive of, rights..'
(MacCormick,1976:314) .
This theory appears to avoid many of the faults
associated with Hart's theory. It seems less arbitrary
in so far as it stresses the particular goods due to
persons rather than an abstract freedom to accept or
reject certain values. The Benefit theory can accept the
existence of inalienable eights. It is more plausible
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intuitively in its acceptance of the ordinary use of
rights-language with regard to children and the mentally
incapacitated.
On the other hand, the Benefit/Interest theory does
have at least one disadvantage. This is in relation to
the problem of moderating rights-claims on the part of
all who stand to benefit from the fulfilment of a duty.
The question is whether one person's duty to another also
gives third parties some right, since they benefit,
perhaps indirectly, from the performance of the duty. And
then what of fourth and fifth parties who may benefit?
(cf. Waldron, 1984:9-10). All that one can do here is to
take this problem into account in the normative sphere
when one seeks to nominate the person or persons who are
to be the beneficiaries of a particular duty. In the
case of special moral rights possessed by means of
contract, the beneficiaries, and thus the possessors of
the right, should be named clearly so as to avoid undue
expectations arising. In more informal arrangements be¬
tween persons such distinctions may be more difficult to
draw.
I do not wish to give the impression here that the
Choice/Will theory is totally discredited. True enough
it does not cover all types of rights, but merely the
category called 'discretionary' or 'option' (cf.
Feinberg,1980:232-238; Golding:1968:546 ), where there is
a freedom to participate in a certain good or to refrain
from such participation. However, it is sufficient that
some rights are waivable and relinquishable to stress the
importance of this theory which highlights the control
that right-holders maintain over the duties of others.
In fact, even in cases where rights are inalienable or
absolute, the claim one has over the duty of another is
essential to one's freedom. To waive one's right in that




Whatever about the possibility of a Christian normative
ethics, there is no such thing as a Christian metaethics.
The analysis of the language of morals is prior to the
study of the relationship between faith and ethics (cf.
Gerard Hughes who claims that problems of method in the
study of morality 'are ultimately philosophical problems'
and that this holds true for moral theology (1978:xv);
there is also the point made by a number of philosophers,
that obedience to God's will requires firstly an
assumption that God is 'good', and one needs to
understand 'goodness' before one recognises this quality
in God, cf. Ewing,1961; Nielson,1973:ch.1) . For instance,
before anyone can discuss the possibility of God having
'rights', or His giving 'rights' to humanity, there is a
need to discuss the meaning of 'rights' as such. This has
been the purpose of this chapter.
At the general level of analysis I examined a number
of mutually complementary and ultimately synonymous tbrms
which bring out the basic meaning of 'right'. In
particular I stressed the appropriateness of using terms
like 'valid claim' and 'entitlement' to elucidate the
meaning of rights-language. Rights give a justification
to make demands on others with regard to certain goods
required by the right-holder. The terms 'power' and
'liberty', used in a general sense, further illustrate
the value of rights in protecting an individual's
interests.
At the specialised, technical level of Hohfeldian
analysis, elucidation of rights-language concentrated on
the various kinds of normative relationship that exist
when 'rights' are claimed. Some 'rights' are more
powerful than others in the way that they impinge upon
others. Sometimes, as in 'claim-rights', there are
clear-cut correlative duties to cooperate with the right-
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holder in achieving his interests, a cooperation which
may imply positive help and/or non-interference. At other
times, as in the case of 'liberty-rights', the
correlative duties are extremely limited, but still offer
some protection. The other types of right - 'powers' and
'immunities' - have to do with a capacity to change
relationships with others or to maintain a present state
of affairs in relation to others. The complexity of
these varied normative relationships was pointed out,
together with criticisms and alternative interpretations.
The aim has been to clarify concepts, not to avoid
controversy. In fact, the controversies discussed,
especially regarding the correlativity of rights and
duties, are a stern reminder that normative relationships
of these types are untidy, yet firm.
The last section on theories of rights brings together
much of the preceding material in synthesis. Rights do
give a degree of control over the duties and obligations
of others. In some cases this control involves a freedom
to waive or relinquish rights, thus releasing anOfher
from a duty either temporarily or permanently. In other
cases, the interest or benefit to the right-holder is of
such importance that the control over correlative duties
has to be firm, and itself becomes a duty on the part of
the right-holder. Feinberg calls this coincidence of
right and duty in the situation of the right-holder a
'mandatory right' (cf. Feinberg,1980:232-238). In other
words, both 'Choice/Will theory and 'Benefit/Interest'
theory contribute something important to the
understanding of rights-language and the concepts this
language expresses. Indeed, the interests of individuals
are important in the analysis of rights, but this must
not become the sole preoccupation of the analyst. This
chapter has insisted that an equally important question
is 'Granted that this interest is justified or valid, how
does this involve others in relation to me and to this
interest?'
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Finally, the controversies raised in this chapter
provide a bridge to the next chapter where I discuss some
sceptical positions regarding rights-language. Put
crudely, the question now has to be asked, 'Is all this
fuss about rights really necessary, and could
contemporary metaethics and normative ethics be
simplified by abandoning rights-language completely?
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Chapter 2
Conceptual Scepticism and Rights
2.1 Introduction
The last chapter introduced some of the philosophical and
legal literature on the concept of rights and the use of
rights-language. The idea there was to clarify and
elucidate that concept and language, partly as a response
to an initial kind of scepticism which would accuse
rights-language of being incurably vague and indeter¬
minate. The clarification and elucidation of rights-
language is of importance in philosophy and in theology,
given the regular use of this kind of language. Obviously
if moral arguments are to hinge on the concept of rights,
that concept must be clear and determinate.
In this present chapter, I continue to face up to
arguments against the value of rights-language, in
particular those arguments which hold that the concept of
rights is 'logically redundant or epistemologically
ungrounded or both' (Gewirth,1986:329). It seems to me
that Christian ethicists have not paid much attention to
this question, but have taken for granted the basic
logical respectability of the rights concept. Obviously,
if philosophy could establish that the use of this concept
is logically redundant or epistemologically ungrounded,
this would cause some embarrassment in moral theological
circles. It is my task here to examine the arguments for
conceptual scepticism in order to show how they fail, and
in order to establish the logical and epistemological
respectability of rights-language in general.
In the following pages I shall deal with these
questions of scepticism mainly as they are presented in
Alan Gewirth's article in Mind (1986), 'Why Rights are
Indispensable?'. He deals with two kinds of scepticism in
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this article - conceptual and moral - but I limit myself
to the conceptual type in this chapter.
2.2 The Correlativity Objection
The doctrine of the correlativity of rights and duties was
discussed at some length in the last chapter (cf.l.4,A),
but how does this doctrine lead to conceptual scepticism
about rights in general? Gewirth shows how the
correlativity objection runs. If right and duty are
simply different names for the same normative
relationship, depending on the point of view from which it
is regarded, then surely one of them is redundant? If the
language of rights adds nothing extra in the way of
content to the language of duty and obligation, then,
arguably, the language of obligation and duty should be
preferred to the language of rights (Gewirth,1986:330;
Arnold,1978:82ff).
In reply to this objection, Gewirth argues thus:
...even though claim-rights and strict duties are
correlative, this does not mean they are identical.
Instead, they have different normative contents and a
different valuational status, in the following way.
Rights are to duties as benefits are to burdens
(1986:333).
Note here how Gewirth adopts a position close to that held
by Feinberg and by Benefit or Interest theorists. For
Gewirth, rights are 'justified claims to certain benefits'
(ibid.,333). A duty, on the other hand, is a justified
burden, restricting the freedom of the duty-bearer 'in
ways that directly benefit not himself but the right-
holder' (ibid.). In this way Gewirth's position is similar
to that of Neil MacCormick as well, for MacCormick has
argued that, at least in certain cases of legal rights,
rights are prior to duties. In his article on children's
rights already cited, MacCormick refers to the Succession
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Act (1964) in Scot's law, where children have a right to
parental property if a parent dies intestate. This right
is possessed even before the executor is named who will
bear the correlative duty (MacCormick,1976:312). According
to Gewirth, rights are prior to duties 'in the order of
justifying purpose or final causality, in that respondents
have correlative duties because subjects have certain
rights.' (op. cit.,333). Rights-language is not
redundant, then, because rights are the 'justifying basis'
of duties.
Ronald Dworkin appears to support the main point of the
non-reduncancy of rights-language in his famous
distinction between 'right-based', 'duty-based', and
'goal-based' moral theories (Dworkin,1978:150-183).
Dworkin adopts a view close to that held by Braybrooke,
discussed above, that the correlativity thesis is untidy
but firm:
In many cases, however, corresponding rights and
duties are not correlative, but one is derivative
from the other, and it makes a difference which is
derivative from which. There is a difference between
the idea that you have a duty not to lie to me
because I have a right not to be lied to, and the
idea that I have a right that you not lie to me
because you have a duty not to tell lies. In the
first case I justify a duty by calling attention to a
right; if I intend any further justification it is
the right that I must justify, and I cannot do so by
calling attention to the duty. In the second case it
is the other way around (Dworkin,1978:171).
Dworkin's stress on derivation rather than
correlativity does not undermine his general position of
'taking rights seriously', for at least some rights would
appear to be prior to duties in his approach. His first
aim, of course, is to oppose both right and duty-based
theories of morality to goal-based theories, the latter
being exemplified in Utilitarianism. 'Rights are best
understood as trumps over some background justification
for political decisions that states a goal for the commun-
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ity as a whole.' (Dworkin,1984:153). (There is some
controversy as to whether utilitarians must be hostile to
the language of rights. Some have been, e.g. Bentham,1843;
Frey,1983, while others are positively disposed, e.g.
Hare,1981:ch 9; Gray,1984.) However, given that right-
based theories of morality protect individuals from
utilitarian reasoning which might demand unjust sacrifices
from them, Dworkin also distinguishes between right-based
and duty-based theories. Although both theory types put
the individual at the centre of attention, each treats the
individual differently. Duty-based theories, e.g. kantian
morality, are more concerned with the quality of acts
reaching a certain standard (whatever the consequences).
On the other hand, 'Right-based theories are, in contrast,
concerned with the independence rather than the conformity
of individual action. They presuppose and protect the
value of individual thought and choice.' (Dworkin, 1978:
172) .
If Dworkin is correct in his analysis of rights-
language, not all rights can be reduced to the language of
duty, since some duties are derivative from rights, and,
secondly, because the language of rights forms a theory-
type which stresses the important moral value of
individuality. Here again the relationship between
metaethics and normative ethics is seen clearly. The
language of morals is found first in everyday talk
concerning moral issues, and the analysis of this language
must take into account what people think is important in
the moral life. Thus, if people are worried that communal
advantage will swamp the legitimate interests of
individuals, such an anxiety may well come to be situated
in moral theory in the language and concept of rights.
A further defence of the language of rights against
reduction to the language of duty is found in another
argument presented by David Braybrooke in his article on
the 'firm but untidy correlation..'. In response to
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Lyons's position he makes this important point:
There is an interpretation of Lyons which makes the
entailment between rights and obligations logically
superfluous, because a set of clear obligations exist
anyway. But logical superfluity does not imply
practical superfluity. People, for instance, might
first learn about their obligations from being
educated about rights. The connection might be kept
for fear of unforeseen lapses in following
obligations (Braybrooke,1972:357).
This 'pedagogical' argument for maintaining the
language of rights is partly a metaethical argument and
partly a normative one. From the normative point of view,
the interest is in getting people to respect rights in the
most effective way. And one way may be as Braybrooke
suggests, to look at obligations from the angle of rights,
rather than looking at obligations on their own separate
from the claims of others. But, learning to look at the
normative relationships between people involves a
metaethical aspect, some 'concept' of the different angles
one can look at what binds people together morally,
namely, rights and duties.
Finally, I can mention once again the key element in
the 'Choice' or 'Will' Theories of rights - the control
one has over the duty of another. Sometimes this control
implies a firm claim against others to act or refrain from
acting; sometimes control means the capacity and freedom
to waive or to relinquish one's right, with the
corresponding release of another from his or her duty.
Now, it seems to me, that any reduction of rights-language
to the correlative language of duty will miss out on this
important function of control over duty. One might argue
that in the place of waiving rights one could create a
hierarchy of duties, with accompanying rules telling one
when a duty no longer applies; but all this does is to
transfer the power of waiver to the persons who frame the
particular rules. It is furthermore doubtful whether an
agreed hierarchy of duties and obligations could be con-
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structed. And, finally, the faculty of waiving is such a
personal one, taking in the area of supererogation for
instance, that general rules for bypassing certain
obligations or duties would be relatively unhelpful, if
not totally useless.
2.3 The Interests Objection
The Interest/Benefit theory of rights holds that the
essence of rights lies in nominating the beneficiaries of
certain duties, in order to protect their interests or
assure their benefit in a special area. The objection now
is that human agents can easily recognise the importance
of respecting interests without having to mention having
rights to them. In this way, rights are only so much
'excess baggage'.
R.Frey, a philosopher from Liverpool University, has
insisted on this point, arguing against the value of
rights-language from a utilitarian perspective. He asks:
What is wrong with torturing or killing someone is
not the violation of some right of his, but the sheer
agony and suffering he undergoes, the snuffing out of
his hopes, desires and wishes, and so on...In short,
there is no need to postulate moral rights as
intermediaries between pain and agony, or twarted
hopes, desires, and plans, or ruined lives and the
wrongness of what was done (Frey,1983:49).
Gewirth's response to this objection sems remarkably
weak. He just says that rights add something indis¬
pensable to the situation, that is, a moral justification
for the protection of an interest. Then he says, rather
lamely in my opinion, that one could have an interest in
murdering someone and even be protected in furthering this
by unscrupulous friends, but this would not amount to a
moral right (op. cit.,334). However, I am sure that Frey
is not thinking of making just any 'interests' morally
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right simply by adding some protection to the agent.
Frey, as a utilitarian, can argue that his moral theory is
perfectly well-suited to distinguish morally between
interests.
Frey's argument then, to have any chance of success,
must begin with interests that are moral. There are, after
all, natural disasters which cause agony and suffering,
snuff out hopes and desires, and so on, but the ways in
which such events touch personal interests is not in
question here. What is in question is human action which
affects the interests of others; and Frey's argument
assumes the basic moral position that persons ought not to
cause others suffering, other things being equal, or
without clear justification. Surely anyone can see this,
is Frey's reaction, and there is no need to complicate
matters by introducing rights as 'intermediaries'. In
some cases no doubt people do what is right and avoid what
is wrong without considering the 'rights' of others; there
can be an intuitive reaching out to the victims of
suffering without much, if any, conceptualisation of
right and wrong, or of rights and duties. But this does
not mean that nothing further can be learned about the
moral realities of such situations, and that rights are
redundant from the explanatory point of view.
The basic problem, I think, with Frey's reductionist
approach is that he assumes too quickly a normative
connection between the interests of persons and the
activity of others in fulfilling these interests. Granted
that another person is suffering in some way, the question
remains 'What is this to do with me?'. Many people suffer
in this world, but T cannot help everyone. In many cases
I have an obligation to help those with whom I have a
special relationship, e.g. family and friends, and this
leaves me comparatively little time and resources to help
others down the road, and even further afield. How do I
distinguish morally between various suffering people?
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Surely one answer is that I should consider the rights
of others. And it usually turns out that certain people
have more of a 'claim' on me than others. Moreover, if I
fail to recognise the justified claims of those closest to
me, I may well cause a specific form of suffering -
betrayal - because of the special expectations that arise
from 'special moral rights'. So it appears that rights
often do help in directing agents towards the relief of
human suffering, and they explain some of the further
intensity of suffering caused when those with most claim
on others are ignored or betrayed. (Again, Melden's ideas
are important here, as he states that, 'For the possessor
of the right orders and conducts some portion of his life
in such a way that a failure on the part of the person
obliged to him is not merely to disappoint him or visit
some misfortune upon him, but to wrong him, i.e. to commit
an offence against him as a moral agent.'(Melden,1977:53).
It is good here to reiterate one of the main points of
my thesis, namely, that rights-language concentrates not
merely on interests and benefits of persons in isolation,
but on the 'claims against' and 'powers over' others which
these interests and benefits provide.
I shall conclude this section with a quotation from
Charles Fried (1978), who takes up a position on rights
and interests similar to Dworkin's emphasis on rights as
trumps over utilitarian attempts to maximise values or
interests. I hope that these words will be self-
explanatory, and a partial summary of what has preceded in
this section.
Yet it is the case that rights are also interests, or
at least they protect or express interests. Indeed,
in consequentialist analyses rights appear only as
interests, more specifically as those interests which
in a particular or general striking of the balance
have ended up as carrying the day over competing
interests. In the system I propose, rights have a
prior status. When a person asserts a right he is
doing more than announcing an interest to be taken
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into account. After all, every interest must at
least be taken into account. And since an interest
is a potential pleasure or pain, the utilitarian must
always consider it, just as a businessman must
consider any potential revenue or cost. The assert¬
ion of a right is categorical. Thus a right is not
the same as an interest, though there is an interest
behind every right (Fried,1978:85).
2.4 The Justificatory Objection
Joel Feinberg situates the grounds of rights in certain
rules or principles. He states that:
A man has a legal right when the official recognition
of his claim (as valid) is called for by the
governing rules. This definition, of course, hardly
applies to moral rights, but that is not because the
genus of which moral rights are a species is
something other than claims . A man has a moral right
when he has a claim the recognition of which is
called for - not (necessarily) by legal rules - but
by moral principles, or the principles of an
enlightened conscience (Feinberg,1970:154).
Robert Young (1978) takes up these ways of grounding
rights and highlights the complexities underlying such
seemingly innocuous remarks, with particular reference to
moral rights (legal rights being relatively determinate in
contrast to moral rights). The main issue here, according
to Young, is the pluralism of moral principles and the
difficulty of finding widespread agreement on moral
matters. It appears that the foundation of rights will be
rather unsound, especially if one does not hold the
existence of objectively correct moral principles
(Young,1978:66) . Given such a moral epistemology, one has
to adopt a conventionalist understanding of moral rights,
as established by community consensus. This will make the
whole question of universal human rights a difficult one
to settle in practice.
Raymond Frey likewise holds that the pluralism of moral
principles undermines the theory of the value of rights:
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'If moral rights are put forward on the basis of
unagreed moral principles, we will not agree on
whether there are such rights, whereas if they are
put forward on the basis of agreed moral principles,
they appear unnecessary, since our principles will
already be leading us to behave in what the rights'
proponents see as the desired way.' (op.cit.,51).
I shall answer the objection that rights can be reduced
to moral principles in the next section; here I must
answer the objection that rights are redundant precisely
because principles are so varied and conflicting.
The first point must be rather obvious: the existence
of rights does not depend on their being recognised by
everyone, though their exercise requires widespread
recognition, especially in the case of human rights.
Arguably, some special moral rights may be exercised so
long as a small group of people (sometimes just one other
person) recognises the normative bond. One might deny the
existence of objective moral values just as one might deny
the existence of God, but this denial would not
necessarily do away with either rights or the Deity.
Secondly, it may be argued that moral pluralism
regarding rights has been grossly exaggerated by thinkers
like Young and Frey. One can point to the existence of
the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, as well as
other international agreements, as a sign of a general
degree of basic agreement on fundamental interests which
can be claimed in international law (cf.MacBride,1980;
0'Boyle,1980; Cranston,1962:chs.3&4).
Sean MacBride, for instance, has argued that the U.N.
Declaration' was not when it was adopted, a binding legal
document, but it has now acquired the status of being
enforceable as part of international customary law.'
(MacBride,1980:11). Such an agreement is rather
surprising in view of the different ideologies expressed
by the world's different governmental systems. Where
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there are conflicts of interests, some rights are
subordinated to others, but often such subordination is
either hidden for reasons of embarrassment, or justified
in terms of other rights. In this way, most states reveal
a degree of unanimity regarding the value of rights, in
spite of the different interpretations of these rights in
practice.
Thirdly, I do not agree with these attempts to load all
the blame for present-day moral pluralism and indeter¬
minacy on the shoulders of the concept of rights. It seems
as if rights-language is being made a scape-goat bearing
moral indeterminacy out into the desert. Unfortunately
for the sceptics, this use of language and the concept
underlying it has a tendency to wander back to haunt them.
In my opinion, rights-language is not indeterminate in
itself, it simply reflects the indeterminacy of the many
competing moral theories in vogue today. In this way,
rights-language seems no worse off than any other part of
moral language, for instance, the language of duty or the
language of rules or the language of virtue. Norte of
these hangs in the air untouched by moral pluralism, so
why single out moral rights as the main culprit? Granted
that some of the claims made to various personal interests
have been immoderate, this provides an argument only for
moderation, not for the redundancy of rights-language. If
the sceptics are to be consistent in their analysis of
moral language in relation to pluralism, they should be
equally despairing of the language of duty and obligation.
Therefore, I am not convinced that moral pluralism
undermines the foundations of rights-language, though I
recognise that concern must be voiced over moral
pluralism's effect on the exercise of many rights.
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2.5 Rights and Moral Principles
In the following sections I move away from the treatment
of conceptual scepticism about rights as treated by
Gewirth, and begin to treat of further types of conceptual
scepticism. The justificatory objection spoke of the
importance placed on moral principles as the grounds of
moral rights, and then tried to weaken reliance on rights-
language by pointing out the degree of moral pluralism
with regard to those principles. A further step might be
to simplify matters by returning to the principles
themselves, using them as a substitute for talk of rights.
Before any attempt is made to make rights-language
redundant in favour of moral principles, it should be
noted how the philosophical treatment of moral principles
is not without controversy. For instance, there is the
question of the distinction between moral principles and
moral rules. Regarding this distinction, Marcus Singer
(1958) declares that,
It has generally been recognised that there is a
distinction of some importance between moral rules
and moral principles. Yet the distinction has not
generally received explicit formulation, and there is
no general agreement on just what it is
(Singer,1958:160).
So, straightaway there is the problem of whether the
reduction of rights is going to be in favour of
principles, or rules, or some combination of these. Singer
favours the view that moral principles are more general
than moral rules, though not so general that they lose
their action-guiding force. Principles have a role, for
instance, in limiting the content of moral rules. Thus,
an example of a moral principle would be the
'Generalization Argument' or principle of justice/
impartiality. This states that 'What is right for one
person must be right for any similar person in similar
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circumstances.' (ibid.,164). Such a principle, according
to Singer, is exceptionless. Also it sets limits to any
moral rule if it is to lay claim to being a 'moral' rule.
Moral rules, on the other hand, are specific, e.g.
'Stealing is wrong', 'Everyone ought to keep their
promises'. Such rules are specifically action-guiding,
but they are so specific that they must allow for
exceptions, according to Singer. However, there is a
general principle which states that exceptions to rules
must be justified. This is a further example of a
principle guiding the content of rules.
More recently, the American philosopher, Daniel Maguire
(1978), has reacted to this distinction between principles
and rules, arguing that in practice these terms are
interchangeable. Thus, what is often called the 'Golden
Rule' could just as easily be called the 'Golden
Principle' because of its generality. Or take the example
of the so-called 'Principle of Double Effect', which might
well be called 'a set of rules for situations where an
action brings forth good and bad effects'. Maguire comes
to the conclusion that 'The effort to render ethics
unnecessarily tedious by distinctions that do not hold up
in usage is both pedantic and unkind.'(Maguire,1978: 258,
note 45).
Whatever the merits of these different approaches to
principles and rules, it appears that all of the authors
who discuss these terms agree on their action-guiding
nature or function. A person interested in being morally
good cannot afford to ignore moral principles or moral
rules, either at the general or at the specific level.
Thus, it seems to me, that the language of moral
principles and moral rules is very close to the language
of duty and obligation. One is not meant merely to consult
principles and rules, but to follow and obey their
direction. Thus, the advice to reduce rights-language to
the language of moral principles brings one back to the
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correlativity objection, which insisted on the priority of
duties over rights. And, it follows that the response made
to that objection will apply again here.
In addition, some further arguments can be made for the
retention of the language of rights, showing that the
language of principle performs different functions in
moral argument from the language of rights. Thus, for
instance, Jeremy Waldron, argues that the language of
moral principles and moral rules refers moral agents to
the right thing to do, what they ought to do. The language
of rights, on the other hand, does not always refer to the
right or obligatory action, but often enough to actions
which are merely permissible. Such permissible actions
have already been covered under the category of
'discretionary rights'. So, my right to do X does not
entail that there is always a moral principle or rule
commanding me to do X, though it usually implies such
principles or rules on the part of others who have the
correlative duty to protect my freedom in this area. In
fact, in some cases persons have a 'right to do wrong'
against others. There may be a principle or rule
forbidding a certain action, but others have no freedom to
impose the principle or rule on others. The common
example here is in the sphere of 'personal morality', of
what 'consenting adults do in private'. Here, persons may
act wrongly, but still have a right to non-interference in
the matter. Non-interference is often a correlative duty
because interference might cause a greater wrong than the
wrong performed by the right-holder (cf.Waldron,1981: 21-
39; Galston,1983:320-327) .
Another argument which distinguishes principles/rules
from rights is that only the former give reasons to act on
every occasion. Having a right does not always give one a
reason to act. An obvious example is the ordinary right
to marry; having this right against others does not force
me to prove its existence by trying to marry. Rights,
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then, do not necessarily justify moral actions on the
part of right-holders, though usually there is the
assumption behind valid claims that the interests sought
are good, and the actions posited are right ones. (Thus,
even in the case of the 'right to do wrong', right-holders
either believe that they are acting rightly, though in
fact their conscience is erroneous, or they are acting in
bad faith but conceal this from others, pretending that
they are following conscience.) There is, however, a
strong connection between rights and reasons for acting,
insofar as valid claims or entitlements presuppose reasons
for duty-bearers to respect the interests of right-
holders. Sometimes, too, right-holders have duties to
claim their rights and are obliged not to waive or
alienate rights. These 'mandatory rights' have been
mentioned already; they are a perfect coincidence of right
and duty in the life of the same person, but one should
note that it is the aspect of duty here that gives the
reason to act, not so much the aspect of right.
It is important for a proper understanding of rights
that the correct relationship between rights and justified
action be noted. I have already stated that rights do not
necessarily justify the action of the right-holder, though
they do usually justify the actions of duty-bearers.
However, in talking of the action of the right-holder a
further distinction must be made, between an agent
pursuing a particular interest and an agent claiming
either the help or the non-interference of others. Having
a right does not necessarily justify the former, but it
necessarily justifies the latter, since the connection
between having a right and claiming against others is
analytic or conceptual.
To illustrate this distinction, consider the basic
right to take up lawful employment. Suppose I have an
offer of a job and someone asks 'Are you justified
seeking employment in that position?', the reply, 'I have
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a right to take on this job', is not the proper answer.
That reply - 'I have a right to take on this job'- is
rather the appropriate answer to the question 'Why do you
expect me to help you to get this job?', assuming that the
right-holder is looking for positive help, e.g. a
reference, or negative help, e.g. an assurance from
another that he or she will not compete for the same
position. The 'right' to take on a particular job is not
necessarily a justification of the agent's decision to do
just that, rather it concentrates on the control one has
over the activity or forbearance of others. There is much
sense, then, in the following words from Glanville
Willams:
No one ever has a right to do something; he only has
a right that some one else shall do (or refrain from
doing) something. In other words, every right in the
strict sense relates to the conduct of another, while
a liberty and a power relate to the conduct of the
holder of the liberty or power (Williams,1956:1145).
It is probably a bit extreme to say that 'No one ever
has a right to do something'. I think there is
justification in using this form of speech in ordinary
affairs, so long as its usage is accompanied by the proper
interpretation, i.e. that rights turn on what I can expect
others to do for me, legally and/or morally, regarding
what I wish to do or not to do.
Finally, in my attempt to show that the language of
rights should not be replaced by the language of
principles, I cite the interesting article by Stephen
Toulmin, 'The Tyranny of Principles' (Toulmin,1981:31-39).
Toulmin is worried about 'the revival of a tyrannical
absolutism in recent discussions about social and personal
ethics.' (1981:31). For instance, in the debate on
abortion, 'much of the public debate increasingly came to
turn on "matters of principle." As a result, the abortion
debate became less temperate, less discriminating, and
71
above all less resolvable.' (ibid.,32). A further example
given by Toulmin of the growing reliance on rules and
principles is worth quoting at length:
My perplexities about the force and value of "rules"
and "principles" were further sharpened as the result
of a television news program about a handicapped
young woman who had difficulties with the local
Social Security office. Her Social Security payments
were not sufficient to cover her rent and food, so
she started an answering service, which she operated
through the telephone at her bedside. The income
from this service -though itself less than a living
wage - made all the difference to her. When the
local Social Security office heard about this extra
income, however, they reduced her benefits
accordingly: in addition, they ordered her to repay
some of the money she had been receiving.
(Apparently, they regarded her as a case of "welfare
fraud.") The television reporter added two final
statements. Since the report had been filmed, he
told us, the young woman, in despair, had taken her
own life. To this he added his personal comment that
"there should be a rule to prevent this kind of thing
from happening.
Notice that the reporter did not say, "The local
office should be given discretion to waive, or at
least bend, the existing rules in hard cases."What he
said was, "There should be an additional rule to
prevent such inequities in the future." Justice, he
evidently believed, can be ensured only by
establishing an adequate system of rules, and
injustice can be prevented only by adding more rules
(Toulmin.1981:32).
Toulmin goes on to explain how humanity has come to
this emphasis on rules. Looking at Roman law, he remarks
that rules were not explicitly used in the Roman legal
system for the first three centuries of its history. This
was due to the small and relatively homogeneous character
of daily life. Legal conflicts were solved by the
'College of Pontiffs', a set of judges who adjudicated
cases set before them. They did not have to give reasons
for their judgements, since the citizens trusted their
judgement and allowed them wide discretion in judgement.
This changed when Rome grew into an empire; the case-load
increased and had to be adjudicated by junior judges.
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These judges had to be trained in the practice of the law,
and this involved passing on rules to deal with different
situations. Less discretion was allowed, as Toulmin
mentions, 'Discretion, which had rested earlier on the
personal characters of the pontiffs themselves and which
is not easy to teach, began to be displaced by formal
rules and more teachable argumentative skills.'
(ibid.,33).
In general, Toulmin argues that the reign of rules and
principles reflects the growth of the 'Ethics of
Strangers'. As communication, especially travel, de¬
veloped, people who were used to dealing morally with
others in the personal and intimate way of small
communities, now had to deal morally with groups of people
who were unknown to them - strangers. Tolstoy's notion of
morality is cited by Toulmin as an example of a system
that has largely passed away, and which needs to be
revived in some ways.
As he saw matters, genuinely "moral" relations can
exist only between people who live, work, and
associate together: inside a family, between
intimates and associates, within a neighbourhood.
The natural limit to any person's moral universe, for
Tolstoy, is the distance he or she can walk, or at
most ride. By taking the train, a moral agent leaves
the sphere of truly moral actions for a world of
strangers,...(ibid.,34).
Once one begins to deal morally with strangers, an
element of distrust enters, and the role of strict rules
and principles is supposed to give some confidence in
dealings with people. Furthermore, since those who run
the legal system are also strangers, they must be
controlled by strict rules as well. One cannot afford to
allow them too much discretion.
Toulmin's warnings about the tyranny of rules and
principles are basically a call for a return to the value
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of equity, which requires an important element of
discretion in the legal and moral system. Treating the
moral world as a world of strangers only gives rise to a
morality of rules stressing equality, but this complex
world of different personalities with different needs de¬
mands equity to temper the rigidity of equality. In the
ethics of intimacy, of the 'friendly society', individual
needs and differences are taken into account, and this
model should be restored so far as it possible.
Toulmin does not mention the role of rights in his
article, so I am not sure what he would have to say about
their role in morality. Some may argue that they too are
an expression of the 'ethics of strangers'. But my
arguments have stressed the fact that rights-language is
more flexible than is sometimes thought, and certainly
more flexible than the strict language of principles,
rules, obligations and duties. The fact that at least
some rights are 'discretionary' and that rights can be
waived or relinquished in some cases is indicative of the
flexibility of this kind of moral and legal language. On
the other hand, rights can also participate in the
categorical nature of rules and principles, especially
when vitally important values are at stake - hence the
usefulness of notions like 'inalienable', 'absolute' and
'mandatory', rights.
2.6 Scepticism and 'Human Rights'
Scepticism concerning rights usually concentrates on moral
rights rather than on legal rights. Frequently when
people think of moral rights they identify these with the
category of 'Human Rights'. However, there is a mistake
here, since not all the rights of human persons are 'human
rights'. If I promise to meet a friend at the cinema this
evening, I give him a right to expect me to keep my
promise, but this right is not a 'human right' in the
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strict sense.
The main characteristics of a human right are given by-
Richard Wasserstrom as follows:
First, it must be possessed by all human beings, as
well as only by human beings. Second, because it is
the same right that all human beings possess, it must
be possessed equally by all human beings. Third,
because human rights are possessed by all human
beings, we can rule out as possible candidates any of
those rights which one might have in virtue of
occupying any particular status or relationship, such
as that of parent, president or promisee. And
fourth, if there are any human rights, they have the
additional characteristic of being assertable, in a
manner of speaking, "against the whole world."
(Wasserstrom,1964:12).
Clearly, the third characteristic mentioned above
eliminates my example of promising to meet a friend from
the sphere of human rights. Human rights are universal in
the sense of being possessed by all in virtue of their
common humanity. However, nearly all the characteristics
mentioned by Wasserstrom are controversial, and some of
the arguments against human rights may engender scepticism
about the many claims made in their name. Indeed, some may
feel that the category should be eliminated totally. Let
me mention some of the problems faced by this category of
'human rights'.
Kai Nielson has criticised the concept of human rights
as epistemologically ungrounded (Nielson,1968). The con¬
cept, he argues, depends on certain built-in normative
assumptions that have not been proved, assumptions mainly
to do with equality between humans. If the moral point of
view is characterised in terms of prescriptivity and
universalizability, then Nietzsche's 'Slave Morality'
qualifies as a moral system. There are some superior
individuals in the human race, and rights and duties apply
to them in the full sense. The Ubermenschen need not
recognise the rights of weaker men and women because they
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are not equal. According to Nielson, then, one begs the
question of the moral point of view by building-in
equality and then assuming that everyone is in fact equal.
It is quite obvious to everyone that in many areas of life
human beings are unequal, so the equality spoken of by
human rights theorists must be of a 'special' kind.
Usually this involves statements about 'intrinsic worth',
but this type of language is rather hard to pin down.
According to Nielson, it appears to be related to some
dubious metaphysical and theological doctrines
(ibid.,578).
If 'intrinsic worth' is related to some distinctive
endowment of human beings, e.g. their rationality or their
ability to value interpersonal relationships, then there
will be some 'humans' whose 'intrinsic worth' will be in
question. There may then be severely mentally handicapped
people who cannot be accorded 'human rights'. If
'intrinsic worth' simply means being a member of the human
race in the sense of being born of human parents, then
holders of such a position may be accused of 'specieSism'
(cf.Ryder,1985:77-88). This charge criticises the arbit¬
rariness of respecting the human species by according it
special rights as against other species. Why should not
gorillas be given special rights because they are born of
gorilla parents?
Personally, I think that Nielson has made some
important points in his criticism of the concept of 'human
rights'. Ultimately, I feel that the notion of 'intrinsic
worth' can only be understood in metaphysical or
theological terms and I shall discuss this in greater
detail in chapter 4. However, I am not sceptical, as
Nielson is, about the possibility and value of either
metaphysics or theology. Moreover, I believe that
Nielson's point about having to build in equality into the
concept of human rights is well taken. The concept of
universal human rights involves an ultimate evaluative
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position concerning humanity. The concept is not a
logical discovery which binds everyone by fear of
contradiction if one were to deny it, it is a moral
discovery which grounds one's normative ethics. And from
here it passes into metaethics. When one refers to the
basic equality of human beings as requiring special
respect to be shown for all, one is not saying that all
humans are equal in their talents and in their actual
participation in earthly goods. One is saying that at the
deepest level all human persons have equal worth, a worth
which demands action to bring the less fortunate of the
species up to a satisfactory level of participation in the
goods which make human worth obvious to the naked eye. It
remains open to people if they want to use this concept or
not, just as it is open to people to accept or reject the
notions of inalienable and absolute rights. One can
understand the meaning of these concepts as one
understands the concept of unicorns and ghosts, yet deny
the actual existence of these realities.
A further problem with the concept of human rights
arises once again in the area of correlativity, this time
in relation to the scope of the right. Human rights are
said to be universal rights, possessed by everyone and
against everyone. But this is not agreed upon by
everyone. Earlier in this essay, I cited the work of
McCloskey on the notion of rights as 'entitle¬
ment s '( cf. 1 . 2 , B) . Remember his argument that the right to
life (a typical human right in most normative systems) can
hardly be seen as a list of claims against every single
person in the world. After all, I am not likely to be in
touch with a large proportion of the world's population
during my life-time, so why should I be in need of some
normative relationship regarding such strangers?
One solution to this problem of human rights implies
that universal human rights are possessed by all, but not
against all. Instead they are rights of citizens against
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their state. This is how Carl Wellman (1978) expresses
the point:
Traditionally, human rights have been thought of as
those ethical rights that every human being must
possess simply because he or she is human. Thus,
human rights are the rights any individual possesses
as a human being. Although this seems to capture
current usage pretty well, I propose a more narrow
conception of human rights. I define a human right
as an ethical right of the individual as a human
being vis-a-vis the state. Excluded by this de¬
finition are the ethical rights one has as a human
being that hold against other individuals or against
organizations other than the state (op.cit., 55-56) .
Wellman explains the reasons why he wishes to narrow
the concept of human rights. Firstly, the tradition of
natural rights and the major declarations of the rights of
man tend to have as their 'primary and definitive purpose'
the proclamation of the rights of individuals 'in face of'
the state. Secondly, there must be a difference between
the relationship holding between the individual and the
state and that which holds between the individual and
other individuals and organisations, 'just because the
state is a special sort of organisation with a distinctive
role to play in human affairs.' (ibid.56).
There is much to be said for narrowing the concept of
human rights in line with Wellman's thesis, especially
when the concern is with exercising rights in a positive
way. Because of the state's power and resources,
individuals more readily look to the state for positive
help and for non-interference than to other individuals.
The state's control over health services and social
services in general are cases in point. But, at the same
time, I am reluctant to eliminate the wider notion of
human rights as being held, at least in some
circumstances, against everybody. Of course the positive
aspect of this is not of first importance. I cannot
expect perfect strangers to help me in many cases where I
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am pursuing some project. But the negative aspect of
human rights is important, insofar as it gives a general
sense of confidence that a wide circle of individuals
recognise my need not to be disturbed, if only implicitly.
Thus, D.D.Raphael (1965:216) makes a useful distinction
between human rights in the 'strong' sense and human
rights in the 'weak' sense. The 'strong' sense refers to
rights held against everyone; while the 'weak' sense'
corresponds to Wellman's narrowing of the concept to
social or civil rights. I feel that both senses have some
validity in moral and legal discourse.
Finally, regarding the difficulties with the concept of
'human rights', there is the connection between these
rights and the traditional 'natural rights'. The modern
term 'human right' tends to hide some of the essentialist
assumptions included in the concept of 'natural right'. Is
there some common 'nature' which all humans possess and
which acts as a basis for deriving fundamental rights? Or
are human rights to be understood in a more
conventionalist sense, with reference to generally
accepted values, but without metaphysical assumptions?
In a seminal article on the subject of 'Natural
Rights', Margaret Macdonald (1947) argues that natural
rights are in the category of values rather than facts,
and as values they are a matter of decision or choice, not
a matter of discovery. In the light of this non-
cognitivist approach to morality, she goes on to say:
In short, 'natural rights' are the condition of a
good society. But what those conditions are is not
given by nature or mystically bound up with the
essence of man and his inevitable goal, but is
determined by human decisions (Macdonald,1947:34 ) .
Inevitably, then, Macdonald is a critic of the view
that there is a fixed human nature from which can be
derived 'natural' or 'human' rights. She calls the
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attempt to do so 'the Aristotelian dream of fixed natures
pursuing common ends', and she lampoons a modern version
of this in the work of J. Maritain, where he uses the
analogy of different pianos, all geared towards the
production of attuned sounds (ibid.,29; Maritain,1942;140-
141). According to Macdonald, 'Men do not share a fixed
nature, nor, therefore, are there any ends which they must
necessarily pursue in the fulfilment of such nature.'
(op.cit.,30).
One can sympathise with Macdonald only, I think,
because her position is so extreme. Of course it sounds
ridiculous to compare human persons to pianos, and to
speak of fixed natures in that sense. It is also
dangerous to try to deduce in detail rights, rules and
principles from human nature. But I cannot see how one
can escape from some notion of a human nature that is
fixed and also normative in some way. How can one talk of
human beings unless there is some set of characteristics
that distinguishes the species from other species of
animal? Not that all human characteristics divide men and
women from the rest of nature in an absolute way. Clearly
there are points of contact, especially between human
needs and those of animals; but there is also a sense in
which being human imprints something special regarding the
experience of those needs, so that they become conscious
values to be promoted. Obviously, human attitudes towards
procreation present a good example of a distinctively
'human' experience of a common animal need. In the second
part of my thesis I shall be drawing out the implications
of the specifically human and Christian appropriation of
procreation (cf.chapter 5).
In recent times, the category of the 'personal' appears
to have come to the fore in much 'natural law' thinking,
such that the older idea of 'fixed nature' has moved into
the background. This may be a good thing, since it is
important to recognise the individual ways in which human
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nature is experienced. Thus, human rights must take into
account the variety included in individual experience of
personal nature. However, this makes respect for human
rights more complicated.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has taken up some of the controversial points
surrounding the analysis of rights-language which were
studied in the first chapter, and has added to these
points in order to make clear the case for conceptual
scepticism with which one can confront this form of moral
language. The underlying question here has been, 'Given
the difficulties of analysing rights and the language of
rights, is it truly worthwhile to maintain the usage of
the concept and the language?'.
In general the conceptual objections presented in this
chapter have been part of a reductionist enterprise
regarding rights-language. I have given a number of
reasons why this form of moral language should not be
abandoned. For instance, rights often appear to be prior
to duties in the sense that duties are for the sake of
rights as burdens are for the sake of benefits. Then
there is the advantage of flexibility in moral language
based on the possibility of waiving rights or
relinquishing them voluntarily. The distinction between
'discretionary' rights and 'mandatory' rights in
particular, reveals how the language of rights can be
strict at certain times and flexible at other times. It
was argued that even if it were the case that rights were
logically superfluous, there would still be a pragmatic
argument for retaining them, for instance, for pedagogical
purposes, in order to remind people of their duties.
Sometimes moral positions become clear by looking at
normative relationships from different angles.
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I argued that rights cannot be replaced by talk of
interests, because the language of rights deals with the
fundamental question of how the interests of others bind
persons in normative relationships. Again the essential
point is that rights are relational realities, and they
help to discriminate between different moral and legal
relationships. Regarding the justification of rights and
the unavoidable moral pluralism of modern society, I
argued that moral pluralism should not be exaggerated, and
that there was at least a general agreement on the value
of the language of human rights. No state wants to have
the name of being a human-rights violator, even if
violation of rights is performed in secret in so many
places. In any case, the argument for moral pluralism
seems to apply equally to the use of other moral concepts,
whether it be duty or obligation, or rules or principles.
The concept of 'right' should not be made into a scapegoat
in this way.
On the subject of the possible reduction of rights-
language to the language of rules and principles, I tried
to show first of all that the relationship between rules
and principles is not very clear. Then I argued that
rules and principles are directly connected with 'right
action', which is not the same concept as 'having a right
to do something'. If an action is the right thing to do
then I have a moral reason for doing it, and, other things
being equal, I ought to do it. But 'having a right to do
X' does not necessarily give me, the right-holder, a
reason to do X, as in the case of the right to marry.
Rights thus protect freedom in general, whereas rules and
principles seem to function in directing human freedom
along particular lines. Since moral principles and moral
rules do not perform the same function as the language of
moral rights, it seems unlikely that the former can take
the place of the latter without remainder.
As a parting shot, I introduced the views of Toulmin,
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who associates the language of moral principles and rules
with the 'ethics of strangers'. This form of language
tends towards absolutism, lack of trust in others,
unwillingness to allow discretion and equity. The language
of rights, I think, can allow readily enough for the
flexibility required in an 'ethics of intimacy' as well as
helping men and women to cope in a world of strangers.
Finally, I treated of some of the difficulties
connected with the language of 'human rights'. Again the
problem of correlativity between rights and duties came to
the fore, and I had to distinguish between 'strong' and
'weak' senses of human rights. I accepted that certain
moral assumptions of an ultimate kind, e.g. equality of
intrinsic worth, should be built into the concept of a
human right, and that no one is logically compelled to do
this. And I argued that the concept of a fixed human
nature is a necessary element in the analysis of human
rights, all the while qualifying this by underlining the
variety of individual participations in the common human
nature. This qualification is a warning against a
derivation of a rigid set of rights from a fixed human
nature. Such a rigid set of rights of the 'mandatory' kind
would be little improvement on the language of principles,
rules, duties and obligations.
In his book, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985),
Bernard Williams puts the question:
If there is such a thing as the truth about the
subject matter of ethics - the truth, we might say
about the ethical - why is there any expectation that
it should be simple? In particular, why should it be
conceptually simple, using only one or two ethical
concepts, such as duty or good state of affairs ,
rather than many? Perhaps we need as many concepts
to describe it as we find we need, and no fewer
(Williams,1985:17).
This is precisely the question I have been attempting to
answer in this chapter.
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Chapter 3
Moral and Theological Scepticism
3,1 Introduction
Having defended the language of rights in the face of
conceptual objections which question the value of the
underlying concept, I now turn to another form of attack
on the language of rights, a two-pronged attack from the
point of view of normative moral theory in both secular
ethics and Christian ethics. There is a certain overlap
between these objections, since Christian ethicists and
theologians have tended to echo some of the normative
moral objections of secular moralists and moral
philosophers. And I also deal with more radical moral
theological objections which have some connection with
mainstream moral philosophy.
I begin, then, with some rather obvious arguments why
the language of moral rights is said to be not really
morally respectable. Firstly, the language of rights
tends towards individualism and egoism, and tends to play
down social solidarity and the common good. Secondly, the
exercise of rights, especially the use of the faculty of
'claiming', is a sign of a growing adversarial trend in
modern life which sets people at loggerheads, and does
little for social harmony and peace.
From here I pass on to a more radical form of moral
scepticism which has a clear theological reference as well
as a secular moral one. I consider what may be called an
'anti-naturalist' position connected with the question
'Can a good man be harmed?' This position is radical
indeed, insofar as it practically refuses to see much of
ordinary human suffering, including what comes through
injustice, as 'harmful' and as the object of rights. The
only value of worth is the development and maintenance of
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moral character; therefore, so much of the language of
rights is merely a distraction from this one aim. From
the theological point of view, this radically exposed
situation is made possible by a kind of faith in one's
'absolute safety' in the hands of a greater power. In the
light of such protection, much of the language of rights
is distracting, concentrating as it does on forms of
'harm' that are hardly worth considering according to this
point of view.
Since the last position may sound quite bizarre, I go
on to discuss some religious positions which appear to
share something of this single-mindedness and lack of care
regarding the suffering which this world can throw up.
Thus, I treat of the early Franciscan tradition and some
pacifist stances. Such minority stances are strikingly
attractive, but are often felt to be too Utopian to be put
into practice on a wide scale for any length of time.
Furthermore, these stances often appear to be justified
in terms of highly original callings discerned by special
individuals. so that it is almost impossible" to
universalise their moral aspect.
I hope to show that the moral and theological
objections fail and that the language of rights is
respectable morally and theologically, once due care is
taken with the use of this language.
3.2 The Egoistic Objection
Gewirth (1986) describes this objection as follows:
Since a right involves a claim that a person makes
for the support of his or her own interests, it
evinces a preoccupation with fulfilment of one's own
desires or needs regardless of broader social goals;
hence it operates to submerge the values of community
and to obscure or annul the responsibilities that one
ought to have to other persons or to society at
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large. The insistence on one's rights may also, in
certain circumstances, violate duties of generosity
and charity, as when a land-owner evicts a needy
family in the depths of winter for non-payment of
rent (1986:332).
The egoistic objection is closely related to the charge
of individualism which is often brought against the
concept of rights, especially in view of the history of
the development of the 'Rights of Man'. Note how this
point is expressed by Eugene Kamenka (1977):
The concept of human rights is a historical product
which evolves in Europe, out of foundations in
Christianity, Stoicism and Roman law with its ius
gentium, but which gains force and direction only
with the contractual and pluralist nature of European
feudalism, church struggles and the rise of
Protestantism and of cities. It sees society as an
association of individuals, as founded - logically or
historically - on a contract between them and it
elevates the individual human person and his freedom
and happiness to be the goal and end of all human
association (Kamenka,1977:6).
Historically, perhaps the most radical example of
individualism and egoism regarding the rights concept is
associated with Hobbes and his notion of a 'Right of
Nature'. In Leviathan (1651) he describes such a right as:
the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as
he will himself, for the preservation of his own
nature; that is to say, of his own life; and
consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own
judgement, and reason, he shall conceive to be the
aptest means thereunto... And because the [natural]
condition of man. . . is a condition of war of every
one against every one;... and there is nothing he can
make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in
preserving his life against his enemies; it
followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a
right to every thing; even to one another's body
(Hobbes,1651:Ch.14;cf.Macpherson,1967:3).
The major problem with a 'right' of this kind is that
it is not really a right in the modern sense, because it
gives no protection to an individual by means of a correl-
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ative duty. And Hobbes himself recognises this when he
states 'But that right of all men to all things, is in
effect no better than if no man had right to anything.
For there is little use and benefit of the right a man
hath, when another as strong, or stronger than himself,
hath right to the same.' (cf.Macpherson,1967:3). In other
words, a right which is just a physical liberty to do
something is worth little or nothing. The legal and moral
concepts of right insist that certain actions have some
protection in relation to others, in view of the judgement
that 'might is not always right'.
Another way of criticising the Hobbesian theory of
natural right is by means of D.D.Raphael's distinction
between 'rights of action' and 'rights of recipience'
(Raphael,1965:207ff). A right of action, according to
Raphael is rather like Hohfeld's liberty-right, defined in
terms of absence of obligation on the part of the right-
holder; a person may act in such a way if she wishes. On
the other hand, the person has no claim against others to
either help her to act or to refrain from interfering in
her activity, as was noted earlier. A right of recipience,
however, does involve obligations or duties on the part of
others; one can expect something, some service, perhaps,
from others. Hobbes's right of nature is a right of action
not a right of recipience. If it is a basic protection and
promotion of human needs, especially of the needs of
weaker human beings, that makes the concept of human
rights important, then they must be rights of recipience
as well as rights of action.
For the other great populariser of the concept of
natural rights or the 'rights of man', John Locke, such
rights are indeed rights of recipience as well as being
rights of action (though he did not use this form of
language). Macpherson shows how Locke is an improvement on
Hobbes with regard to the analysis of natural rights:
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The grounds for claiming Locke as a genuine natural
rights man are apparently clear: (1) His natural
rights are presented as effective rights, rights
which others have a natural obligation to respect.
(2) His natural rights, being less wholesale than
Hobbes's, are more meaningful and more specific
(e.g., the right of private appropriation and the
right of inheritance). (3) Locke uses natural rights
to establish a case for limited government, and to
set up a right to revolution (1967:6).
However, for all the impressiveness of such an
expression of natural rights, Locke ruins his reputation,
in Macpherson's opinion at least, by overriding one of the
limits of natural rights (with regard to property
acquisition), 'thus removing the equality of natural
rights' (Macpherson,1967:6 & 1964:197ff). Because of this
justification of inequality regarding the accumulation of
property the basic individualism of the theory of natural
rights shines through even in Locke. 'Locke's natural man
is bourgeois man: his rational man is man with a
propensity to capital accumulation. He is even an
infinite appropriator' (Macpherson,1967:9).
D.D.Raphael (1965), while accepting that Locke's
natural rights are rights of recipience as well as rights
of action, admits that as rights of recipience they are
largely negative. The natural rights to life, liberty and
property are essentially the right to be left free to
live, left free to do as one chooses, left free to enjoy
the fruits of one's labours (op. cit.,211ff). The
positive rights to aid from others were hardly developed
at all, unlike the modern concept of human rights. As
Kamenka (1977) declares:
The demand for rights in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries was a demand against the
existing state and authorities, against despotism,
arbitrariness and the political disenfranchisement of
those who held different opinions. The demands for
rights in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
becomes increasingly a claim upon the state, a demand
that it provide and guarantee the means for achieving
the individual's happiness and well-being, his
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welfare (op. cit.,5).
Though freedom from despotism and oppression is of
importance, it seems clear that the rights of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were of more value to
some groups than others. The benefit to those who already
had property, education, and a reasonable quality of life
must have been greater than to the poorer sectors of human
society. Thus, natural rights which favour the relatively
strong members of society and leave the weaker members to
'go to the wall' are a clear sign of individualism and
egoism. (Richard Tuck (1979) shows how some treatments of
rights in 17th century political writers tended towards
political absolutism, in which individuals, by entering a
social contract for the sake of peace, give up rights to
resist even the unjust use of power by the sovereign. In
other words, the 'rights' of rulers were held to be of
such an absolute quality that personal 'inalienable'
rights could be overridden. When a person enters a
contract to avoid anarchy, he must be willing to risk the
violation of personal rights in order to avoid greater
harm through the breakdown of social order; cf. Tuck, chs
4&5,on John Selden and his followers.)
The theoretical criticisms of natural rights theory so
far presented are further supported by the historical
evidence of the practice of respect for rights in the
American and French Revolutions. The equal rights of all
men in the American Declaration of Independence to 'Life,
Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness' did not extend to
slaves. In fact, the contemporary American constitution
did not contain a Bill of Rights; Americans had to wait
until 1791 for this. The Reign of Terror in France
disappointed many of the European liberals who had
expected so much from the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and the Citizen (1789).
The moral criticism of the language of rights in the
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wake of the French Revolution seems to have come equally
from liberals, conservatives, and socialists to use the
rather crude labels of popular political science. From
the liberal point of view, Jeremy Bentham attacked the
doctrine of natural rights in his Anarchical Fallacies
(1843). Part of his criticism was conceptual. As a legal
positivist, Bentham only had time for rights which had the
sanction of law. Hence, 'natural rights' were a nonsense.
But he also criticised the language of natural rights from
a moral angle. On this point Jeremy Waldron (1987) states
that 'by the mid-1790s he [Bentham] was convinced that
talk of natural rights was not merely nonsense in a good
cause, but 'terrorist language', 'mischievous' and
'dangerous nonsense' (Waldron,1987:40).
Bentham associated the Terror of the 1790s with the
fall away from law legitimised in part by the rhetoric of
natural rights. According to Waldron, Bentham was of the
opinion that human life without positive law would be
characterised by the warlike situation described by Hobbes
as life 'before' the social contract. The Reign of Terror
was ample evidence of the disastrous results of moving
away from pragmatic legal sanctions used to control social
life. Moreover, the language of rights, Bentham thought,
could be used to obstruct much needed social reform which
enlightened government might be expected to introduce.
This might happen as a result of appeals to inalienable
and imprescriptible natural rights belonging to
individuals. What was needed as the moral standard for
political reform, in Bentham's opinion, was the
utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness of the
greatest number.
Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France
(1790) represents a conservative reaction to rights-
language. Again one can say that Burke's critique of the
language of natural rights is partly conceptual and partly
moral and political. Conceptually, Burke attacked the
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French Declaration of The Rights of Man for its generality
and for its 'metaphysical abstraction' (cf. Waldron,
1987:97). For Burke, slogans like 'Liberty, Equality, and
Fraternity' could not be depended on to organise political
life. Instead, what is required is a careful study of the
circumstances of each 'civil and political scheme'
(Waldron,1987:85). Morally and politically, Burke felt
that the French Revolution had more or less 'thrown out
the baby with the bath-water'. He admitted that the ancien
regime was in need of reform, but he believed that the
Revolution had done away with many of the good things in
the traditional political system. The important values in
his political morality were, according to Waldron,
'conservatism, caution and respect for establishment'
(ibid.88). Instead of building on sound foundations such
as these, the abstract theorists of the Revolution had
given way to the anarchy of individual interpretations of
rights. And even if the majority of citizens agreed on
certain interpretations of rights, such a democracy only
served to make Burke fearful of the tyranny of the
majority, whereby the rights of minorities would be
violated. Burke preferred the notion of a political elite
ruling the nation, guided by and judged by the value of
service to the common good.
The socialist critique of rights-language as found in
the writings of Karl Marx concentrates on the fundamental
contradiction between the 'Rights of Man' and the reality
of capitalist society in which these rights are supposed
to be implemented. Marx held that capitalists
traditionally utilised the concept of rights to break down
the feudal system, in order to insist on the alienability
of land and the equality of the right to possession and
acquisition. In practice, however, the language of natural
rights tends to be used in an ideological way as a
protection of the 'interests' of a minority group or
class. As in Bentham, Marx felt that talk of rights can
easily become a smoke-screen either to support the status
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quo or to hide the refusal to bring about radical
egalitarian reform. According to Marx, it is in the
interest of the bourgeoisie to encourage the doctrine of
rights at an abstract level, whilst the basic corruption
of the social structure, which obstructs the
implementation of the true doctrine of equal rights, is
concealed, (cf.Marx's On the Jewish Question (1844) in
Waldron,1987; Meszaros,1978:47-61).
Christian theologians have frequently recognised the
individualistic and egoistic nature of the traditional
doctrine of the rights of man. David Hollenbach (1979),
for instance, cites the work of Macpherson (1964) in
studying the rights doctrine of Hobbes and Locke. The
conclusion is that 'the liberal rights theory is
compatible with the presence of extreme want in a society,
even when the resources necessary to eliminate it are
present.' (Hollenbach,1979:15 ) . This state of affairs is
made possible by the liberal emphasis on negative freedom
and defensive rights. Jose Miguez Bonino (1980) says of
the eighteenth century rights proclamations: 'Human rights
are defined in this stage in the perspective of the
individualism that characterises modern thought. There is,
no doubt, a primacy of the economic dimension of this
individualism.' (Bonino,1980:25) . Wolfgang Huber (1979) is
yet another theologian to study the history of the concept
of human rights, and he has this to say about the American
and French revolutionary movements: 'Human rights were
demanded equally for all; their formulation was not, of
course, entirely free from the limitations of class
consciousness, and their content bears the stamp of an
attitude of bourgeois possessive individualism.'
(Huber,1979:5).
All in all, then, the history of the concept of rights
tends to have an inbuilt bias towards individualism and
egoism. Often the kind of individualism and egoism hidden
in the proclamations of the rights of man was of the group
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or class variety, since there can be a group egoism or
selfishness just as easily as there can be the self-
centred preoccupation of single individuals. But the
question remains whether this tendency gives sufficient
reason for eliminating rights-language from present day
moral vocabulary? Do the points made in preceding pages
undermine the moral respectability of the language of
rights?
Let me begin my response to the objection above with
Gewirth's own answer. This involves what he entitles the
'Principle of Generic Consistency', which when applied to
rights appears in the form: 'Act in accord with the
generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself.'
(Gewirth,1986:338ff.). This principle is a version of the
principle of universalizability or of generalization,
which is widely held to be a necessary principle of
morality. Dorothy Emmet (1966) has called this principle
a 'constitutive rule':
A constitutive rule in morality would be a necessary
condition for a practice being called a moral
practice at all. One candidate for such a con¬
stitutive rule has been called by Mr Hare and others
'Universalizability' (Emmet,1966:59).
Emmet goes on to explain this point. It involves the
rule 'treat like cases alike, and different cases
differently', or put more precisely, 'if it is right to
treat A in a certain way, it is right also so to treat
others who resemble A in the relevant respect.' (ibid.).
The practical value of this formal criterion of ethics is
that 'it excludes arbitrariness in the sense of
inconsistency in the application of a principle.'
(ibid.,62).
Now Gewirth shows that human rights as moral concepts
necessarily involve the criterion of universalizability or
the principle of generic consistency. Thus all humans must
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seek to respect the basic rights of others as well as
claiming them for themselves. One cannot accept that
there are other humans in the world besides oneself, but
refuse to accord these others human rights one claims for
oneself. One could argue this point from a purely-
prudential position, that one will not get far in having
one's interests protected if one fails to recognise a
corresponding duty to respect and protect the interests of
others. However, a more satisfactory argument appeals to
the general relationship that must exist between
individuals sharing the same basic nature. Being a member
of the human race involves a kind of kinship which demands
some level of altruism in living a human life. The
language of human rights reflects this altruism of kinship
in theory, though in practice humanity tends to be
distracted by what has been called above (2.5) the 'ethics
of strangers'. The notion of equality which was seen to
be a necessary assumption of the theory of natural or
human rights is a difficult assumption to accept in
practice. If it were accepted in practice, so many of the
duties and obligations which are now thought to be related
to charity or beneficence would be included in the
category of strict justice. Because the hungry of the
Third World are equal with the people of the First and
Second Worlds only in terms of their abstract humanity
their interests are not strictly respected. If the poor
of the world could be seen as human in the sense of being
part of the human family , then their 'rights' in justice
could be truly respected.
I think that W.Huber is highly perceptive when he makes
this comment on the famous slogan of the French
Revolution:
It is interesting to note, however, that the third
element of the slogan, fraternity, did not find its
way into the human rights documents of the
Revolution. Fraternity is not a claim before the law
but rather an attitude, a 'virtue' in the classical
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sense of the term (Huber,1979:6).
What follows from this remark is the conclusion that
the theory of human rights has long remained on the
abstract level, accepting in an abstract manner the
equality of all human beings, but missing out on the heart
of this equality in the concept and virtue of fraternity.
In other words, the concept of human rights, of respecting
the basic interests of all humans requires some serious
effort to see oneself as part of a universal family in
more than a rhetorical or sentimental sense. Thus, there
is an antidote to the historical individualism and egoism
associated with the liberal human rights tradition in the
almost forgotten, but central, aspect of fraternity,
without which the concept of a human right remains
abstract and without a heart. (For an interesting
application of the concept of fraternity to the question
of the just distribution of medical resources, cf.
Campbell,1978:83ff.) In a sense, the doctrine of human
rights has not failed, it just has not been tried or
implemented as it should, by taking into account the
challenge presented by its originators to see those far
away as brothers and sisters rather than as strangers with
little or no claim on one. The real challenge of the human
rights tradition is to widen the circle of those regarded
as equal and to see equality in a personal rather than in
an abstract way. The abuse of the doctrine of human rights
does not lead to an elimination of that doctrine as
morally disreputable, since there is still a core truth
which, once recognised, is at the heart of human moral
endeavour.
There is some danger in admitting that the history of
the doctrine of human rights is characterised in part by
ethical individualism. The reason for this is that
'Individualism' is by definition a negative concept with
heavily pejorative meaning. So, admitting the charge of
individualism is a bit like admitting to the charge of
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murder (another negative concept), and then trying to
justify oneself. Steven Lukes (1973) says that:
Ethical individualism is a view of the nature of
morality as essentially individual. In the seven¬
teenth and eighteenth centuries this may be seen as
having taken the form of ethical egoism, according to
which the sole moral object of the individual's
action is his own benefit. Thus the various versions
of self-interest ethics, from Hobbes onwards,
maintained that one should seek to secure one's own
good, not that of society as a whole or of other
individuals (Lukes,1973:99).
I think I have shown already in a satisfactory way that
the deep theory of human rights involves elements of
altruism, equality and fraternity. The fact that the
language of rights can be used in a reactionary way does
not take away from the basic aspirations deeply embedded
in the concept of universal human rights. I accept fully
the statement of Alan Falconer of the Irish School of
Ecumenics (1980): 'Rights, however, do not solely emerge
in the conflict to secure the protection from interference
by other individuals or groups. They also emerge as an
aspiration. Human rights are values to be protected or
encouraged.' (Falconer,1980:204). This should not be
surprising in the light of Christian insistence on the sin
of humankind. Just as rights arise because of human
conflict, a conflict which is often destructive, so the
attempt to overcome such conflict can itself be infected
with the sin of the world.
In spite of the dangers of individualism and egoism
associated with the language of rights, it is important to
note that individualism is in fact a perversion of a
closely related value, namely, 'individuality'. The
American Roman Catholic theologian Daniel Callaghan (1965)
has written in praise of individuality, arguing that
Catholics must avoid two extremes, one of complete
'docility to authority combined with conformity to the
prevailing piety of the Catholic community', the other of
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'pure self-direction..., a refusal to accept any part of
the collective whole.' (Callaghan,1965:163). Callaghan
then states that 'it is only as a unique individual that
one can be a Christian.' (ibid.).
Another theologian, Thomas Ogletree (1985) recognises
that in Christian ethics 'in shifting the locus of
origination in moral experience from the dynamics of self-
integration to the call of the other, the moral subject
appears to lose all rights before the other.'
(Ogletree,1985:51). And in response to this threat he
speaks up for 'being good to self', or as he puts it 'The
first word may be: enable enjoyment, and not: be
responsible to and for your neighbour. Grace is prior to
commandment.' (ibid,53). Jurgen Moltmann (1980) is highly
critical of Christian apologetics for defaming the 'will
to self-actualisation as irreligious', but he insists that
there is a kind of self-actualisation that has nothing to
do with egoism but is part of the love commandment 'love
your neighbour as yourself' (Moltmann, 1980:188). This is
applied directly to the notion of claiming one's' own
rights. It is part and parcel of God's command to love
self properly.
Note how some modern authors have stressed that human
rights are really protections for individuals against the
state (cf. McCloskey and Wellman, op. cit.). And recall
Dworkin's concept of rights as trumps against utilitarian
considerations of general welfare. Consider, too, the
emphasis in marxist states on social and economic rights
rather than on individual freedom of speech and
conscience. Given these positions, there is still a need
to protect the individual human being against group
tyranny. There is a richness which individuals bring to
the notion of human nature in practice which must be
respected by the language of rights, as has been noted
already in the discussion of Macdonald's critique of
natural rights (cf.2.6).
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Does respect for individuality mean that the common
good of society is thereby harmed? Not necessarily, must
be the answer. It is difficult to see how the common good
can be based on the violation of individual rights;
indeed, this is one of the common arguments against cruder
forms of act-utilitarianism, that it is willing to
sacrifice individual basic goods for what it considers to
be the general welfare. There must not be an exaggeration
of the tension between the good of individuals and the
good of groups, including the state. In fact, humans
often have a desire to cooperate in communal activities.
John Finnis (1980) devotes a chapter of his book
Natural law and Natural Rights to showing this general
desire to act with others in ways that bring about
individual well-being as well as the well-being of others
(Finnis,1980:Ch VI). Very often, in fact, the individual
well-being fades into the background as cooperating actors
concentrate on some shared good, as in 'play'. As Finnis
puts it, 'the central feature and good of play is that the
activity or performance is valued by the participants for
its own sake, and is itself the source of their pleasure
or satisfaction.' (ibid.,140). In other words, it is a
mistake to think of all people acting all the time from
motives of personal satisfaction. Clearly, Finnis
believes that humans can be altruistic in many situations,
especially in relationships of friendship and family.
But, interestingly, he insists that altruism, the going
out of oneself in service to others, requires that one has
something individual to give.
...[0]ne can give nothing to a friend unless one has
something of one's own to give. One cannot even have
him to dinner if one has no food save one's own
ration. You say, let him bring his own food, it is
the sharing that counts. But what am I sharing with
him? My shelter, warmth, living-space. You say, have
dinner together in the communal eating place. But
still I have to give him my company, my attention and
interest, which I thereby deny to someone else
(ibid.,144).
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If the common good is to be served, then, the individual
contributions of the community must be protected in the
first place. The common good is built on the riches of the
individual personalities making it up.
Finally, in defending the concept of rights against the
charge of individualism and egoism, one can underline the
various movements in recent times which struggle to obtain
respect for the rights of different oppressed groups. One
need only think of White liberals in South Africa
sacrificing their own security in order to draw attention
to the human rights abuses visited on the majority Black
population. And there are many other examples of
individuals and groups acting in dedicated support for the
rights of minority groups from basically altruistic
motives (cf. Smith,1986:557, for references to such
individuals and groups: Martin Luther King; Feminists; and
Liberation Theologians). In other words, not all rights-
claims are self-centred and egoistic.
3.3 The Adversarial Objection
This objection may perhaps be seen as an extension of the
preceding one. Recalling the notion of rights as claims,
or as entitlements which enable one to claim, the present
objection is that such a possibility of claiming tends to
thrust people into adversarial and 'potentially coercive
relations whereby each seeks to impose burdens on others
for his own benefit' (Gewirth,1986:332).
Another way of expressing this position is found in
Simone Weil's remark to the effect that
rights-language has a commercial flavour, essentially
evocative of legal claims and arguments. Rights are
always asserted in tones of contention; and when this
tone is adopted, it must rely upon force in the
background or else it will be laughed at (Weil,1949;
cited in Young,1978: ).
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Here the morally jarring quality of claiming one's rights
is underlined. The objection seems to bring one to the
other extreme from those who oppose rights-language from a
legal positivist approach. Bentham considered moral
rights as nonsense because they lacked legal sanction to
back their exercise. Now Weil holds that such an approach
would only do more harm than good because of the
contentious nature of claiming against others who fail to
respect rights.
The Christian moralist, Stanley Hauerwas, has also
concentrated on the adversarial tendency of claiming
rights. In his Suffering Presence (1986) Hauerwas
discusses the appropriateness of references to the rights
of children and is heavily critical of this approach to
their welfare. But his dissatisfaction with the
application of the language of rights to children is part
of a wider dissatisfaction with the language of rights in
general. He sees the language of rights as a reflection of
society's individualism and goes on to say that
Rights are necessary when it is assumed that citizens
fundamentally relate to one another as strangers, if
not outright enemies. From such a perspective
society appears as a collection of individuals who of
necessity must enter into a bargain to insure their
individual survival through providing for the
survival of the society. (Hauerwas,1986 :128)
From this point of view, Hauerwas suggests, one can see,
how inappropriate it is to speak of children having
rights, for it assumes that children are merely another
interest group in need of protection from other interest
groups, 'including their parents' (ibid.,125).
Moreover, the morally jarring effect of claiming one's
rights is reminiscent of Stephen Toulmin's attack on 'the
tyranny of principles' (cf.2.5 above). Toulmin speaks of
'the stresses of lawsuits' in the United States - 'the
homeland of the adversary system'- all the time seeing
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this as a symptom of the 'ethics of strangers' (op.
cit.,35ff.). When persons are in the habit of claiming
their rights at a moment's notice, is not this a sign of
the 'ethics of strangers'? Nevertheless, Toulmin
recognises that there are limits to the adversarial system
in practice in the U.S., which takes some of the bite out
of the adversarial objection:
Even in the United States, the homeland of the
adversary system, at least two types of disputes -
labor-management conflicts and the renegotiation of
commercial contracts - are dealt with by using
arbitration or conciliation rather than con¬
frontation. This is no accident. In a criminal
prosecution or a routine civil damage suit arising
out of a car collision, the parties are normally
complete strangers before the proceedings and have no
stake in one another's future, so no harm is done if
they walk out of court vowing never to set eyes on
each other again. By contrast, the parties to a
labor grievance will normally wish to continue
working together after the adjudication, while the
disputants in a commercial arbitration may well
retain or resume business dealings with one another
despite the present disagreement. In cases of these
kinds, the psychological stress of the adversary
system can be quite destructive:...(ibid.,35).
I feel that this example provides some answer to the
adversarial objection and the morally jarring quality of
rights-claims. There are in certain circumstances ways of
claiming rights, involving more or less peaceful
arbitration, which accepts that some kind of harmonious
relationship beneficial to all parties in the dispute is
to be maintained afterwards. In other words, the morally
jarring quality of rights as claims is limited to those
situations where the persons claimed against remain as
strangers, outside the circle of one's intimacy. And in so
far as one makes an attempt to draw strangers into that
circle of intimacy, one has to show greater care in
claiming in an adversarial sense. In fact, ideally the
adversarial sense of rights as claims should be relegated
to situations where relationships between persons have
broken down to such an extent that they have to be separ-
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ated, each receiving what is due as a result of the life
of the relationship. I am thinking here in particular of
marriages and friendships which break down. I envisage
the language of rights in such circumstances as a way of
salvaging some justice from the situation. In other
words, I accept that there will be some situations in
which rights-language must be used against a background of
bitterness and hurt; but I insist that this use need not
be the primary use of the language of rights. People can
accept that conflict is a part of life and that mutual
rights in such situations can be negotiated and upheld.
The adversarial objection appears to be related more to
the language of claiming rights than to the language of
having claims and entitlements. The presumption of this
objection seems to be that all rights must be claimed and
that all right-holders will naturally spend their time
taking their neighbours to court. But, of course, this
presumption is false. In a number of cases of possessing
rights, claiming is inappropriate because of the
circumstances. For instance, Robin Downie (1969), in his
discussion of the 'right to criticise' mentions the case
of the tutor who has the right to criticise a student, but
should not exercise this right in certain cases, e.g.
close to an examination, when such criticism might
seriously undermine the confidence of the student
(Downie,1969:122-123) . Claiming the right to criticise
would be singularly inappropriate at such a time.
Another way of expressing the limits to claiming rights
is by reference to the distinction made already between
mandatory and discretionary rights. Where a right is
discretionary the right-holder is permitted to waive her
claim more or less at will. Indeed, whenever the emphasis
on claiming rights becomes too insistent, it needs to be
supplemented by the emphasis on the power to waive rights-
claims. Sometimes, in order to avoid the bitterness of
adversarial proceedings, right-holders' waiving of rights
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may amount to acts of supererogation. Needless to say,
the power to waive a right is severely limited in the case
of mandatory rights (and does not exist in the case of
inalienable rights), and whenever a right is waived the
motives and reasons of the person should be examined,
since waiving rights may be an easy option for some,
rather than having to face up to necessary (though
ultimately positive) conflict which comes with claiming.
I should also mention the limits to claiming associated
with manifesto rights as described by Feinberg (1970).
These 'claims' refer to basic needs of persons which for
various reasons cannot be fulfilled in the foreseeable
future. Feinberg gives the example of young orphans in the
Third World and their needs as a case of possessing such a
right (op. cit.,153). It is inappropriate for the poor
children of Latin America to claim a right not to be
poor, since the immediate possibilities of alleviating
their poverty are non-existent. As a long-term goal,
respect for the rights of the poor of the Third World, in
the sense of individualised, specific needs, regarded as
basic in the developed lands, is something to be
encouraged. But attempting to claim the impossible or the
Utopian makes little or no sense. Rights-claims should be
kept as specific and as practical as possible if they are
to be correlated with workable duties or obligations.
(cf.0'Neill,1986:100, 'Holders of rights can press their
claims only when the obligations to meet these claims have
been allocated to specified bearers of obligations.')
In spite of the adversarial objection, then, I prefer
to follow the example of Feinberg and stand by the value
of claiming:
Even if there are conceivable circumstances in which
one would admit rights diffidently, there is no doubt
that their characteristic use and that for which they
are distinctively well suited, is to be claimed,
demanded, affirmed, insisted upon. They are
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especially sturdy objects to "stand upon," a most
useful sort of moral furniture....This feature of
rights is connected in a way with the customary
rhetoric about what it is to be a human being.
Having rights enables us to "stand up like men," to
look others in the eye, and to feel in some funda¬
mental way the equal of anyone (ibid.,151).
3.4 Can a Good Man be Harmed?
This question is the title of an article by the
philosopher Peter Winch (1972). Indirectly, the question
and the article present a further kind of radical
scepticism about the rights people ordinarily claim. If
Winch's argument is successful, so many of the claims
humans make today will have to be set aside as
unimportant, or, worse, as morally distracting.
A 'Harm' and the Good Man
Winch presents a number of examples of the thesis that a
good man cannot be harmed, but feels 'absolutely safe'.
Let me mention just one of these examples. In modern
times, Wittgenstein (1965:8) has noted an experience which
he says is not uncommon, namely, 'the experience of
feeling absolutely safe.' What sense can one make of this
remark?
It appears that Wittgenstein regarded such safety as
being a possible feature of one's fitting into the moral
language game, within which an absolute value is given to
the pursuit of the good. For Wittgenstein the moral
language game commits the participator to certain values
which bind him or her uncompromisingly. One can see how
binding moral values are by contrasting two uses of the
term 'ought'. If I am a mediocre tennis player and
someone challenges me saying 'You ought to play better',
there is no obligation to heed this advice or command.
There is nothing wrong in saying, 'I am quite happy play-
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ing at this level.' On the other hand, if I behave badly,
by lying for instance, I cannot set aside the criticism
'You ought to be truthful.', by saying 'I am quite happy
being a liar'. To say something like that is to fail to
understand the moral language game and to put oneself
outside of it.
Thus, within the moral language game the language of
duty and obligation in relation to the pursuit of the good
has an absolute status. As long as one pursues the good
one cannot be harmed. In other words, according to the
line of argument I am following, the good man can be
harmed only when he gives in to sin. His fall from grace
is the only real tragedy from the moral point of view.
How is scepticism about the language of rights derived
from the notion that the good man cannot be harmed? The
immediate answer is that so much of the language of rights
is directed towards protecting people from harm in the
ordinary sense of pain and suffering and deprivation. In
fact, claims to be protected from suffering have
proliferated to a bewildering extent, distracting humanity
from the 'one thing necessary' - pursuing the good. To
give serious attention to any 'harm' other than moral harm
may be in itself harmful. It seems to me that this
objection works best in conjunction with the two previous
objections of individualism/egoism and the adversarial
trend of modern society, perhaps even adding further a
kind of 'slippery slope' argument.
When persons begin to claim all sorts of rights to what
might be called 'pre-moral' goods (that is goods or values
seen in the abstract apart from particular situations of
choice by moral agents), e.g. health, education,
employment, participation in government, and so on, there
is a real danger of undermining one's moral character
through entering into conflict with others, making false
claims, exaggerating one's needs. It is so easy to be
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drawn into sin by the power which claiming gives the
individual. According to this point of view, even
seemingly unselfish claims for the sake of others must be
viewed with some suspicion, since fighting for the rights
of others can be just as damaging morally as fighting for
one's own rights. In both cases the 'fighting' or
'struggle' can be harmful in the true 'moral' sense.
The approach so far described can be applied in
practice in at least two ways. On one hand, one could
adopt a high stoic approach which counsels a radical
detachment from the goods of this world. This would allow
a person to minimise the pain of losing his or her
participation in such goods, and there would be less
temptation to make claims which add to the conflict and
disharmony of moral life. The advice, in other words, is
that people should not get too interested in their health
or wealth (to take just two examples), because such goods
are precarious, and when they are deprived of them
depression and anger may be the result. Then they may
start making claims against others, getting into" the
adversarial trend and ultimately falling away from pursuit
of the Good. On the other hand, there is a less radical
approach which permits the enjoyment of goods like health
and wealth, but is willing to let these goods go without a
struggle rather than get involved in 'sinful' conflict.
B 'Harm' and the Faithful Person
It is at this stage that I can introduce a clearly
theological note. In my opinion, the philosophical
discussion of the possibility of limiting the concept of
harm to moral harm, the harm to moral character, has
marked Christian echoes, beginning in the early Church and
appearing again and again throughout Christian tradition.
Many of the New Testament writings reveal the struggles
of a small, powerless and persecuted group. The earliest
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strands of the literature, especially the letters to the
Thessalonians and Corinthians, are marked by strong
eschatological expectations which colour the moral out¬
look of the early community (cf.Sanders,1986;
Schnackenburg,1965 : Partll, chl; Ogletree,1984:chs.4&6;
Houlden,1973:9-13; . There is an air of detachment from
worldly goods in Paul's advice to the Corinthians on
adopting a state of life, such as marriage (I
Cor.7:26,31). Some Christians took detachment to an
extreme and decided to abstain from working, and Paul had
to warn against this in his second letter to the
Thessalonians (2 Thess.3:6-12).
Clearly, New Testament morality, like Old Testament
morality before it, emphasises community as opposed to
individualism. Speaking of pauline morality, John
Ferguson (1973) comments on this communitarian emphasis:
The keyword is here koinonia, which is variously
rendered fellowship, communion, contribution,
distribution, partnership, sharing and other terms in
such a way as to obscure the fact that it is a common
thread running through the New Testament. The word
comes in Acts, of the common life of the church
(2,42), and of the sharing of material resources
(4,32). Both passages are to be seen in the light of
the immediately preceding gift of the Holy Spirit
(Ferguson,1973:73).
No wonder, then, that Paul takes the Corinthians to
task for the disputes which undermine the peace of the
community. In fact, some of these disputes between
Christians were brought out into the open in the pagan
courts, to Paul's evident disgust. 'To have lawsuits at
all with one another is defeat for you. Why not rather
suffer wrong? Why not rather be defrauded? But you
yourself wrong and defraud, and that even your own
brethren.'(I Cor.6:7-8,RSV.). These words appear to be a
critique of individual selfishness in claiming against
others, when individual sacrifices ought to be made for
the sake of the good of the community. Moreover, there is
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a hint of the view that a good man cannot be harmed
ultimately, since the apostle counsels allowing oneself to
be wronged rather than doing wrong. This is not to say
that Paul failed to see such sacrifices as harmful to some
extent, only that such suffering was ultimately worthwhile
in the light of God's fidelity to his promises. For
instance, one should keep in mind the eschatological
perspective of the Christian community seen as joining in
the judgement of the world when the End at last comes (I
Cor.6:2,cf.Houlden,1975:11).
One further scriptural example which is related to the
safety of the good man comes from the first letter of St.
Peter. On the subject of the various duties which the
Christian must undertake, the writer refers to the duties
of servants to their masters (I Pet. 2,18ff.). The duty
of service is not just to the good and kindly but also to
those who are harsh. There is no merit in suffering when
one is being punished justly, but there is merit in
suffering injustice patiently. The reason given for this
is that it is part of the Christian's imitation of Christ,
who suffered for their sakes and left them this suffering
as an example to follow. Christ's redemptive suffering has
brought humanity, seen as straying sheep, back to the
shepherd of their souls. In the midst of suffering there
is still a sense of safety in the hands of God. Comment¬
ing on the admonition to suffer humbly in this epistle, R.
Schnackenburg (1965) states that this 'is not an ethical
admonition making a virtue out of necessity, but springs
from the religious insight, that God alone can change the
ultimate darkness of this world era, that only he can
"exalt you in the time of visitation" (5:6).'
(Schnackenburg,1965:370) .
The objection may now be presented which argues that
there is little sense in protesting against injustice, and
claiming one's rights, when one is part of a tiny
persecuted sect in a backwater of the Roman Empire.
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Surely the early Christian subordination to the ruling
powers was simply a sign of the wise policy of 'keeping
one's head down' and 'not making waves'. And, one might
add, when Christianity became more established it soon
found its voice in claiming what it thought was its due.
This objection may well be partly valid, but it can easily
enough be countered with the claim that the Church was
merely following its Lord's advice to be 'as wise as
serpents and as simple as doves'(Mt.10:16) . However, I
think there is more theologically to the examples
mentioned above than a concerted attempt to close ranks
and provide a respectable front for jews and pagans alike.
It seems to me that the New Testament doctrine on the
essential safety of those who love God and do good remains
as a valuable critique of efforts to brand all kinds of
suffering as harmful, and which leads to the bewildering
proliferation of rights in modern times. For one thing,
the suffering that Christians must bear does not come to
an end when the crudest of persecutions are over. The
rejection of immoderate personal claims is not merely a
feature of the time when the Church expected an imminent
Parousia. In every age the call goes out to Christians to
embrace 'the fellowship of Christ's sufferings'.
In his article, 'The Fellowship of his Sufferings',
Barnabas Ahern (1965) situates this conception in the life
and teaching of St. Paul:
Through conversion St. Paul gained a new spiritual
life. On the road to Damascus he received from the
risen Christ the messianic gift of the Holy Spirit
who ever after inspired and ruled his activity as
that of a true son of God. For the Apostle this
meant, in the expressive phrase of Philippians 3:10,
that he had come to know Christ, "in the power of his
resurrection." But that was not all. He affirms in
the same breath that, through conversion, he came to
know also "the fellowship of his sufferings." This
significant addition is in accord with the polarity
of all Pauline thought which joins death and
resurrection as two inseparable aspects of the same
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salvific mystery, whether in the life of Christ or in
the lives of Christians (Ahern,1965:95)
It would be a serious mistake, however, to think that
the call to fellowship in the sufferings of Christ is
limited to the group of apostles or to a certain period of
time at the start of the Church's history. This call to
fellowship in the sufferings of Christ and through these
sufferings to the glory of the resurrection, is the basis
of the Christian reality of baptism into Christ. For all
the baptised there is a call to follow the Master through
suffering and death into new life. There is no other way
for the Christian to be saved. Ahern remarks on this
striking feature of Paul's doctrine on Baptism:
For him sacramental death marks the point of
departure for an altogether new life, in which the
Christian ever remains "dead to sin, but alive to
God" (Rom.6:11). This is possible only because, in
Baptism, the Christian shares the very Spirit of
Christ which endures forever in the body-person to
which the new member is united (ibid.,107).
This sacramental death must not be unduly
'spiritualised', as if no struggle is involved in
accepting Baptism in the first place, and afterwards in
living out the implications of the new life in the Spirit.
Consider, for instance, the doctrine in Galatians where
Christians are said to have 'crucified their flesh with
its passions and desires' (Gal.5:24). On this, Ahem warns
that 'The word "crucified" is not a mere figure. Baptism
gives a share in the death which loving fidelity to God's
will produced in Christ, so that Paul could write, "With
Christ I have been nailed to the cross" (Gal.2:19)
(ibid.,108). (For a truly profound discussion of this
passage in relation to 'Grace as power in, and as mercy
towards, man',cf. R.Niebuhr,1943:vol. 11,111-123) There
is a real personal struggle in passing from the life of
the flesh to the life of the Spirit, and walking in the
Spirit itself is a constant challenge. Thus there is a
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constant tension in the Christian life between what has
already happened to the individual in his or her calling
and what needs to be achieved. A.hern puts it well,
Christian life, therefore, involves an enduring
paradox. The Christian, on the one hand, lives on an
eschatological plane, sharing the risen life of the
Savior and His love for the Father. Paul writes in
the name of every Christian, "I live, now not I, but
Christ lives in me" (Gal.2:20). On the other hand,
the activity of the Holy Spirit has not yet
transformed the whole of man, nor the whole of the
world around him (ibid.,109).
In the Pauline doctrine discussed so far, then, there
is a sense of realism about the suffering that must be
endured by Christians, and, at the same time, a sense of
confidence in the possession of the believer by God's
Spirit (cf.Marshall,1946:269 'The gift of the Holy Spirit
has profound ethical as well as religious results.').
This is particularly clear in Romans where Paul describes
the 'terminus of Christian experience, "If we are sons, we
are heirs also: heirs indeed of God and joint heirs with
Christ, since we suffer with him that we may also be
glorified with him. For I reckon that the sufferings of
this present time are not worthy to be compared with the
glory to come to be revealed in us" (Rom.8:17f)' (Cf.
Ahern,1965:111).
With regard to the language of rights the Christian
perspective on being involved in the fellowship of
Christ's suffering tends to undermine what I regard to be
one of the main pillars of the ethos of claiming rights.
This ethos assumes that suffering and pain are always
harmful, have no redeeming features, and must always be
the object of claims for relief. The Christian tradition,
as I have outlined it, is not willing to accept such an
assumption about the sufferings of this world
(cf.Hauerwas,1986:165ff. for a good description of human
ambivalence in the face of suffering.). Some sufferings
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are inevitable and represent a vital aspect of the
Christian way of life (cf. Hick,1966:358-363, for the view
that a world without suffering would be impoverished
because of the lack of opportunity to practice certain
virtues,eg. compassion and courage.). Baptism is both a
'tomb and a womb', the Christian must die in order to
live, and the painful death to self, to all that opposes
God's will, continues throughout one's earthly life. The
claiming of rights, on the other hand, tends to become
linked with strenuous efforts to avoid all suffering.
This form of language is associated with individual
autonomy and power over one's life, whereas Christianity
tends towards a recognition of the necessity of human
weakness, service of others rather than developing
personal power and autonomy, and a total dependence on the
grace and will of God. There is even the temptation
presented by the language of rights of becoming like the
pharisee of the Gospel, marching to the front of God's
house and claiming against Him.
The Christian way offers a theology of suffering which
relativises the concept of 'harm'. Clearly, the most
serious harm that can occur to the believer is alienation
from God through sin. Earlier I mentioned that this New
Testament view of 'harm' has been echoed down through the
ages in the Christian tradition. Before offering some
criticism of this stance in relation to the language of
rights, I want to discuss briefly two examples from the
Christian tradition which attempt to remain faithful to
the theology discussed above.
3.5 The Franciscan Tradition
The fact that Francesco Bernardone remains one of the most
popular saints of the Christian Church and has such a wide
appeal even today, suggests that his interpretation of,
and living out of, the Christian faith should be taken
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seriously. Unfortunately, the attractiveness of St.
Francis for many is based on a superficial and sentimental
understanding of his life and teaching. If there is one
thing that St.Francis was not, it was the caricature of a
nature loving hippy that is sometimes presented for public
consumption. He was above all a man who took the imitation
of Christ seriously, an almost literal imitation which
concentrated on the poverty and obedience of Jesus. The
question of poverty has always been a controversial one in
the Franciscan tradition, often narrowly focussing on a
material interpretation of this evangelical virtue
(cf.Esser,1970:228-240; Moorman,1968:chs 16&25). More im¬
portant than this, however, is a more profound
interpretation of poverty, as mentioned in the following
quotation from Simon Tugwell (1985):
In the later Franciscan tradition it is precisely
material poverty which is regarded as crucial, and
this in turn comes to mean little more than legal
poverty; but for Francis himself the essential
poverty is seen in the abandonment of rights, in the
abandonment of one's own will. In one of his
Admonitions he is quite explicit: 'Who is it who
abandons everything he possesses? It is the person
who yields himself totally to obedience in the hands
of his superior (Admonition 3:3) (Tugwell,1985:129).
Of course, Francis would not have expressed his
vocation in terms of the language of rights, since that
form of language was unknown in his day, but Tugwell is
wise to use this language to describe and explore
Francis's basic attitude. Consider again the language
used earlier to elucidate the rights concept - claims,
entitlements, powers and liberties - and it has to be said
that Francis turned these on their head. The 'Poor Man of
Assisi' called his followers fratres minores or lesser
brothers. This means in the words of Tugwell:
Francis wants his friars to be minores precisely in
the sense that they are never to be in a position to
control things, they are to be at the mercy of
whatever happens (ibid.,129).
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But control over things and avoidance of being at the
mercy of whatever happens is the basic rationale of rights
language, the very opposite of the Franciscan spirit,
which is sometimes said to be a recovery of the true
spirit of the Gospel. Francis did not seek security and
protection for himself or his followers. This is a
position founded on a particular understanding of divine
providence. As Tugwell expresses it, 'If this is God's
world, ruled by his providence, we ought not to have to
protect ourselves against it. Whatever happens is God's
gift to us.' (ibid.,130). Tugwell sees this whole stress
on 'radical unprotectedness' as based on a Christological
foundation. Francis wished to imitate the unprotectedness
of Christ. This is the true background to Francis' love
of nature, a love which was far from sentimental:
The exposure to nature which is a genuine part of
Franciscan tradition is not primarily a matter of
fresh air and fun, it is most typically a sharing in
Christ's exposure to maltreatment and rejection.
Francis was no romantic, sentimentalising and
idealising the raw life of nature; he knew very well
what happens to people who strip off the customary
ways we have devised of insulating ourselves against
the world outside: they get crucified. But it is only
on the basis of a readiness to be crucified that
redemption can operate (ibid.,132-133).
It is reasoning of this kind that explains the sense in
which Francis of Assisi must have experienced what
Wittgenstein was trying to express in the position that
the good man may feel safe, though suffering harm in the
ordinary sense of that word. In Francis's case, the
feeling of being absolutely safe is based on nothing else
but a profound faith in the working of a loving divine
providence. He was a firm believer in the phrase of St.
Paul, 'All things work for the good of those who love God'
(Rom.8:28), and this means all things, even the painful
things.
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This radical life project of the early Franciscan
tradition was as 'scandalous' to people in the Church in
the twelfth century as it is today. Many of his advisers
urged Francis to adopt the rule of some already existing
order which would not be so severe and demanding, but he
refused to consider such a step. Pope Innocent gave
verbal approval to the original rule of St.Francis around
1209, and was probably wise to withhold written
approbation until Francis showed that this seemingly
impossible life could be lived over time, and without
falling into the unorthodoxies of his predecessors, such
as Peter Waldo. The example of the Franciscan Order down
through the centuries often gives the impression that the
radical approach of its founder needs to be 'adapted' for
the sake of lesser men and women than the 'Poverello'.
Still, the possibility of a simple Gospel style of life
without the distractions which lead one into concern for
one's rights against others maintains a certain
attractiveness.
3.6 Christian Pacifism
In the contemporary world, even within the Christian
tradition, radical pacifism is a strictly minority
position. The 'right' to self-defence and the doctrine of
the 'just war' are widely accepted as a more realistic
approach to the violence of humankind. However, there are
some voices that sound out in favour of the pacifist
stance.
Take Stanley Hauerwas, for example. In The Peaceable
Kingdom (1984), he shows a clear hostility to much of the
rights-language currently in vogue, especially when a
right to violence for the sake of justice is in question:
Therefore Christians cannot seek justice from the
barrel of a gun; and we must be suspicious of that
justice that relies on manipulation of our less than
worthy motives, for God does not rule creation
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through coercion, but through a cross
(Hauerwas,1984:104).
Hauerwas is very much in line with the Franciscan
critique of Christians trying to get into positions of
control; this is not the strategy of the peaceable
kingdom. In fact, as eschatological people, according to
this theologian, there is a very real sense in which
Christians must be out of control: 'Living out of control'
is part of the virtues of patience and hope. And he goes
on to say:
For the irony is that no one is more controlled than
those who assume they are in control or desire to be
in control. It is the rich above all whose wealth
gives them the illusion of independence,
separateness, of being in control. But all of us in
one way or another willingly submit to the illusion
that we can rid our world of chance and surprise.
Yet when we do that our world becomes diminished as
we try to live securely rather than well (ibid.,105).
This seems to me to be an admirable repetition of what
Tugwell has portrayed as the theology of St. Francis. If
the language of rights is used as an instrument of control
in the sense that Hauerwas has described, then moral
scepticism about this form of language is to be taken very
seriously indeed. The reference above to living 'securely
rather than well' is a recognition of the risks of
discomfort arising from pursuit of the Good.
Indeed, Hauerwas becomes even more explicit in his
reservations about rights-language in his criticism of a
'natural law' ethic:
For example, natural law is often expressed today in
the language of universal rights - the right to be
free, to worship, to speak, to choose one's vocation,
etc. Such language, at least in principle, seems to
embody the highest human ideals. But it also
facilitates the assumption that since anyone who
denies such rights is morally obtuse and should be
"forced" to recognise the error of his ways. Indeed,
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we overlook too easily how the language of 'rights',
in spite of its potential for good, contains within
its logic a powerful justification for violence
(ibid.,61).
When it comes to the Christian strategy for facing
aggression, Hauerwas discusses the argument between the
Niebuhr brothers, Richard and Reinhold, from the pages of
The Christian Century in 1932. This concerned the proper
Christian response to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.
Hauerwas tends to side with the pacifism of Richard which
involves a way of 'doing nothing' which is still
theologically significant (ibid.,Ch.8). Christian in¬
activity, for Richard Niebuhr and for Hauerwas, is the
type founded on a belief in a force in history that will
ultimately create a different kind of world from the one
currently experienced. Moreover, the Christian way of
doing nothing entails an attitude of humility, the
recognition that man's righteous indignation is far from
being actually righteous. Christians must wait for God to
act, and, in the meantime, stand aloof from movements such
as nationalism and capitalism, uniting in a higher loyalty
and preparing in this way for the future. Either way,
human life on earth seems touched by tragedy. For
Reinhold Niebuhr this stems from the imperfect, even
sinful, response of Christians to violence, which is still
a necessary one. For his brother Richard and for Stanley
Hauerwas, on the other hand, tragedy stems from refusing
to respond to violence with violence and thus running the
risk of being abused by violent men (Hauerwas,1984:145).
The pacifist tends to believe that it is better to suffer
evil than to do evil. Those who refuse to take such a
radical stance are forced to speak of necessary evil in a
just war, or the lesser of two evils, or they attempt to
glorify retaliatory violence as righteous indignation.
One of the major influences on the theology of Hauerwas
is of course the work of John Howard Yoder. Many of the
themes brought out above concerning the radicalism of
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Christian responses to suffering and evil find parallels
in his work, especially in his The Politics of Jesus
(1972). He tends to be critical of the mendicant tradition
in its attempt to justify a literal imitation of Christ's
life by reference to the Gospel story (Yoder,1972 :133-
134). The early Christians were not concerned with
imitating the poverty of Christ, or the fact that he was a
carpenter. Paul's advice on remaining unmarried does not
refer to the example of Jesus, though tradition holds he
remained single. The only area of the earthly life of
Jesus which is set before Christians for their imitation,
is,according to Yoder, the carrying of the cross.
With regard to this concept of sharing in Christ's
cross, the fellowship of his sufferings, Yoder is quite
specific:
The cross of Calvary was not a difficult family
situation, not a frustration of visions of personal
fulfilment, a crushing debt or a nagging in-law; it
was the political, legally to be expected result of a
moral clash with the powers ruling his society.
Already the early Christians had to be warned against
claiming merit for any and all suffering; only if
their suffering be innocent, and a result of the evil
will of their adversaries, may it be understood as
meaningful before God (1 Pet.2:18—21; 3:14-18;
4:1,13-16; 5:9; James 4:10) (Yoder,1972:132).
Interestingly, Yoder cites the case from the letter of
Peter where servants are required to be subordinate even
to harsh and unjust masters. Note, too, that this kind of
suffering is 'meaningful before God' in Yoder's opinion.
Once again, I am not claiming that Yoder denies that
pacifism brings harm to individuals. It is simply the case
that harm of one type has to be embraced to avoid a more
ultimate kind of harm - eternal death.
Finally, on this question of pacifism, what is most
interesting in Yoder's work is his insistence on the
realism of a pacifist ethic. In his fifth chapter he
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instances ways of non-violent resistance used successfully
by the Jews against the Romans, and he entitles another,
later chapter 'Revolutionary Subordination' (ibid.,90-
93;163-192). This is important as a critique of the
assumption that violent resistance to evil is practically
always necessary. It can also be used to question the
need to claim rights in situations of conflict. Yoder and
Hauerwas thus encourage Christians in particular to expend
more energy in the area of ethical imagination before, and
often instead of, getting involved in violent adversarial
positions. Hauerwas believes that ethical imagination is
often very limited in what he calls 'Quandary ethics'
(1984:4,128). He claims that there can be solutions to
moral dilemmas which transcend the narrow ethical
imagination of the protagonists; but so often the pro¬
tagonists are tied to traditional formulas which are
unsatisfactory from the viewpoint of the peaceable
Kingdom.
3.7 Response to the Preceding Sections
I wish now to respond to the preceding sections which
centre on philosophical and theological scepticism
concerning the concept of 'harm' which underlies so much
of human rights-claims.
First, I want to admit the strength of what has been
said, especially from the Christian point of view, as a
support for the position that rights-language needs to be
severely moderated if it is to be morally valuable. In
particular, the approach argued above rightly attacks the
view that one can have an automatic right against any and
all harm (in the ordinary sense of the word) that might
touch one's life. There can be an obsessive fear of any
suffering or deprivation which paralyses people from
getting on with life, and this fear may be expressed in
part by the urge to claim rights against others. (Simon
Tugwell (1980), in commenting on the beatitude 'Blessed
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are those who mourn..', states that 'our libertarian age,
with its frantic quest for pleasure and excitement, is
oddly characterized by an increase in the number of people
complaining to their doctors that they can no longer feel
anything at all.'(1980:61). In the light of this trend,
the world needs to hear the words of Christ blessing
humanity's negative feelings.) Moreover, I believe there
is some sense to the position that moral harm is one of
the most serious kinds of harm to be guarded against in
life.
Having admitted the value of the objections to some
extent, I must still voice some reservations about the
details of the objections. For instance, some care must be
taken in accepting an anti-naturalistic position, which
seems to be the case in Winch's article. There is a danger
in making a rigid distinction between pre-moral and moral
values, such that the latter come to be transported into a
mysterious world of their own, entry into which is by
private intuitions alone.
Without getting too deeply immersed in the argument
over ethical naturalism, I shall mention what I regard to
be the main features of the controversy. In her article
'Moral Beliefs' (1958), Philippa Foot answered the
question 'Why be Moral?' by saying that the virtues can
only be recommended if they constitute a good to the
virtuous man. In other words, the reason for being moral
is that it pays to be moral in the ordinary sense in which
people live in peace and harmony and enjoy the good things
of life. Foot believed that immoral people may prosper
for a while but in the long term will be unhappy. (Foot's
original position was an attempt to revive a form of
ethical naturalism in reaction to the metaethical theories
- emotivism and prescriptivism - in vogue at the time.
Hare's prescriptivism, in particular, tended to create a
wide gap indeed between facts and values, and left the
discernment of values at a highly subjective, almost
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arbitrary level. Since writing in 1950, Mrs. Foot has
considerably reworked her ideas, cf.Foot,1978:xi-xiv.) In
reply to Mrs Foot, the philosophers D.Z. Phillips and H.O.
Mounce (1970) argued that morality cannot be reduced to
prudential factors in this way. In fact, they argued that
people can remain prosperous and relatively happy (in the
sense meant by Foot) by adopting an evil life-style. If a
person is powerful enough and cares little for public
opinion a life of crime certainly does pay.
So, according to Phillips and Mounce, a person can only
be moral for moral reasons. The good person does not
reduce morality to prospering or faring well in an
everyday sense, though no doubt he or she will want to
fare well so long as that is possible without doing wrong.
For the anti-naturalist position, to prosper or to fare
well must be understood morally in the first place; there
is something irrational in claiming that an evil person
can 'prosper', since prosperity is so intimately linked
with goodness. But is not this an example of a stipulative
definition, deciding to link prosperity and happiness with
moral goodness? There is indeed a sense in which this
definition appears as stipulative, but I feel that it may
still have wide appeal, so much so that it takes on the
quality of a discovery or revelation. One may seem to be
forcing a definition on others, whereas in fact one is
appealing to others to recognise a common enough
experience. In the case of being morally good, it is
quite a respectable position, I think, to hold that this
is such an important human value that its absence must
entail some unhappiness. The major problem, however, in
speaking in this way is that 'happiness' is generally
understood in a psychologically subjective way. Thus, it
is difficult to convince the person who enjoys the effects
of wrong actions that he must be unhappy 'deep down' or
'subconsciously'.
The main drawback associated with the position of
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Winch, Phillips and Mounce is that it makes too much of
the conflict between maintaining one's moral character and
participating in what I have called pre-moral values.
Usually, moral goodness involves the harmonious
arrangement of these values by the individual moral agent.
Note that reference to health and life as being pre-moral
values does not imply that such values are unimportant, or
indeed that they are unrelated to moral life. As used in
recent Roman Catholic morality, the category of the pre-
moral relates to values important to human beings seen in
an abstract way, before being chosen by individuals in
particular circumstances (cf. articles by Jannsens, Fuchs,
and Schuller, in Curran & McCormick, 1979; note that they
vary in their terminology, speaking of 'ontic good', 'non-
moral good', 'physical good', as well as 'pre-moral
goods'.But these terms are practically synonymous). It is
only when these values are taken in a personal sense, when
they become the object of individual choices, and even
claims, that they become truly 'moral' values.
Thus, personal moral character does depend on the
attitude one has towards 'pre-moral' values, and the ways
in which one seeks to participate in them together with
others. Indeed, there may be occasions when the basic
values of human living may have to be sacrificed for the
sake of moral character and moral goodness, for instance,
martyrs give up the possibility of enjoying many goods,
rather than act directly against a basic good or value.
But the point is that personal moral goodness always
involves a positive respect for pre-moral goods or values.
For the most part, then, moral agents can maintain their
moral goodness and prosper in the ordinary sense of
enjoying pre-moral values. In fact, moral goodness is
based on respect for such values.
The second drawback in concentrating on personal moral
goodness or character at the expense of all other values
is that it may be self-defeating. In avoiding moral harm
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one can be willing to sacrifice the good of others too
easily. In order to avoid the adversarial objection, one
may avoid making claims for others in the cause of one's
own moral rectitude. The aim of moral goodness seems to
be like the aim of happiness - neither should be sought
directly; they come by concentrating on something else,
especially the welfare of others. The New Testament
insistence on living according to the Spirit and avoiding
the things of the flesh is not supposed to lead to
personal navel-gazing and obsessive concern with one's own
spiritual and moral progress. By concentrating on the
teaching and example of Christ one comes to live an
altruistic, loving way of life. At a later stage of
Christian history, when the mendicant orders began to
appear, some members of the older monastic orders were
shocked at the notion of 'religious' moving about outside
of the cloister, but the good of others was regarded by
the friars as a justification for making the world their
cloister, even at the cost of committing some 'unavoidable
sins' (cf. Tugwell,1979:134-139)).
It is extremely difficult to avoid the scope of rights-
language, even in radical moral and religious systems such
as Franciscanism and pacifism. For if a vision such as
these is deemed central to life, how can one let it go
without a struggle? Although Francis wanted to live a
precarious and unprotected life, he still had to consider
the right to follow conscience, to say yes to the
revelation he felt came from God. This is why Francis so
stubbornly refused to adopt any other existing rule of
life. He was driven by the message of God, as he saw it,
and in this case the least one can say is that the right
to live according to the Gospel followed from the duty to
live it. One can think as well of Francis' companion,
Clare, who begged of the Church the right to live in
complete poverty in imitation of the spirit of Francis.
Pope Innocent 111 'granted this unique and unheard of
privilege somewhere between the conclusion of this Council
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[Fourth Lateran] in 1215 and his death on 16 July 1216.
This rarest of privileges ever granted held that the Poor
Ladies of San Damiano were allowed to live without
communal property (possessions) and that no one could
compel them to accept possessions.' (Van Leeuwen,1987:66).
The claims of Francis and Clare seem odd in contemporary
terms; who today wishes to live insecurely? But for those
enchanted by the Christian Gospel, poverty was
paradoxically the greatest treasure.
With regard to pacifism, something similar can be said.
A radical right is being claimed, a right of conscience,
not to be forced into forms of self-defence regarded as
immoral and unchristian. It involves the claim to be a
conscientious objector in wartime, and perhaps the claim
against other Christians as well as against non-believers
to consider pacifism as a legitimate response to violence.
Ultimately, there must be at least one right that can
be claimed, namely, the right to be morally good, to
follow one's conscience (cf.Cahill,1980:277). The problem
remains as to how wide the scope of this right really is.
If one takes ethical naturalism seriously and underlines
the importance of pre-moral values, then rights to
participation in these cannot be excluded, though they may
need to be moderated when conflict arises. Much more can
be said about the importance of claiming participation in
pre-moral values, but I shall hold this over until the
next chapter.
3.8 Conclusion
In a recent book review, David Little states that, 'At
present, it is difficult both to live with and without
"rights-talk".' (Little,1988:40). I hope that the last
three chapters have illustrated the truth of this
statement. In particular, this chapter has underlined the
drawbacks and disadvantages of rights-language from a
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moral point of view. Yes, the language of rights can be a
cover for individual and group selfishness, for instance,
when human rights remain at an abstract level and when the
equality built into the basic concept is not cashed in
practical terms. I argued that the the virtue of
fraternity is needed to save human rights from abstraction
and self-centredness.
In response to the criticism that the language of
rights leads to an adversarial approach to human conflict,
the answer must be 'Yes and No'. 'Yes' in the sense that
the 'limited intelligence' and 'limited sympathies' of
humanity (Warnock,1971:ch 2) can lead to situations where
justice can only be achieved by making claims against
those reluctant to accept their duties. 'No' in the sense
that, not all rights-claims demand such an adversarial
background; in some cases arbitration and negotiation can
proceed on a civilised basis, which avoids a major part of
the bitterness arising from personal conflict. It remains
the case that humanity needs at times to stand up for
rights rather than acting as a door-mat for unscrupulous
elements.
This last remark is also partly the answer to the
critique related to the question 'Can the good/faithful
man be harmed?'. Insofar as being morally good demands
participation in certain basic pre-moral values, then
claims to such participation in my own life and in the
lives of others must be taken seriously. Of course such
claims can multiply to an extent that scandalises many and
which may damage the respectability of rights-language in
general. For instance, the obsessive desire to rid
humanity of all pain and deprivation is not a good basis
for developing a set of realistic rights-claims. (In fact,
one might say that the distinction between claims and
liberties mentioned above (1.3 &1.4), is a sign that
people cannot expect to escape all harm in their relations
with others.)
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From the Christian perspective it is equally clear that
suffering and pain are not the unmitigated disaster they
are sometimes made out to be. They can be part of God's
providence in general, and part of the Christian vocation
to share in the fellowship of Christ's sufferings in
particular. There remains a sense in which the greatest
harm that can befall a faithful person is moral harm, and
avoidance of this can call for the sacrifice of pre-moral
values. However, for the most part human flourishing
consists of harmonious participation in a set of non-moral
goods. And such participation requires the ability to




Theological Foundations of Rights-Language
4.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapters I have taken seriously
conceptual and moral scepticism concerning the language
of rights. In the last chapter in particular I recognised
some force in the moral objections to this form of
language, as these were expressed by both secular
philosophers and Christian ethicists in a shared attack.
I accept that some moderation of rights-language,
especially regarding human claiming, should be kept
firmly in mind; however, I remain firm in my belief that
the language of rights is conceptually and morally
respectable in spite of possible abuses. Ultimately I
come down on the side of the latin tag ' Abusus non
tollit usum'. Just because the language of rights can be
used in a vague and indeterminate manner does not mean
that one has to resort to a radical conceptual
scepticism, and likewise just because this language can
be abused morally, does not force one to embrace a
radical moral scepticism concerning it.
In this present chapter I begin with a brief
consideration of the Christian Church's attitude towards
the concept and language of rights. This is a
continuation, to some extent, of the section in the
preceding chapter where parts of the Christian tradition
were seen to be wary of the idea of human claiming in
certain circumstances. This wariness will be encountered
again, but also a more positive approach to rights in
modern times will be shown. The question of a particular
Christian contribution to the foundations of rights-
language will be discussed in the light of the wider
discussion of the distinctiveness of Christian ethics. I
shall argue that there is such a distinctiveness, and
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that in application to the language of rights it operates
through the distinction between 'absolute' and 'relative'
dignity.
4.2 From Hostility to Respectability
Three types of classical hostility to the natural rights
tradition were mentioned in the preceding chapter,
labelled 'liberal, 'conservative', and 'socialist', and
represented by Bentham, Burke, and Marx, respectively.
To this hostile reaction I can now add the Roman Catholic
Church. This Church has come a long way since the
encyclical Quanta cura (1864) and the Syllabus of Errors
(1864) of Pius IX to the encyclical Pacem in terris of
Pope John XXIII in 1963. This is the road from hostility
to respectability or hospitality. The language of rights
has, so to speak, come in out of the cold.
Why was the Catholic Church so hostile to the 'Rights
of Man'? The answer is given, I think, by John Langan in
his essay 'Human Rights in Catholicism' (1982)
Catholicism's institutional sympathies during most
of the nineteenth century were with a conservatism
which had its roots in the ancien regime. It is
important neither to conceal nor to overstate these
sympathies. The Church, especially in France,
experienced the proclamation of human rights in 1789
as a very cold and hostile wind, and it cannot claim
for itself a significant place in either the
theoretical or practical struggle for human rights
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Human-
rights theory in an explicit and politically dynamic
form confronted Catholicism as an alien force and it
has taken Catholicism a long time to appropriate it
(Langan,1982:31-32).
Langan's point of view is supported by John Henley's
more recent article in the Scottish Journal of Theology
(1986), where he declares that,
until recently at least, the church and theologians
have played little part in the human rights move-
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ment. Whatever is made of the appeals to a divine
source in earlier statements and declarations about
human rights, it has to be acknowledged that the
movement has derived its inspiration largely from
humanistic ideals,... Hence it has been thought
inappropriate for the 1 Johnny-come-lately1 of
theology to suggest that the cause of human rights
would best be served by being given a theological
foundation (Henley,1986:366-367).
Henley also mentions in his article the Church's
concern about 'the egalitarian and self-sufficient vision
of humanity found in much of the talk about human rights
from the time of Thomas Paine and even earlier, though
with more caution, of John Locke' (ibid.,367). Expanding
on this he claims that:
The inability of most Christian churches to accept
this egalitarian outlook will have been due not only
to their profoundly undemocratic structure and
temper, but also to the confidence placed by
humanists in man as the measure and master of all
things. The declaration in which such confidence is
most apparent is the French and it is noteworthy
that the figure of the Deity is here most shadowy.
It may also be significant that this declaration
accompanied a revolution that went most disastrously
wrong;., (ibid.,368).
According to Bernard Plongeron (1979), the reaction of
the Catholic Church to the Rights-Declarations has to be
seen in terms of a dialectic between 'anathema and
dialogue' (Plongeron,1979:39) . At first the 'Rights of
Man' were anathema because of their emphasis on freedom
of thought and opinion, and because the privileged place
of Roman Catholicism was thought to be in jeopardy. Pius
VI's brief Quod aliquantum (1791) singled out for special
criticism those articles of the French Declaration of
1789 which underlined rights to freedom of conscience in
general and with regard to religion in particular
(articles 10 and 11). Because the religion of the
revolutionaries was in question, it was felt that freedom
of conscience applied to matters of faith might lead to
'indifferentism', the idea that all kinds of religious
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faith are of equal validity. Plongeron states that Pius
saw in these rights-claims a 'sinister conspiracy':
This equality, this liberty, so highly exalted by
the National Assembly, have then as their only
result the overthrow of the Catholic religion, and
that is why it has refused to declare it to be
predominant in the realm, although it has always
enjoyed this title (Pius VI,1791 cf.Plongeron, 1979:
41).
With time, however, Plongeron shows that hostility to the
revolutionary principles softened:
But when, after 1793, Catholics were forced to
recognise the irreversible and expansionist
progression of the 'immortal principles of 1789',
they were to change their tactics. Rather than
perpetuate an absolutely sterile denunciation of the
Declaration of Rights, they preferred to claim for
the Catholic religion the safeguards offered by
article 10 on liberty of conscience (ibid.,41).
It appears that Roman Catholic attitudes to rights of
freedom of conscience varied according to whether
Catholics were in a majority or minority position vis-a¬
vis other denominations. In a majority position, as in
France, the Church's privileged position was emphasised
and the rights of minorities played down. In a minority,
and often persecuted position, as in the American
colonies on the eve of Independence, rights to freedom of
conscience were regarded as truly liberating.
Nor should it be forgotten that the papacy at that
time was itself a political state; it had not yet lost
the papal states. So the move towards democracy included
in the declarations must have been as upsetting to the
bishops of Rome as to other political leaders. As Peter
Hebblethwaite (1982) puts it:
The negative view of human rights in the nineteenth
century of course had a lot to do with the existence
of the Papal States, for the popes behaved like any
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other threatened autocrats. They censored the
press, imprisoned or executed rebels, and regarded
liberal ideas (including talk of human rights) as
the plague. These time-bound considerations
affected them deeply and shaped the dominant
tradition of the magisterium (Hebblethwaite,1982
: 193).
The watershed in the history of the Roman Catholic
Church's growing regard for the language of Rights is, of
course, the encyclical Rerum novarum (1891) of Pope Leo
XIII. According to David Hollenbach, 'It was with Leo
XIII that the Church began to move from a stance of
adamant resistance to modern Western developments in
political and social life to a stance of critical
participation in them.' (Hollenbach,1979:43).
What was most significant about this encyclical was
its protest against the economic and social injustice
which had been exacerbated by the Industrial Revolution.
As the Irish theologian, Donal Dorr (1983), puts it:
Though the content of Leo's encyclical was important
and remains important, what was perhaps even more
important was the character of the document as a cry
of protest against the exploitation of poor workers.
It is not so much the detail of what Leo had to say
that was significant but the fact that he chose to
speak out at that time, intervening in a burning
issue of the day. His intervention meant that the
Church could not be taken to be indifferent to the
injustices of the time. Rather, the Church was seen
to be taking a stand on behalf of the poor
(Dorr,1983:11-12).
Since Dorr's main interest in studying the social
teaching of the Roman Catholic Church's magisterium is to
document the growth of an option for the poor, he is
careful to point out an early move in this direction at
this stage. Although Leo rejected socialism as an answer
to injustice and set clear limits to the operation of the
state in the lives of individuals, he felt that the state
had a special duty of care for the weaker members of
society:
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...when there is question of defending the rights of
individuals, the poor and badly-off have a claim to
especial consideration. The richer class have many-
ways of shielding themselves...whereas the mass of
the poor...must chiefly depend on the assistance of
the State (RN,29;cf.Dorr,1983:15).
Of course, Leo's encyclical makes mention of rights
and duties, not just of the state, but also of employers
and their workers (cf.Camp,1986). Here it seems the Pope
remained singularly conservative, as can be seen in his
reaction to conflict between classes. Dorr mentions two
possible strategies open to people struggling for
industrial justice. One way is to call upon employers
and industrialists to repent and be converted from their
life of exploitation. Along with this, the workers are
urged to be patient in waiting for the results of this
conversion. The other way is 'to animate the poor to
demand their rights. They would be encouraged not simply
to wait patiently for justice but rather to confront the
rich and powerful when this proves necessary.' (op.
cit. ,19) .
Now Dorr suggests that the first strategy above is
closest to the mind of Leo because of his conviction of
the importance of stability in society. It appears that
Leo XIII wanted change in society, but a change 'from the
top down' rather than 'from the bottom up'. Dorr holds
that 'He issued a ringing call to conversion to the
people who held economic power. But what if this call
goes unheeded? Then it appears that the poor working
class have little option but to put up with their sad
situation.' (ibid.,19-20). This general approach leads
one to wonder if the language of rights with its emphasis
on claiming has been recognised in its proper light. One
gets the impression that Pope Leo is more interested in
encouraging the powerful to recognise their duties to
others than in enabling the weak to stand up for
themselves in demanding their due. In other words, the
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language of rights in use here seems to be of a
paternalistic kind, where one power (the Church) attempts
to claim rights for those with no power against another
group (industrialists and the state) who have economic
and political power.
It is not my task to cover the whole development of
the Church's use of the language of rights in her social
doctrine; indeed, others such as Hollenbach and Dorr have
covered much of this ground in their own work (cf.the
articles in Curran & McCormick,1986,; also cf.Elsbernd,
1986,Schooyans,1980 and Hamel,1984). Clearly there is a
development from Leo XIII to John XXIII's Pacem in
terris, and further development in the documents of
Vatican II, the Synod of Bishops, and the writings of
Pope John Paul 11. Most significant, perhaps, is Pacem
in terris, which gives 'an explicit, though qualified,
endorsement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights'
(Langan,1982:28). In this encyclical is found what
Hollenbach calls 'the most complete and systematic list
of...human rights in the modern Catholic traditibn.'
(Hollenbach,1979:66). Important in this context is the
fact that the encyclical thus includes two main
categories of rights - civil and political (cf. Articles
1-21 of the Universal Declaration) and social and
economic (Articles 22-28 of the Declaration) - in a way
that takes on board rights emphasised by both liberal
democratic and socialist political traditions.
Still, this encyclical has been criticised, by Langan
for instance, for not going as far as Vatican II in its
declaration on religious freedom (op. cit.,29). Langan
points out an ongoing struggle in the doctrine of the
Roman Church here:
Part of what was being worked out in Pacem in terris
is the problem of reconciling the rights to freedom
of belief and expression with the obligatory aspects
of such values as truth, the common good, and the
133
moral virtues - a problem which continues to trouble
liberal democracies (ibid.,29).
In the language of rights, the tension here is between
an approach which is still too impressed with duties and
obligations, such that the favourite right becomes the
mandatory right (often a disguised duty for the right-
holder) and which gives a minor role to discretionary
rights and the right to be wrong or in error.
Note too the growth of humility within the Catholic
Church regarding the practice of rights. The Synod of
Bishops in Rome (1971) has this to say about the Church's
obligation to respect rights 'within her own house':
While the Church is bound to give witness to
justice, she recognises that anyone who ventures to
speak to people about justice must first be just in
their eyes. Hence we must undertake an examination
of the modes of acting and of possessions and life¬
style found within the church herself
(No.40;cf.Hebblethwaite,1982:196).
In this way the Church has come a long way from the
position of simply claiming her own rights against
others, in the sense of protecting her own institutional
needs rather than the relevant needs of all her members.
The remote history of Protestant response to the
doctrine of human rights is not easy to uncover; however,
the more recent developments within the Protestant
traditions are reasonably well documented. For instance,
Jurgen Moltmann has written a useful article on this
subject (Moltmann,1978).
Moltmann claims that the World Council of Churches
played a supportive role in the production of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In particular,
Moltmann singles out the work of that Council's
'Commission of the Churches for International Affairs'
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(CCIA). It contributed to the codification and defence
of the later human rights blueprints, e.g. the 1966
International Covenants, eventually ratified in 1976.
Moltmann stresses the importance of the conference
organised by the CCIA at St. Polten in 1974, when the
subject of discussion was 'Human Rights and Christian
Responsibility'. This was important, in Moltmann's eyes,
because of the presence of representatives from Eastern
European countries and the Third World. They helped the
conference make 'a convincing correction to the one-sided
western conceptions in that it drew up a catalogue of
basic human rights, which begin with the 'right to life'
(Moltmann,1978:182;cf.Rogers,1975:128).
In 1977, at the centenary meeting of the World
Alliance of Reformed Churches held at St.Andrews, a
document entitled 'Theological Basis of Human Rights' was
accepted as the 'first step towards an ecumenical
'Christian Declaration on Human Rights' '
(cf .Miller ,1977). Plans for a document of this type go
back to the General Assembly of the World Alliance in
Nairobi (1970), when it was decided to embark upon a
study programme on the subject of the theological basis
of human rights. Moltmann himself played a part in this
study, following on intensive work carried out by member-
churches.
Another study concerning human rights was decided upon
by the Lutheran World Federation at its assembly in Evian
in 1970. Six years later, a summary conference was held
in Geneva and the results were published in the following
year under the title 'Theological Perspectives on Human
Rights'. The main authors were Heinz-Eduard Todt and
Wolfgang Huber (Huber & Todt,1977).
Before moving on to consider the possibility of a
distinctive Christian approach to the concept of rights,
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I would like to draw attention to an article by J. Robert
Nelson (1982) in which he warns against adopting certain
stereotypes regarding denominational approaches to
rights. His main thesis concerning rights is that they
are concerned with freedom. He insists that freedom or
liberation are primary code words in the New Testament,
and that in his person and his teaching Jesus was the
Liberator (Nelson,1982:1). But how have the Christian
churches lived up to this example? Nelson replies:
Of the three main divisions of Christianity,
Protestantism enjoys the best, but not an unsullied,
reputation for securing, extending, and enhancing
human freedoms. Indeed, there is a popular, well-
preserved stereotype which portrays Protestant
history as a series of successes in emancipating
people for the enjoyment of greater freedom. The
contrasting corollary to this image is that of Roman
Catholicism as a perennial inquisition (ibid.)
Though there are elements of truth in this stereotype,
Nelson directs attention to the fact that 'Ambiguity
taints the entire history of Christianity insofar as
human rights are concerned.' (ibid.,2). He is especially
critical of early Lutheran and Calvinist stress on
obedience to civil authority. And most interesting of
all, is the reference to the Protestant representatives
form Eastern Europe at the already mentioned St. Polten
conference, who, greatly influenced by socialist emphasis
on social rights as opposed to individual rights, tended
to be highly critical of the Western claims to individual
freedoms. Ironically, it is in Poland, a predominantly
Roman Catholic country in the Communist bloc, that the
struggle for individual rights of free speech and the
organisation of labour in free unions has been
predominant. So what has happened to the stereotypes of
Protestant individualism and Catholic repression of
individual freedoms? The traditional stereotypes are
clearly breaking down.
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4.3 The Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics
Before I can consider the question of providing a
Christian foundation for rights, the prior question of
the possibility of a distinctive Christian ethics has to
be faced. This debate has raged of late particularly
among Roman Catholic theologians (though one should not
forget the important contribution made by James Gustafson
(1975)). In the following pages I shall rely heavily on
Vincent MacNamara's discussion of the issues in his Faith
and Ethics (1985).
I begin with MacNamara's account of the different ways
in which religious faith may influence moral beliefs and
practices. There may be a causal relationship between
religious beliefs and moral beliefs. This means that a
person may learn about moral right and wrong, what she
ought to do morally, from some religious tradition, e.g.
the commandments of the Old Testament or the teaching of
Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. There can be a
psychological relationship between religion and morality
insofar as religious beliefs can motivate someone to act
in a particular way morally. Thus, for instance, a person
may decide to forgive another person following on the
example of Christ. Without this example the person may
realise the goodness and Tightness of forgiving in the
abstract, but not be able to 'bring himself' to actually
do it in practice. There is also a possible ontological
relationship between religion and morals. This involves
the belief that the goods or values of this life derive
from a divine source, that created value depends on
uncreated value - the goodness of God. The last
relationship mentioned by MacNamara is that of
'epistemological dependence' and entails that at least
some moral positions held by Christians 'cannot be
intelligibly arrived at or supported without the
framework of faith' (op. cit.,96). This is the most
radical form relationship between faith and morality,
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because it appears to underline the possibility that the
content of morality may differ according to whether one
is a religious believer or not. (For further discussion
of the various possible connections between religion and
morality,cf.Davies,1982:ch 10; Baelz,1977:chs 6,7,&8.)
On the question of epistemological dependence of
morality upon religious belief, Macnamara discusses the
debate between two schools of thought in Roman Catholic
moral theology. On one hand, the so-called 'Autonomy'
school allows the possibility of there being causal,
psychological and ontological links between religious
belief and morality, while refusing to accept
epistemological dependence ( cf. Fuchs , 197C^ Schuller,1976;
Curran,1974). On the other hand, there is the so-called
'Glaubensethik' (Faith-Ethic) school which holds that all
four types of relationship are possible, and thus that
Christian ethics is highly specific (cf.Ratzinger,1980;
Delhaye,1973; Rigali,1978). Put simply, and perhaps
simplistically, the 'Faith-Ethic school tends to claim
that the content of morality may be different for
Christians; while the 'Autonomy' school of thought tends
to deny this, allowing that Christian belief is important
in giving specific motivation and context to the moral
life. As will be seen, the differences between these
groups hinge largely on how one understands concepts like
'content' of morality and 'motives' for acting morally.
(One should note as well that mention of 'schools of
thought' should not be taken as an assumption that every
theologian in each group holds exactly the same views on
the subject. Obviously the writers mentioned are
categorised in their particular group because of a common
trend or motif in their approach to the study of this
particular sphere of ethics.)
The areas where the content of Christian ethics is
supposed to be different from humanistic morality are
mentioned by MacNamara as follows:
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There are values, it [the Faith-Ethic school] says,
such as poverty, virginity, renuntiation of power,
humility, modesty. There are demands to receive the
Eucharist, do penance, preach the Gospel. There is
the New Testament's new vision of marriage, of the
world, of hope. There are attitudes of joy,
thankfulness, prayer, indifference to the world
(op.cit.,96).
This list looks at first sight to give strength to the
Faith-Ethic approach. However, the 'Autonomy' approach
has its answer. Firstly, it is not impossible for
humanists to value poverty, in the sense of living a
simple life in solidarity with the poor of the world.
Also it is doubtful whether virginity is a style of life
open to Christians alone. But what of specifically
religious realities such as receiving the Eucharist and
preaching the Gospel? One strategy used by the
Autonomists to get around this objection is to make a
separation between strictly moral values and religious
values. Preaching the Gospel or receiving sacraments, if
they are commands, are not moral commands. The point
here, according to MacNamara, is that many contemporary
moral philosophers (Frankena,1970; Foot,1958; Warnock,
1971; Williams,1973) are sceptical of any attempt to see
acts directed towards God as truly moral. This is
because of:
the widely accepted view about the definition of
morality which requires that normative judgments, if
they are to qualify as moral, must meet a material
social criterion pertaining to the distribution or
promotion of non-moral good or evil among sentient
beings (MacNamara,1985:102).
One can see why the 'Autonomy' approach has such
attraction for certain theologians. In first place, it
is in line with traditional 'natural law' theory, which
insists upon a common grasp of moral truth by all humans
independently of divine revelation, though not
independent of God's gracious gift - natural law is a
reflection of the eternal law after all. Secondly, it
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avoids the problem of two kinds of morality in the world,
one, a minimalist kind for unbelievers and the other, a
more challenging one for Christians. And related to this,
is the possibility of arguing rationally with other
humans, believers and nonbelievers alike, regarding what
is required for persons to maintain and promote their
humanity.
Still, the odd thing about this debate is that in some
ways all involved in it seem to agree on the fact that
Christian ethics does have something distinctive to
recommend it. The disagreement is on where exactly this
distinctiveness lies. Does it lie in the realm of content
or in the realm of motivation?
The answer to this question depends on the scope of
what one holds as the content of morality, and also on
distinguishing carefully the place of motivation in
making moral judgements. In other words, one has to take
into account both 'act-evaluation' and 'agent-evaluation'
in humanistic and Christian ethics.
A. The Content of Christian Ethics
Regarding the content of morality, I pointed out that
there is sometimes a tendency to separate off 'purely
religious realities' like receiving sacraments and
preaching the Gospel from ethics or morality. But it is
easy to protest against such a compartmentalisation of
life. Even in terms of the required 'material social
criterion pertaining to the distribution or promotion of
non-moral good or evil among sentient beings', a strong
argument can be made in favour of including 'religious
rituals' in the moral category. Much has been written
of late concerning the relationship between liturgy and
justice that shows the moral challenge involved in the
Christian's sacramental life. Reception of the
Eucharist, for instance, cannot be so spiritualised that
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it enables Christians to forget that the 'body of Christ'
is found starving in the world as well as in the sacred
species offered on the altar (cf. Lane,1981; Kilmartin,
1980; Duffy,1980. The sacraments are not just spiritual
nourishment for people, 'in this world, but not of it';
they point to the divine interest in this world through
creation, incarnation and redemption, an interest which
humans must imitate in daily life.
So, too, with prayer: the traditional Thomistic view
of prayer of petition is that the Christian is included
in a special way in the providence of God, such that
humans can actually bring about certain goods in this
world that would not come about if they did not pray.
This is the view of St. Thomas (Summa Theologiae,
2a2ae,83); Christians pray, not to change God's will, but
within that will, in order to accomplish it. And some
things will just not happen if Christians do not pray. I
see no problem in accepting that prayer is a strictly
moral obligation for those who accept such a doctrine of
petitionary prayer (In fact, St. Thomas treats of prayer
of petition under the virtue of religion, which is that
section of justice that seeks to give God his due).
In this way, prayer is both directed to God and can
have material effects on life in this earth (These issues
have been discussed widely in philosophy of religion in
recent decades: cf. Brummer,1984; Phillips, 1981;
Richards,1980). Moreover, since belief in the power of
sacraments and prayer demands religious belief, it would
appear that part of the content of morality is
religiously specific. (Oddly enough, one of the foremost
of the theologians of the 'Autonomy' school, Joseph
Fuchs, accepts that 'man's religious and cultic
relationship to God is also moral conduct'
(Fuchs,1970:16). This seems to suggest that the
differences between the two 'schools' of thought must be
distinguished, with proper care shown for the nuances of
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each position, even within each school.
B. Motives and Reasons in Relation to Content
The other major problem I mentioned concerns the more
subjective level of motivation. It is sometimes claimed
that Christianity offers a special motivation to do what
is morally right, though the particular act may be
recognised as obligatory by the non-believer. MacNamara
argues that the 'Autonomy' school tends to mix up motives
and reasons at this stage, causing some confusion
(MacNamara,1985:ch 4, especially page 103ff). What is
this distinction between 'motives' and 'reasons'?
A great deal of purely philosophical analysis has
been applied to the related notions of 'reason',
'motive', and 'intention' (cf. Ryle,1949; Anscombe,1957;
Kenny,1963; Flew,1966). In ordinary language in use each
day, most people do not distinguish carefully between
reasons and motives, and this is understandable since
motives are always reasons in one sense of that term. By
this I mean that a motive is at least an explanatory
concept, explaining why a person acted in a certain way.
However, in ethical deliberation one concentrates more on
the justification of action than on its explanation.
After all, an action may be explained by bad motives just
as easily as by good ones. And in relation to
justification, it is my opinion that the language of
'reasons' is more appropriate than the language of
'motives.
When I place the stress on reasons for acting, I am
thinking of the reasons that justify an action or
practice morally. When I do X for a morally justifying
reason Y, the reason Y both explains why I acted and
justifies the act. But I feel that the language of
motives has more of a connection with explanation of
actions rather than with justification. This is because
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motive is more akin to psychological and causal aspects
of action rather than the aspect of moral judgement. A
motive characteristically 'moves' a person to act, hence
the 'causal' element. From the psychological point of
view, motives tend to refer to desires which move a
person to do something. But having a (justifying) reason
to do something need not necessarily move one to act,
even if one is conscious of the legitimacy of the reason
from the moral point of view. Thus, there is more of a
gap between reason and action than between motive and
action.
The ideal to be achieved in the moral life is always
to act on the basis of justifying reasons, and this means
being motivated by those reasons. This is an important
distinction, since a person may have a notional grasp
that an action is good, e.g. helping a poor man with
alms, but may be moved to aid the man by a disreputable
reason - to be admired by others as a 'charitable'
individual. In this way, an agent can recognise a good
reason for doing something and not be motivated to do it;
e.g. a student who recognises that he ought to go to
lectures, but gives in to the temptation to stay in bed.
Or an agent can have a good reason for acting, and moves
to achieve an object, but for another reason that fails
to justify the act.
I believe it is a mistake to talk of motives when
attempting to justify actions. Reasons justify actions
and make certain motives respectable from the moral point
of view. Often, indeed, the idea of 'having a good
motive' is used as a type of excuse when the act posited
is of questionable moral worth. For instance, in the
discussion of active euthanasia there is sometimes this
tendency to excuse acts of 'mercy killing' because of the
alleged 'good' motives of friends and relations of the
patient. I have no objection to arguments in this area if
they are based on 'good' reasons instead of 'good'
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motives; in fact, my point all along has been that truly
'good' motives must be based on justifying reasons. Just
because an agent has some good in view and is motivated
by this does not entail that the act is right. Goods must
be seen in relation to one another if basic values are
not to be sacrificed needlessly. However, good motivation
may mean a good deal in evaluating the character of the
agent, presuming that he or she has made a decent effort
to discern the various values involved in acting.
Now the point that MacNamara wishes to make against
the Autonomists is that Christian beliefs offer certain
reasons for acting which are not available to those not
sharing those beliefs. And this involves much more than
the claim that Christian beliefs just motivate the
believer. What MacNamara is saying, I think, is that one
must take a step further back beyond motives to the
justifying reasons which motivate people. And if one
looks at these, one will find reasons based on religious
beliefs, which distinguish the actions of Christians from
non-Christians.
Justifying reasons for acting can vary. If my
neighbour offends me in some way and I discern that I
have an obligation to forgive him, I may have a number of
good reasons for doing this. I may argue that I have an
obligation to myself not to bear a grudge over time and
that I 'couldn't live with myself if I failed to
forgive'. Or I may approach forgiveness from the point of
view of the other person's right to be forgiven. Perhaps
the harm done was small, and the other meant no harm in
the first place. I may reason that this person should not
have to bear the brunt of my exaggerated bitterness.
Then again, I may consider wider issues such as the bad
example given to family and neighbours and the long-term
effects of personal feuds on later generations and the
peace and harmony of the neighbourhood. All of these
reasons for forgiving my neighbour are basically humanis-
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tic: there is yet no mention of religious reasons. So let
me mention a few.
I am under an obligation to obey the command of Jesus
to forgive others out of love (Lk.7:41ff.;17:3-4). Partly
the reason for this is the fact that the Heavenly Father
allows his rain to fall on just and unjust alike
(Mt.5:44ff.) ; in other words, God is patient with all
humans until their dying moment when they make their
final option for or against Him (2 Pet.3:8-9,15). Part of
the reason for forgiving others is that God has forgiven
me in a most dramatic way and expects me to imitate him
spontaneously (Mt.18:23ff.). I should also forgive if I
wish to bring my gifts to the altar in worship and if I
wish to pray the Lord's prayer honestly (Mt.5:24-25;6:14-
15).
These religious reasons for forgiving my neighbour are
also moral reasons, not only in the basic effect of
bringing about a reconciliation here and now between
persons, but also in so far as there are obligations of
gratitude to God as to any other person when another does
one a good turn. Moreover, if one knows something of
one's benefactor's wishes, one should consider the
possibility of acting appropriately. It also seems to be
a good thing morally to follow the example of a man
(Jesus) widely recognised to be a good model from the
moral point of view.
Note that I am not saying that the religious reasons
mentioned contradict the non-religious reasons for
acting. There is an overlap between the reasons such that
Christians may act from all of these reasons at different
times. Obviously, people very often act morally without
considering all the possible good reasons for acting.
Often it suffices that a person has at least one
justifying reason for acting morally. What I am arguing
here is that Christians should try to consider the
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religious reasons for acting as well as the reasons held
in common with humanists. I believe that there can be a
set of justifying reasons for acting morally and that the
religious reasons offer a deeper, an ultimate grasp of
the significance of the actions intended (cf. the warning
of P.J.McGrath concerning the idea of having different
reasons for saying that a type of action is right or
wrong (McGrath,1969:59-61) . This is simply because of
the basic Christian insight that moral behaviour is a
vital part of the most important relationship a human
being has, the relationship with God.
I believe, then, that it is necessary to distinguish
among the justifying reasons for acting the 'natural law'
reasons available to all men and women of good will and
the reasons stemming from revelation which are available
only to those called to faith. The fact that the latter
bring one closer to the ultimate truth about human life
and its supernatural destiny does not mean that the
former are unimportant or can be ignored. The Christian
has access to both kinds of reason; the non-believer', by
definition, has access only to the former. Does this
mean that the Christian has a superior morality to that
of the non-believer?
The answer must be 'Yes and No'. The affirmative ans¬
wer depends on there being a situation where the
Christian looks carefully at the elements making up the
moral judgement, all the facts open to any human observer
of rational discernment, and also consults the Christian
tradition for the relevant values. The resultant
judgement takes together the best of human judgement
together with God's wisdom as revealed in Scripture and
Tradition. The negative answer applies to situations
where believers attempt to force moral problems into a
framework where traditional principles do not apply so
easily and where general values in the tradition are
misapplied in relation to new problems. Sometimes, then,
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religious justifying reasons offer little practical
guidance in particular areas of moral controversy (cf.
Vatican II's Gaudium et spes,33, which states that 'The
Church derives religious and moral principles from the
deposit of God's Word which it safeguards, but it does
not always have a ready made answer to particular
questions.' cf. Mahoney,1984:2). This will become
evident in the second part of this thesis in relation to
the problems raised by the development of reproductive
technology.
I want to be clear about the general trend of my
argument over the preceding pages. I am claiming that,
because of the gap that may exist between reasons for
acting morally and being motivated to act morally, it is
tempting to say that religious beliefs typically act as
an extra pressure to do what is right when the natural
law reasons fail to give the essential motivation. This
of course may be part of the role of religious beliefs,
but it is not in my opinion the only role or the most
important role they play in moral deliberation "and
action. I am claiming that religious beliefs provide
ultimate justifying reasons for acting morally without
contradicting the fundamental natural law reasons. I use
two different terms - 'ultimate' and 'fundamental'- to
qualify the different kinds of reasons here because I
want to maintain their complementary roles in moral
reasoning within Christian ethics. Moreover, it must be
clear that the meaning of 'content' of morality for me
must involve reference to the agent's reasons for acting.
In other words, I refuse to distinguish strictly between
act and agent evaluation, making the former of key
importance and making the latter peripheral. Any attempt
to separate the two makes the analysis of moral actions
too abstract. In fact, without consideration of the
mentality of the agent, one must talk of human
'behaviour', but not of human 'action'.
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4.4 Christian Reasons for Respecting Rights
If it is granted that Christian beliefs influence the
ways in which members of the Church see the content of
morality, how does this apply to the Christian's attitude
towards rights? Firstly, following MacNamara's
characterisation of the 'Autonomists', it can be argued
that Christian beliefs motivate one to respect rights in
general and religious rights in particular. Secondly, it
can be argued that all rights pertaining to human beings
are really derivative from God's rights. The concept of
God 'having rights' may be said to be distinctively
religious. As well as discussing God's rights against man
one can also discuss the question of man's rights against
God, and whether this makes sense or not.
A. Religious Rights
I mean by 'Religious Rights' claims to freedom of
conscience regarding religious belief, the liberty to
worship both in public and in private, the right to
educate one's children in line with one's own beliefs,
the right to preach the Gospel or spread doctrine in
certain ways, the right to live out the 'vocation' of
one's choice. Now, one does not have to be a Christian
or a religious believer at all in order to respect these
rights. As a legislator, an atheist or agnostic can see
all of these rights as part of the general right of
freedom of conscience, regarded as a key humanistic
value. The personal beliefs of the legislator or indeed
one's fellow citizens may be that religious belief is
irrational and worthless, but such beliefs do not get in
the way of respecting the right to be 'irrational'.
Still, it must be an advantage if the religious rights
mentioned are respected for religious reasons. Instead
of being motivated by a general respect for freedom of
conscience, those within the legal system would then be
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in a position to share in the justifying reasons guiding
the believer to act in accordance with these particular
rights. It seems more likely that the right to enter a
monastery will be more readily respected by those who
have some respect for that value than by those who think
the choice wildly eccentric but harmless.
The advantage of sharing religious justifying reasons
for acting in certain ways is probably best seen in
situations where such personal and communal freedoms are
in danger of being overridden in the name of, say,
utilitarian reasoning. Then one may be able to argue in
favour of respecting these rights because of one's
personal grasp of the deep values involved. I conclude
that, although believers and non-believers can respect
the religious rights of others, the moral content of
their activity is different because it is based on
different justifying reasons. Note that the justifying
reasons for the Christian include the basic natural law
reason of respect for conscience, but also include the
reason that God wills the freedom of his children to
relate to him in certain ways.
B. God's 'Rights'
In my discussion of the relationships between faith and
ethics I have argued that religious morality is truly
morality insofar as its doctrines relate in part to human
good in this world. At the same time the morality of
Christians must be distinctively religious because moral
acts and practices must be seen in some basic sense as
God-directed. Any person committed to being moral must
not be satisfied with merely bringing about certain good
effects following on from a deliberately limited process
of moral discernment. What is required is an attempt to
discern the best justifying reasons for doing right. For
the Christian these reasons ought to transcend the
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fundamental natural law reasons available to all persons
of good will. The reasons should have God as their
object, not in the sense that God benefits from the
actions, but in the sense that Christian ethics
recognises an obligation of gratitude to God for creation
and redemption (cf.Spicq,1963:35, 'But our essential
reaction in the face of divine goodness, the one which
will be the inspiring force of our moral life, is clearly
that of gratitude. ' ) ; that life has an eschatological
perspective in which Christians wait in longing for
Christ's second coming; and that moral activity can be
part of the process of deification.
Regarding the language of rights in particular, I
would now like to discuss an approach which stresses the
God-directed nature of all rights, since the basis of all
rights is God's right against his creation. Among the
theologians holding his position I shall mention three in
particular: Emil Brunner (1947), Jurgen Moltmann (1980),
and Franz Bockle (1980).
Emil Brunner discusses rights in the context of
justice in his Christianity and Civilisation (1947-48).
In ancient civilisation, Brunner informs his readers,
justice and religion were closely linked, the civic order
was expected to copy the divine order, the lex naturae to
mirror the ius divinum. Thus, 'Justice is something
holy; it is backed by divine order, divine necessity'
(Brunner,1947:vol 1,108). The lex naturae represents the
orders of creation, which the Church fathers connected
with the logos, in whom the world is created and finds
its order. 'That is to say, the Christian Church never
had a lex naturae conception other than a Christological
one' (ibid.). Of course he admits that the pagans could
know the moral law based on the orders of creation. They
know something of justice, 'although the depth of
Christian justice remains hidden from them' (ibid.).
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The proper understanding of justice and rights, then,
is, for Brunner, a theological one. He blames Grotius
for the demise of the theological understanding of
justice by driving a wedge between natural law and divine
law (for a defence of Grotius,cf. d'Entreves,1951:50ff.).
From then on, morality becomes increasingly secularised
and is separated from its religious and metaphysical
base. Brunner wants to retain the concept of 'natural
right', but understood in a religious context, since all
persons are sharers in the same dignity given in
creation. The sovereignty of God above all must be
stressed: 'Man has no rights over against God being his
creature and property; he lives entirely from God's grace
and mercy. Rights he has only in os far as God gives
them' (ibid.,VolI,117-118). And in the second volume of
this work, Brunner insists on this point:
The first pronouncement about "belongings" or
"rights" is this: that all things belong to God.
The ius divinum is not in the first place the right
which God gives, but the right which God has, and
this right alone is absolute (Brunner, 1948: vol 2.
112).
In this passage, Brunner appears to be anxious lest
people should think that God's gift of rights to them
involves some claim against God, thus undermining his
sovereign freedom.
A similar stress on the primacy of God's rights is
central to Moltmann's view: 'We see the theological
contribution of the Christian Church in the grounding of
the fundamental human rights upon God's right to man.'
(Moltmann,1978:193). Such a right is revealed, says
Moltmann, in salvation-history especially in the
scriptural concept of covenant. Here Moltmann tends to
underline the rights and duties of those who enter into
covenant, but he does not make clear whether rights under
the covenant are against God as well as against one's
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neighbour. One might think that this reference to God's
rights is universally held in Christian theology, whereas
in fact it is not, and Moltmann is realistic enough to
recognise that this view is not even the Protestant view,
least of all the Christian view. For instance, the
Lutheran approach to this question as expressed by Todt
and Huber rejects the notion of a 'Christian foundation'
of human rights (Moltmann.1978:190; Huber & Todt,1977;cf.
David Jenkins,1975:99, where he says that 'The struggle
for human rights requires no theological justification.')
Moltmann remains true to the Reformed tradition of
Brunner in stressing a theological foundation in God's
rights.
Franz Bockle makes plain the primacy of God's claim as
central to the whole study of fundamental moral theology.
Under the heading 'The Question of the Ultimate Basis of
Moral Claim', Bockle has this to say:
Instead of asking about the ultimate basis of moral
claim, we could well ask about the limits of man's
moral autonomy. This is also the special concern of
our own enquiry. It is a simple matter of course
for theological ethics that the ultimate basis of
man's moral obligation is found in God's radical
claim imposed on man. But everything depends on the
way we understand this divine claim (Bockle,1980:5) .
One wonders, having seen the admission of Moltmann as
to the controversy over the question of a Christian
foundation for rights, whether Bockle can afford to be so
certain of the ultimate basis of man's obligation in
God's claim. In fact, he does not appear to recognise the
major problems of talking about God's claims or rights.
He is more concerned in the section from which the
quotation has been lifted to harmonise human dependence
on God with human autonomy. Bockle does not really
follow up the question of God's claims as such. It is
fairly clear that he transfers as soon as possible to the
correlative language of obligation, a wise move indeed,
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but of little help in the analysis of what 'God's rights'
could mean.
What then are the problems of using the language of
rights in relation to God? John A. Henley (1986)
provides a valuable service to Christian ethics in his
discussion of this question. First, he speaks of the way
in which talk of God's rights must be analogical.
Prescinding from consideration of the putative 'rights'
of animals, rights are usually held to be predicable only
of persons. Moving from the known to the unknown the
question now arises, 'Is God sufficiently like human
persons to allow the predication of the language of
rights?'. Henley points to the Christian doctrine of the
Trinity where the term 'person' is used in a relational
sense. The term 'Father' seems to permit some view of God
as having rights on the analogy of any earthly father
having rights against his children, rights to gratitude
and loyalty, for instance (op.cit.,372). It is, however,
difficult to know exactly how God's personhood is
similar to human personhood, even when it is claimed that
God became human in Jesus of Nazareth, who is the perfect
image of the Father (Heb.l:3; Col.1:15). The least a
Christian would wish to hold, I presume, is that God may
be more than what is called a 'person' but certainly not
less. (Some theologians have been sceptical about the use
of the language of 'person' and 'nature' in relation to
God. For instance, R. Panikkar (1973) narrates how at the
Vatican Council some African Bishops spoke to him of
their sadness that their native languages had no words
corresponding to these terms. In reply, Panikkar
expressed his admiration for such languages and his
regret that he did not know them himself
(Panikkar,197 3:41 ). )
If God is in some sense a person how might his
'rights' be categorised? Recalling the distinction
between human rights and special moral rights, where does
153
God fit into that schema? Henley shows that God's
'rights' cannot be like human rights for the simple
reason that human rights are defined as those 'one has
simply because of who one is and in order to become who
one is' (ibid.,372). But God, as understood in
traditional theistic terms, cannot change in order to
become more or less divine. This is the single most
difficult problem relating to the concept of the rights
of God. Rights are required by humans because they are
weak and because there is a sense in which human dignity
can be undermined by the actions of others. People need
the protection of rights against one another, but God
needs no such protection. He cannot be harmed in any way.
(Brian Davies,1982:22-24, argues from traditional
theistic premises that God cannot be a moral agent, since
this would be to make him a being among other beings;
because moral agents are usually said to have duties as
well as rights; and because moral agency is generally
linked with notions of success and failure in the moral
enterprise. Clearly none of these criteria applies to
God. Thus, if God has rights, they are not of a type pos¬
sessed by ordinary moral agents.)
A further reason why the human rights concept cannot
apply to God is the fact mentioned earlier, that the
notion of equality is built into the doctrine of human
rights. Each human person has a similar basic dignity
and owes every other person the same respect. However,
God is not on equal terms with his creatures, and there
are theologians like Brunner who reject out of hand the
idea of humans having rights against God.
If God's 'rights' are not of the 'human rights' type,
is there any way in which they can be said to be like
'special moral rights'? Henley is equally sceptical of
this approach, for 'special rights obtain only between
those who share a particular relation, not between all
and sundry.' (Henley,1986:372). So it is doubtful whether
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the special relationship existing between God and those
who accept the gift of faith can provide a basis for the
rights of all men and women. Henley holds that 'this
right of God exists only in relation to those whom in
biblical terms he has chosen and this is not yet
everyone.' (ibid.). There is some point to this argument,
since special moral rights tend to apply only to people
who voluntarily enter into a relationship with some other
person, and this is simply not the case in a world which
often voluntarily rejects the existence of God.
However, it is arguable that some special moral rights
arise without bilateral agreement. The relationship
between parents and their offspring is a case in point.
Children do not 'consent' to be born and to enter into a
normative relationship with their parents, but it is
common to hold that children as they grow up must
respect, to some degree, their parents' rights.
Analogously, it may be argued that all human beings are
de facto God's children or God's creatures and that God
has rights against them even if they do not recognise the
existence of such rights. It must be remembered that
rights can exist without any immediate hope of their
exercise. Perhaps in the present world with its large
proportion of non-believers in God, his 'rights' against
such people are 'manifesto rights' in Feinberg's sense?
Nevertheless, if one is interested in a universal respect
for human rights in practice, it seems that giving them a
theological foundation must fail from the start, given
the wide disagreement on even the basic question of God's
existence. This does not mean, however, that a
theological foundation is impossible. In any case, even
if it is accepted that God's 'rights' are more like
special moral rights than human rights, one is still left
with the fundamental problem of coping with the
consequences of failure to respect God's 'rights' - is
God harmed by the failure of His creation to obey him and
give him his due? My conclusion is that talk of God's
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'rights' is so divorced from the usual meaning of rights-
language as applied to human persons, that such a usage
is of very little, or no, help in Christian ethics.
C 'Rights' Against God
Is there more sense in talking of the rights of men and
women against God in spite of worries about maintaining
God's sovereignty? At first sight there does seem some
sense to this notion, since rights are important for
human beings in basic relationships they have with any
powerful figure who can exercise some control over their
lives. And surely God's omnipotence together with his
interest in human life suggests that humans need some
assurance that God will respect their freedom?
Thus, there are theologians who want to speak of the
rights persons hold against God. Albert Knudson, for
instance, takes Brunner to task for his criticisms of the
doctrine of natural rights from a theological point of
view, for saying that rights have no place in the
Christian ethic of love, and that all the goods of life
are gifts of God's grace, not rights. To this Knudson
responds:
But if this be true in an absolute sense, there is
no moral order. Duties vanish as well as rights.
The only way in which the idea of a moral universe
can be maintained is by ascribing moral res¬
ponsibility to God and a limited independence to
man. As Creator of the world, God is a responsible
being, and we his creatures have rights over against
him as well as duties to him. The failure to see
this is due to a one-sided and exaggerated
conception of divine grace, a conception that is
excluded by the fact of human freedom
(Knudson,n.d..:180).
Likewise, Christopher Wright (1979) refers to human
rights against God in the context of scriptural examples.
He thinks that 'the Exodus was a 'declaration of right'
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inasmuch as Israel had <a right to be redeemed'
(Wright,1979:18). And he goes on to say:
For God had, in his sovereign freedom, chosen to
make himself responsible for Israel. In his
covenant with Abraham, God not only undertook a
responsibility towards Abraham in the form of a
promise, he also bound himself to himself, as it
were (ibid.,18).
Clearly the mention of a binding promise here implies
that God has created a situation in which a special moral
right comes into being with the covenant. God's
sovereignty remains, since he is the dominant partner.
The major disadvantage in speaking of rights against
God, and one which I think is insuperable, is mentioned
by Joseph Allen in an article in the Journal of Religious
Ethics (1974). He asks what could rights against God mean
in practice? Can people claim long life, or health, or
comfort? All that can be claimed, according to Allen, is
what God has promised - steadfast love. But is this
really significant?
But of what use is that claim? Of no use against
God, because it is his nature to love, and we cannot
conceive (from the standpoint of Christian faith) of
circumstances in which we might ever have to assert
that right, that is, of any instance when the
promise would not be kept (Allen,1974:131).
The notion of claiming against God makes no sense,
since the language of rights only fits a world where
persons live under the shadow of ignorance and
selfishness. Human beings need rights against others
because of the general moral weakness of the whole race,
which makes human living so vulnerable. But God is never
a threat to personal welfare and flourishing, as fellow
human beings can be.
The discussion so far has been designed to underline
the difficulties of speaking analogously about rights in
157
relation to God. It is exceedingly difficult to know how
the language of rights can be applied strictly in this
area when the differences between God and humanity are
noted. It appears that the very features of human life
which make the language of rights essential are not
features of God's life as he has been traditionally
conceived. I shall leave to others the possibility of
applying the language of rights to God from less
traditional perspectives.
4.5 Grounding Rights in Human Dignity
While accepting that respect for human rights in practice
does not require a theological justification, but
essentially natural law reasons which are open to all men
and women who have reached the age of moral discernment,
I am still interested in the question of theological
foundations for the language of rights. I feel that
there are particularly distinctive religious justifying
reasons which derive from Christian tradition which
change the content of respect for rights for "the
believer. Having rejected the approach which tries to
derive human rights from God's rights, I now wish to
explore what I believe is a more favourable approach,
namely, that God gives rights to human beings against one
another because of his providential care for his
children, whether they believe in him or not. This allows
for the protection of human dignity and also refuses to
attack God's sovereignty.
The first point I can make is that God creates a world
in which conflict is possible and in which that conflict
is actualised by human freedom. And what interests me
most in this context is the issue of moral conflict
arising from human selfishness and pride. Though God does
not will human sin, he does allow sin to occur with all
its bad consequences, near and remote. But Christian
revelation speaks of a God who in a sense 'responds' to
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human disobedience and alienation, through the grace of
forgiveness and through moral and religious guidance in
the 'old law' and the 'new law'.
Alan Falconer (1980) expresses the manner in which God
uses conflict, with reference to the work of Andre Dumas
(1978) on political theology:
In his analysis of the Old and New Testaments, Andre
Dumas in Political Theology and the Life of the
Church, sees a recurrent pattern of conflict in the
events recorded - a conflict which arises primarily
because of the differences between individuals and
groups. Such conflict possessed then, as it does
now, both destructive and creative elements. It is
particularly in the creative element of conflict
that God is seen active. In such conflicts, God
appears as the 'Disturber' or 'praesentia explosiva'
(Falconer,1980:212; Dumas,1978;Chs.2&4).
Thus, the concept of conflict is ambiguous from the
Christian point of view. It appears that creative
conflict is a valuable aspect of human becoming and human
dignity. Falconer locates this creative conflict in.the
necessary self-assertion each individual needs to develop
in order to flourish as a unique being (op.cit.,199ff).
One's own self-assertiveness naturally comes up against
the assertiveness of others in positive and negative
ways, and the positive ways are an expression of this
creative conflict. The language of rights can be
understood as part of this creative conflict, a response
to oppressive and negative conflict as found in the
selfish assertiveness which is injustice. The creative
conflict revealed in particular in the power to claim
against others is God's gift and task to those who often
seem trapped in the web of destructive conflict. Thus,
Falconer sums up the argument so far:
Human rights emerge as attempts to regulate the
conflict between human beings or groups of human
beings in such a way as to protect the individual or
group and also in such a way as to enable human
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beings and groups to grow to maturity. Human rights
reflect, then, and engage the two effects of
conflict,viz. the destructive and the constructive
or creative (ibid.,201).
What is most interesting in Falconer's analysis above
is the positive function given to rights in bringing
about human maturity. Respect for rights in human life
is not just a defensive need, though this is important as
'protection' against oppression (destructive conflict);
it is also a positive, personal need with regard to
'enablement' (creative conflict) directed towards the
attainment of maturity. Though Falconer does not stress
the function of claiming as much as I would like, it
seems to me that the 'enablement' mentioned above must
include the capacity to claim for oneself basic goods
necessary for personal flourishing. But such claiming
itself entails struggle insofar as it is part of the
process of maturation. Falconer does not say that the
way in which rights regulate the conflict between human
beings will be painless. I assume there will often be a
difficulty in achieving a proper balance between creative
and destructive conflict. It is only realistic to admit,
as I have done in the third chapter, that rights-claims
can themselves be morally jarring, contributing to the
destructive conflict they are meant to overcome.
However, such dangers must not be used to obscure the
central point that without some conflict there can be no
truly human life.
The position just enunciated is not Feinberg's
position on claiming in another guise, though it bears a
close enough relationship to his approach. The
specifically theological colour involves the idea of God
as 'Disturber' and as 'praesentia explosiva'. How does
this disturbing presence of God make itself felt through
the language of rights? One answer must be that God
disturbs the powerful of this world through the claims of
the weaker members of the human race. This is one of the
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major insights of current theology of liberation, which
refuses to accept a fatalistic approach to suffering
arising from injustice. This form of theology seeks to
enable the poor of the world to recognise their
obligation to claim in God's name against oppressive
forces. According to this vision, it is better to be
crucified in the process of claiming basic rights than to
be crucified in cowardly silence (cf. Leonardo and
Clodovis Boff,1984:2-3; Bonino,1980:27-29; Latin American
Bishops (Puebla),1980:48-49).
I believe that Falconer was influenced in his
reference to God as 'Disturber' by the writing of David
Jenkins (1982) who tends to see rights as a weapon in
'God's warfare on behalf of men and women created in his
image and as part of his judgment on the inhumanities of
societies and institutions, including those of the
Church.' (Jenkins,1982:99) . Jenkins refers to an earlier
article on the subject of rights in which he says that
human rights are related to 'the divine attack, or the
human attack under divine inspiration, on the obstacles
to becoming human.' (ibid.,99;cf.Jenkins,1974) . If this
position is valid, then it sheds a further light on the
question of the moral content of rights. Here is an
essential justifying reason for the Christian who wishes
to understand in a deeper way why respect for rights is
important.
Allen, who has been mentioned already in relation to
his critique of talk of rights against God, is quite
prepared to accept that rights are God-given:
The right that corresponds to God's promise, along
with the rights that correspond to the structure he
has bestowed upon us in creation, reflects, from a
Christian point of view, what is essential to true
humanity. Therefore, whether because it is God's
command, or because it is right to affirm one's true
humanity, such fundamental rights need to be
vindicated when they are brought under attack
(Allen,1974:131-132).
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The clear implication here is that rights, far from being
an attempt to undermine God's sovereignty, are in fact a
significant expression of respect for God's sovereignty
over creation. This point is stressed as follows:
To speak of rights in these relationships, though,
is not at all to compromise God's sovereignty, but
to express it, because the rights that reflect what
it is truly to be a person and therein a child of
God are the expression of how God in his sovereign
will has bound himself in steadfast love toward his
creatures. The Christian understanding of God and
man, far from being contradictory to the concept of
moral rights belonging to persons, is inseparably
connected with it (ibid.,132).
All that has been said so far in this section can be
brought under the general heading of respect for human
dignity. In Christian ethics it is extremely common to
express this dignity in terms of humanity being created
in God's image. A number of theologians mention this link
between rights, dignity and the image of God in humankind
(e.g. Moltmann,1980:194; Jenkins,1982:99; Bonino,1980:26;
Blank,1979:27; Carroll, 1987 :148ff. ; Aubert,1986:142-143).
Now talk of human dignity and of humanity being a
reflection of God's own life sounds highly impressive at
a general level; it is when one tries to pin this kind of
language down that difficulties begin to arise. James
Childress (1986) summarises some of the controversies
surrounding this concept in his article on the subject in
the New Dictionary of Christian Ethics (1986:292-293).
For instance, there is the basic question of how far the
image of God in humankind has been damaged by original
sin. Reformation theology tends to underline the
essential damage done to the image itself, while Roman
Catholic theology has tended to distinguish between a
basic image which remains untouched and an added quality
of grace which is lost in the Fall (sometimes this is
based on a distinction found as early as Irenaeus between
the 'image' and the 'likeness' of God in humanity.).
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However, it is again dangerous to speak of a unified
'Protestant' approach to this question, since Childress
points out how Lutherans and Calvinists interpret the
effects of original sin on humankind differently.
Lutherans talk in terms of loss of the image; Calvinists
in terms of corruption, not loss, of the image.
The other major issue is that of locating the image of
God in some distinctive feature of human nature.
Childress has this to say:
Although the image of God is often construed as
reason and free will, it has also been interpreted
as spiritual capacities, such as self-transcendence
or the capacity for and the call to relationship
with God, and as excellences, such as righteousness
(ibid.,292).
Either approach mentioned in this quotation gives rise to
embarrassing problems in grounding human dignity on this
concept of image. If image is related to reason and free
will, then there are the problems of grounding the
dignity of humans lacking these capacities - embryos,
young children, the severely retarded, the comatose, the
demented. On the other hand, if the image of God in
humanity is dependent on a person's actual response to
others in spiritual and moral relationships, then as well
as the same problems with the categories just mentioned,
one may also have problems maintaining the dignity of
solitary persons, those suffering from psychopathic and
sociopathic disorders, and persons who make a radically
self-centred fundamental option. If the image of God in
man and woman is dependent on one's moral record in terms
of responsibility to others, then it seems likely that
the image of God will come and go, grow stronger and
weaker in the course of daily life.
(Linking image with moral rectitude is found in
Ramsey,1950:354, 'When man ceases to reflect the image of
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God and begins simply to reflect upon himself and his own
rights, he is no longer in the image of God.' But if
rights are based on the dignity related to image, do
human rights disappear when the image does?) Thus, the
question remains: 'Is such a concept of a varying and
changing image able to ground human dignity?
In order to surmount these problems I feel it is
necessary to make some important distinctions, between
'absolute' and 'relative' dignity and between 'intrinsic'
and 'extrinsic' worth.
Beginning with the notion of 'relative dignity', I
think that this is connected with what is sometimes
called humanity's distinctive endowment (cf.
Mill,1861:187 ; Downie & Telfer,1980:39 ). In effect this
includes both approaches to the image concept mentioned
above by Childress. Human beings differ from the rest of
nature in their possession of reason, free will, and the
ability to relate to others in a remarkably intimate
manner. This is a general rule applying to the majority
of human beings, but there are of course the exceptions
to this rule referred to already, those who do not have
reason and free will and perhaps little ability to have
intimate relationships with others. Moreover, the
distinctive endowment of most people in the majority
group is always fragile. Persons may suddenly begin to
suffer from depression, neurosis and psychosis, which
obstruct the life of reason and the intimate
relationships painfully constructed over the years.
Senile dementia may set in, or a stroke may occur, or a
brain haemorrhage experienced, which change the subject's
personality in dramatic fashion. It should be recognised
by now why I speak about 'relative dignity', because it
is based on such a fragile set of qualities and
characteristics.
I believe that human relative dignity is the same as
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human extrinsic worth. Both concepts function at the
level of basic evaluation of quality of life judgements.
For the most part, persons are valued because of the ways
in which they participate in the distinctive endowment
mentioned. When a person is living to the full, this
ordinarily means that he or she is acting reasonably, in
control of personal life as far as possible, enjoying
intimate relationships, and a host of other goods which
require some use of reason and imagination. When the
distinctive endowment which allows for such a
participation in the good life is in danger or at risk,
often frantic attempts are made to rescue it. If it is
lost, persons become more dependent on others, and often
feel 'less a person' depending on the loss of quality of
life experienced. Some persons may even feel that life is
no longer worth living and thus seek a 'final solution'
to their seemingly 'pathetic' state. In other words,
once one's distinctive endowment as a human is
undermined, there is the temptation to think that one's
dignity is also undermined.
However, there are the further concepts of 'absolute
dignity' and 'intrinsic worth' which operate at a deeper
level than distinctive endowment, and which can lead
people to a positive evaluation of human life which
appears to have lost all 'quality' as this is usually
understood. This approach I cannot see as being
reasonable other than in a religious context. It makes
sense only in terms of the value which God places on His
creation.
This declaration will become clearer, I hope, by means
of the distinction between divine love and human love.
For this purpose I shall refer to the interesting
treatment of this distinction by the theologian James
Burtchaell in his book Living with Grace (1973). Here
Burtchaell contrasts divine love and human love:
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The Father's love embodied in Jesus is
characteristically different from our natural human
way of loving. As a man, I am drawn to love various
things and persons. I love the Oregon coast at
sunset, Brandenburg concertos, asparagus, and my
eight grade teacher. No matter how one cares to
name these reactions - savouring, loving, liking,
desiring, appreciating - there is a common dynamic
in them all. I am attracted by certain qualities in
these other persons and things, qualities which
willy-nilly I find congenial and appealing
(Burtchaell,1973:20) .
Having described natural human loving, the other side of
the contrast is then presented:
Unlike ourselves, the Father loves men, not for what
he finds in them, but for what lies within himself.
It is not because men are good that he loves them,
nor only good men that he loves. It is because he
is so unutterably good that he loves all men, good
and evil. He loves sinners. He loves the loveless,
the unloving, the unlovable. He does not detect
what is congenial, appealing, attractive, and
respond to it with his favor. Indeed, he does not
respond at all. The Father is a source. He does
not react; he initiates love. His is motiveless
love, radiating forth eternally (ibid.,21).
The contrast between these kinds of love reveals the
distinction between 'relative' and 'absolute' dignity.
Human loving requires something attractive in order to
respond positively, it requires what has been called
distinctive endowment. When this fades, it becomes more
difficult to love others. However, divine love does not
respond to distinctive endowment, it simply loves
whatever it brings forth. 'Absolute dignity' is the value
which God places on human life in the very act of
bringing that life into existence. The particular talents
and endowments are a precious gift of God to humanity but
are not God's reason for loving the human race. Thus,
God's creative love is the basis of the absolute dignity
which persons possess even when they lose everything that
makes life seem worthwhile in the eyes of the world.
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Now respect for rights must be related to the concept
of 'relative dignity'. Rights protect the goods which
make up what is called 'a good quality of life'. Rights
do not relate directly to the concept of 'absolute
dignity' since that depends on God's love which cannot
change or be undermined by any human action. In other
words, the evil that men and women do can injure human
'relative dignity' or 'extrinsic worth', but cannot
injure human 'absolute dignity' or 'intrinsic worth'.
However, I must not give the impression that 'relative
dignity' is unimportant theologically. Although I must
not love God's gifts to the exclusion of God Himself,
part of loving God must involve an appreciation of his
gifts of reason, free will, the ability to relate to
others, and all that these imply. I cannot afford to be
indifferent to the content of relative dignity, since
that is part of God's image in my life. God's gifts
cannot be separated totally from his nature. Moreover,
given Burtchaell's analysis of human loving, it appears
that if I wish to begin to love God and my fellow humans
I must find something attractive in them. So human love
must approach God and his creation in terms of the beauty
which attracts the heart. From here I should try to ready
myself for the kind of love which remains steadfast when
the beauty of creation is absent, when 'relative dignity'
fades.
Respect for rights, then, may be seen as a first step
in arriving at an approach which transcends ordinary
human loving. Unless I have the memory of God's love in
his gifts of distinctive endowment and the beauty of
creation in general, I shall find it extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to take the leap of faith in grasping
(even in the weak way open to humanity when strained to
its uttermost limit) the reality of absolute dignity.
Rights function in protecting relative dignity so that
the memory of God's attractiveness remains in mind, and
so that I may experience something of the absolute safety
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mentioned earlier.
If rights are to be grounded theologically on the
notion of image as the basis of human dignity, they must
be understood in the light of the two aspects mentioned
above. Humanity is made in God's image means on one level
that the mere act of existing is a reflection of God's
love as absolute source. Human life is of value before
one takes into account all the wonderful things humans
can do through the further gift of God. Secondly, at the
other level, human life reflects the life of God in the
sheer attractiveness of human experience when God's gifts
are taken seriously and enjoyed. Rights function at this
second level, protecting that image of God in men and
women which is most fragile and temporary.
A.6 Conclusion
This chapter began with an attempt to chart briefly the
course of the language of rights from 'hostile watefs',
so to speak, to the 'safe harbour' of Christian
respectability. This course has not been altogether
smooth, as seen in the reluctance to accept the conflict
which must arise quite often when rights are claimed. An
underlying political conservatism, especially in Roman
Catholicism, has often appeared to fail in going beyond
the rhetoric of claiming rights, for fear of political
violence and anarchy. The risks associated with claiming
are only reluctantly embraced by the Church. However,
there is some evidence that the Christian Church has
moved from a position where she was concerned mainly with
her own rights against what seemed a hostile world. As
Moltmann puts it, 'the church cannot wait with its
protest until its own religious freedom is threatened.
It is there for the sake of man and must raise its voice
for the rights of man.' (Moltmann,1980:184).
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Although the language of rights has become respectable
in Church circles and is used frequently in 'official'
statements, there is still relatively little attention
being paid to the careful analysis of this language.
Thus, Henley rightly refers to 'the naivety with which
some theologians and church leaders concerned about human
rights have understood the relation between theoria and
praxis.' And the upshot of this, he claims, is that 'the
cause of human rights has been virtually taken for
granted in certain circles, especially those of the World
Council of Churches, and little critical attention has
been paid to such matters as its foundations.'
(Henley,1986:367).
I have tried to pay some more attention to the
question of theological foundations for rights-language
in this chapter, but first I attempted to clarify the
issue of the distinctiveness of Christian ethics.
Basically I discussed two related issues: the meaning of
the 'content' of morality and the distinction between
'motives' and 'reasons'. I argued that a sharp
distinction should not be made between 'act-evaluation'
and 'agent-evaluation' as happens when motives are
categorised under the heading of 'agent evaluation'. What
is more important is to examine the justifying reasons
which motivate (or should motivate) an agent to act.
These reasons are central to the content of morality.
They always refer to the goods or values to be realised
in the action.
For Christians, there will be natural law reasons for
pursuing certain goals and these will be shared with all
men and women of good will. In fact, Christians cannot
eliminate such reasons, with their basic reference to
human benefit and harm, from their moral deliberations.
However, the beliefs of Christians based on revelation
give more profound justifying reasons for acting which
draw out the deeper meaning of the natural law reasons.
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To respect the rights of others, for instance, because
they are made in God's image (however that is to be
interpreted) is closer to the ultimate truth about human
life and its value than any secular reason.
Thus, I have spoken of the advantage within
Christianity of having both 'fundamental' and 'ultimate'
reasons for acting, in which the natural law aspects are
fundamental, though the religious justifying reasons are
ultimate. In my opinion, religious belief relating to
the doctrines of creation and redemption capture the
'fundamental' value of human life in an 'ultimate' way.
Those who do not share in such beliefs can hold the
fundamental values, but will not understand their
ultimate value. Such a distinction, I believe, makes a
difference to the 'content' of morality.
Having shown that Christian ethics is distinctive in
content because of the specific justifying reasons which
should motivate the believer, I then went on to show some
wrong avenues of approach to the question of theological
foundations for the language of rights. I rejected the
notion of God having rights, and the notion of humanity
having rights against God. It is better to say that human
rights are willed by God, given by him. C.J.Wright states
clearly, 'What God demands of me to do for B constitutes
B's rights.' and 'Rights do not exist apart from the
demand of God upon someone.' (Wright,1979:9).
God supports the efforts of men and women to respect
rights as part of the project of arriving at human
maturity, through achieving a balance between creative
and destructive conflict. A. more dramatic way of
expressing this point is to say that rights are part of
God's warfare against all that would undermine humanity's
dignity. This includes the destructive conflict just
mentioned. Thus, the language of rights as used by men
and women can be a sign of God the 'Disturber' at work on
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earth refusing to allow his creation to return to chaos,
and confounding the strong through the claims of the
weak.
I then pointed out the difficulties in speaking of
human dignity and the related theological term 'image of
God' . I thought it necessary to distinguish between the
image of God as the ground of humanity's 'absolute
dignity' and also as the ground of humanity's 'relative
dignity'. The former is based on God's love of humankind
as seen in the very fact of their existence. The latter
is based on the quality of life which God enables men and
women to develop, what I have also called human
'distinctive endowment'. The language of rights pertains
directly to the category of 'relative dignity' where the
image of God can wax or wane depending on the
circumstances. However, it pertains to the category of
'absolute dignity' indirectly, insofar as human loving
needs some appreciation of quality of life, if it is to
accept that life as worthwhile when goods or values are
removed. Needless to say, the leap from recognition of
'relative dignity' to 'absolute dignity' depends on a
special illumination or grace from God in conjunction
with the human response of joy in relation to the fragile
gifts bestowed on humanity, a joy which is protected to
some extent by the reality of claiming rights.
I trust that this material will be sufficient to
support my earlier arguments against scepticism
concerning rights. There are many other issues which,
unfortunately, I could not treat of in this chapter. For
instance, the arguments of Moltmann and Henley (op. cit.)
which underline the eschatological nature of rights could
not be discussed. Nor could I deal with the attempts to
locate the language of rights in Scripture. Wright makes
a valiant effort to do just this, but I am sceptical of
this whole operation (cf.Limburg,1979; Blank,1979;
Bonino,1980; Ahern,1984). Much more could be said about
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'relative dignity' and the values which contribute to it.
These goods can be 'Revelation-Faith' experiences leading
persons to a fundamental grasp of the manner in which all
life, but especially human life, is in the grasp of a
gracious God (cf. Shea, 1980: chs 1&2). T could go even
further and speculate that participation in certain goods
given by God can be part of the process of the
deification of the human person.
Enough has been said in this and preceding chapters to
dispel some of the fears one might have in regard to the
use of the language of rights. But it still remains to be
seen how this theoretical part can be applied in
practice. Therefore, I move now to the second part of my
thesis, where I attempt to show the usefulness of the




Application to the Sphere of Reproductive Rights
To me, having a baby inside me is the only time I'm
really alive. I know I can make something, do
something, no matter what color my skin is, and what
names people call me. When the baby gets born I see
him, and he's full of life, or she is; and I think
to myself that it fehat fct doesn't make any
difference what happens later, at least now we've
got a chance, or the baby does.
The words of a black mother from Robert Coles,
Children of Crisis, cited by A.Dyck,Hastings Center
Report, 1973, p.75.
Can it be said that some individuals and couples
have a basic "need" for children, the frustration of
which would seriously harm their very humanity?
This does not seem plausible it would be highly
questionable to place such an uncertain and variable
need among those universal human needs
which,....,give rise to moral claims and
obligations.
Choices in Childlessness,(1979),(Report of the Free




The Basic Analysis of Reproductive Rights
5.1 Introduction
From the first chapter of this thesis I described rights
as valid claims or entitlements to something regarded as
good or valuable and against someone, the person or
persons with some correlative obligation. The Benefit or
Interest theory of rights stressed the good, value, or
interest which justifies placing the 'burden' of a duty
on others. The Choice theory, though partially
discredited, has some importance in its stress on the
power that right-holders have over the normative
relationship entailed by the possession of the right.
Therefore, the analysis of all particular rights,
including reproductive rights, must concentrate on two
specific areas: the good or value that is claimed and the
relation between the claim and the duty or to personalise
this - the relation between the right-holder and the
duty-bearer. All other questions must be related to
these basic issues. For instance, conflicts between
rights can exist because goods can be in conflict and
because human relationships centring on such goods can
conflict.
In this chapter I want to mention briefly the central
issues that need to be faced if any sense is to be made
of 'reproductive rights'. These include the goods
involved in having children or founding a family; the
question of the identity of right-holders and duty-
bearers, i.e. who has the right to reproduce and who has
the respective duty to respect that right?; the question
of conflicting interests and rights; and the basic ways
in which my analysis of the Hohfeldian distinctions might
apply to the sphere of reproductive freedom.
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5.2 Reproductive Values
That human reproduction involves some important values or
goods can hardly be denied; the problem is to decide on
the relative importance of these. Stanley Hauerwas (1981)
claims that there is often confusion in people's minds
regarding the reasons for having children or founding a
family. He says that he begins his college course on
marriage and the family with questions such as 'What is
it?' and 'Why would anyone want to do it?'. Such
questions puzzle his students who tend to join the course
thinking of it as a "how to do it" option
(Hauerwas,1981:157). He feels that the answer to his
fundamental question tends to be unsatisfactory:
"What reason would you give why one should be
willing to have children?" They say "children are
fun," or "as an expression of a couple's love," or
"because it is just the thing to do," but they
clearly doubt that any of these are an adequate
basis for having children. Their often unexpressed
doubt seems to me to illustrate the depth of the
crisis concerning the family: we lack a moral
account of why we commit ourselves to having
children (ibid.,157).
Keeping in mind that it is justifying reasons which
are central here, what are the reasons for wanting to
procreate? John Bowlby (1965) mentions cases where
illegitimate girls grow up to have illegitimate children
themselves. Often the reasons for this happening are
negative from the moral point of view. 'Running side by
side with the need to use the baby as a weapon against
the parents was the need to use it as a weapon against
themselves', as a result of 'profound feelings of guilt'
(Bowlby,1965 : 113-11A) . Obviously not all reasons for
conceiving and bearing babies are morally justifying
reasons.
John Finnis (1980) gives two basic justifying reasons
for having children. One is the value of life itself,
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which includes bodily and mental health. The other value
realised in human procreation is 'sociability', which
includes the intimacy between husband and wife and their
offspring. The two values are associated with
distinguishable desires, according to Finnis:
We can distinguish the desire and decision to have a
child, simply for the sake of bearing a child, from
the desire and decision to cherish and to educate
the child. The former desire and decision is a
pursuit of the good of life, in this case life-in-
its-transmission; the latter desires and decisions
are aspects of the pursuit of the distinct basic
values of sociability (or friendship) and truth
(truth-in-its-communication) , running alongside the
continued pursuit of the value of life that is
involved in simply keeping the child alive and well
until it can fend for itself (Finnis,1980:87).
Finnis's reference to the distinction between the
desire to procreate and the desire to cherish and educate
children is important, because it brings up the question
of the scope of reproductive rights. One can distinguish
the 'typical' cases from the 'less typical'. The common
experience of humanity is the holding together of the two
desires mentioned by Finnis. Most people want to cherish
the children they procreate, at least when that child is
a child of a loving relationship. One should note here
the pain of many unmarried mothers when it comes to give
up their babies for adoption.
But there are the less typical cases as well, most
obvious being the recent trend in commercial surrogacy,
where the intention from the beginning is to give the
child to the commissioning couple. Arguably, this
practice could give rise to reproductive claims which
limit the scope of reproductive freedom to the experience
of pregnancy and birth. But there is also the matter of
reproductive rights in cases of pregnancy happening from
rape. Since the conception was involuntary, what kind of
rights are involved here? If the woman decides on an
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abortion, is this the exercise of a reproductive right or
of a right to health and general self-determination? If
the woman decides to give birth to the child, is this an
exercise of the mother's reproductive right, or should
one concentrate on the 'rights' of the fetus, or is
there a combination of rights here? Because my own
approach stresses that reproductive rights are
essentially special moral rights arising from voluntary
decisions to found a family, I find it difficult to see
pregnancy through rape as open to the application of such
rights. (I have decided not to discuss the issue of
methods of childbirth in this thesis, though there is
obviously some connection between them and reproductive
freedom, cf. Huntingford,1985.)
Much time could be spent drawing out the details of
these basic goods of life and sociability (not to mention
the communication of truth); here I shall make just a few
points.
First, procreation is a distinct aspect of the good of
life as such. Usually the main aspect of the pursuit of
this good is the maintenance and promotion of existing
life, my own life and the lives of others. However, by
life is meant not mere bodily and physical existence, but
truly 'human' life. The existence and health of body and
mind are the basic substratum necessary for participation
in basic personal goods, e.g. those mentioned by Finnis:
knowledge, play, sociability, aesthetic experience,
religion, and so forth (op.cit.,chs III & IV). Now the
good of procreation is associated with the continuation
of truly human life beyond my own individual enjoyment of
these basic goods. In other words, there is a form of
altruism in wanting human goods to be enjoyed, when my
own enjoyment of them has come to an end. This is not to
deny, of course, the deep-seated human need to 'live on'
after death (cf.Dyck,1973:75). Perhaps the birth of
children can be seen as a vicarious existence after
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death. Note that the Christian can, and must, share in
the desire that human goods be experienced by others
after her death, as long as God wills his creation to
last; though vicarious immortality in one's children
should be replaced by a desire for a personal share in
God's eternity.
Second, the basic good of human sociability is of
course wider than the shared joy of a man and woman
bringing their child into the world, but human
procreation is arguably one of the fundamental
expressions of sociability. Interestingly, Finnis appears
to situate procreation in relation to this good at the
level of giving a home to children or raising a family.
He speaks above of the distinctive desire 'to cherish and
to educate the child'. So, while the good of life can in
one sense be satisfied simply in conceiving and giving
birth to a child, the good of sociability would appear to
require an ongoing sharing of parental resources,
especially love and truth, with the child. However, it
must be admitted that Finnis, in the quote given above,
insists that the ordinary care parents show for their
children in keeping them alive is an expression of the
good of life. Clearly the fact that a man and a woman
bring a new life into the world can be a binding factor.
The child can be the focus of an intimate relationship.
But it must be remembered that caring for a child
begotten by another couple can still contribute to the
good of sociability in binding together the adoptive
parents. The relationship between the distinct desires is
both complex and controversial.
So far I have concentrated on justifying reasons for
having children, assuming all along that the primary role
of reproductive rights is to protect persons in the
fulfilment of their desire to have children. I firmly
believe that this is the primary focus of reproductive
rights. But I have to recognise that a secondary aspect
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of these rights is concerned with reproductive freedom in
a wider sense. Another way of expressing this is to
argue that reproductive rights are an aspect of a more
basic right, the right of self-determination. In the
reproductive sphere this right involves the freedom not
to procreate as well as the right to procreate. The
freedom not to have children itself has various aspects.
It may refer to a basic vocational decision not to marry,
and if one makes marriage a precondition of the
possibility of using one's reproductive capacity, this
entails a decision not to have children. Another aspect
might involve the separation of vocational decisions,
such that two persons agree to marry but on principle
refuse to have children. And, most obvious of all, the
sphere of reproductive freedom extends to the spacing of
children within the dynamic of the marriage relationship.
This emphasis on self-determination as the essential
feature of reproductive rights is exemplified in the
attitude of Sheila McLean (1986) of Glasgow University:
Merely not interfering with existing capacities
admittedly permits reproduction, but does not tackle
the fundamental issue. Is the production of
offspring the overriding moral good which demands
the protection of the terminology of human rights?
Might not the debate equally focus on the
individual's right to self-determination, which -
whilst still acknowledging an inherent value in
freedom from intervention and the importance of
reproduction or parenting - none the less also
depends on freedom of choice? To adopt such a
perspective can expand our consideration of
reproduction and ultimately render any right more
meaningful (McLean,1986:100).
The notion of self-determination is of great
importance, I agree, but the question remains how far
this applies in the reproductive sphere? McLean tends to
be quite radically individualistic, to the extent of
being in favour of the rights of single persons to have
children (ibid.,1986:110). Christian ethics naturally
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frowns on this approach to self-determination, and tends
to stress instead the freedom of the married couple to
determine the size and spacing of their children (cf. The
Vatican's Charter of the Rights of the Family,1983,
Article 3). There are, of course, well known differences
of opinion among Christians concerning the scope of this
freedom and the means used to realise it.
Most of the justifying reasons for having children
mentioned so far have been of the 'natural law' type,
i.e. reasons recognisable independently of God's
revelation in Scripture. But there are also specifically
religious reasons which can be added to the natural law
ones. Often these reasons offer a greater depth to the
already existing secular reasoning, and again it must be
noted that I am not claiming that religious reasons
eliminate the importance of the secular or natural law
reasons.
In first place, one can value the procreation of
children and the promotion of family life because in this
way the community of the Church is built up. In other
words, procreation is not simply about self-preservation,
the 'selfish gene' reproducing itself; nor is it simply
about the survival of the human species as a good in
itself; nor is it simply about continued participation of
humanity in certain general goods; it is also about the
preservation and promotion of the life of the Christian
community with its special story. In this light one can
understand why Finnis wished to include the good of
'truth-in-its-communication' (Finnis,1980:87) as a jus¬
tifying reason for having children and experiencing
family life. Bringing children into the world seems to
involve the duty to share with them what one
conscientiously believes to be truly good, and this
includes cultural and religious traditions. Children of
Christian families are not born as citizens of the world
with a generalised religious belief, but into a partic-
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ular culture, nation, and religious tradition. Thus,
Hauerwas insists that, within Christianity, marriage and
family life are not just natural habits, 'the usual thing
to do'. The Christian religion has made marriage and
family life a vocation, and one with a strong community
dimension:
The family is not just something we do because we
are in the habit, nor is it something we must do to
fulfil a moral purpose. Rather marriage and the
family, like the life of singleness, becomes a
vocation for the upbuilding of a particular kind of
community (Hauerwas,1981:174).
In second place, the good of procreation and family
life has an important association with God's nature as
Trinity. Thus, Cathal B. Daly, the Roman Catholic bishop
of Down and Connor, wrote in 1962 a criticism of the
works of Glanville Williams and Joseph Fletcher, which
included the view that their advocacy of artificial
insemination was an attack on the very notion of God, his
Fatherhood:
God Himself could find no better name to express His
Being and His creating and loving relation to
mankind than the human name of Father. Who strikes
at human fatherhood strikes at God.
...[It is] from the idea and self-revelation of
God that we learn what human fatherhood should be.
God's is the fatherhood of whom all fatherhood in
heaven and on earth is named (Daly,1962:124).
Use of the terminology of 'Father' and 'Son' does not
imply that God's nature involves sexual differentiation.
As Michael Schmaus (1966) reminds his readers: 'If we use
the word Father, we use it to express creativeness, and
we mean by it the Generator, Guardian and Preserver of
life.' (Schmaus,1966:184). So emphasis on God's
Fatherhood is not a sexist approach to theology. Indeed,
in relation to procreation both human parents share
equally in the image of God as generators, guardians, and
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preservers of new life. Thus, I might just as easily have
referred to the 'Motherhood' of God, since women are
partners in the origin of new life. The point at issue
here concerns the extent to which human procreation at
its best reflects the dynamism of God's nature, both as
'immanent' and 'economic' Trinity (cf.Rahner,1970;
McBrien,1980:357ff. 'A proper theological and pastoral
understanding of the Trinity depends upon our perception
of the identity between the so-called "economic Trinity"
and the so-called "immanent Trinity."'). Procreation is
an image of the immanent Trinity in so far as the love of
a couple reflects the traditional processions of the
divine persons - Son from the Father, and Spirit from
Father and Son (cf.Jordan,1970:ch 9, entitled
'Procreation as Divine Immanence') .
Although parents bring a unique individual into
existence, that individual is flesh of their flesh and is
(ideally) an expression of their intimate love. But
procreation is also an image of the economic Trinity,
the Trinity as it goes outside of itself in creation and
in the assumption of the human nature of the Word. In
giving birth to children parents are taken out of
themselves in the recognition that the new being is
different from them, though intimately related to them.
Thus, just as God can be seen in himself with regard to
the trinitarian relations and for others with regard to
creation and incarnation, so human parenthood can be seen
in terms of the relationship between spouses which is
enriched by procreative love and also in terms of the
relationship of love between parents and the new
individual. In each case a change of focus shows the
richness of reproductive reality, especially when seen in
a Christian light. Jean Vanier (1985) summarises the
argument above as he declares that:
In the Christian vision of sexuality, man and woman
render present the mystery of the Trinity. Our God
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is not a solitary God; he is one God in three
persons. In fecundity, there is also a trinitarian
mystery (Vanier,1985:142).
One should be able to recognise from what has been
said above the relationship between procreation and
'relative dignity'. Human beings have 'absolute dignity'
quite apart from anything they do, as I have said
already; but 'relative dignity' depends on free
participation in basic goods. Being able to see
procreative love as a sharing in God's creative power and
also as a revelation (weak and analogical as it is) of
God's nature must contribute greatly to the Christian
couple's self-respect and to their faith in the goodness
of human reality.
It has not been my task in this section to order the
various justifying reasons according to their relative
importance. Instead, I have tried to mention just a few
of the reasons why procreation is such a good that it can
be the object of a right. Some of these reasons are
shared by all reflective individuals quite independent of
religious belief, whilst other reasons depend on
religious belief to guide individuals and couples. The
next issue in need of analysis is the nomination of the
right-holders in this sphere of reproductive freedom.
5.3 The Right-Holders
The right to reproduce is regarded as a human right by
the United Nations Declaration, when in Article 16.1 it
states that 'men and women of full age...have the right
to marry and found a family'. Now not all of the rights
human beings have are human rights in the strict sense,
and to make matters more complicated, the scope of human
rights is somewhat controversial. I mentioned earlier
the views of Wellman, McCloskey and Raphael on this
question. Human rights are said to be universal,
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possessed by every human being in virtue of his or her
basic humanity. They are not based on differentiation
among persons with regard to age, sex, race or religion.
(In passing one should note the difficulty here of
reconciling 'human rights' with the category of so-called
'womens' rights' claimed by feminists. The two categories
cannot be identified because human rights do not
differentiate on the grounds of sex. But neither can one
categorise the rights of women as such under special
moral rights. I am not sure how to deal with this
concept.)
Is there not something contradictory then in the U.N.
Declaration above when it speaks of 'men and women of
full age'? Does this not qualify the universality of
human rights in the sphere of reproduction? I think the
answer here must involve the distinction already made
between 'having' a right and 'exercising' a right. The
Declaration must be thinking of the power to actually
exercise the right to have children, and this of course
is only possible for men and women of full age (though
even this may have to be qualified in reference to the
mentally retarded where chronological age often lags
behind basic human maturity). What then of the other half
of the distinction? Can persons have a right to
reproduce without the possibility (physically) of
exercising the right? I think that it is possible to
speak of the reproductive rights of young children before
puberty. The reason for this is that actions may occur
which would damage the exercise of reproductive rights at
a later stage. Conceivably certain medical treatments or
lack of such might damage a person's reproductive
capacity in childhood.
Or children may be brought up by their parents or
guardians with a distorted view of sexuality and
procreation, with the result that a 'normal' sexual
relationship within marriage is made extremely difficult
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or impossible. Some cases of alleged 'infertility' in
adult life may be due to negative parental attitudes to
sexuality adopted perhaps unconsciously (cf.
Philipp,1975:ch 12 'Psychology and Infertility'). Thus,
it makes some sense to state that those entrusted with
raising children respect the reproductive rights of their
offspring by imparting to them a healthy outlook on
sexuality as part of the basis of family life.
Mention should be made here of the issue underlined in
parenthesis above, namely, the question of reproductive
rights of the mentally retarded. This will be discussed
in greater detail in chapter 7. Here, however, I will
say that being of 'full age' chronologically does not
automatically entitle a person to found a family. In
fact, in some cases of severe retardation the age of the
person has little relevance; what matters is the ability
of the person to understand and enjoy the good being
claimed. Where such an ability to participate in the good
of reproduction is absent, one has to ask about the
potential to develop this participation, and if this is
low or non-existent, then a real question mark hangs over
talk of reproductive rights for persons in this category.
Rights are said to protect individual interests
against encroachment by other individuals, and especially
the state (cf. Wellman,1978:55-56); they are also said to
be 'trumps' against utilitarian reasoning which would
sacrifice individual welfare for the sake of group
welfare (Dworkin,1984:153). But are reproductive rights
of this individual kind?
Sheila McLean, looking at the U.N. Declaration's
Article 16 and the European Convention on Human Rights
(1952, Article 12), suggests that the emphasis here is
not on individual rights at all because of the link
between procreation and marriage and the family.
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What is significant about both of these declarations
is that they do not per se make reference to, or
provide for, an individual right to reproduce.
Rather they seem to protect only the rights of those
who are married (and those who, by implication, are
capable of legally entering into this state). The
individual as such is not protected by this: merely
the nuclear family, which is ' the natural and fun¬
damental group unit of society and is entitled to
protection by society and the State' [reference is
to U.N. Declaration, Article,16,(3)] , is accorded
special status (McLean,1986:113).
Leon Kass (1985) also underlines this ambiguity re¬
garding the possession of a right to reproduce, in the
context of a discussion of infertility and 'Making
Babies'. He says: 'But the right to procreate is an
ambiguous right, and certainly not an unqualified one.
Whose right is it, a woman's or a couple's?'
(Kass,1985:44ff.) I think the more traditional view of
the value of procreation, both secular and religious,
tends in the direction of the right of the couple to have
children or to found a family. However, this approach may
present some difficulties for the language of rights with
its individual emphasis. One way around the problem could
be to regard the average married (or co-habiting) couple
as an individual person with rights against others
(perhaps on the analogy of a business company or some
group being a 'legal person'). This would work, I think,
where the individuals within the relationship are of one
mind in planning their reproductive freedom. It would be
problematic, however, in cases where the partners
differed in their desires regarding children and family
size.
An interesting point in relation to the preceding
discussion concerns the common distinction made already
in this work between 'human rights' and 'special moral
rights'. If one considers reproductive rights as
primarily predicable of couples instead of as individuals
against relative strangers, then the right to have
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children appears to be a special moral right as well as a
human right. In fact, it might be expressed in this way:
men and women have (normally) a human right to enter into
a relationship within which they have the special moral
right to procreate. If this is acceptable, then the
primary categorisation of reproductive rights must be as
special moral rights, not as human rights. A human right
is a right against the state and/or everyone else
(depending on one's point of view). But no person can
claim the right against another person to provide him or
her with a child, unless that other person is willing to
enter into such a relationship (and which, for Christians
at least, must involve a wider sharing of life than
merely bearing and raising a child). The human right in
this matter is the claim-right against others and the
state not to interfere unduly in the power to freely
enter such relationships, as well as not interfering
without serious justification in procreative decisions
within such relationships. (I make the right to procreate
essentially a special moral right between partners in
marriage, and only secondarily a right against the state
to provide maternity services, simply because the primary
element in founding a family is the production of gametes
by the couple and their sexual relationship which
involves mutual donation of these sex-cells. The
contribution of the state is secondary in the majority of
cases to what the spouses do for each other.)
Where infertility is involved, however, the right-duty
relationship may change because of the special need of
couples at the primary level of gamete production and
conception.) The special moral right to procreate is
primarily against the person with whom one enters a
relationship in which it is understood (promised,
perhaps) that having children will be attempted as part
of the relationship.
It will have been recognised at this stage that the
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various aspects of the analysis of reproductive rights
are closely related and overlapping. Once one has
mentioned the underlying goods or values which are the
objects of rights, it is natural to move on to consider
the persons who are in a position to enjoy these goods.
And then, since rights are both claims to goods and
claims against others regarding those same goods, the
next aspect of analysis must be the identification of the
duty-bearers, those against whom the rights are held.
5.4 The Correlative Duty-Bearers
The distinction between human rights and special moral
rights concerns both right-holders and duty-bearers. I
mentioned earlier the difficulties some philosophers have
with the notion of a universal right possessed by
everyone against everyone else. How can my right to life
(a basic human right if ever there was one) be held
against everyone in the world, when I shall encounter
only a small minority of the world's population in my
life-span? The answer, I suppose, is that the scope of
the right is exaggerated for the purpose of stressing the
value of human security. Thus, the negative right not to
be attacked by anyone gives a basic security precisely
because it takes into account so many hypothetical
eventualities. Remember too that D.D.Raphael
distinguished between 'strong' and 'weak' senses of human
right, with the weak sense referring to a more limited
right against the state (cf. Raphael,1965:216-217).
Special moral rights, on the other hand, have a more
limited scope in terms of the relationship between right-
holder and duty-bearer. Marriage is an example of such a
relationship.
If reproductive rights are human rights in the strong
sense, then they are held by individuals or couples
against everyone else in the world. But how significant
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is this? Can I expect strangers from a foreign land to
support my reproductive freedom? It seems doubtful
whether my human rights here give rise to a strict
positive duty in the lives of individual citizens of
India or Australia. However, some argument may be made
for the existence of duties of beneficence or charity,
especially in the provision of maternity services and
family planning guidance for Third World countries.
Whether developing countries have a strict right to such
help is a moot point, and will be taken up again in my
chapter on population control.
If reproductive rights are human rights in the weak
sense, then they are held against the state and possibly
one's whole society. By the 'state' I mean government
and its health and social services; and I include
'society' insofar as the population of a particular
country are responsible for the government elected.
Thus, if reproductive rights are regarded as important by
society and the state fails to respect such rights in
practice, then there would appear to be a duty on the
part of citizens to complain to their elected
representatives, and ultimately to vote out a government
which does not protect such important values. These
rights, though called 'weak' are in fact, paradoxically,
the strongest protection one can have, precisely because
of the growing dependency on the state in the sphere of
reproduction. Individuals and couples require more than
state non-interference in order to promote reproductive
freedom, very often they need positive help from the
State; services for the infertile provide an obvious
example of this.
If reproductive rights are primarily special moral
rights, then they are held by those who voluntarily enter
into an intimate relationship with a view to having a
child or children. Within the more traditional world-view
this has meant that the primary right is that of each
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spouse against the other in possession of the correlative
duties. How strict the right of each partner against the
other is is itself a matter of some controversy. Even
within Christianity there are some who hold that
procreation is an optional part of the marriage
relationship, and thus that the right of the spouses in
this matter is purely discretionary (cf. Free Church
Federal Council & British Council of Churches,(1982)
Choices in Childlessness:12,52) . The more traditional
view of all the churches, and still the official teaching
of Roman Catholicism, is that procreation is a mandatory
right of married couples, that is, a coincidence of duty
to procreate and right to procreate. (This duty and
right refers to normal couples who are not in danger of
having severely handicapped children and who can afford
to raise offspring. Cf. Ford & Kelly,1963:434, for
'excusing reasons' for not having children.) In cases
where the special moral right to procreate is held by the
couple to be discretionary, both may wish to waive their
rights to found a family. In cases where the right to
procreate is regarded as mandatory, the spouses may feel
that they have no permission to waive the right against
one another. Thus, in the former case the other partner
is released from his or her duty, whilst in the latter
case both partners are held to their strict duty.
It may be objected that the introduction of a weak
sense of human right has undermined the distinction
between human rights and special moral rights, since the
citizens' relationship with the state and its services
involves special moral rights. Does not the state
'promise' to care for the health of its citizens, even to
the extent of providing free or subsidised medical
services for the vast majority of society. There is a
point to this objection, I agree, but I think that the
category of special moral rights should be kept for more
intimate and more specific relationships. In relation to
reproductive freedom, for instance, it is doubtful
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whether the state's promise to care for the health of its
citizens is specific enough to correspond to a strict
right to infertility services in every region. Both
because of the scarcity of resources and the
controversial nature of some alleged reproductive rights,
the duty of the state is not always easy to pin down.
However, there is a sense in which individual citizens
enter into strict normative relationships with
representatives of the health services, e.g. doctors, and
the special moral rights arising here can include
reproductive rights. (It is partly because of the special
normative relationships between medical staff and their
patients that the former can be so disillusioned with the
lack of state support for the specific area of care they
are trying to provide. Because the demands on the state
are so many and so varied, it is difficult to include the
relationship between it and individual patients in the
category of special moral rights.) Further controversy
arises when one includes among reproductive rights
permission to enter into special normative relationships
with gamete and embryo donors and with surrogate mothers.
5.5 Goods/Rights in Conflict
The actual exercise of rights is obstructed not merely by
those who ignore their duties and are deliberately
unjust, but also by those who argue that some right-claim
is either invalid to start with, or that it is only a
prima facie right which in this instance is overridden by
some other right to some equally important or more
important good. In this section I wish to mention some
of the possible conflicts which might qualify
reproductive claims.
I mentioned in the section on the justifying reasons
for having children Finnis's reliance on two particular
goods or values - life and sociability. However, while it
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is true that human procreation can be an expression of
these goods, it is not difficult to see that these goods
involve other aspects which procreation may damage or
obstruct. For instance, even though the situations are
relatively rare today, child-birth can be a danger to the
life of the mother. And if one includes health in
general under the value of life, a wide interpretation of
mental health (as in the practice of the Abortion Act in
England) may introduce a conflict of goods and rights in
many cases. The point at issue here is the fact that at
times one cannot enjoy together all the goods or values
that are usually claimed as rights. If a doctor informs
a woman that becoming pregnant and having a child may
damage her physical and/or mental health, it is difficult
to see how she can claim both rights (i.e. the right to
have a child and the right to good health) at the same
time. At least one of the goods must be sacrificed (cf.
G.J.Hughes,1978:54-56, on the subject of 'incompossible
want s').
The good of life is also the basis for the enjoyment
of other goods to which there are rights. Although it can
be said that procreation is at the service of life and is
a creative act, obviously becoming pregnant, having
children and raising them, involves the sacrifice of
other goods which childless individuals can enjoy. Thus
some rights may have to be waived in order to enjoy the
right to reproduce. The right to work, for instance, may
have to be limited towards the end of pregnancy.
With regard to the good of sociability, it is possible
that having children may damage relationships instead of
cementing them. For instance, some strain may be felt in
the relationship between husband and wife, especially if
the pregnancy is unplanned. Worries may arise concerning
the resources present to raise the new family member in
an appropriate manner. And if other children exist, the
birth of another brother or sister may upset the delicate
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equilibrium of family life. Special problems arise in
this area if it is known that the child in the womb is
handicapped, physically or mentally. Then parents may
wonder if they have a right to bring the child to birth,
taking into account the rights of already existing
children and the partners' own rights against each other.
It is of course highly controversial whether embryos and
fetuses within the womb have strict rights to be born.
The moves towards 'wrongful life' cases in American
courts would seem to suggest the existence of a 'right
not to be born' (cf. Liu,1987:69-73 ; Steinbock,1986:15-
20; Feinberg,1974:180).
Some philosophers today are willing to refer to the
rights of future generations. Feinberg, for instance,
considers that the influence the present generation has
on the basic interests of future generations provides a
justification for speaking of their rights. He agrees
that future generations have a more remote "potential"
than fetuses in the womb, 'but our collective posterity
is just as certain to come into existence "in the normal
course of events" as is any given fetus in its mother's
womb.'(1974:181).
Often concern for the interests of future generations
centres on ecological issues, and the duty of presently
existing people not to ruin the environment for their
descendants. But it may also be argued that the
reproductive rights of the present generation must be
limited by the rights of future generations not to
inherit certain genetic defects. This eugenic type
argument can of course lead to different strategies. On
one hand, it might lead to curtailment of the rights to
reproduce of the sections of the population likely to
produce children with inherited and inheritable defects,
by either voluntary, involuntary, or non-voluntary
contraception, sterilisation and abortion. On the other
hand, the rights of future generations in this area might
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be better served by investing in the study of genetic
defects with the aim of ridding the gene pool of
deleterious genes.
I am not convinced of the value of using the language
of rights to refer to the interests of future
generations. My main reason for this scepticism is not
that future persons cannot claim for themselves - neither
can embryos or young children, yet I would argue for the
possibility of their having some basic rights - but that
future persons simply do not exist. And the fact that
there is a great probability that persons will exist in
the future does not move me from this position. The
danger in talking about the 'rights' of future persons or
generations is that one bases this on a picture or image
which makes one imagine that such persons already exist
in relation to the present generation. Because what is
done now by people may influence their grandchildren, and
because they live to see the effects of their present
actions on these grandchildren when they come into
existence many years hence, does not mean that those
children have rights at this moment against 'their
grandparents'. They may have some right to criticise the
actions of their grandparents and their generation when
they come to maturity, but they have no strict rights
before they were conceived. I think it would be odd to
argue that my rights to a nuclear free world (assuming
for the moment that the nuclear revolution has had more
bad effects than good effects on human life) were
violated before I was conceived by the scientists who
developed the atom bomb or by the politicians who applied
their discoveries in destructive ways.
This is not to say that the present generation has no
normative relationship to future generations, only that
it is not of the kind that involves strict rights and
correlative duties. I believe that there is a duty to
consider the interests of future persons when acting in
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certain ways which will affect their eventual welfare,
but this is not strictly a duty to future persons; it is
instead a duty concerning persons who will probably exist
(cf. the distinction made by McCloskey (1965) between
'duties to' and 'duties concerning'). Another position
here would be to invoke the argument made earlier,
namely, that the correlativity between duties and rights
is not as strong as that between rights and duties. Thus,
it could be the case that the present generation has some
duties to future generations without these duties
entailing rights. However, my own opinion is that, from
the point of view of rights-language, future persons are
in the same category as animals and paintings - their
interests (and in the case of works of art, their value),
though important, are not as important as those of
existing persons. Thus, there are duties concerning them
but no duties to them. The normative relationship between
present and future generations is much weaker than that
between members of the presently existing generation.
There is also the argument that some of the present
trend in introducing technology to reproduction, for all
its good intentions, in fact sets a trend which will bind
future generations, just as so many of this century's
technological innovations take away or reduce human
choice (cf. Walter,1985:26-27 for a description of how
luxuries become needs and how needs then remove freedom
and make one dependent). Either way, what is done today
with the intention of respecting reproductive freedom
will affect the interests of future generations for
better or for worse. All moral agents should take such
interests into account when making moral judgements, even
though I feel it is better not to construct rights from
the interests of future persons. The next section will
discuss briefly how the more technical distinctions in
rights-language might be used to elucidate discussions of
reproductive rights.
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5.6 The Hohfeldian Distinctions
I think it appropriate at this stage of the discussion,
just before returning to the technical language of
rights, to make a brief comment on the relationship
between rights and justice. Clearly the two concepts are
closely related, but what exactly is this relation? I am
impressed by Hollenbach's answer to the question:
The entire theory of rights is developed within the
framework of a complementary theory of justice.
Rights represent claims to those things which are
due individuals. The notion of justice is an
indispensable means in the process of judging which
of these claims takes priority over others in
situations of conflict. The language of rights,
therefore, focuses on the dignity, liberty and needs
of all persons in society regarded disjunctively or
one at a time. The language of justice, on the
other hand, focuses on the dignity, liberty and
needs of all persons regarded conjunctively or as
bound by obligations and duties to one another
(Hollenbach,1979:144).
Two points stand out here in particular. First, the
different focus of rights and justice should be noted:
the former on what individuals can claim for themselves
in the protection and promotion of their individuality;
the latter on the need for individuals to recognise that
rights can be in conflict and that there are duties to
respect the rights of other individuals as well as
claiming their own. Second, theories of justice attempt
to harmonise the conflict between rights in order to be
fair to all.
When one examines the traditional types of justice,
especially the distributive and commutative forms, one
recognises how justice attempts to be fair to individuals
while taking into account the common good. Hollenbach
defines commutative justice as being 'concerned with the
relationships which bind individual to individual in the
sphere of private transactions' (Hollenbach,1979:145).
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Thus, there is a sphere of life which is relatively
private and intimate, and where the principle of
subsidiarity demands that the state allow the maximum
freedom in line with the common good. Distributive
justice and social justice operate at a wider level, and
are defined by Hollenbach as follows:
Distributive justice determines how public social
goods are to be allocated to individuals or groups.
Conversely, social justice specifies how the
activities of individuals and groups are to be
aggregated so that they converge to create the
social good (Hollenbach, 1979:145).
It should be clear, however, that these types of
justice are meant to be complementary and overlapping.
If commutative justice is to flourish, for instance,
'public social goods' need to be distributed fairly; for
instance, if patients are to have a satisfactory
relationship in commutative justice with their doctors
and nurses, there must be a prior emphasis on
distributive justice in the provision of facilities for
training medical staff and maintaining high standards.
And for this to occur, presumably there has to be a
system of taxation and thus a limit on what individuals
can do with their personal resources. Or, to take another
example, if people want the freedom to enter into
satisfactory contracts with others, they need to
cooperate with the legal and political system which
regulates business affairs for the protection of society.
Problems begin to arise, of course, when commutative
justice and distributive and social justice conflict,
either when individuals resent contributing to the common
good, or when the state intervenes unfairly in personal
relationships in the name of the 'common good' (Consider,
for instance, two contemporary and opposing theories of
distributive justice in Rawls,1973 and Nozick,1974) .
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Obviously these issues apply in the sphere of
reproductive rights, especially in view of the
distinction between human rights and special moral
rights. Special moral rights in particular seem to be
closely related to commutative justice, and I have
stressed the requirements of the marriage agreement (call
it a contract or a covenant if one will) with regard to
the decision to procreate or not. But insofar as
procreation is also linked with health (a basic human
right), and health requires for its protection more
resources than an individual can provide - the birth of
children, ante-natal and post-natal care, and above all
treatment for the infertile - one seems to require a
strong expression of distributive justice and social
justice if reproductive rights in the full sense are to
be respected. In other words, reproductive rights are
respected in the context of justice when there is a
balance between the state's respect for the rights of
individual couples to have children and the couple's
readiness to consider the resources needed from the state
in order to support their rights.
Thus, there has to be a kind of 'give and take'
regarding commutative and distributive justice. The state
has to respect the individual couple's right to found a
family in security, whilst each couple must be ready to
accept that the state has other duties to fulfil as well
as providing support for reproductive rights. This last
point may mean that couples have to make sacrifices at
times by limiting family size, and it may mean as well
that couples should be willing to contribute what they
can to help other couples to procreate, e.g by paying
their taxes, or by lobbying for the direction of more
funds into infertility treatment.
The particular claims, liberties, powers and
immunities possessed by people involves substantive moral
issues, in which are debated questions of the relative
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importance of the goods desired and the normative
relationships between the parties concerned. In general,
however, one can say that claims are the strongest kinds
of rights, giving rise to strict duties of aid or non¬
interference. Liberties are less strong in their binding
force, giving less protection than strict claims and
leaving much of the pursuit of the desired good to
personal effort. Powers and immunities have different
strengths according to the circumstances, and are
specifically related to the maintenance or change of
relationships. Let me give some applications of these
concepts within an assumed moral theory, say, Roman
Catholic orthodoxy on procreation.
The freedom to have children according to Roman
Catholicism demands as a precondition entry into the
married state. Now, deciding to be married involves a
basic human right. It is also a claim-right. This right
entails a basic protection from being obstructed in
entering into a committed relationship with a person of
the opposite sex. In normal circumstances the state
cannot forbid marriage, and society has no right to
criticise the decision to marry. The right is basically
negative, a right to non-interference. But it is arguable
that some positive right against the state and society
exists to recognise the importance of marriage as an
institution and to frame legislation to uphold that
institution for those who freely choose it.
Though the right to marry is a human right and a
claim-right, it is also a liberty-right in relation to
potential partners. No one has a strict claim against
particular members of the opposite sex to enter into
marriage. Each person is free to get married or not. As
with the single way of life, a liberty-right means 'no
duty not to do X' .
Because the decision to marry involves a relationship
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bound by special moral rights, neither the state nor so¬
ciety (nor the Church for that matter) have the power-
right to make marriage a duty. They cannot, without the
permission and consent of individuals, change their
relationship as relative strangers to that of intimate
lovers. Hence, each individual has an immunity-right
against powerful institutions like the ones mentioned not
to be forced into marriage. (This assumes the truth of
what might be called the 'modern romantic view of
marriage', a view held mainly in the Western world. One
must recognise differing views about the freedom to marry
and to choose a partner in other parts of the world
(cf,Prickett,1985, for accounts of traditions of marriage
and family life in different world faiths). Here again I
must reiterate that the application of the Hohfeldian
distinctions depends on the ways values are recognised
and ranked in importance in different societies. Getting
married may be a liberty in some places and a duty in
other places.
Within the marriage relationship, then, the partners
have a general claim against each other not to exclude
procreation from their relationship, except for serious
reasons. (Traditional Roman Catholic doctrine spoke of
two ends of marriage. They are mentioned as follows by
P.Adnes (1966) ' In matrimonio, finis primarius "operis"
est procreatio atque educatio prolis, finis autem
secundarius mutuum adjutorium. ' cf. Codex juris canonici,
(1917), 1013,// 1. Since Vatican 11, this terminology of
a hierarchy of ends is no longer in vogue, and there is a
preference for the view that the goods of marriage are of
equal importance and inseparable, cf. Gaudium et spes
(1965),Articles 47-52 (cf.Flannery,1975:949-957), and the
present Code of Canon Law (1983), 1055 ,//I., cf. English
translation, Canon Law Society of Great Britain and
Ireland). But in practice they have a liberty-right to
procreate and space the arrival of their children
(Vatican Charter of the Rights of the Family (1983),
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Article 3, 'The spouses have the inalienable right to
found a family and to decide on the spacing of births and
the number of children to be born..'). The Church may
expect a couple to have children in time, but its
teaching cannot lay down detailed guidelines as to when
procreation should take place and the number of children
the couple should ideally have.
The special moral rights arising from marriage involve
the power-right of the spouses to become parents by
procreation. In other words, marriage creates an initial
relationship of intimacy between a man and woman, and
provides for the possibility of initiating a new
relationship whereby husband and wife become father and
mother. Moreover, this power-right is exercised every
time the couple decide to procreate, and a child is born
to their union. With each new child the couple become
parents to a new individual. They have the right in
certain circumstances to change their relationship
further in this way. By implication, the couple have
immunity-rights against any person or institution that
would force them to have children against their will,
since this would involve an illicit attempt to change
their relationship.
When a couple suffer the effects of infertility, the
question of rights enters in relation to the means used
to circumvent this. In the teaching of the Roman Catholic
magisterium a couple have no claim to use illicit means
to overcome infertility. (Such teaching has been explicit
in Roman Catholicism certainly since Pius Xll, but has
been decisively stated recently in the Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith's Ins truction on Respect for
Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of
Procreation, (1987).) There is no liberty-right either,
since there is a duty to respect other rights. For
instance, there is the claim-right of each partner to
procreation through 'normal' sexual intercourse, not
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through artificial insemination, even by husband. There
is also the claim-right of each spouse not to allow a
third party to contribute gametes to the process of
procreation. In the case of ijn vitro fertilisation, there
is the whole question of the claim-right to life of
embryos to consider. Because of these strong claim-
rights, official Roman Catholic teaching cannot speak of
power-rights to become parents by such means. Also each
spouse has an immunity-right against the other partner
not to be pressurised into becoming a parent in one of
these ways.
Obviously many of these positions regarding the
practical application of types of rights are
controversial. I mention these particular positions in
order to show how the Hohfeldian distinctions might be
used within a particular moral system. Other moral
systems will disagree with the Roman Catholic Church's
way of associating goods, and especially with the
particular special moral rights accorded by the spouses
to each other within marriage. The language of rights can
be used clearly by opposing moral systems and provides a
method of seeing where the differences of approach lie.
5.7 Conclusion
I am aware of the summary nature of this chapter and of
the relative shallowness of the treatment given to the
various aspects of the analysis of reproductive rights.
But then this chapter is meant only as an introduction to
further chapters which present what I think are major
moral and legal issues involved in reproductive freedom.
To have gone into greater detail in this chapter would
have made for an unwieldy introduction and would have
encroached on the material of the final chapters of the
thesis.
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The complexity of the different aspects involved in
the analysis of reproductive rights must be obvious from
the initial pages of the chapter. Examination of the
reasons for having children, for instance, reveals both
justifying reasons of different kinds as well as
explanatory reasons which do not justify having children.
Often it seems that people do not consider in a conscious
way the reasons for founding a family. For many, it is
simply 'the natural thing to do', a response to some
instinct or perhaps to social conditioning (or a mixture
of both). From a more analytical point of view, I
suggested that the basic goods of life and sociability
act as justifying reasons in general for having children.
These are fundamental natural law reasons. But mention
was made also of specific Christian reasons, related to
the continuation of the Church and its story of
salvation. More speculatively, there is the relationship
between procreation and the life of God in the Trinity.
As God the Father is the origin of all life, human
parenthood is an image of God's creative love. And since
human procreation at its best is a free and conscious
act, it reflects God's activity better than the
instinctive responses of the animal kingdom.
Later in the chapter I discussed the related issue of
conflict between goods which can give rise to conflict of
rights. Since procreation is only one aspect of the goods
of life and sociability and may interfere in the
participation in the other aspects, great care has to be
shown in harmonising the right to procreate with the
other rights related to these goods. Most obvious here is
the relationship between husband and wife and between
parents and their existing children. Arguably, the
special moral rights of marriage mean that husband and
wife must think of the health of their own intimate
relationship before many other goods. Also reproductive
rights entail a duty to raise children in an appropriate
way. A decision to have another child when it is not
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possible to give it proper care may be immoral, even
though I would prefer not to speak here of the future
person's 'rights'. Clearly, existing children have
interests which must be considered, if one holds that
reproductive rights generally carry over into the right
to raise children.
Concerning the correlativity of rights and duties, I
underlined the special moral problems arising with regard
to the nomination of right-holders and duty-bearers. The
primary issue regarding right-holders of reproductive
rights is whether rights are possessed by individuals as
such, their being part of the wider right of self-
determination, or whether they are possessed by
individuals as part of a relationship which gives rise to
special moral rights. The mainline Christian view tends
toward the latter position. But there are all sorts of
complications here, especially with regard to claims made
by homosexual and lesbian 'couples', issues which I
cannot deal with in this work.
The nomination of duty-bearers also presents some
difficulty, due in large part to problems mentioned
earlier concerning the analysis of human rights and
special moral rights. The strong sense of human rights
entails universal duties, i.e. duties on the part of
every moral agent in the world, though these duties will
be hypothetical in many cases. The weak sense of human
rights limits duties to the state and its organs. Since
human rights in the weak sense involve both positive and
negative duties, while human rights in the strong sense
are usually of the negative type, the former are often
more beneficial from the practical point of view. So it
is important to agree on the role of the state in
'supporting' reproductive freedom.
Regarding the notion that reproductive rights are
special moral rights, I focussed especially on the duties
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of the partners in marriage, duties which tend to arise
from what most Christians at least will say is part of
the essence of marriage. The idea that healthy married
couples can simply decide in principle not to found a
family with children of their own will appear scandalous
to many. In other words, there is a widespread intuition
that the right to found a family is not totally
discretionary. But special moral rights in the
reproductive sphere may also arise between couples and
their doctors, in such a way that the distinction between
human rights (in the weak sense) and special moral rights
gets blurred. More controversially, there may be a
question of special moral rights giving rise to mutual
duties between donors of gametes and surrogate mothers
and the recipients and commissioning parents.
In the remaining four chapters of this thesis I intend
to take up and develop some of the analytical aspects
raised in this introductory chapter. Clearly, I must
continue to involve myself in substantive moral issues or
normative ethics. I cannot avoid making personal
judgements, but such judgements are relatively
unimportant in the context of my methodological interests
in this work. What is primary is the description of the
issues involved in some controversial reproductive
claims, showing the possible rights involved, the kinds
of conflict that may arise, and trying to discern the
potential right-holders and duty-bearers. Moreover I am
concerned with the way in which the technical
distinctions made within the language of rights can
clarify positions which are then open to casuistic
reasoning. Naturally, too, I am interested in presenting
more of a Christian orientation to these questions.
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Chapter 6
Reproductive Rights and Population Control
6.1 Introduction
Much of the modern emphasis relating to reproductive
freedom centres on the technology applied to human
infertility. More and more people, in the developed
world at least, are now aware of the plight of infertile
couples and sympathise with their efforts to found a
family. The last two chapters of this thesis will
consider some of the problems related to the language of
rights in this area. But in this present chapter I am
concerned with the particular issue of the decision to
space the arrival of children within the context of the
couple's relationship. As seen already, this is often
said to be part of the general right of self-
determination. Couples can and must make decisions on
the number of occasions that they will become parents,
since each new child of theirs implies the initiation of
a new parental relationship of responsibility.
Though it is my opinion that the primary aspect of
reproductive rights is the positive one of having
children, the secondary aspect of limiting family size in
order to fulfil duties to existing children, the other
spouse, and to society and the state (insofar as
procreation may call on considerable resources from the
community), must not be ignored. Clearly, the situation
regarding the optimum size of family for the realisation
of respect for all the rights and duties entailed by
procreation will vary from place to place. In this
chapter I am aware of problems of underpopulation in some
parts of the world, but I tend to concentrate on issues
related to overpopulation. Whatever the reasons are that
inspire couples in the less developed countries of the
world to have large families, the central question is
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'Are there sound justifying reasons for claiming the
right against state and society to procreate at will?'.
Or looked at from the other angle, the question then is
'Are there sound justifying reasons for the state and
society to attempt to limit the rights of couples to
decide on the size of family they want or feel they
need?'
The answers to such questions depend, I think, on
finding out whether the freedom to have large families,
when actualised, damages important goods which are the
object of conflicting rights. Hence the emphasis in what
follows on the connection between population growth and
world hunger. This chapter, then, applies the language of
rights to a key issue of conflict regarding essential
human welfare.
6.2 Locating the Major Issues
A. Population Trends
My previous chapter introduced the concept of the right
to have children in general. But this general right
requires more specific study, and in this chapter I
concentrate on a specific aspect of reproductive choice,
namely, family size. In particular, I shall dwell on the
possibility of tension which may occur when personal
choices relating to family size conflict with the needs
of a larger group, a church, a cultural group such as a
nation, or the world community at large. Obviously I am
assuming that personal choices with regard to procreation
can have effects which go far beyond satisfying the needs
and wants of individuals and family groupings. And since
these decisions of individual couples touch on the
welfare of others, there is a need to face the question
of whether and to what degree reproductive freedom may
have to be curtailed.
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Let me now attempt to specify what I mean when I say
that family size is an issue of key importance in the
discussion of reproductive rights. Note that I am not
talking in first place about individual decisions taken
separately. I am interested in general trends within a
certain group and area. One or two couples deciding to
have either a very small family or a very large family do
not affect the average family size, but where such
decisions become a trend the influence on the wider
society can be significant. It may be useful to examine
this point in relation to the situation of
'underpopulation' in many of the more developed nations.
In an article in The Scotsman, Peter Lyth (1985)
writes on the problem of population in West Germany, a
country with one of the lowest birth rates in the world
(Lyth,1985:8;cf.Clare,1986:91ff. for a discussion of
similar problems in Hungary.). Lyth describes the
situation as follows:
The fall in the birth rate started, as in many
Western countries, with the introduction of the pill
in the 1960s, but in West Germany the trend became
extreme. Since 1974 the birth rate has been
exceeded by the death rate, in other words, the
total population has been declining. Lately the
Germans have acquired the distinction of having the
lowest birth rate in the world, at less than ten
births per 1,000 inhabitants per year.(1985:8)
Lyth goes on to speak about the worries this low birth
rate is causing politicians in particular. For instance,
the Minister of Defence, Manfred Woerner, has extended
the length of national service for young Germans from 15
to 18 months. 'The accent for the future seems to be:
fewer people will have to carry a greater load.'
According to Lyth, things have changed greatly since the
1930s when 'Hitler tried to encourage German women to
have more children by giving them medals called "The
Honour Cross of German Motherhood" (bronze for four chil-
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dren, silver for six, gold for more than eight). So the
choices of individual couples with regard to procreation
have clear effects of a negative kind on the life of the
society in which they live.
On the other hand, when people think of population
problems they usually think of the alleged crisis of
'overpopulation' in the less developed countries of the
world. In fact, this 'problem' of overpopulation may be
one of the reasons why couples in the more developed
lands decide to limit their family size. Germaine Greer
(1985) writes of the example of Doctor Paul Ehrlich, the
author of the well known work The Population Bomb
(Ehrlich, 1971) , who, in order to show his sincerity in
preaching the doctrine of 'Zero Population Growth', had
himself sterilised after the birth of his daughter
(Greer,1985:404). But before going on to analyse in more
detail the problems relating to overpopulation, it will
be useful to recognise at the start the complex of
factors which go to make up the whole issue of population
control. Some of these factors are brought out by the
theologian Charles Curran (1985), following the main
trends of Philip Hauser's argument (Curran,1985:234;
Hauser,1971:233-239):
From my perspective I am inclined to accept the
analysis of Philip Hauser that human beings are
complex culture-building animals, and the population
crisis is really a series of four crises or
problems. First, the population explosion maintains
that, assuming the present trend, by the year 2000
the population of the developing countries will be
about the same or as great as the total population
of the world in I960. Second, the population
implosion refers to the increasing concentration of
people on relatively small portions of the earth's
surface, a phenomenon generally known as
urbanization. Third, the population displosion
means the increasing heterogeneity of people who
share the same geographical space as well as the
same social, political, and economic conditions and
is exemplified by the current problems in Northern
Ireland and many countries in Africa or even in
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Canada. Fourth, the technoplosion refers to the
accelerated pace of technological innovation which
has characterized our modern era. (Curran,1985:234)
These distinctions reveal some of the complexity of
the issues involved in population control. Obviously not
all of the distinctions apply directly to family size,
but it is not difficult to find some indirect
applications. For instance, the so-called 'technoplosion'
has had widespread effects on life on this planet, and
not just in relation to the quality of human life;
indeed, technological innovation has had a clear effect
on procreative choice from its effect on the death rate
(and especially the infant mortality rate) to birth
control techniques.
Regarding the question of population implosion or
urbanization, one can consider the question whether
change of location from rural background to city life
leads to a 'culture-shock', whereby previously held
values, including decisions with regard to family size,
are abandoned under the pressure of new circumstances.
Clearly, too, the reality of population displosion with
its problems of heterogeneity of population, can have an
effect on procreative choice. For instance there may be
an incentive to have more children for fear that another
rival group may swamp one's own group due to its growing
social and political dominance. In the past, in places
like Northern Ireland, some Protestants felt fear and
apprehension in the face of the trend among Catholic
couples to have large families, and that fear included
the worry that a minority group would soon develop a
greater status in society, with accompanying demands for
greater political participation. It will be good to keep
these distinctions in mind as I move on to discuss in
more detail the question of population explosion.
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B. The 'Population Explosion'
From the preceding discussion on the complexity of the
problems involved in population control in general, it
will come as little surprise that the specific issue of
population growth, gives rise to many controversial
expositions of the 'facts', and arguments concerning both
causes and possible solutions of the 'problems'.
Firstly, if it is assumed for the moment that there is
a population explosion in some parts of the world, it
still cannot be assumed that this is necessarily bad and
to be discouraged. Indeed, there is some evidence to
suggest that rapidly growing population may be a boon to
some of the developing countries. For instance, Donald
Warwick cites the example of Argentina, where in 1974 the
Health ministry restricted the sale of contraceptive
pills as part of an effort to increase the population to
50 million by the end of this century (Warwick, 1974:2).
In the mid-1970s, Brazil too was unconcerned to a great
extent with decreasing the population growth rate because
of the economic boom it was experiencing at the time (cf.
Nelson,1980:42ff. for a description of Brazil's ' "Econ¬
omic Miracle" '). In fact, in times of economic boom a
country may well need more people to take advantage of
the opportunities presented by the economic trend. So it
seems that population explosion is partly a relative
matter depending on the economic resources available at a
given time and the distribution of these among the
population. In some cases population increase can be a
boon, whilst in other situations it is a tragedy.
Secondly, before going on to treat the question of the
connection between poverty/hunger and the population
explosion, it is important to recognise that even in the
wealthier nations of the world there may be what might be
called 'selective population explosions'. By this is
meant the growth of population among disadvantaged groups
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in society. In other words, there is often concern in
wealthy nations about the 'irresponsibility' of the
procreative choices of the poor. A good example of this
reality is to be found in the following words of a poor
black American mother in Robert Coles's Children of
Crisis (cited by Arthur Dyck,1973):
The worst of it is that they [the State's social
services] try to get you to plan your kids by the
year; except they mean by the ten-year plan, one
every ten years. The truth is, they don't want you
to have any, if they could help it (cf. Dyck,I973:
75-76; Gordon,1977:399-400) .
I have already hinted above that the population
explosion becomes a 'problem' when the pressure of
population imposes conditions of hardship on a group. At
its most extreme, the conditions in question amount to
starvation and famine. But to say this is to assume what
needs to be proved, namely, that overpopulation is a
major cause of poverty in less developed countries. It
also assumes that the basic terms of the argument are
clear, that the criteria which lead to the conclusion
that the world is heading towards a crisis in food
production are uncontroversial. Both assumptions can be
questioned.
Taking the latter assumption first, the basic language
used in speaking of 'the Food Crisis' tends to be vague
and indeterminate. A warning about this is sounded by N.
Eberstadt (1979) in his article 'Myths of the Food
Crisis' :
How little we know about the world food problem is
frightening. There are really no accurate figures
on food production for any poor country; the margin
of error in the estimate for India alone could feed
or starve twelve million people. Nutritionists'
estimates of the "average" daily adult protein
requirement have ranged from 20 grams a day to over
120. Perhaps most astonishing, we do not know the
world's population within 400 million people. In
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short, we do not know how much food there is, how
much food people need, or even how many people there
are (Eberstadt,1979:292).
Turning to the first assumption, there is at least
another option which might be considered if one is set on
seeing at least some connection between hunger and over¬
population, and that is the thesis which inverts the
causal sequence just mentioned above: overpopulation then
is seen as an effect of poverty and underdevelopment,
already present due to other factors, both natural and
human.
If there is to be a sensible discussion of
reproductive rights in connection with world hunger, the
two considerations just made must be kept in mind.
However, of particular importance is the question of what
the future holds with regard to possible famine and
ecological disaster, and the connection with population
trends. In this matter it is vital to study two possible
replies to the question just posed. For the sake of
simplicity I shall characterise these two approaches as
'Neo-Malthusian' and 'Developmentalist' .
C. What Causes World Hunger?
Concerning the first approach there is a useful summary
in the following description from Onora O'Neill (1980):
Malthusians take their name from Thomas Malthus
(1766-1834), who argued as early as 1798, in his
Essay on the Principles of Population, that it was
necessary to seek voluntary curbs on the rate of
population growth because unrestricted population
growth would be faster than the growth in food
supplies and so lead to famine. Since Malthus's
time, more optimistic writers have thought him
wrong, because in some countries the rate of
economic growth has far out-stripped the rate of
growth of population. The average person in the
developed countries today is far better off than his
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or her ancestors were in Malthus's day. Neo-
Malthusians do not deny that this economic
improvement has occurred. But they think it cannot
be sustained, and correctly point out that it is in
some part due to the smaller size of family now
common in the developed world...They characterise
population growth as an explosion or a bomb that
economic growth cannot defuse (0'Neill,1980:269).
O'Neill of course makes necessary further distinctions
between positions held within the Neo-Malthusian camp;
for instance, there are some relatively optimistic
members who think that population growth can be
controlled and brought into line with economic growth.
However, others are more pessimistic and do not believe
that population control can avert famine. Though no
names are mentioned specifically by O'Neill, I presume
she has in mind writers such as Paul Ehrlich (1971),
William and Paul Paddock (1967), and Garrett Hardin
(1974).
O'Neill also gives a useful summary of the
Developmentalist position, as follows:
Developmentalists join with pessimistic neo-
Malthusians in their view of attempts to avert
famine by controlling population growth. They note
that where population growth rates fall this is
often after a reasonable level of economic well-
being has been reached. For the very poor, children
are an asset as well as a liability. Only one's
children can provide for old age or sickness or the
other disabilities that in wealthier countries (and
in planned economies) are covered by social or
private insurance schemes....Developmentalists tend
to think that there will be no demographic
transition in countries with rapidly growing
populations until there has been at least some
economic growth. Trying to achieve economic growth
by limiting population growth is therefore going
about the problem in the wrong way. (op.cit.,271)
Among those holding a position of this kind I can mention
the names of Arthur Simon (1975), Arthur Dyck (1973), and
Jack Nelson (1980).
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It is not my main task in this chapter to decide in
favour of some particular analysis of the population
explosion. I mention these two general views of the
relationship between poverty and population because of
their relevance to the question of reproductive rights.
What is this relevance? The point is this: if it can be
established more or less clearly that the earth is either
in the midst of, or in the process of moving towards,
crisis in the sense of widespread starvation and
ecological disaster, and if it can also be established
that the major contributing factor is overpopulation,
then there exists some justifying reason for controlling
population and limiting reproductive rights.
The justification for limiting individual freedom with
regard to procreative choice can be argued with reference
to the need to respect the common good (which is always
the good of the individual in the long-term) taking into
account humanity's social nature. Limiting choice in this
sphere can also be justified in terms of liberal
principles, for instance John Stuart Mill's famous
principle: 'That the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised
community against his will is to prevent harm to others.
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrant' (Mill,1861:135) . Now, the harm-to-
others principle may be difficult to specify in all cases
(cf.Lee,1986:Ch.5) , but if it is reasonably certain that
the harm to be avoided is famine on a large scale, there
can hardly be a clearer example of the application of
Mill's principle.
D. The Means of Controlling Population
Having established in general that the state,
representing society as a whole, may have a right in the
face of crisis and disaster to limit the reproductive
freedom of its citizens, there is still the need to face
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the more specific question of the means used to achieve
that end. Note that in the quotation from Mill there is
the assumption that people may need to be forced to think
of the harm their individual choices and actions inflict
on others and that coercion may be required to protect
others in society. Applying this to reproductive choices,
one can recognise that control of population presents
authorities with two main ways of implementing policy -
voluntary and involuntary control of family size.
Voluntary control is brought about mainly by means of
education in the widest sense. I have in mind here, not
just information about family planning, but a general
moral education involving a recognition of the
conflicting rights occurring when couples have large
families which they cannot rear properly. In other words,
voluntary control of population implies an appeal to
moral conscience of individuals concerning the principle
of respect for persons and the need to achieve a balance
between the types of justice regulating human
interaction.
Involuntary control of population, on the other hand,
is more problematic from the moral point of view. Under
this heading one needs to consider both positive and
negative incentives offered to individuals by the state.
On the positive side there are various payments - money,
gifts, services - made out to members of the target
population to encourage limitation of family size. Then,
on the negative side, the incentives vary from economic
penalties imposed on those who have more than the average
number of children required to maintain zero population
growth to compulsory sterilisation and abortion (cf.
Henry,1976; Christiansen,1977). One author, Melvin
Ketchel, has even suggested putting chemicals in the
water supply with the purpose of reducing fertility
(Ketchel,1968).
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It may be objected that positive incentives offered by
the state should not be included under the heading of
involuntary control of population; but I have included
such incentives in this category because I follow the
opinion of those like Arthur Dyck who find both positive
and negative incentives in this area 'morally
problematic': 'Both positive and negative incentives are
morally problematic. Unless they are extremely high they
do not effect the relatively wealthy; and at the same
time whether high or low are unduly coercive for the
poor. Furthermore the effects of incentives are
detrimental to children rather than to their parents'
(Dyck,1973:78). In other words, all incentives tend to
discriminate against the poor and those who have little
freedom to say 'No' to what seems to be a bribe
(cf.Warwick,1974:2). This is why I have preferred to
limit the category of voluntary control, concentrating on
moral education with its appeal to respect for persons,
for the common good, and depending on more altruistic
than prudential motives for limiting births.
Up to this I have centred attention on the policies
open to the more optimistic Neo-Malthusians, who hold
that population control can be the answer to problems of
world famine and poverty in general. But there are also
the more pessimistic thinkers - Hardin, for instance -
who do not hold out much hope that population control can
save the earth from disaster. Instead, more ruthless
measures are required. This is how O'Neill summarises
Hardin's approach:
The citizens of affluent countries are like
passengers in a lifeboat around which other,
desperate, shipwrecked persons are swimming. The
people in the lifeboat can help some of those in the
water. But if the citizens of affluent countries
help some of the starving, this will, unlike many
lifeboat rescues, have bad effects. To begin with,
according to Hardin, the affluent countries will
then have less of a safety margin, like an overladen
lifeboat. This alone might be outweighed by the
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added happiness of those who have been rescued. But
the longer-run effects are bad for everyone. The
rescued will assume that they are secure, will
multiply their numbers and so make future rescues
impossible. It is better, from a utilitarian point
of view, to lose some lives now than to lose more
lives later. So no rescue attempt should be made.
(O'Neill,1980:275-276)
Hardin insists that if affluent countries keep on
pouring aid into poorer countries, the people there will
not face up to their own responsibilities to save
themselves by reducing their population. So, it seems,
the richer countries have to be cruel to be kind. Poor
people in the less developed lands must die of famine if
the lesson of control is to be learned. It also seems to
be the case that any right to aid on the part of poorer
countries must be made conditional upon the full co¬
operation of those nations in limiting drastically
population growth.
Another metaphor used to rationalise a means similar
to that proposed by Hardin is that of 'triage' advocated
by Paddock and Paddock (1967). The world is like a
battlefield strewn with wounded soldiers and with few
doctors to care for them. Difficult decisions have to be
made: the people doomed to die must be abandoned; those
lightly wounded can be left to themselves and to nature's
own healing; and a further group will be the ones to
benefit from scarce resources. Applied to the question
of famine and population growth, some nations are beyond
help and must be abandoned just as Hardin suggests.
Many arguments can be marshalled against such
metaphors. For instance, O'Neill points out in relation
to the lifeboat image, that people in the water do not
have a clear entitlement to a place in the lifeboat,
especially if this would endanger those already in place;
however it is not clear that this applies equally to the
issue of those suffering the effects of famine. For it is
arguable that the poor people of the world do have some
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entitlement to survive, especially if hunger and
starvation are largely the result of unequal distribution
of the earth's resources. Moreover, It may be the case
that the affluent nations achieved their affluence partly
by the exploitation of the less developed countries, and
perhaps this exploitation continues through various forms
of neo-colonialism. Thus there might be a right to
restitution on the part of the descendants of those
colonised and exploited (cf. 0'Nei11,1986:110, for a
discussion of whether the poor nations have a 'special'
right against colonial nations. This seems to be a
further aspect of the problem of conflict of rights
between generations). In other words, searching
questions need to be asked about how certain folk got
their seats in the lifeboat in the first place. And if
their position there is brought into question then a
question-mark must be placed against their right to
impose ruthless population control on the very nations
who have contributed to their comfortable position.
Perhaps the strongest arguments against the lifeboat
and triage metaphors come from the opposing
Developmentalist position. For one thing, Develop-
mentalists are often less happy in talking about the
'problem' of overpopulation in the same breath as the
tragedy of famine and poverty. It's not that they fail to
see a connection between the two, but that their position
is hostile to the view that the population explosion is
the cause of world poverty and famine. They are more
likely to see overpopulation as an effect of poverty
caused by underdevelopment and uneven development. I
shall try to explain these points briefly.
Underdevelopment has to be explained in terms of a
complex set of factors, some of which are listed in the
following remarks from George Lobo:
A country can be said to be overpopulated only in a
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relative sense, viz., with reference to the
resources actually available to sustain in a decent
manner the existent number of people. But the
potential resources of the earth are still very
immense. The problem is of properly exploiting them
and distributing them. Even poor and densely
populated countries like those of South Asia could
have vastly more than the present population. But
not only do the primitive methods of agriculture and
industrial production stand in the way, but the
outdated and neo-colonial structures positively
hinder any progress. (Lobo,1985:205)
Lobo goes on to underline the influence of vested
interests (who manipulate political life and control the
local bureaucracy) on the economies of these poorer lands
(ibid.,205). Nor does Lobo forget the influence of
foreign interests, especially multinationals (ibid.:l47-
149).
Uneven development is also of importance in explaining
the poverty of the developing countries and the
population explosion which is thought to follow from it.
Arthur Simon expresses the point well:
Lower death rates, not higher birth rates, are
responsible for today's population growth. Poor
countries as a whole have actually lowered their
birth rates slightly over the past several decades -
but death rates have dropped more sharply, and that
achievement has touched off the population boom.
Advances in medicine and public health, along with
increases in food production, account for most gains
against early death. (Simon,1975:29)
But what has this to do with poverty in the less
developed countries? Simon explains by pointing out that
the population explosion actually began in Europe some
centuries ago, since it was there that the original
improvements in health care and medicine took place. But
Europe could cope with the growth in population for two
main reasons. First, she experienced an Industrial
Revolution which provided employment for the masses. And,
second, many countries developed colonies from which they
received cheap raw materials (and even cheap labour).
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However, in the less developed countries, something
different has happened: the medical advances have been
introduced to a certain degree such that population
growth is greater than the death rate, but there has not
been the equivalent development of industry or
agriculture to give a decent standard of life to those
who live longer. So there arises the strange situation
where thinkers like Hardin attempt to argue that the
present situation of crisis in developing countries
necessitates allowing those who could live longer to die
slowly. It seems that what the rich nations give with one
hand they take back with the other. This is what is meant
by uneven development.
For the Developmentalists in general, then, population
growth in itself is not the problem, but a symptom of the
real problem - underdevelopment and uneven development.
Thus, if drastic measures involving the limitation of the
intimate procreative freedom of couples are applied on
the basis of a false belief that overpopulation is a
cause of world poverty and hunger, then reproductive
rights are being violated. It is therefore of primary
importance to elicit the facts about world poverty and
population growth before any attempt is made to limit the
freedom of individuals.
Of course, to state that overpopulation is not the
problem is not the same as denying that overpopulation is
a problem. After all, symptoms of illness are often
painful, requiring treatment in their own right. Thus, as
well as working on the development of the poorer
countries, some limitation of family size may be a good
thing, so long as it is not a cover for dragging one's
heels in the sphere of development. Dyck puts the point
clearly as follows:
Compulsion can only be justified as a last resort,
where the costs of failing to lower birth rates is
221
very high, where alternatives have been tried and
failed, and where society combines its population
policies with effective efforts to remove gross
inequalities in the society. Two or three children
is far too precarious a hold on the future for those
who live under circumstances where infant mortality
rates are high, and where the availability of
medical services, education, and jobs is highly
uncertain. Indeed, no just population policy is
possible within a system of gross social
inequalities (Dyck,1973:79).
One should note a couple of points from this
quotation. For instance, almost everyone will agree that
compulsory population control ought to be the last
resort, but the question remains whether the earth is
already on the brink of a 'last resort' situation.
(There is a question here of whether ordinary moral norms
fail to apply in what C.Fried calls 'catastrophic'
situations, Fried,1978:10. Fried thinks that, because of
the possibility of such extreme situations, the norms of
right and wrong are 'categorical' instead of
'absolute',ibid. ) Secondly, one must remember that being
permitted no more than two or three children seems less
of a violation of the right to procreate than being
forbidden to procreate in the first place, especially
when one takes into account the grave social effects in
terms of harm to others which total procreative freedom
might permit. Dyck stresses this distinction a good deal
in the essay I have been quoting and there appears a lot
of good sense in it, unless one places absolute
significance on individual freedom.
6.3 The Application of the Hohfeldian Distinctions.
A. Types of Justice
Before I move on to consider these distinctions I shall
first recall the important distinctions made between the
types of justice, especially between commutative and dis-
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tributive types. Remember that commutative justice is
traditionally concerned with the contracts and agreements
entered into by individuals, whereas distributive and
social justice are more to do with the good of the
community, achieved by the distribution and aggregation
of natural and personal resources. I also mentioned that
conflicts are possible between these types of justice and
that individual promises and contracts must take into
account the common good. In other words, there is no
absolute distinction between private and public morality.
(For further discussion of the distinction between
'intimacy' and 'privacy', cf.Gerstein,1984) This should
be clear in relation to the whole question of marriage
and reproductive choice. If there is a general trend
towards either small families or large families, such
choices have clear effects on the life of society as a
whole. Although the choice of size of one's family is
certainly an intimate one, it can hardly be a wholly
private one.
What then is required in cases where types of justice
conflict in the area of reproductive choice? Does the
right of the state to protect the common good override
the right of the individual couple to decide on the
number of children they intend to procreate? The answer
to questions of this type is a matter for particular
moral theories to discuss. On one hand, it might be
argued that such intimate choices on the part of married
couples in particular should be regarded as sacred and
untouchable, and that the state should make no effort to
intervene in personal choices of this type. In terms of
the Christian tradition, there might be some who would
hold a strongly vocational view of procreative choice,
believing in the mysterious ways of God in bestowing the
gift of children on couples, such that the state must
refrain from intervening. Finnis, for instance, does not
believe that the common good can be invoked to limit the
right of married couples to decide on family size; in
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fact, the common good requires that such freedom be
respected. For Finnis, this is an absolute right
(Finnis,1980:225).
Here one needs to note the full meaning of the con¬
cept 'absolute right'. Strictly speaking it means that a
right cannot be waived or alienated by the holder, nor
can it be forfeited by him or her. With regard to
reproductive rights this would imply that no person can
give the power to the state (or to any person except
one's partner in marriage) to limit his or her personal
procreative choice; for instance, no person has the right
to decide not to have any more children simply because
someone offers some incentive which is attractive.
Likewise, according to the doctrine of absolute rights,
no person should be deprived of his or her freedom to
procreate on having reached some prescribed number of
children.
At the same time as upholding an absolute right to
have children under commutative justice, one can presume
that this position does not deny that couples may have
duties not to have more children than a certain average.
There is a difference between the two positions. One way
of explaining the difference is by having recourse to the
so called 'right to do wrong'. In a particular situation
a couple might be acting wrongly in deliberately
conceiving another child, but it could well be wrong for
others to intervene in such a case, simply because of the
intimacy of the decision. It is not clear from the
comments made by Finnis whether or not his position would
permit the state and society to use non-coercive means to
'educate' people to limit the size of their family on a
voluntary basis.
When it comes down to conflict between important
goods, Finnis holds that some goods are so basic that one
must not act to suppress them directly, though individual
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choices may imply acting against what he calls basic
goods indirectly (Finnis,1980:120). In terms of the types
of justice Finnis could claim that basic goods in
commutative justice cannot be sacrificed directly in
order to attain a level of distributive or social
justice. This would be a matter of 'doing evil to achieve
good'(Rom.3:8). However, relatively few contemporary
thinkers seem to accept this point of view. Not only is
there widespread opposition to the use of the
direct/indirect distinction in solving situations of
moral conflict (often associated with dissatisfaction
regarding the doctrine of double effect with its
distinction between direct and indirect or oblique
intention,cf. articles by Knauer and Schuller in Curran &
McCormick, 1979.), but there is also a general
controversy about the weighing of values. Are basic goods
incommensurable as Finnis argues, or are they in some way
'associable' as Richard McCormick believes? (McCormick,
1979:334).
In the case of population control in response to over¬
population and its link with the prospect of world wide
famine and poverty, there is a need to ask whether a
crisis situation calls for crisis intervention, such that
certain basic or fundamental values take precedence over
other values which in ordinary circumstances one would be
extremely slow to sacrifice. Remember that the good being
sacrificed in this area is the exercise of the right to
have children beyond the average needed to maintain zero
population growth, and it is arguable that this
limitation is less radical, and less an attack on a basic
good, than to refuse permission to a couple to have even
a single child. On the other hand, one cannot afford to
overlook the fact that infant and child mortality rates
in the developing countries puts the limitation of family
size in a different perspective, since parents may be
left without any support if their children die. Thus it
seems that a willingness to limit family size in poorer
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countries must be accompanied by a willingness to protect
those who make great sacrifices to reduce the birth rate;
in other words, the duty to limit family size on the
part of individual poor couples would appear to be linked
to their right to a standard of development which will
compensate for their personal sacrifices. In terms of the
types of justice discussed already, this would mean that
limitations in the field of commutative justice in
relation to the decisions of couples regarding family
size should be compensated by serious improvements in
the effectiveness of distributive and social justice,
e.g. in the provision of health services that will reduce
the infant and child mortality rate.
B. The Hohfeldian 'Clusters'
Turning now to the Hohfeldian distinctions, I want to
concentrate on the conflict between the rights of
couples to decide on the size of their families and the
putative rights of the state to limit reproductive
freedom.
The whole discussion so far has seen the need to limit
family size, and thus reproductive choice, in the context
of the connection between overpopulation and a crisis in
the ability to feed the poor of the world, as well as
catering for their other basic needs. It is largely
because the word 'crisis' is used that intervening in the
intimate sphere of human procreative choice seems to be
justifiable. If, however, it was discovered that the
crisis was in fact highly exaggerated, what would the
response be? One response, I think, would be a
reassessment of the strategy of intervening in individual
freedom to have children. The balance would turn in
favour of the rights of the individual couple. And people
might well want to label the right of the individual
couple with the strongest of the Hohfeldian distinctions
- a claim right. It would be tempting to say that the
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typical couple has the strict claim against the state to
permit them to decide on the number of children they will
have in their family. In other words, only very serious
reasons justify intervention in personal choice in this
intimate sphere.
Corresponding to this strict claim-right, would be the
strict duty of the state not to interfere in personal
choice. In terms of the other distinctions the state
would have no claim against individual couples to limit
family size. It would have no liberty-right to intervene
in any way, since a liberty is defined as having 'no duty
not to do X' , and obviously the state has a duty not to
intervene in this case. It would have no power to
interfere, since a power is a legal or ethical competence
to bring about a certain effect, and circumstances would
not permit the state to exercise such a power. The
effect in this case would be to curtail the freedom of
the individual partners in a relationship to 'make' each
other a parent at will. And, finally, the state would
have no immunity from criticism, legally or morally, if
it were to actually interfere with personal choice in
this matter. In fact, the governing power of a country
would suffer from a strict disability in the sense of
being unable to frame laws to limit reproductive choice.
If, on the other hand, there is a definite crisis in a
country as famine stalks the land, the balance of rights
may tilt in another direction. This time it may be
argued that the state has some right to intervene in
personal reproductive choices for the sake of the over¬
all good of the nation. Now it appears that the state
has the central claim-right against individual couples
that they limit the size of their family. This claim must
be qualified, however, firstly by using the distinction
between the right to found a family of at least one
child, or some average number, and the right to procreate
at will; and, secondly, with regard to the means used
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in order to exercise the claim-right.
In first place, then, the right of the state (and when
I mention state I always mean to include society which
the state represents) would apply only against families
which procreate beyond a certain number of children. The
argument in favour of such intervention on the part of
the state would presumably invoke the notion of
distributive justice, that in a particular case or set of
cases, parents have put an extra strain on the resources
of the community by having too many children. In second
place, the central administration must always be aware of
the need to use the more coercive measures of population
control as a last resort. Thus the state's claim against
couples should be exercised first of all through
educational methods and moral appeal, and after that by
means of positive incentives, then the negative
incentives, and then, as a last resort imposed
sterilisation might be considered. It seems to me,
however, that individual nations may differ on the
morality of the more coercive means, arguing, for
instance, that some means are never justified in view of
certain ends. Even a crisis situation may not justify
the use of some means, forced abortions, for instance.
Arguably, the claim-right of the state to interfere in
personal reproductive choices depends on whether
overpopulation is the cause of poverty or simply one
effect of underdevelopment, for which one must seek
another cause. If overpopulation is just an effect of
underdevelopment, then any right to control population
can only be justified if it is exercised in conjunction
with a whole programme of development. Without that
development the basic claim-right of the state in this
sphere must be questioned, especially if the more
coercive forms of population control are being intro¬
duced .
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It seems to me that there are two linked manifesto
rights in question here. There is the right to proper
development of the resources of a country in order that
its citizens may be able to participate in basic goods;
and there is the right to reproductive freedom in
relation to family size. What is being argued here is
that the second right is partly dependent on the first.
One major problem in relation to all this is that
manifesto rights provide an easy excuse for states to
drag their heels with regard to reform of social and
economic institutions, while demanding that the poor
sacrifice their basic right to reproduce without any
return.
A useful distinction to keep in mind here is that
between 'infringing' and 'violating' a right
(cf. Thomson, 1986 :40-42). If I am lost in the mountains
and night is drawing on, I may be justified in breaking
into a mountain shack owned by someone else, in order to
avoid serious illness or death by exposure. But, in
doing this, I infringe the right of the owner and I ought
to pay some restitution for any damage or inconvenience
caused. If I simply decide to vandalise the shack out of
boredom, on the other hand, I violate the property rights
of the individual.
Applying this distinction to the matter of population
control, the state must always keep in mind that certain
kinds of interference in personal reproductive choice
amount to an infringement of a right because of the con¬
nection between this intimate set of decisions and the
important goods which act as justifying reasons for
limiting the freedom of others. A right is infringed
when some other value takes precedence over it in
practice; but the choice between values or goods is
necessarily looked upon as something unfortunate, and
which needs some form of compensation after the
infringement. Furthermore, it must be recognised that
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the infringement of a right can easily be transformed
into a violation if the compensation is ignored, and if
the right in question is sacrificed too readily. So, the
right of the State to exercise control over population in
some circumstances should be seen perhaps as a necessary
evil or unfortunate necessity in view of the presence of
natural and moral evil in human life. But having said
that, it is still possible to speak in certain circum¬
stances of a liberty-right to infringe the right of
another.
Of course in my discussion so far I have treated of
two extremes where rights seem relatively clear. The
possibilities were: either there is serious famine in a
place or there is not. But affairs are never quite this
clear. A famine may be relatively serious at the present
time, but predictions are made which try to warn the
world community of the possibility of a greater disaster
unless quick action is taken. Advice may be given to
start a strict birth control programme in order to avert
worse famine. But there is no guarantee that control of
population size will be the answer to the problem, since
it may not be the cause or the sole cause. (James
Gustafson, in his discussion of these issues, stresses
the various natural forces which are often among the
major causes of famine and malnutrition (1984:220ff.)
Nor is there any guarantee that the situation will turn
out to be as bad as has been predicted. In other words,
'scare tactics' may be used in order to introduce control
of population in a developing country, and the reasons
behind this may be either honest or dishonest. In
situations of doubt about future consequences and about
the causes of certain misfortunes, it seems to me that
the balance of rights between individuals and the State
are very finely balanced indeed.
With respect to the Hohfeldian distinctions one could
balance claim against claim, power against power,
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immunity against immunity, but it seems to me that the
most useful form of balancing rights in conflict in such
situations of uncertainty would be liberty against
liberty. The reason for this choice is that liberty-
rights require the least sacrifice of freedom in terms of
the duties imposed on others. Thus, if the state has no
duty not to call for population control, this liberty
might be limited by the liberty of individual couples to
reject this call. In other words, the state could have a
limited right to attempt to persuade couples of the
danger of overpopulation, but couples would have the
right to disagree with the state's diagnosis of the
situation. In such conflict situations some freedom is
given to each side.
6.4 The Specific Christian Orientation
There should not be any great surprise that the
Christian Church shows a keen interest in the whole
question of population control and the moral issues
related to it. Clearly the Church must show concern when
the life of humankind is threatened in any way. In
particular, the moral tradition of Christians must take
into account the ways in which the relative dignity of
the human being may be undermined by poverty and
starvation on one hand, and by illicit interference by
the state in intimate areas of choice on the other.
Given that the Christian moral tradition is made up of
a set of particular traditions which may differ from one
another significantly, it will hardly be expected that
all Christian denominations will come to exactly the same
conclusions on this matter of population control. Indeed,
there are very different approaches to the analysis of
the question in the first place. Curran, for instance,
points out the ambivalent attitude of the Roman Catholic
Church on the question of whether there is a population
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'problem' (Curran,1985:228; cf.Walsh,1974:632-636). In
fact, the Vatican seems to prefer to take the develop-
mentalist approach, transferring the 'problem' away from
overpopulation. Dyck, on the other hand, writes of the
more explicit recognition of the problems of population
control in other Christian denominations, especially the
United Methodists (1970) and the United Presbyterians
(1972) (cf. Dyck,1986:486). Then there will be radical
differences in opinion regarding the means used to
control population, even in times of crisis. The Roman
Catholic Church's opposition to contraception and
sterilisation, not to mention abortion, is well known.
Thus, even the voluntary control of family size presents
different approaches within the overall Christian
tradition.
Is there any specific contribution to be expected from
the Christian Church in this whole area? If there is,
one will hardly expect the contribution to be at the
factual, scientific level, in arbitrating between the
Neo-Malthusian and Developmentalist positions, for
instance. I do not think that the Church's role is to
provide some extra infallible knowledge which settles
once and for all the differences between population
experts (though this is not of course to deny that the
Church may have her own experts in the field). Any
contribution from the Church will be more from the values
perspective (keeping in mind that the analysis of
population issues is often a combination of facts and
values). It may also involve the particular kind of
justifying reasons discussed earlier in this essay.
A Sinful Influences
The first contribution of the Christian tradition in this
area must surely be its realism in recognising the
presence of sin in human life, including the process of
moral reasoning and decision making. For Stanley
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Hauerwas, sin in human life involves the perversion of
desires and a lack of truthfulness concerning the present
unsatisfactory state of human existence. As he puts it,
humans seek fulfilment in religious faith often 'without
recognizing that in order to know and worship God rightly
we must have our desires transformed' (Hauerwas,1984:14).
So sin is found most clearly at the level of desire, and
hence a basic Christian task is to examine one's
conscience in relation to population control if one has
some interest in the matter (for instance, as a member of
a foreign state offering aid to a developing nation,
including birth control technology, or as member of the
board of a multinational with economic interests in the
matter of birth control.). One should keep in mind the
work of theologians like Reinhold Niebuhr who have
stressed the increased likelihood of moral corruption in
human groups, and this might be applied to the activities
of both foreign powers and local politicians in
attempting to limit family size (Niebuhr,1960:chs.4&5).
Modern discussions of sin,then, have tended to move
away from an individualistic and atomistic understanding
of the presence of evil in human life. The atomistic
understanding which stressed individual wrong actions,
especially sins of commission, has been criticised in the
light of the notion of 'fundamental option' which tends
to stress patterns of action over time, including sins of
omission (cf.Fuchs,1970b; Cooper,1972). The individual¬
istic understanding of sin has been corrected to an
extent by references to 'social sin', described by
Richard McCormick (1978:35) as 'that enslavement of
persons [which] occurs through structures'.
Concentrating for a moment on this idea of sinful
structures, McCormick specifies two ways in which such
structures operate today. The first is referred to as
'"operational structures"' and involves 'zoning laws,
welfare systems, tax systems, health-delivery systems,
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international monetary systems' (ibid.). The second is
referred to as '"ideological structures"',which he
describes as 'nothing more nor less than a corporately
adopted priority' (ibid.). Then he declares that, 'An
ideological structure becomes enslaving when it makes
some value other than individual persons the organizing
and dominating value.' His conclusion is well worth
quoting:
In summary, then, when large numbers of people are
suffering or are denied their rights and
opportunities, look for a value that subordinates
them and one that has been made a structure by
becoming the organizing force of policies and
decisions (ibid.,35).
It is not too difficult to see how McCormick's analysis
above can be applied to certain efforts to control
population in the world. One would do well to consider
the influence of sin at the level of both 'operational
and ideological structures'. Note too that the sin enters
quite 'respectably' by stressing a particular value and
playing down the fact that other key values (to which
people have rights) are being subordinated in the
process.
B Means and Ends
To my mind the second contribution which the Christian
Church can offer humankind in its moral decision making
with regard to population control involves the connection
between ends and means. This does not mean that
Christianity simply preaches slogans of the type 'The
end doesn't justify the means'. What is needed in first
place is an understanding of the limited ends open to
humanity within a Christian world-view. This is the
initial point made by Paul Ramsey (1970) in his
discussion of the relationship between means and ends. In
response to those who want to ensure a genetically bright
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future, Ramsey says that the Christian 'is not under the
necessity of ensuring that those who come after us will
be like us, any more than he is bound to ensure that
there will be those like us to come after us.' (1970:29-
30). And regarding the link between means and ends,
Ramsey warns that 'any person, or any society or age,
expecting ultimate success where ultimate success is not
to be reached, is peculiarly apt to devise extreme and
morally illegitimate means for getting there.'
(ibid.,31). Applying this insight to the means used to
'ensure' that famine and poverty is overcome, it should
be stressed that Christianity does not promise an end to
these tragedies in this life, and if one is frantic to
achieve just that, there is the real possibility of
utilising wrong means.
Once one has realistic ends in view, the Christian
will then seek to apply moral expertise in judging the
appropriate means to that end. And this is no easy
matter, especially when the means to population control
is thought to involve the infringement of a basic right.
Part of the Church's moral expertise in this area of ends
and means is of course the traditional doctrine of double
effect, which, for all the criticism it has received of
late, does centre attention on some key issues in making
moral decisions, including the proportion between the
effects and the intention of the agent(s).
When it comes to judging the appropriateness of
certain means of population control, the churches may be
expected to agree at least on those means which should be
totally excluded from consideration depending on the
circumstances. The reference to circumstances here is to
the judgement on whether there is a crisis at hand or
not. If there is, the Church may support some limited
coercive measures as a last resort in order to control
birth rates; if there is ~no crisis, then even those
coercive measures should be condemned. A good example of
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the Church's taking a firm position on the means to limit
population growth is the general criticism of 'lifeboat
ethics' on the part of Christian ethicists. Arthur Dyck
holds firm against such means being accepted by-
Christians :
Some will not relinquish their commitment to save
lives as the need arises even if it should mean
disaster for the world: some values are seen as more
important than survival. Others argue that it is
not survival as such that is the issue, but rather
the survival of a way of life. (Dyck,1986:486).
The statement reflects a 'quality of life' type
argument, in saying that the ruthlessness involved in
letting people die without any aid cannot be a means to a
good end, precisely because the means is part of the end.
There is a clear contradiction here in the moral
structure of the action, one which fails to live up to
values of either justice or love. Christianity should be
willing to risk the judgement that some actions should
never be contemplated in view of the fact that it is
impossible to see how even the best end could compensate
for a morally wrong means. Indeed, a judgement of this
sort is probably the underlying meaning of the language
of intrinsically evil acts. And this point is also
related to my earlier discussion of the maxim that it is
better to suffer evil than to do what is evil. So, if
humanity arrives at the state of affairs when it has to
be as callous as Hardin suggests regarding suffering
humanity, it could be argued that a question mark hangs
over the whole reason for living on. And if the position
that the good man cannot be harmed is advocated, given
that 'harm' is understood in the moral sense, people
might be willing to suffer with the poor rather than live




The final contribution I shall mention here has to do
with the concept of vocation, which has a long religious
pedigree. Though some Christians (especially in the
Reformed tradition) dislike the term 'vocation' because
of its associations with the special calling to monastic
or 'religious life', the notion of a 'calling' is an
important biblical concept. (On the Reformed tradition
regarding 'vocation', note how the article on this
subject in The Encyclopedia of the Lutheran Church (1965)
treats of the notion as secondary to that of 'Work'. This
reflects Luther's own preference for a functional
interpretation of vocation in terms of 'offices', cf.
Helm,1987:58.)
In the Old Testament, according to Colin Brown
(Brown,1975 ), the idea of a call seems to be connected
with the voice of authority:
Such a call is always a command, never a mere
invitation (Job 13:22). This call expects that men
should- hear and answer. Hence it is not despotic
compulsion. Men can refuse to obey the call of God
(Is.65:12; Jer.13:10); they can refuse to hear it
(Is.50:2; Jer.7:13) or seek to avoid it
(Ex.3:11;4:1;10 :13 ; Jer.1:6) (Brown,1975:272).
According to J.I. Packer:
The developed biblical idea of God's calling is of
God summoning men by his word, and laying hold of
them by his power, to play a part in and enjoy the
benefits of his gracious redemptive purposes
(Packer,1984:184).
In the New Testament Brown calls attention to the use
of the word kaleo to refer to invitation in the parables
of the Great Banquet (Lk.14:16-25) and the Marriage Feast
(Mt.22:2-10) . He claims that there is usually a hint of
privilege and command in these parables, as in 'I came
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not to call the righteous, but sinners' (Mt.9:13;
Mk.2:17; Lk.5:32). 'These parables make it clear that,
when a man ignores the divine invitation, he not only
misses an opportunity, but may be squandering his life
and hope' (Brown,1975:274).
Such references do not of course prove that God
'calls' persons to marriage and parenthood in the same
way as he calls persons to faith in him, or to perform a
particular task as prophet or apostle. Callings to some
state of life, such as marriage or the single way, are
subordinate callings in scriptural terms, but they cannot
be ignored if one wishes to hold a relatively strong
doctrine of divine providence.
Mention of divine providence in relation to vocation
or calling is not an attempt to mystify the basic moral
issues involved in relation to rights. Although there is
a mysterious aspect to God's call, whether it be to faith
or to a particular state of life, in the case of a call
to a particular state there are also human criteria for
judging or discerning its validity. For instance, a
calling to a state of life must involve a manner of
living which embraces certain goods. Some of the goods
in relation to procreation have been mentioned already.
But as well as involving these goods, there are the major
criteria of aptitude for, and inclination towards, the
particular state. All sorts of moral, psychological, and
physical elements are involved in the discernment of
God's call. The response to a call is then both God-
directed and constitutive of human flourishing, if the
call is true and the response sincere.
Because moral elements are involved in choosing a
state of life within the general Christian vocation of
following the normative humanity of Jesus Christ, one can
understand why Christian ethics must be concerned with
issues like population control. If the state interferes
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unduly in this area, it not only invades the area of
marital intimacy, but may obstruct the conscientious
decisions of couples who believe that God is calling them
to parenthood, not just once or twice but on many other
occasions, i.e. to have a larger than average family. On
the other hand, the Christian Church must remind
potential parents of the duties they have to provide a
secure home for their children as well as the duty not to
put undue pressure on the resources of the state
The Church's role in relation to population control
and reproductive freedom needs to be both supportive and
critical. Because of the important goods involved, which
are related to human relative dignity, the Church must
support the basic claims regarding choice of family size
on the part of individual couples, and the need of the
state, representing the whole community, to control
family size in relation to the resources available to
support a decent quality of life for those already born
and those who will be born. The Church must not be seen
in some simplistic fashion as 'on the side of' the
individual against the state, or vice versa.
6. 5 Conclusion
Though the title of this chapter refers to population
control in general, the major part of these pages have
dwelt on problems arising from anxieties about
overpopulation and its relation to world hunger. The more
optimistic Neo-Malthusian approach to the problem thinks
that strict population control, limiting family size in
developing countries, is a major element of any attempt
to avoid the tragedy of famine. However, there is also
the Developmentalist approach which shows some scepticism
concerning the alleged causal relation between
overpopulation and famine.
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Much of this chapter has been a discussion of these
positions. And it has been difficult to come down
absolutely in favour of either. I tend towards the
Developmentalist point of view, seeing overpopulation as
a problem, but mainly as an effect of underdevelopment
and uneven development. I am somewhat sceptical of
prophecies concerning future crises and the way in which
such dire warnings can provide a rationalisation for
violating reproductive rights of couples in the Third
World (cf.Eberstadt,1979:293-294, who argues that ex¬
aggerated claims relating to the extent of world hunger
leads to apathy in the developed nations.). However, I
can see how the language of rights might have to be
applied in different ways if the Malthusian nightmare
becomes a reality. The claim of the state, as
representative of the community at large, against
individual couples would be stronger than it is at
present. Depending on the extent of the crisis, however,
the state would have to decide on the minimum number of
children allowed per couple before the crisis is
surmounted. Note that the more basic right of couples is
to have at least one child, rather than to have a large
family. However, in poor countries where infant and
child mortality is high this point may have little
relevance; hence the crying need for economic and social
development to reduce the mortality rate. Nevertheless, I
have stressed that any curtailment of the right of
parents to extend their family size can be seen as an
infringement.
Even where there is some right to limit family size,
the state must still show care in the use of appropriate
means to achieve this. Some means involve an attack on
other goods, especially freedom of conscience, but also,
as in the case of compulsory sterilisation, on the claim
to bodily integrity. I pointed out that traditional
Christian ethics (especially Roman Catholic) has paid
much attention to the appropriate relationship between
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ends and means in line with the scriptural maxim of not
doing evil in order to achieve the good.
Thus, the main issue of this chapter has been an
examination of conflicting goods and their associated
rights. On one hand, there seem to be strong justifying
reasons for respecting the intimate decisions of couples
to decide on family size. While, on the other hand, the
so-called 'problem' of overpopulation, with its alleged
effects on participation in certain basic goods and
quality of life, appears to support the right of state
and society to set some limit to reproductive freedom.
The special difficulty experienced in eliciting the
'facts' about world hunger and overpopulation and
establishing a causal connection between them, leads to
some scepticism concerning some attempts to curtail
reproductive freedom. One wonders whether some efforts to
limit family size is not a violation of reproductive
rights, rather than, as is sometimes claimed, an
unfortunate infringement of those rights.
Finally, I have suggested that part of the Christian
contribution to this question involves a reminder of the
presence of sin in the world, both in individual and
group life. Thus, the explicitly mentioned justifying
reasons for controlling population may conceal less
reputable motives, including the selfishness of not
caring for the hard work of sharing resources with the
poor, and the promotion of development in less prosperous
lands. Included in this point is Ramsey's warning about
becoming obsessed with strictly impossible ends, such
that extreme means are contemplated and even enacted. The
notion of parenthood as a Christian vocation likewise
takes into account the need for moral discernment when
making decisions about family size, since the right to
become a parent must be qualified by the right of




Reproductive Rights and the Mentally Retarded
7.1 Introduction
In my discussion of population control and the need to
limit family size in certain cases, the major suggested
justifying reason for limiting freedom was the
relationship between overpopulation and famine. If that
relationship could actually be established there would be
some justification for infringing, but not violating the
reproductive rights of certain couples. It was suggested
that the right to reproduce would be infringed if couples
were limited to having an average number of children
needed to maintain zero population growth. To refuse the
freedom to have a single child would amount to a
violation of the more basic right. In other words, the
more basic right to found a family of at least one child
was recognised as a practical absolute even in situations
of crisis.
When the focus turns to the question of the
reproductive rights of the mentally retarded, however,
one generally has in mind the removal of the right to
found a family. At least with regard to the severely
mentally handicapped, it is widely accepted that they
should not procreate. In this chapter I ask in first
place if it makes sense to talk of the mentally retarded
as having reproductive rights, and if this is accepted as
a working assumption, then there is the further issue of
the possible limitations of the right and the reasons for
curtailing or removing freedom from the individuals in
question. There is also a need to consider the particular
difficulties arising from the notion of 'non-voluntary
sterilisation' and the accompanying notion of 'proxy' or
'substituted' consent. Nor can I afford to ignore the
wider issues regarding sexuality and the handicapped. And
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finally, I must attempt yet again to put these matters in
a Christian perspective.
7.2 The Possibility of Reproductive Rights
I have already mentioned in this essay the statement by
the United Nations Declaration that 'men and women of
full age...have the right to marry and to found a family'
(Art.16,1). In 1971, the U.N. adopted a Declaration of
the Rights of the Mentally Handicapped, which included
the statement 'The mentally retarded person has the same
basic rights as other citizens of the same country and
the same age' (cf. Craft,1987:13). In the realm of
reproductive choice, the basic right is a combination or
cluster of Hohfeldian elements, including the right to
beget genetic offspring, to rear children, and to space
births at one's own discretion (Bayles,1978:38) . But
should one take seriously the declaration that all
mentally handicapped people have all these rights?
Assuming that the right to found a family is a basic
right, one could still ask if it makes sense to draw a
parallel between the mentally retarded and 'normally'
developed persons of the same age. In some cases the
parallel can be made, where the mental handicap is of a
moderate type, but it is more difficult to establish this
point as retardation becomes progressively more
debilitating. In fact, I would go so far as to argue
that the mentally incompetent have no reproductive rights
as such.
So the first point I want to make is to underline the
need to distinguish between the degrees of handicap
within a large heterogeneous group. (Rosalyn Kramer
Monat,1982:5, distinguishes between mild, moderate,
severe, and profound types of retardation. I shall use
the terms 'moderate' and 'severe' in a general sense in
what follows.) If one is thinking of a case where a
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person is severely retarded, the basic right to marry may
itself be in question; and if there is no competence in
this area, it will follow that no right to rear children
can be allowed, assuming the rights of children to
competent parenting. On the other hand, the moderately
handicapped person may be competent to enter into
marriage, but a question mark will still hang over the
competence to rear children.
However, it may be the case that special help from
social workers, counsellors and friends could help the
person (especially if married to a similarly retarded
partner) to adapt to caring for at least a single child.
If help is needed over and above that required by
normally developed persons, then there is a sense in
which the rights of the mentally handicapped are
different from the rest of the population, since in order
to participate in the good of being a parent and raising
children more resources than usual are required to enable
the handicapped person or couple to achieve that end. The
moderately mentally retarded may have the same basic
rights with regard to founding a family, but specialised
rights may be involved in the means to achieve this good
end. The question then must be, how far society is
willing to contribute to the special resources required
to enable the moderately handicapped to participate in
this good?
I have noted that having a reproductive right in the
full sense requires some ability on the part of the
individual person or couple to participate in the good of
raising children. (I am assuming here that reproductive
rights are not just to do with the experience of being
pregnant, but that this experience is a means to the end
of raising one's genetic offspring.) This ability may be
actual or potential. In the cases of potential ability I
am thinking about mentally retarded persons whose
prognosis is good, who are somewhat in the position of
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normal children in that, given time and development,
their sexuality and ability to develop responsible
relationships will mature. One should recall the point
made two chapters ago, namely, that there is a sense in
which children have reproductive rights, though at the
time they are not able to exercise them. Various actions
of related adults may have an effect on the future use of
reproductive capacities. In other words, consideration
must be given to future possibilities of parenting for
fear of closing off these options without due cause. I
now look in more detail at the reasons used most often to
justify the limitation of reproductive freedom of the
mentally retarded. They all relate to possible bad
effects arising from the retarded having children.
7.3 Reasons For Limiting Such Rights
A The Genetic Rationale.
Reference was made above to the criterion of parental
incompetence as one of the reasons given for limiting the
freedom to procreate. This reason would also apply to the
right to adopt or foster children. Quite simply,
according to this position, the interests of future
persons, children not yet born, must be given precedence
over the rights of married persons judged to be mentally
handicapped. But would the mentally handicapped be
permitted a more limited right to act as gamete donors?
This must be doubtful due to the possibility in some
cases of passing on genetic defects. As Michael Bayles
(1978) puts it,
Many mental illnesses and much mental retardation
are now known to be genetically based. The
difficult issue is how likely it must be that a
child will have a defect. No absolute probability
such as 25 percent can be specified as a minimum.
Instead, the probability sufficient to justify
sterilization will vary with the seriousness of the
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defect; the more serious it is, the smaller the
probability needed to justify a sterilization.
(Bayles,1978:AO)
Thus, even if a mentally retarded couple were deemed
relatively competent as parents, there would still be the
moral question about the risk of bringing another
retarded person into the world. Of course there is
always this risk in procreation, but the risk is greater
in the case of the mentally retarded. In fact, J.R.Kramer
argues that retarded parents who choose to have children
may risk violating their offspring's right not to be
retarded' (Kramer,1976;Thompson,1978:31).
Concern about future persons or generations can be
seen from two perspectives. On one hand, one can
concentrate on the particular individuals introduced to
this world at a strict disadvantage in comparison with
normally healthy children. One could say that life in
this world is difficult enough to cope with without one's
parents passing on a negative genetic inheritance. On the
other hand, one can concentrate on the wider issue of the
overall gene pool; in other words, one can consider the
eugenic issues.
Regarding the possible 'rights' of future persons not
to inherit genetic defects from their parents, there is
room for healthy scepticism for several reasons. The
first reason is connected with 'wrongful life' actions in
law, which appear to require a comparison between life
with some handicap and non-existence. But it is arguable
that such a comparison does not make sense because of the
impossibility of grasping the notion of non-existence as
a kind of state. Secondly, even if such comparisons were
possible, they would be highly subjective. How could one
develop a list of handicaps which would amount to
criteria for claiming the right not to be born? I doubt
if handicapped persons themselves could agree on such a
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list. Thirdly, how could claims work in such situations,
since the future person does not yet exist? And once the
person did exist, the damage, if one could call it that,
would be already done. All the right could amount to
would be to criticise one's parents for bringing one to
birth. But it is doubtful whether this is a satisfactory
kind of right (in fact, wrongful life cases are not
directed against parents but against medical advisers
deemed to have given wrong advice or insufficient
information) .
If it is said that the right not to be born retarded
is to be claimed by others on the behalf of future
persons, then one faces the question 'Who will be given
such a power to claim against parents in such an intimate
sphere of life? Finally, one can question whether it is
appropriate to speak of the rights of future persons.
Rights can only be predicated truly of existing persons,
even if they are not yet in a position to claim.
Regarding the eugenic rationale, before the Nazi
excesses and the development of a pejorative meaning,
sterilisation for eugenic reasons had a certain degree
of respectability, a respectability reflected in some
legal systems. Michael Bayles refers to some examples
from the United States. Seemingly, the State of Indiana
was the first to adopt a eugenic sterilisation statute,
in 1907. This move was followed by other states,
especially after the Supreme Court upheld the validity
of such statutes in 1927. On that occasion the attitude
of the court was well expressed by Justice Oliver Wendall
Holmes:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare
may call upon the best citizens for their lives.
It would be strange if it could not call upon those
who already sap the strength of the State for these
lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by
those concerned, in order to prevent our being
swamped by incompetence. It is better for all the
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world, if instead of waiting to execute dangerous
degenerate offspring for crimes, or let them starve
for their imbecility, society can prevent those who
are manifestly unfit for continuing their kind. The
principle that sustains compulsory vacination is
broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian
tubes... Three generations of imbeciles are enough.
(Buck v. Bell,274 U.S. 200,207 (1927); Bayles,
1978:37)
There was a change of attitude, however, in the 1940s,
as instanced in the 1942 decision to hold an Oklahoma
statute unconstitutional (with regard to the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment)
(cf.Skinner v. Oklahoma,316 U.S. 535 (1942).) In the
1970s, according to Bayles, 'courts have ruled both for
and against involuntary sterilisation of the mentally
incompetent' (ibid.,37-38), but it is interesting that
judgements in favour of compulsory sterilisation no
longer appeal to the eugenic rationale; instead the
concern is for the children born of the mentally
handicapped in terms of their inheriting their parents'
condition and the disadvantage of being raised by
incompetent parents.
One does not hear the kind of language used by Justice
Holmes, that the incompetent 'sap the strength of
society', or that society needs to anticipate serious
crime by sterilising the parents who may produce deviant
offspring. These forms of argument have been largely
discredited on both moral and scientific grounds. This is
not to say, however, that such reasons as just mentioned
are not still a motivating factor in many cases, even
though more 'respectable' moral arguments are put forward
explicitly. (Mason and McCall Smith (1983:53), in their
discussion of this issue of sterilisation of the
retarded, suggest that relatively strong reasons exist
for adopting this course of action in the case of the
severely retarded, because '[T]he alternative is to allow
a person manifestly ill-suited for the bearing of
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children to saddle the community with the cost of raising
children who will themselves, unless adopted, be deprived
of the opportunity of a normal upbringing'. Note how the
welfare of society is mentioned before the child's good.
Sheila McLean notes the ambivalence present in the
American legal system on this matter of involuntary and
non-voluntary sterilisation of the retarded, but she
comments favourably on what she sees as a trend towards
protection of reproductive choice. As I have noted
already in relation to McLean's position on reproductive
rights, such rights are to be seen in a wider context of
the right to self-determination, part of which is the
right to privacy. Thus McLean cites the case of Carey v.
Population Services International:
The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child
is at the very heart of ....[a] cluster of
constitutionally protected choices. That decision
holds a particularly important place in the history
of the right of privacy. (431 U.S. 678;
McLean,1986 : 111 )
McLean at the same time laments the fact that not all
states in the Union have applied the principle just
enunciated to the retarded. In particular she cites the
case of North Carolina Association for Retarded Children
et al v. State of North Carolina et al, where the court
stated that the mentally retarded comprised a particular
category who 'may rationally be accorded different
treatment for their benefit and the benefit of the
public' (420F. Supp.451 (1976); ibid.,112). Note in
particular in this quotation the paternalistic emphasis
preceding the more utilitarian rationale of general
benefit or welfare. More will be said on this question
of paternalism after I treat briefly of the alleged
rights of children to 'competent parents'.
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B, The Parental Incompetence Rationale.
Some mention has already been made of this rationale, so
I shall not labour the point here. However, some points
should be made to highlight some of the problems judging
incompetence.
In first place there is the question whether the
putative right to competent parents is not on the same
level as the putative right not to be retarded. However,
it seems more difficult to establish the right to
competent parents: firstly, because of the relative
vagueness of the term 'competent', and secondly, because
having incompetent persons probably does not affect
children in the direct way genetic defects do. For
instance, the state and the community may help both
parents and children to cope with some levels of
incompetence, whereas genetic defects seem more intract¬
able problems to have to face.
In first place, then, one can examine the concept of
parental incompetence. Obviously this concept involves
both factual and value judgements. And if the whole
question of parental competence is controversial, one can
expect the problems to be somewhat exacerbated in
relation to the mentally retarded. Michael Bayles warns
against making easy judgements about the criteria for
'mental incompetence':
..., psychologists and mental health workers do not
agree about the psychological conditions or criteria
of mental incompetence. Both factual and value
disagreements are involved. People with different
values have different conceptions of what is needed
to protect oneself. For example, some claim that the
criterion that all people with an IQ below 70 are
incompetent is too stringent, does not allow for
individual variation, and uses the wrong basic
measure. Moreover, it is now unpopular to make
judgments about general mental incompetence; the
emphasis is upon specific functional incompetence.
(op.cit.,38; also cf.Gaylin,1982)
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Bayles himself thinks the best sign of incompetence is
the legal standard required for the appointment of a
guardian to oversee the affairs of a person. This occurs
when a person is 'incapable of understanding and acting
in the ordinary affairs of life' (Bayles,1978:38). Now,
applied to the right to become a parent and raise
children, Bayles's argument seems quite strong. After
all, if a person cannot manage his or her own affairs in
a responsible fashion, then it is unlikely that such a
person can take on the onerous responsibilities of
parenthood.
With regard to the notion of specific functional
incompetence mentioned above by Bayles, to apply this to
parental incompetence would require of the agent to: list
the particular functions involved in raising children;
note if specific persons have the aptitude for each
function; ask if special help can be provided which will
make up for some incapacity in special cases; and,
finally, consider whether or not the other partner in the
marriage can supply for the weak points in the
spouse/parent in question. On one's answers to these
questions will depend the degree to which one might feel
justified in limiting the reproductive freedom of the
retarded. And remember that restriction of freedom in
such a basic area of self-determination will always be to
some degree an infringement of a right; what has to be
avoided at all costs, however, is the violation of a
right.
Thus, in some cases one may be justified in limiting
the family size of a handicapped couple because they can
only cope with raising a single child, but one might have
no justification interfering with the more basic right
to found a family by refusing a couple the opportunity to
procreate in the first place. It is an extremely
difficult question to balance any putative right of
offspring not to be retarded or to have 'normal' parents
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against the right of (at least) the moderately retarded
to experience the joy and the challenge of parenthood.
C Paternalism as a Rationale.
Whereas the last two sections presented reasons for
limiting reproductive freedom on the basis of a conflict
of rights between prospective parents and any children
they might procreate, the paternalistic rationale is
geared towards protecting a person 'from himself or
herself', so to speak. I have already shown something of
this rationale in the legal criteria for appointing a
guardian to look after a person's interests. The point at
issue here is whether the mentally retarded person
suffers from such incompetence that his or her acts are
not really free, not truly part of an attempt at self-
determination, but part of an irrational impulse which
harms the person, such that the person requires another
to act in his or her interest. The problem presented here
is that of distinguishing a justifiable paternalism from
the unjustifiable intervention in the person's 'right to
do wrong'. Does the mentally retarded person in some
cases have a right to do wrong, which is a lesser evil
than permitting others to intervene 'in his real
interest'? It is of course difficult to answer this in
the abstract, but one should perhaps draw a parallel
between the case of some mentally retarded people and the
case of parents who have to judge the degree of freedom
to allow to their still immature adolescent children.
Sometimes parents have to allow their children to make
mistakes rather than protect them at all costs.
The notion of freedom is of central importance as I
just pointed out. The so called 'right to do wrong' only
makes sense in the light of the doctrine of freedom of
conscience. Often it is better to permit a person to harm
himself or herself rather than take away the individual's
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freedom of decision and action; and this may even apply
to harm done to others (cf. Eric D'Arcy's discussion of
the doctrine of Pope Pius XII which holds that it is not
always the duty of men and women to 'repress all error
and deviation'. God's own infinite perfection does not
require him to do so, and this applies also to humanity
(D'Arcy,1961:242ff.; AAS,45(1953),798) . ) But, it seems
to me, it does not make any sense to speak of freedom of
conscience or the right to do wrong in the case of the
mentally incompetent or severely mentally retarded- hence
the justification of some forms of paternalism. The
freedom of conscience I am interested in protecting
depends for its existence on an acceptable degree of
understanding concerning the ends of action, including
some notion of responsibility with regard to self and
others.
In application to the reproductive freedom of the
mentally retarded, there must be a doubt in many cases as
to whether patients understand in a responsible way the
implications of sexual activity. Where there is no
understanding of procreation, but still a desire to
fulfil basic sexual instincts, there would appear to be
some justification for paternalistic protection of the
individual from the consequences of instinctive actions.
This presumes of course that the handicap is of a type
that excludes any possible training in understanding and
responsibility with regard to procreation. When a person
acts without freedom, without a basic understanding of
the effects of the action, there is no sense of speaking
of a personal right to act in such a way; in fact, there
would arguably be a right to be protected from such harm
against those who have some understanding of the effects
in question as well as some connection with the
handicapped person.
Another way of seeing the rationale behind paternalism
in the cases of mental incompetence, is to say that the
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actions of the incompetent person are not in the full
sense his or her own; it is as if someone else, or some
force, is moving the person to act in a way detrimental
to his or her welfare, and in the face of which the
person requires protection. Whilst the incompetent person
has little freedom, he or she does still have interests
which should be protected. The question of rights still
applies, since the mentally incompetent can benefit from
society's protection. However, it is debatable whether
the rights of the incompetent include reproductive
rights. As I have said, I do not approve of reference to
reproductive rights in relation to persons who have
virtually no chance of ever appreciating the good of
procreation. The rights of the mentally incompetent in
relation to their reproductive faculties are an aspect of
general rights all persons have to appropriate health
care. (I think a similar point needs to be made when
talking about cases where the mentally incompetent become
pregnant by accident - the right not to be forced to have
an abortion should be argued either from the point of
view of the rights of the fetus to life, or the right of
the mother to her bodily integrity; cf. Mahowald,1985:22
& Abernethy,1985:23, for comments on a 'case study'
relating to a mentally ill woman who refuses to have an
abortion.)
At this stage it will be useful to refer to two
examples of legal paternalism with regard to limiting the
freedom to reproduce of the mentally handicapped. The
cases in point come from English legal judgements and
have to do with proposed sterilisation of retarded girls.
In re D (a minor) (Wardship: sterilisation).1976 Fam.185
Diana Brahams (1987) describes the basic details of this
case concerning a a girl aged 11 with Sotos syndrome
(cerebral gigantism) as follows:
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She had a dull normal intelligence; and her
clumsiness was lessening and her behaviour
improving. It was not possible to predict her
future role in society but it was likely that she
would have sufficient capacity to marry. Her widowed
mother feared that she might become pregnant and
wished her to be sterilised. A hysterectomy was
proposed , with the support of her general
practitioner, a paediatrician responsible for her
care, and a gynaecologist. (Brahams,1987:757)
However, before the operation could take place, an
educational psychologist objected and had the girl made a
ward of court. In the subsequent judgement, Mrs. Justice
Heilbron 'held that the proposed operation involved the
deprivation of a woman's basic human rights to reproduce,
and would be, if performed on a woman for non-therapeutic
reasons and without her consent, a violation of such
right.' (Brahams,ibid.) The judge held in this case that
on the basis of the evidence before her the operation to
sterilise the girl was 'neither medically indicated nor
necessary and would not be in the girl's best interests'
(ibid.).
Here is a case, then, where the paternalism of parent
and doctors was deemed unjustified, and where the
judgement of the court was needed to bring out the true
interests of the child. In a sense, however, the court's
judgement was itself a paternalistic one in view of the
fact that the girl's own views on the matter were not
central to the case. The court instead tried to predict
a future state of affairs and to allow for a basic option
or freedom to be exercised at a later date. One must
remember that the presence of a right to something does
not depend always on a present desire or felt need. A
person in a depressed state, who is considering suicide,
still has a right to life, though living on seems to have
little attraction for him or her. The desire to marry and
have children may not be in the mind and heart of a
child, but the child has the right not to have future
options curtailed at this early stage without serious
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justification. Thus, in the case under discussion, it was
the girl's potential to marry and found a family at a
later date which led the court to prohibit the operation.
In re B (a minor) (Sterilisation).
This more recent case from 1987 gave rise to much media
interest. The situation of the minor is given in a brief
summary by Brahams:
A girl born on May 20, 1969, was the second of five
children In May,1973, a care order was made and
parental rights were vested in the local authority.
The child lived in local-authority homes and spent
weekends and parts of school holidays at her
mother's home. She was of low intelligence, but she
did not need protection under the Mental Health Act
1983. She could dress herself, attend to herself
during menstruation, and perform simple domestic
tasks. She spoke only a few words at a time. She
could not be allowed out alone because she did not
understand traffic or the use of money. She
suffered from epilepsy, but the fits were controlled
by drugs. She was moody and could become aggressive
and violent. She had a history of reacting badly to
medication. She could hope to attain the skills of
a 5 or 6 year-old in some areas. (ibid.,757)
Brahams goes on to speak of the recent growth in
sexual awareness in Jeanette's life and the feelings of
anxiety on the part of her mother and guardians that she
might become pregnant. The Times Law Report on the
proceedings adds a further important detail concerning
the girl's sexual development,
She had all the physical sexual drive and
inclinations of a physically mature woman of 17 and
had already shown that she was vulnerable to sexual
approaches. She had already once been found in a
compromising situation in a bathroom, and there was
significant danger of pregnancy resulting from
casual sexual intercourse. (Report, May 1,1987:37)
What would be the effects on this girl if she were to
become pregnant? The Law Report answers in these terms:
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She would not understand, or be capable of easily-
supporting, the inconveniences and pains of
pregnancy. As she menstruated irregularly, pregnancy
would be difficult to detect or diagnose in time to
terminate it easily.
Were she to carry a child to full term she would
not understand what was happening to her, she would
be likely to panic, and would probably have to be
delivered by caesarean section, but owing to her
emotional state, and the fact that she had a high
pain threshold she would be quite likely to pick at
the operational wound and tear it open, (ibid.,37)
In the light of these facts and predictions of facts,
the Sunderland Borough Council, with the mother's
support, sought to have Jeanette made a ward of court
with a view to having her sterilised. (It was considered
that contraception was not a viable option.) Justice Bush
gave permission for the operation but the Official
Solicitor appealed the case at the Court of Appeal. That
appeal was rejected, but further leave of appeal was
granted, this time to the Lords, and their judgement
upheld the original decision to permit sterilisation of
Jeanette.
It is interesting to note some of the arguments put
forward by the Law Lords to justify their judgement. For
instance, in the words of the Law Report,
Lord Oliver said that no one was likely to forget
that we lived in a century which, as a matter of
relatively recent history, had witnessed experiments
carried out in the name of eugenics or for the
purpose of population control, so that the very word
"sterilization" had come to carry emotive overtones.
It was important at the very outset, therefore,
to emphasize as strongly as it was possible to do
so, that the appeal had nothing whatever to do with
eugenics. It was concerned with one primary
consideration and one alone, namely the welfare and
best interests of the young woman, an interest which
was conditioned by the imperative necessity of
ensuring, for her own safety and welfare, that she
did not become pregnant (ibid.)
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These remarks speak for themselves. They take into
account the emotive issues involved and the unsavoury
associations linked with sterilisation of the retarded.
Also the strictly paternalistic rationale is underlined.
The court considered the earlier case of re D (a minor)
which I have discussed above. And the Lord Chancellor
accepted the reasoning behind that judgement refusing
permission to sterilise the minor, namely, that it would
violate a basic human right to reproduce. However, in
this case, he felt that such a right was not in question,
since 'that right was only such when reproduction was the
result of informed choice of which the ward in the
present case was incapable' (Report ibid.)
Interestingly, the court recognised the full
seriousness of the issues involved in this case. Thus,
Lord Bridge, in concurring with the judgements of his
colleagues, 'observed that the Official Solicitor acted
with complete propriety in bringing the case first to the
Court of Appeal and then to their Lordships' House'
(ibid.) This was said in view of the great public
interest, and even disquiet, regarding cases of this
type. And in order to calm some of those fears the Lords
felt obliged to strictly limit the exercise of
paternalism, in particular by taking some power out of
the hands of parents and guardians and passing this on to
the justice system. Thus Lord Templeman said that
sterilization of a minor should only be carried out with
the permission of a High Court judge. As the Times Law
Report put it,
A court exercising wardship jurisdiction emanating
from the Crown was the only authority empowered to
authorize such a drastic step as sterilization after
a full and informed investigation, (ibid.)
In the two cases discussed in the preceding pages, one
should note two different exercises of paternalism, a
paternalism which is both legal and moral. On one hand,
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was a situation where the court refused leave to
sterilise the minor, because it felt that the girl's best
interests would not be served by the operation, i.e. her
reproductive rights would be violated. It was a case of a
conflict of paternalisms, since the girl's immediate
guardians/carers were presumably also acting in her best
interest, but mistakenly according to the judgement of
the court. On the other hand, the second, and more recent
case, was a situation of potential conflict between two
sources of paternalism, but which turned out in practice
to be an agreement on the best interests of the minor,
i.e. that sterilisation did not amount to a violation of
her rights.
7.4 Problems of Non-voluntary Sterilisation
One should be aware of the distinction between in¬
voluntary and non-voluntary sterilisation. Sterilisation
of the involuntary type involves an action which bypasses
or ignores the patient's own wishes. It ignores the
requirement of informed consent. One can see examples of
involuntary sterilization in relation to population
problems, where some states (India and China, for
instance) have attempted to use this as a method to
control family size. And one could also mention some
cases where criminals have been sterilised as a punitive
measure. Non-voluntary sterilisation, on the other hand,
refers to situations such as the ones just under
discussion where the procedure is imposed on a person who
is mentally incompetent and cannot consent to the
operation, even though it is thought to be for her
benefit.
In such cases of incompetence a special form of
pater-nalism is required on behalf of the patient.
According to Raanon Gillon (1987), the usual method used
is like that used in relation to children, 'where
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are exercised by proxy on the child's behalf.' (Gillon,
1987:59)
There is no doubt that in many situations parents or
guardians play a vital part in protecting the rights of
their children or those placed in their care; most often,
perhaps, in consenting to medical treatment. But it is
also well known that not all parents act in the interests
of their children. There are occasions in fact where
children have to be removed from the family home and made
wards of court for some period of time, since the basic
needs of the children are not being met in the home
environment.
With regard to the reproductive capacity of the
mentally retarded the position seems to be special. On
one hand, there are similarities with the position of
children in need of protection, but on the other hand the
retarded are not children when it comes to their
sexuality. As was seen when I discussed the Jeanette case
above, this involves a person with the sexual instincts
of a young woman, but with the understanding and level of
responsibility of a 5 year-old. Furthermore, there is
little or no hope of this girl's coming to any mature
understanding of her sexuality. But, one may object,
children are often attracted to what is harmful to them,
and this requires that one watch them carefully lest they
play with matches or razor blades. That is true, of
course, but in the matter of handicap sexuality deeper
questions are at issue. In particular, there is the
argument that there is need to separate the danger of
becoming pregnant from the need of the handicapped
person to have some form of sexual expression. In the
language of rights one could argue that, whilst the
severely retarded have no right to reproduce, they do
have a right to sexual expression without the danger of
becoming pregnant. Thus, sterilisation may be a
paternalistic expression of the right of the retarded not
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to reproduce, while protecting the right to sexual
expression.
In relation to both normally developing children and
the mentally retarded the paternalism of parents and
guardians may be either a help or a hindrance to the
welfare of their charges. Sometimes, for instance, the
parents' own interests are the primary motivation for
limiting the freedom of the retarded minor, even though
there may be some justifying reason for protecting the
minor from himself or herself. It is natural that
parents should be anxious when their children grow to
sexual awareness, but are unable to participate in
sexuality responsibly. The trauma of pregnancy, and the
possibility of having to care for an unwanted child must
put some pressure on carers to put into effect a policy
of 'better safe than sorry' . And there may be a mixture
of motives not readily admitted to, which places a
question mark over parental paternalism. (But see
Hauerwas,1986:131ff. for words in favour of paternalism.)
It is because of the possibility of paternalistic
abuse on the part of those directly involved in caring
for the mentally retarded that the paternalistic
responsibility is necessarily shared in circumstances
such as the cases discussed above. The courts step in as
a more objective judge of the minor's best interest, and
it may be useful to appoint a lawyer to act as a kind of
'devil's advocate' by presenting different options, which
may better represent the retarded individual's interest.
Naturally the court must take into account the reality of
the patient's position, rather than demanding some
unrealisable ideal. For instance, the court must take
into account the difficulty of controlling the movements
of the handicapped moment by moment in a busy institution
or the pressure on parents in a family with other
children to look after.
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On the other hand, the court should be willing to
criticise the lack of proper services in certain
situations, which make sterilisation appear necessary for
the handicapped. For instance, should staff and parents
be given opportunities to learn skills in educating the
retarded in the responsible use of their sexuality? Again
one should recall the point made earlier, that the
mentally retarded make up a very diverse group of
different conditions, not all of which are severely
debilitating in terms of responsible action. Thus the
more disinterested paternalism of the courts may have the
special role of reminding parents and institutions that
the particular welfare of the individual in their care
must not be sacrificed too easily to the interests of the
carers, no matter how legitimate those interests are on
their own.
The emphasis on legal paternalism as a check on the
paternalism of the immediate carers is to be found as
well in the American legal system. I refer in particular
to the important case brought before the New Jersey
Supreme Court, Ln the Matter of Lee Ann Grady, 426A.2d
467,1981. There are some differences between this case
and the case of Jeanette discussed above. For one thing,
Lee Ann suffers from Downs Syndrome and was no longer a
minor when her case was brought to court. And, one other
thing, there was no claim that Lee Ann was sexually aware
or showed any interest in sexual contact. The
sterilisation was proposed mainly in order to protect her
from the full effects of sexual abuse, i.e. pregnancy.
Writing about this case, George Annas (1981) recalls
that it was the New Jersey Supreme Court that was
responsible for another landmark decision, that of I_n re
Quinlan, which gave permission to the parents of Karen
Ann Quinlan to remove what they considered extraordinary
or burdensome means in treating their daughter. And
Annas suggests that one might expect the court to apply a
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similar judgement in the case of Lee Ann Grady. However,
this was not the way things turned out. It is worth
quoting Annas at some length:
As in Quinlan, this court sees its task as
fashioning a way to preserve the right of choice for
incompetent persons. Unlike Quinlan, however, the
court refuses to permit the person's parents and a
court-appointed guardian to make the decision.
Instead it insists that only the court can make this
decision for an incompetent.
The court gives two reasons for distinguishing
this case from Quinlan. First it sees the
alternatives in Quinlan as "much more clear cut":
indefinite life in a coma versus natural
death Second, there was no history of abuse in
Quinlan-type decisions. In contrast, many choices
are open to Lee Ann Grady; and there is a history of
horrible abuses in this area. (Annas,1981:18-19)
Though not very happy with the reference above to the
court's interest in preserving 'the right of choice for
incompetent persons', since almost by definition the
incompetent have no personal choices at the reproductive
level, still the message is clear from London to New
Jersey: because of past abuses in this area and possible
repetitions in future, the legal system must intervene to
protect the 'rights' of the incompetent.
7.5 The 'Sexual Rights' of the Retarded.
One may wonder why I should consider the matter of sexual
rights at this point. I do so because of the close
connection between sexuality and procreation, especially
in the Christian tradition. Moreover, it is often felt
today that rights to sexual satisfaction are ultimately
more important than the right to procreate. In fact, it
is sometimes suggested that the right to procreate is
purely discretionary and can be waived or relinquished as
a means towards enjoying the right to sexual intimacy.
Regarding the mentally retarded this point is applied
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differently depending on the seriousness of the handicap.
Whatever the view of some Christians that sexual intimacy
can never be legitimately separated from marriage and at
least the possibility of procreation, there is no
shortage of secular philosophers who are willing to
separate these goods, especially in relation to the
mentally retarded. Thus, Robert Neville (1978) has this
to say about handicap sexuality:
Freed from pregnancy, childbearing, and childrear-
ing, an active heterosexual life can enrich the
existence of some mildly mentally retarded in much
the way it can that of so-called "normals". Other
things being equal, mildly mentally retarded people
can benefit from and have a right to sexual activity
and the social forms sexual relationships can
involve, such as marriage. Capacities for marriage
and long-lasting affection do not have to be clearly
present, however, for the retarded to have a claim
on sexual activity for pleasure purposes alone.
(Neville,1978:33)
For many people of course this kind of statement is
scandalous. Part of the explanation of this response may
lie in the theory put forward by Ann Craft (1987), among
others. She says that there is a 'general discomfort with
the sexuality of individuals with mental handicaps' which
stems from contradictory expectations held of them. On
the one hand, 'both men and women with mental handicaps
are seen as having very strong sexual inclinations,
coupled with poor personal control, making them a menace
to society at large' (Craft,1987:14) . She mentions the
scare there is if it is suggested that a hostel for the
mentally retarded is to be located in a residential area,
with parents worried that their children will be sexually
molested (ibid). On the other hand, 'The second belief
is linked to the myth that children are asexual until
puberty' (ibid.). And since mentally handicapped people
remain children whatever their actual age, and since
children are not interested in sex, the mentally
handicapped should not be interested in sex. But in fact
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they are, as many have pointed out (cf. Heshusius, 1987:
35-61; Monat,1982:chs.1 &2; Vanier,1985).
Contradictory beliefs with regard to mental handicap
and sexuality may in fact lead to similar behaviour on
the part of carers, though the reasons for acting may be
different. Thus, if one believes that the handicapped
have uncontrollable sexual instincts leading to
promiscuous behaviour, then sterilisation may be imposed
as a solution to protect the person from herself or
himself. On the other hand, if one holds that the
mentally handicapped are like children and have no real
interest in sexuality, one may again seek to have the
person sterilised, but this time to protect the
individual from being molested by others. In both cases
the last resort solution may be accepted too readily,
where the proper response should be a realistic
assessment of the individual handicapped person's sexual
needs and the level of maturity of the person. In other
words, sterilisation may be a way of sweeping handicap
sexuality under the carpet, while actually claiming that
one is permitting the handicapped person more freedom to
participate in human sexual expression.
If it is true that some mentally handicapped people
have uncontrolled and uncontrollable urges, what service
is being done to a handicapped person by sterilising him
or her and then leaving the person free to take advantage
of sexuality 'for pleasure purposes alone'? Surely, the
first step here is to judge indeed whether the
individual's sexuality is uncontrollable or whether it is
simply uncontrolled but capable of being controlled.
Sterilisation does help to avoid some obvious harm to the
person who is not in control, but it leaves untouched the
harm a person may do to himself or herself on a deeper
level by the exercise of sexuality in an inhuman way.
Just because a normal person avoids pregnancy does not
imply that the use of sexuality is innocent and painless.
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Normal people can be hurt deeply when they abuse their
sexual gifts; can the same not be said for the
handicapped, other things being equal? (I leave open the
question as to whether the handicapped might have the
right to solitary sexual satisfaction. Obviously the
Christian moral tradition tends to stress the
interpersonal basis of human sexuality. But if the
capacity for interpersonal relationships is severely
limited, the question arises whether masturbation, say,
might be morally licit?)
Turning to the other belief which plays down the
sexual interests of the handicapped, but which attempts
to protect them from sexual predators, one must question
the notion of sterilising a person as the solution to
this problem. The most common objection to this
'solution' is that sterilisation may in fact encourage
others to abuse the mentally handicapped, in the light of
the knowledge that the girl will not become pregnant.
Again I have to repeat the point just made above:
pregnancy is not the only disaster one has to guard
against in the care of the handicapped and their
sexuality: what is in question is the whole sexual well-
being of the person. It is better not to forget the human
tendency to seek the easy solution to complex problems,
and the tendency of institutions to sacrifice individual
welfare on the altar of efficiency. The so-called 'right
to sexual expression' of the mentally retarded person is
not served by automatically sterilising the person, male
or female (cf.Chakraborti,1987:794, who claims that in
ten years working with the mentally handicapped she only
once recommended sterilisation, and then it was to a
mentally handicapped couple with two children.). I argued
earlier when discussing the right to rear children that
the mentally retarded may have this right, but that its
exercise may involve further rights to particular
training over and above that received by normal couples.
It seems reasonable to argue similarly in the area of
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handicap sexuality - they may require further education
to participate in the goods which come more easily to the
normally developed.
7.6 Application of the Hohfeldian Terms
In the preceding discussion, right from the beginning of
this chapter, I have steered a course among various
substantive moral issues, taking certain options and
rejecting others. My position has been relatively
traditional insofar as I have accepted as an ideal an
initial right to enter a committed heterosexual
relationship, and from this base I moved on to consider
the right to found a family. Since the general trend
today is to treat the mentally handicapped equitably in
relation to the rest of the moral community, I envisage
the moderately retarded at least as having the primary
human right to marry and in certain situations having the
special moral right to found a family (where this
involves giving birth to at least one child and raising
it to maturity).
The human right to marry is a strict claim-right for
the moderately retarded. This can be claimed against the
state and against all who would obstruct the freedom of
the retarded person to enter the married state. It is a
liberty-right with regard to other persons, since no one
has an obligation to marry any other person. It is a
power-right insofar as any reasonably competent person
can change his or her legal and moral relationship from
being single to being married. It is an immunity insofar
as others suffer from a disability or lack of power to
stop the handicapped person from marrying.
The special moral right within a relationship like
marriage to attempt to found a family is qualified both
for normal couples and handicapped couples. If a couple
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cannot afford to have children, or if founding a family
might seriously injure the health of either spouse or
undermine the relationship, the spouses may have no claim
against each other for a time. In fact, there may be a
claim against each other not to procreate until the
circumstances improve. If this is the case, there is no
liberty to procreate, since this is defined as having 'no
duty not to' procreate and there is here a duty not to
have children. With regard to powers, there would be no
power to procreate, since this would entail the moral
capacity to change one's relationship to that of parent,
and one has a duty not to do this.
For the moderately retarded a cloud of doubt hangs
over their right to have children, even if they have the
prior right to marry. Depending on the circumstances, the
handicapped couple may be allowed to have a single child
(so long as they accept help from others in raising it),
but no more than this. Or the couple may be advised
either not to have children or to have their children
fostered. Or there may be no problem at all with
permitting the retarded to decide on the number of
children they want.
As the type of mental handicap gets more serious in
terms of mental incompetence, the paternalistic rationale
becomes stronger and the rights of carers, including the
state, become more stringent. The claims, liberties,
powers and immunities of the handicapped couple (and
individuals) become weaker in relation both to marriage
and procreation. In cases of total incompetence, there
are no reproductive rights, but there are rights relating
to the health and welfare of the retarded person which
are supposed to give protection against 'accidental'
reproduction. Such rights are claims made by proxy.
There is no sense in speaking of liberties, since claims
are already in place. However, powers and immunities
operating by proxy can be of importance, especially when
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the legal system makes an Incompetent person a ward of
court. This entails some immunity from arrangements made
for the incompetent person by one set of carers, e.g
parents or local authorities.
It seems, then, that the reproductive rights of the
retarded grow stronger or weaker along a continuum,
depending on the level of mental competence and
incompetence. The more competent a person is the closer
he or she is to having the claims, liberties, powers and
immunities of 'normal' people. The less competent a
person is the more limited reproductive rights are, until
they are virtually non-existent. In between, the limits
placed on the reproductive freedom of the retarded will
often be controversial. There are special problems, as I
pointed out, regarding the degree of paternalism required
to protect the rights of the retarded. It seems to me
that the more serious the handicap the stricter the
claim-right to paternalistic intervention. In other
words, the handicapped person has a strict right to have
others make decisions for his or her welfare. However,
this gives rise to a whole new set of problems, including
the means used to protect the welfare of the incompetent
person, and conflicting opinions between carers on the
true interests of the person in care. To treat these
questions properly one would need to introduce the
relevant Hohfeldian distinctions to the relations between
the handicapped and their carers.
One can imagine taking other options with regard to
the reproductive rights of the retarded, which I have
either ignored or rejected. Consider the possible
reproductive rights of single retarded persons who have
no wish to marry. Or think of homosexual or lesbian
individuals and couples who also suffer from retardation
of some kind. What sort of claims, liberties, powers, and
immunities might they have? On the other hand, imagine
taking seriously the alleged 'rights' of future persons,
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and ask what claims etc. they might have against their
retarded parents or against the present generation for
permitting them to procreate. Then try to match these
rights with those of the retarded.
7.7 The Christian Context and Contribution.
A The Dignity of the Retarded
I can begin this section by more or less repeating
certain points made in the parallel section of the last
chapter. First, there should be no expectation that the
Christian moral tradition should be in a position to
offer particular information on the diagnosis or
prognosis of mental states. Christian ethicists will of
course be interested in what psychologists and other
experts have to say about mental retardation and the
potentialities of particular patients, since these
'facts' are basic to moral judgements and conclusions,
but it is not their field of study as such. In the same
way, the Christian moral theologian cannot judge in some
a priori way whether a mentally incompetent person should
use contraceptives or be sterilised, insofar as these are
medically indicated. Nor is the Christian theologian
meant to pontificate on methods of sex education for the
retarded, although he should know something about these
if he is to make sensible statements about the ability of
mentally handicapped persons to participate or not in
basic goods. As Richard McCormick states, 'it is true to
say that the Judaeo-Christian tradition is much more a
value-raiser than an answer-giver' (McCormick,1975:17).
The most basic value underlined by the Judaeo-
Christian tradition, according to McCormick, concerns the
dignity of the individual person. McCormick cites the
Protestant theologian Helmut Thielicke (1964), who speaks
of man's 'alien dignity' as follows:
270
This "alien dignity" expresses the fact that it is
not man's own worth - his value for producing "good
works", his functional proficiency, his pragmatic
utility - that gives him his dignity, but rather
what God has "spent upon him," the sacrificial love
which God has invested in him (Dt.7:7f). Therefore
this alien dignity actualizes itself at the very
point where man's own value has become questionable,
the point where his functional value is no longer
listed on society's stock market and he is perhaps
declared to be "unfit to live" (Thielicke,1964;
McCormick,1975:10).
'"Alien dignity"' is synonymous with what I called
earlier 'absolute dignity', both referring to a
transcendent source. Nothing can take away that dignity
in this life, since God never changes his mind about his
creation. However, insofar as persons are treated in a
pragmatic, utilitarian fashion, the absolute, alien
dignity of persons is concealed, by falling back on a
relative dignity which is so unsure. With regard to the
mentally retarded, this failure to see the absolute
dignity of each individual, no matter how severely
handicapped, is most serious when the attitude behind it
is eugenic (cf.Hauerwas,1986 : ch 9 on the question 'Should
We Prevent Retardation?). But one must not forget that
some forms of paternalism can be equally dismissive of
the retarded person's dignity under the guise of
'respectable' moral reasons. Here again the Christian
Church must never neglect to point out the mixed
motivation behind so many moral decisions and actions.
Paternalism may sometimes be self-seeking, and this
presumably is why the legal system in certain countries
intervenes to provide a further court of appeal in
protection of the best interests of the handicapped
person.
In my earlier discussion of the distinction between
absolute and relative dignity, I insisted that rights are
geared towards the protection of the latter. This was
argued on the basis of the doctrine that basic goods are
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revelation experiences pointing to absolute dignity and
ultimate self-worth. If personal rights to basic goods
are violated, loss of faith in God and in life can be the
result. Can this be applied to the mentally retarded?
This is difficult to answer for every case, but I am
pretty sure that the moderately retarded can experience a
diminishment of their relative dignity when paternalism
is imposed without a proper reason. I am not at all clear
whether or not the more severely retarded are harmed by
paternalistic intervention such as sterilisation; perhaps
they have some a-thematic grasp of loss, though they
cannot articulate the feeling in any coherent fashion.
B 'Blessed are the Poor'
If the Christian Church has a duty to uphold the relative
dignity of mankind as one of the ways in which God
reveals himself as the source of absolute dignity, this
must apply equally to all human creatures. In fact, the
Church must have a special concern for those who seem
least in the eyes of the world, due either to their
'natural' lack of talent or due to human injustice which
ensures that some people get a 'head-start' in life. In
relation to the mentally retarded, it seems to me that
they fit in well to this category of the poor and
oppressed which The Judaeo-Christian tradition has
stressed as specially blessed by God. They are the ones
who are 'poor' or 'poor in spirit' according to the
synoptic beatitudes. Their poverty involves a recognition
of complete dependence on God, for they have nothing of
their own to boast of. Not that the poor merely accept
their oppressed status without protest. They cry to God
for liberation.
What I have just said is of course one of the main
themes of Liberation theology. Note how Leonardo Boff
(1984) expresses the theological option for the poor:
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The theologian of liberation opts to see social
reality from a point of departure in the reality of
the poor - opts to analyze processes in the
interests of the poor, and to act for liberation in
concert with the poor. This is a political decision,
for it defines the theologian as a social agent,
occupying a determined place in a correlation of
social forces: a place on the side of the poor and
oppressed. (Boff,1984:48)
As well as being a political and ethical option for
the theologian and for the Church as a whole, Boff claims
the option for the poor is an 'evangelical definition: in
the gospels, the poor are the primary addressees of
Jesus's message and constitute the eschatological
criterion by which the salvation or perdition of every
human being is determined (Matt.25:35-46)' (Boff,ibid.;
cf.Sobrino,1984:chs 4&5; Gutierrez,1983).
The mentally retarded share many of the features of
the poor of Latin America. It could be argued that not
enough resources have been invested in raising the
retarded to an educational level which would give them
some autonomy. They have sometimes been the subject of a
smothering paternalism, which is often well-intentioned
but still harmful, and which is sometimes the result of
ignorance and prejudice. In the theology of liberation,
theologians insist on the importance of the poor
liberating themselves, not just becoming the objects of
liberation achieved by middle class paternalism.
Similarly, one would expect an ethics of liberation
directed towards the mentally handicapped to attempt to
provide means for this group to work out their own
liberation. This should involve the handicapped in
voicing their claims on their own behalf, based on their
own experience of frustration and injustice.
Unfortunately, little can be done to help the severely
retarded to claim rights for themselves because of their
radical incompetence. However, the Christian moral
tradition should be willing to challenge some parents,
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guardians, and institutions to recognise their own need
for liberation from an over-emphasis on their own
interests (including the influence of 'operational' and
'ideological' structures of society) and an inability to
see the absolute dignity of the severely retarded in
their care.
The insights of liberation theology may be joined to
one of the insights grasped by David Jenkins (1975) in
speaking of the struggle for human rights as a sharing
'in by Christians as a part of God's warfare on behalf of
men and women created in his image and as a part of his
judgment on the inhumanities of societies and
institutions, including those of the Church.'(op.
cit.,p.99). Efforts to respect the rights of individuals
and groups, such as the mentally retarded, whose welfare
has not usually been a priority in society, may surely be
seen as part of God's warfare.
C A Theology of Sexuality for the Mentally Handicapped
It seems to me that a further area where the Church could
make a useful contribution to the reproductive freedom of
the handicapped, is the development of a theology of
sexuality which would apply specifically to the mentally
handicapped. Very little work seems to have been done in
this area, and often one sees a simplistic application of
general principles to the mentally retarded, without
reference to their special needs. There are two extremes
to be avoided in such an enterprise: on one hand,
ignoring special needs and treating handicap sexuality,
including reproductive freedom, exactly like that of the
normally developed adult; on the other hand, creating a
wholly different set of moral standards for the mentally
retarded, which sets them apart from everyone else and
only serves to discriminate further against the
handicapped.
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The first extreme might be illustrated by an example
from Roman Catholic moral theology, the judgement
condemning as illicit direct sterilisation. I need not
enter into the detail of the condemnation of
sterilisation by the magisterium - such points are
covered in standard manuals (cf.Ford & Kelly,1963:ch.15;
Healy,1956:ch.6; Peschke,1978:329-333). The kind of
sterilisation condemned as illicit by Roman Catholic
orthodoxy is contraceptive sterilisation as opposed to
therapeutic sterilisation understood in a narrow sense.
This is regarded as an evil means because of the intent
to avoid conception. Note that not all Catholic moral
theologians accept this doctrine; there are some
dissenting voices,e.g. Haring,1974:90-91; McCormick,1981:
chs. 13 & 14; Curran, 1976: ch. 6). But their dissent is
part of a wider dissent concerning the magisterium's
position on contraception as applied to normal married
couples. The point at issue here is whether sterilisation
is illicit in relation to the retarded.
In particular, when one considers the severely
retarded who may need paternalistic protection from the
effects of their sexual instincts, one may ask whether
sterilisation in such cases is not truly therapeutic,
even though the intention is contraceptive. This seems to
me to be a case where the moral principle applied to
normal couples may not apply to some of the handicapped.
The basic reason for this misapplication is that the
severely handicapped are not in the position of couples
who may selfishly exclude children from their marriage.
As Haring puts the point: 'It might be said, then, that
the real immorality comes in the irresponsible refusal to
fulfil the vocation of husband and wife and father and
mother' (Haring,1974:90).
Likewise, in cases of relatively moderate handicap
where there is difficulty using 'natural family planning
methods', it must be asked if contraceptive intervention
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might not be justified because of the limits of the
retarded in controlling their reproductive freedom. Of
course, one may dissent completely from the Catholic
Church's teaching on contraception and sterilisation and
thus wonder what all the fuss is about in relation to the
handicapped and their sexuality. All I am doing here is
to suggest that moral principles accepted as appropriate
by the Catholic magisterium should be adapted to the
situation of the mentally retarded, and that this move
should not necessarily undermine the usual applications
of moral principles in the ordinary cases of able-minded
persons.
The second extreme which the Christian Church should
warn against, lest the reproductive rights of the
handicapped be violated, involves placing the mentally
retarded in a special moral category which undermines
their status as moral agents. Again this may occur if one
simply lumps all mentally retarded together in a single
group comprised of people considered to be practically
amoral. I have in mind here the point made earlier about
the right of the handicapped to sexual expression. One of
the reasons given for sterilising the retarded is that
they can then exercise their right to 'sexual activity
for pleasure purposes alone' (cf.Neville,1978:33). Now,
Some people may believe that such sexual activity is a
right of both the mentally retarded and the normally
developed, but the Christian moral tradition is highly
suspicious of such an idea, especially if one is talking
about the more intimate expressions of sexual love. The
danger to be avoided here, I think, is of ignoring the
call to responsibility which comes to many of the
mentally retarded as well as to the able-minded.
Sterilisation (or any contraceptive intervention)
should not be permitted if it is really meant to save
people from the effects of irresponsible actions, when
the better approach is to lead a person to exercise a
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mature self-discipline. If one wants the mentally
handicapped person to be as much a member of the moral
community as possible, then one must expect them to live
up to the same moral standards as able-minded persons.
Sure enough this may involve a challenge to the rest of
the community to provide specialised moral education for
the morally immature, but, arguably, this is the best
kind of paternalism there is.
The Christian Church must insist that any right to
sexual expression must be seen in the context of
responsible intimacy; in helping the handicapped to
achieve that intimacy one must not water down the moral
requirements unduly, since in doing so one renders the
mentally retarded a disservive. The right to sexual
expression is part of the moral and legal baggage people
carry as members of the moral community, but to cut off
that right from basic moral responsibilities surrounding
it may only serve to exclude the mentally retarded person
from that community.
7.8 Conclusion
I began this chapter mentioning the commonly held belief
that the mentally retarded have no right to reproduce,
or, better, a right not to reproduce. This belief
arises, I think, because people rarely consider the wide
variety of conditions which make up this category of
persons. The danger here, of course, is that persons
suffering only a limited retardation, and who are thus
capable of marriage and founding a family, may have their
reproductive rights violated.
As with people enjoying normal health and mental
competence, one should apply to the mentally retarded the
notion of reproductive rights as in first place the right
to have children or found a family. The secondary aspect
277
of reproductive rights must be the right not to have
children and to space the number of children the couple
decide to have. Those with mental handicap should be
treated equitably by the state and by society, and this
is not the same as treating these persons equally with
the rest of society (cf.Hauerwas,1986:162). This must be
obvious, since the handicapped often have special needs.
Regarding the right to marry and procreate, the mentally
retarded presumably have special rights to that aid which
can bring them up to the level of enjoyment of goods
which is so often taken for granted by the normally
developed.
The key question, then, concerning the reproductive
rights of the retarded centres on the degree of
paternalism required by these members of the community if
they are to maintain their (relative) dignity. I believe
that there is a right to paternalistic intervention which
becomes stronger as one moves along the continuum towards
mental incompetence. But there is also a right that this
paternalism be controlled lest it smother any sign of
autonomy.
I recognise that my emphasis on paternalism and on the
rights of the handicapped in relation to the state and
society is just one possible position within the total
discussion of the place of the mentally retarded in
society. For instance, I have played down the conflict
of interests between the retarded who desire to have
children and those children seen as 'future persons'.
Likewise, I was not keen on stressing the eugenic
rationale or the 'burden' of caring for the retarded in
society. Such positions are based on particular moral
assumptions and Christian values, and I can well
understand the controversial nature of my approach in a
pluralistic society.
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To sum up, I have emphasised how the mentally retarded
population are a group of people who need special help if
their sexual and reproductive rights are to be respected.
Paternalism is often required, but its aim is to create
as much autonomy for the handicapped as possible. The
rights of the retarded to limited paternalistic
intervention involve various levels of protection, each
level providing a check on the others. Once again, the
Hohfeldian terminology has been shown to be useful in
clarifying some of the possible normative relationships
which are required if reproductive values are to be
claimed for the retarded. As always in discussions of
rights, one has to consider the goods involved and the
ways in which one can limit the freedom of others in
order to achieve some participation in those goods. The
Church operates on one level challenging parents,
guardians and the legal system, as well as society as a
whole, to cherish the rights of the retarded as they must
cherish the rights of the weak and poor in their midst.
But it is dangerous to forget that the rights of the
mentally handicapped or retarded also represent a
challenge to the Christian Church to review the
theological principles which may or may not be at the
service of respecting those rights. God's warfare against
the evil that enslaves men and women takes place on the
battleground of 'academic theology' and the 'moral
statements'(or lack of them) of the churches, not simply
in the homes and institutions where the struggle to
'care' for the retarded goes on. This is the case insofar
as the handicapped and their carers look to theologians
and 'the Church' for guidance as to God's will in the




Reproductive Rights and Artificial Insemination
8.1 Introduction
I wish to discuss in this chapter a further area of
concern with regard to the moral and legal freedom to
procreate. In the next few pages I will be interested in
Artificial Insemination (AI) primarily as a means used by
childless couples to found a family. One must be aware
that the procedures involved have wider significance than
helping the infertile; for instance, AI may help those
who have been alerted to some genetic defect which could
be passed on through the male gametes, such that they
seek donor sperm to ensure a birth free from deleterious
genes possessed by the male spouse. AI may also be used
by those with ambitions to have offspring of a particular
type. They hope to have children with special talents and
thus they choose gametes from a 'superior' male. Clearly,
too, AI is in essential relationship of continuity with
procedures like IVF and ET insofar as it is the first
step in artificial reproduction, separating procreation
from the intimacy of sexual intercourse. So the main
points at issue in this chapter will be whether one
should countenance AI as an appropriate way of
procreating children. If it is appropriate morally and
legally, should one speak of a right to this means of
overcoming infertility? (I shall not discuss the alleged
right to use AI for the other reasons besides infertility
mentioned above.)
Although I am now discussing a different sphere of
interest from those underlined in previous chapters,
there is of course some overlap between all three
chapters. In particular this overlap has to do with the
means allowable in exercising reproductive rights. Thus,
while most reasonable persons will agree on the notion of
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responsible parenthood, there will be a difference of
opinion on the means used to practice this virtue: should
sterilisation be permitted or should 'natural family-
planning' methods be used? Should abortion be part of an
attempt to be a responsible parent? If it is agreed by
all that some mentally retarded people should not become
pregnant for their own sakes as well as for the sake of
the children they might procreate, should such persons be
sterilised, or given long-term contraception, or simply
supervised more closely in institutions, as well as
giving time and expertise to education in sexual
responsibility? In this chapter on Artificial
Insemination the language of rights becomes quite
complicated, especially when one considers the problems
related to insemination by donor. Most of the discussion
will centre on this form of artificial reproduction.
8.2 Artificial Insemination and Infertility.
The extent of infertility is rather hard to assess.
However, it is thought that as many as ten per cent of
couples suffer from some kind of infertility
(Warnock,1985a : 8 ; Snowden & Mitchell,1983 :16 ; Winston,
1987:11, mentions the number 1 in 8 couples). Snowden and
Mitchell claim that in one third of these cases the
infertility will be due to some defect in the male.
'This indicates an incidence of about 16,000 marriages a
year which will be infertile because of the husband. The
Peel Report (1973) estimated that some 10 per cent of
these couples (1,600) may consider AID at sometime during
their marriage (Snowden & Mitchell,1983:16). These of
course are the estimated figures for Britain, but one can
assume that relatively similar figures will appear around
the developed world where AI is more readily available.
The major cause of male infertility is sperm defects
or dysfunction (cf. Hull,1986:24-35). Men may suffer
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ogliospermia (a decreased number of sperm cells) or from
aspermia (the absence of sperm). In the case of
ogliospermia AIH may be appropriate to achieve
conception. This usually involves building up semen and
assisting it on its way (Boyd,Callaghan,Shotter,1986:65).
Where aspermia is in question only AID can be of service.
8.3 Attitudes towards Artificial Insemination.
If one holds the point of view that there is a right to
do wrong in certain situations, then one may perhaps hold
that persons have a right to AI even if it is a wrong
means to achieve a good end. However, it is more
satisfactory from the moral point of view to establish AI
as a licit means to a good end. The right to do wrong
should be exceptional. So, what are the arguments
commonly put forward for and against AI in human beings?
A Secular Attitudes: The Warnock Report
In favour of AI in general are those who emphasise the
great pain suffered by infertile or childless couples,
against which must be balanced the bad effects of using
either AIH or AID. Mary Warnock (1985a) , for instance,
underlines the distress of childless people:
For those who long for children, the realisation
that they are unable to found a family can be
shattering. It can disrupt their picture of the
whole of their future lives. They may feel that they
will be unable to fulfil their own and other
people's expectations. They may feel themselves
excluded from a whole range of human activity and
particularly the activities of their child-rearing
contemporaries. In addition to social pressures to
have children there is, for many, a powerful urge to
perpetuate their genes through a new generation.
This desire cannot be assuaged by adoption.
(Warnock,1985a:8-9)
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The Warnock Report was not interested in the debate as
to whether the desire for children was biological or
psychological, a deep instinct or a result of social
pressure. There is a utilitarian flavour to the Report in
as much as it concentrates on the pain and frustration of
individual childless couples and the need to overcome
this (cf.Lockwood,1985:170-173; Mahoney,1984a:288). If
the means of overcoming infertility lead to less pain or
frustration than the ongoing pain and frustration of
childlessness, then such means are morally justified.
With regard to AIH, the Report could find no
justification for regarding this as an illicit means
either morally or legally, though it did express grave
reservations about the posthumous use of a man's semen by
his widow. The reason for this reservation was typically
consequentialist, i.e. 'the profound psychological
problems for the child and the mother'
(Warnock,1985a: 18) .
Regarding AID the Warnock Report recognised that there
were stronger reasons for rejecting this as an illicit
means of overcoming infertility. But the members of the
group were generally in favour of AID once it was
controlled by law and surrounded by certain safeguards. A
good summary of the Report's attitude towards AID is
given by Boyd, Callaghan and Shotter:
Considering arguments against AID, the Warnock
Committee noted that the law did not equate AID with
adultery and that AID lacked the personal
relationship involved in adultery. The husband's
consent to AID, moreover, suggested 'a mark of
stability in a marriage'. The donor, as a third
party, the Committee believed, did not necessarily
threaten the exclusive marital relationship.
Harmful tensions might subsequently build up between
the couple, or the child might be harmed if he
accidentally discovered his origins: but the kind of
problems involved existed and often had been
overcome in the analogous experiences of step-
parenthood and adoption. The risk of a donor passing
on a harmful genetic condition could be minimised by
limiting the number of donations from any one donor.
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Against all these objections (as well as against
fears about the imponderable consequences of AID for
the family and society generally), the Committee
believed, there had to be set the fact that AID was
a simple, painless and 'not particularly invasive'
way of helping a couple to have 'a very much wanted
child' whom they could 'bring up as their own ' and
who was 'biologically the wife's. A further, no
less important consideration, the Committee added,
was that 'the practice of AID will continue to grow,
with or without official sanction and its
clandestine practice could be very harmful,
(op.cit.,68; Warnock,1985a:18-28).
The Warnock Report, if it is representative of
informed public opinion, reveals a change of attitude
from the findings of the Feversham Committee published in
1960. That Committee accepted as licit AIH when medically
indicated, but decided that AID was not acceptable, and
in saying so believed it reflected public and medical
opinion. The members of the Committee did not consider
the legal banning of the procedure necessary, but they
accepted that the legal status of children born of AID
was that of illegitimacy. To enter the husband in the
register as father of the child was furthermore the
commission of an offence under the terms of the Perjury
Act (1911).
Opinion was changing, however, and by 1968 the British
government decided to make both AIH and AID available
under the NHS if medically indicated. The Peel Report in
1973 suggested that the NHS centres offering AID should
be accredited, but this was not implemented. Boyd et al.
suggest that this is due to the ongoing falsification of
records in order to avoid the stigma of illegitimacy.
This has also had the unfortunate effect of maintaining a
cloud of secrecy around the practice of AID, including
the short and long-term effects of the procedure on
children and their families.
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B Christian Attitudes
What about the attitude towards Artificial Insemination
within the Christian tradition? As in other areas of
sexual morality and reproductive rights the Christian
community is divided on the moral status of AI. Again,
the diversity of opinion is not simply one of Roman
Catholic conservatism against Protestant liberalism. For
instance, up to relatively recently some Roman Catholics
in good standing were moving away from the condemnation
of AIH by The Holy Office (1897) and the statements by
Pope Pius Xll in 1949, 1951, and 1956. Thus, Bernard
Haring (1974) claims that the Pope's statement of 1949
(AAS , 41 , 5 57ff. ) was less explicit about AIH than on the
question of AID, and he concludes that
When the sperm comes from the husband and the whole
marriage is lived in a climate of love, then not
only is he biologically the father but there is not
that total severance between the unitive and the
procreative meaning of marriage Voluntary
(directly intended) ejaculation for well justified
diagnostic aims therefore does not constitute
ipsation (op.cit. , 92).
Richard McCormick (1981), while accepting that pro¬
creation should generally be achieved through sexual
intercourse admits that, 'if AIH is not a substitute for
sexual intercourse, but in relatively rare cases its
complement, the reasoning would not seem to support the
absolute prohibition' (McCormick,1981:317 ; Peschke,1978:
479-481; Lobo,1985:260-263).
In relation to AID, however, there is a fair degree of
agreement both within Roman Catholic moral theology and
among some Protestant ethicists on rejecting this as the
appropriate means to found a family. Among the dissenting
voices from this wide consensus are Joseph Fletcher
(1971) and John C. Fletcher (1986); and on the Catholic
side (with reservations) Charles Curran.
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The most extreme justification of AID from a
theological point of view comes from Joseph Fletcher
(1971). Some of his remarks in this area have, received a
certain notoriety over time. Take these words for
instance, 'Man is a maker and a selector and a designer,
and the more rationally contrived and deliberate anything
is, the more human it is' (Fletcher,1971:781;
McCormick,1981:283-284). Since AIH and AID are prime
examples of the application of reason to procreation,
they must be acceptable, seems to be Fletcher's
conclusion. It is the opposite extreme from the view
that procreation must not be transferred from the
intimacy of married life to the laboratory.
In a recent article on 'Reproductive Technologies'
John Fletcher reviews some of the theological positions
on AID. He rejects both principled and consequentialist
forms of opposition to AID and accepts the procedure as
licit 'provided there is informed consent by the husband
and safeguards for the recipient and the donor'
(Fletcher,1986:537). Unfortunately, he gives no positive
reasons for accepting AID from a theological point of
view.
Charles Curran gives as his opinion:
In general I give weight to the argument from the
meaning of the marriage covenant and from the fact
that the child is the fruit of the love and the
bodies of husband and wife. However, I do not
believe that these reasons constitute an absolute
prohibition against AID. There are strong reasons
to counsel against an easy acceptance of AID...In my
judgment adoption is to be preferred. However, I
cannot exclude the possibility that AID could be a
morally good choice in some circumstances despite
serious problems that are present (Curran,1982:123)
When it comes to official statements of mainline
Churches in the Christian moral tradition, I have already
noted the Roman Catholic opposition to both AIH and AID.
286
Protestant Churches, on the other hand, tend to have
little objection to AIH, while remaining ambivalent about
AID.
In the Church of England, Board of Social
Responsibility Report, Personal Origins (1985), the
members of the Committee had to agree to differ on the
moral status of AID:
There are two different points of view held among
us. One is that if donation takes place within a
stable marital relationship, it still has the status
of a good, though not, of course, one which should
become the norm; the other believes that the perils
to marriage as understood by Christians, are so
grave that the extension of gamete-donation should
be strongly discouraged, and AID dislodged from the
established position it holds among the techniques
of aided fertilisation (Personal Prigins,1985:39)
The other major Report, from the Free Church Federal
Council and the British Council of Churches, entitled
Choices in Childlessness (1982),shows a disagreement on
the value of AID as the following quotation indicates:
Some of us from the outset took the view, from which
no further argument or reflection dislodged us, that
there is a specifically Christian objection to the
practice of AID. This rested on the conviction that
marriage is a covenant-relationship between husband
and wife exclusive of al others, not only in sexual
intercourse, but also in the procreation of
children. If there is going to be a child by one,
then so long as the covenant relationship endures,
it shall be a child by both; if it is not to be by
both, then it shall be by neither. This is part of
the meaning of marriage "for better, for worse".
Others of us took the view that the full and
informed consent to AID of both husband and wife
materially altered the case. Such consent cannot in
principle be invalidated by the existence of a
covenant-relationship. It can be incorporated within
the covenant and may in certain circumstances
support and even strengthen it. (Choices,1982:43)
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The Social Responsibility Board of the Church of
Scotland, in its response to the Warnock Report in 1985,
found AIH acceptable, but objected to AID, especially to
'the unwarranted intrusion of a third party in the
marriage relationship' (Boyd, Callaghan & Shotter, 1986:
91-92). This was accepted by the General Assembly of the
Church in 1985. Nor was the Kirk happy with Warnock's
attitude towards the responsibility of the donor, nor
with some of the legal aspects of AID.
In general the Christian arguments in favour of AID
must rely on the notion of stewardship over creation
together with the notion of vocation to parenthood within
marriage. I have already pointed out the goods involved
in being a parent, especially with regard to the intimacy
between the spouses and the revelation-experience with
which child-birth and raising a family can provide the
partners, namely of living within a gracious Mystery.
However, a question mark hangs over AID in particular, as
to whether the intimacy of marriage is shattered by the
intrusion of a third party at the genetic level, even if
there is no sexual relationship at a personal level.
Furthermore, there must be some moral limits to the
exercise of the vocation to parenthood, since God does
not call persons to a way of life if the means of
achieving that state are morally wrong. Thus, it lies
open to the Christian moral tradition to claim that
parenthood by means of AID is not justified under the
title 'vocation'.
In the last few pages of this discussion of some
positions favourable to AID and AIH to some extent, I
could not help mentioning the opposing attitudes in the
process. Let me now rehearse those objections to AI in
general, and to AID in particular.
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C Analysis of the Objections
The most general objection which is said to apply to both
kinds of artificial insemination is that they are
'unnatural'. Now this word is problematic. If it simply
means a procedure which departs from the normal course of
events, then one has to distinguish normal occurrences
which are good from those that are bad. One could argue
that selfishness and pride (and a host of related vices)
are normal to humans, yet Christianity preaches that men
and women should do all in their power to deviate from
such a 'norm'. Clearly then one has to distinguish
between what is natural and what is normal, so they
cannot be equated in any simple way. If one is opposed to
tampering with nature in specific areas, such as health
care, then one may have to explain why one is in favour
of operations to save people from premature (yet
'natural') death while being opposed to AI which helps
couples to procreate when nature 'breaks down', so to
speak.
To make any sense of this objection one has to show
that 'the cure is worse than the disease',i.e. that human
efforts to make up for nature's 'faults' end up making
things worse. Or one can argue that some natural
processes are so special that God has given a specific
command limiting human stewardship in such cases. Both
arguments mentioned above can be used to support the
notion that 'unnatural acts' are morally wrong. The best
known approach here is the strict Roman Catholic one
which stresses the inseparability of certain related
goods, for instance sexual love and procreation. Thus
when 'nature' breaks down in the case of infertility, the
means used to remedy this defect must be 'natural' in the
sense of holding together the unitive and procreative
goods of marriage. Therefore, while surgery to unblock
fallopian tubes and AI are in one sense equally
'artificial' ways of remedying infertility, according to
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this point of view, only the latter is 'unnatural' and
therefore morally wrong. Note that this is not a
tautological argument; it is not a matter of defining
morally right as the natural way, but of pointing out how
the natural way is conducive to human flourishing.
A clear statement of this whole approach is found in
this quotation from Pius Xll in 1951:
To reduce the cohabitation of married persons and
the conjugal act to a mere organic function for the
transmission of the germ of life would be to convert
the domestic hearth, sanctuary of the family, into
nothing more than a biological laboratory....The
conjugal act as it is planned and willed by nature,
implies a personal cooperation, the right to which
the parties have mutually conferred on each other in
contracting marriage. (Pius XII,AAS 43(1951)850;
McCormick,1981:316).
The opposition of the Church's moral tradition to
masturbation is a further element in its opposition to an
'unnatural' procedure in the sphere of sexual ethics.
True enough masturbation is declared a wrong activity
because it often involves the encouragement of sexual
fantasies, which may amount to fornication or adultery in
the heart (cf.May,1977:50); but it is primarily condemned
in Catholic tradition, I think, because human sexuality
is supposed to be relational and open to new life. Some
may argue in favour of masturbation in relation to AIH
especially, that the intention is relational and open to
life, but the magisterial teaching of the Roman Church
will only accept the achievement of new life through
sexual intercourse, even if that intercourse has to be
assisted in some way (cf. Boyd,Callaghan,& Shotter, 1986:
80-81 on the subject of 'Assisted Insemination', and
detailed discussion by Kelly,1950:14-22).
On this view of what is 'unnatural' there is no need
to go further in distinguishing AIH from AID. However,
AID is said to involve a further reason for objecting to
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AI: as mentioned already, it involves the intrusion of a
third party into the intimacy of the marriage
relationship. For those who do not hold as valid the
Roman Catholic view of the 'unnatural' status of Al this
argument is more substantial. I pointed out that those in
favour of AID argued strenuously against the notion that
it involves adultery, since sexual intercourse does not
take place between the woman and the donor. (Similar
arguments are made against using the term 'prostitution'
for surrogate motherhood; but cf.the Scottish case of
MacLennan v MacLennan, 1958 SC 105, for refusal to see
AID as adultery). But there may be no need to criticise
AID as adultery if there are other reasons for objecting
to the intrusion of a third party in the marriage
relationship. It could be argued for instance that the
very nature of marriage requires that procreation comes
about from the direct personal cooperation of the couple,
such that if one spouse, in this case the husband, is
infertile, the misfortune must be shared by both partners
rather than involving the fertility of an anonymous
donor.
The principle behind this position is enunciated by
McCormick as follows, 'First, and above all, it violates
the marriage covenant wherein exclusive, nontransferable,
inalienable rights to each other's bodies and generative
acts are exchanged by the spouses' (McCormick,1981:312-
313). Note here the language of rights and the
distinction beteen the right to the body of the partner
and the right to generative acts with one's partner. The
former right is not violated, since AID does not involve
adultery in the usual sense; but the latter right - to
generative acts - is violated, if one considers the
marriage covenant as prohibiting any partner from
allowing a third party access, even indirectly, to either
partner's generative faculty. Too much stress can be
placed on the absence of sexual intercourse, whereby it
is largely overlooked that the donor is present in every
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cell of the child carried by the mother. Of course one
may still agree that there is a right to the generative
acts and faculties of another within marriage, while
allowing for the power to waive or alienate this right in
some circumstances. I take it that this is close to the
position of those who accept AID when both spouses give
their informed consent to the procedure - they simply
waive their rights for the sake of achieving pregnancy.
What remains to be discussed is whether in fact couples
have the power to waive such rights. In the quotation
from McCormick above note how he used the terms 'non¬
transferable' and 'inalienable' to qualify the right to
found a family with one's marriage partner alone.
The discussion so far has concentrated on the more
'principled' objections to AI, and especially to AID. By
'principled' I mean an approach which looks straight at
the Tightness or wrongness of an act or procedure in
itself. It is usually associated with a deontological
approach to ethics as opposed to a consequentialist
approach. Mary Warnock recognises this distinction when
she says in the foreword of her Report that, 'Moral
questions, such as those with which we have been
concerned are, by definition, questions that involve not
only a calculation of consequences, but also strong
sentiments with regard to the nature of the proposed
activities themselves' (Warnock,1985a:2). Remember, too,
one of the positions held by some of the members of the
Choices in Childlessness Report - 'Some of us from the
outset took the view, from which no further argument or
reflection dislodged us, that there is a specifically
Christian objection to the practice of AID'
(Choices,1982:9) . So there are some positions underlying
the use of the language of rights which are not easily
debated rationally precisely because one comes to
ultimate value positions very quickly, and such positions
cannot be susceptible of proof. This is not to say that
the principles held so dearly by Christians are false,
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but that they will probably appeal only to those with
similar intuitions and values. But then how is one going
to go about getting others to respect these rights; how
will one positivise them or put them into law?
In my opinion the principled approach works well
enough in societies that are characterised by great
stability and consensus, where there is no move towards
moral pluralism. However, in a more pluralistic society
the Christian moral tradition needs to relate its
principles to a more consequentialist type of moral
methodology. One expects Christian principles in the area
of marriage and sexuality to fit in realistically with
everyday experience (cf. G.J.Hughes,1978:37, where he
declares that 'An ethical theory which exhibited as false
a large number of the ethical beliefs people held as true
would simply fail as an adequate theory.'). If one is
intent on pointing out the damage which AI does to human
welfare, especially to the marriage relationship, should
it not be possible to show the bad effects of practising
AIH or AID. Let me take a few examples of conse-
quentialist analysis of AID.
In his discussion of AID, John Mahoney (1984b) makes
the following remarks:
Much is also made of the resultant stress between
husband and wife when a child who ideally should be
the fruit and the physical embodiment of their love
and union can constitute rather a perpetual reproach
of personal inadequacy. It should be noted,
however, that if attention is concentrated on this
evidence alone, as the harmful personal and
inpersonal consequences which are predicted as the
inevitable result of donor contribution, then such
consequences are in principle verifiable by follow-
up studies of families which are the result of such
procedures. It might, for instance, turn out that
not all marital and parental relationships are un¬
dermined in such cases. (Mahoney,1984b:18)
Mahoney points out in passing here, that if one objects
293
to AID because of the 'biological and relational
imbalance between the genetic parent and the social
parent' then one may find a parallel situation in some
cases of second marriages, where a man becomes step¬
father to the children from his wife's previous marriage.
And he warns against accepting the common belief that all
relationships between children and their step-parents are
characterised by cruelty and lack of harmony. (There are
of course differences between the situations: the social
father is usually one who gives consent to AID for his
wife and accompanies her through pregnancy, so that a
closer relationship with the child is made possible right
from the start. There is also the fact that children of a
previous marriage are often the fruit of intimate sexual
love and so are a reminder of a previous relationship,
whereas AID involves no such personal relationship with
the donor).
Common sense would seem to suggest that AID will
damage a marriage if one partner puts pressure on another
to accept AID, or if outside pressures, e.g. family, push
a person or couple into accepting the procedure.
Resentment and anger may follow upon this kind of
pressure. Perhaps worse still, any child thus procreated
may become a symbol of the unsatisfactory situation and a
reminder of the pressure imposed on the couple.
Likewise, if a couple freely initiate the process of
seeking a child by AID and have come to terms with it in
their relationship, common sense would suggest that the
joy of having a child will amply compensate for any
tension arising in the relationship.
But, one may object, 'common sense' is one thing, but
what about the facts? Is there any survey of AID families
which will give statistical evidence of the harmful
effects or otherwise of AID? Unfortunately, the social
scientific evidence is not very clear, one reason being
that AI is largely unregulated in any centralised form. A
294
great deal of confidentiality or secrecy surrounds the
process, and one can understand how many couples do not
wish any follow-up into the matter. In fact, any follow-
up may do damage to the precarious balance of joy and
guilt which an AID child may bring to a couple. Asking
probing questions may simply open up old wounds. Snowden
and Mitchell (1983) stress the ambiguous nature of the
reports on the effects of AID:
Almost all published reports describing AID
conclude that 'the emotional and psychological
problems within marriages where AID children have
been born are few' (Rubin, 1965). Indeed some go
further and argue that such marriages are improved
and enriched (Jackson and Richardson,1977). It is
interesting to note that most of those who publish
these positive statements are AI practitioners
themselves. ...It is usually left to psychiatrists
or departmental committees to argue that AID leads
to severe disturbance in family relationships
(Gerstel,1963) or to raise other doubts about the
procedure (Feversham Committee, 1960). When
considering the effect on wife and husband both
those in favour of AID and those against it stress
the biased nature of the information collected by
their opponents. The AI practitioner will only
obtain information from 'satisfied' customers and
the psychiatrist only sees those who are suffering
psychological stress. (Snowden & Mitchell,1983:46)
An interesting report on AID from the U.S. is that of
M. Curie-Cohen, L. Lutttrell, and S. Shapiro (1979).
George Annas (1979) describes the findings of this report
and comments on them. His main conclusion is that,
The results are disturbing. Besides pointing to a
general lack of standards and the growing use of AID
for husbands with genetic defects and for single
women, the findings tend to indicate that current
practices are based primarily on protecting the best
interests of the sperm donor rather than those of
the recipient or resultant child. (Annas,1979:14).
In particular the Curie-Cohen survey worries Annas in
two specific areas. First, the area of donor selection,
where the survey found that 80 per cent of all AI
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practitioners use medical students and hospital residents
as donors. Annas interprets this as a sign of conscious
or unconscious eugenics, with doctors wishing to
perpetuate the genes of their group in the world.
Further, the study showed that doctors in selecting
donors 'made many erroneous and inconsistent decisions'
(ibid.,15). In second place, there was the area of
record-keeping. Annas mentions that,
While the Curie-Cohen survey found that 93 per cent
of physicians kept permanent records on recipients,
only 37 per cent kept permanent records on children
born after AID and only 30 per cent kept any
permanent records on donors, (ibid.)
With so few physicians keeping a strict record
concerning donors, the children of the AID process are
clearly at a disadvantage as regards the identity of
their genetic father. In an age when genetic counselling
is becoming more important, it seems to be a form of
discrimination against children born of AID that vital
information be kept from them. As Annas puts it:
...if no records are kept the child will never,
under any circumstances, be able to determine its
genetic father. Since we do not know what the
consequences of this will be, it cannot be said that
destroying this information is in the best interests
of the child. The most that can be said for such a
policy is that it is in the best interests of the
donor. But this is simply not good enough. The donor
has a choice in the matter, the child has none. The
donor and physician can take steps to guard their
own interests, the child cannot, (ibid.).
These worries with regard to the best interests of AID
children were accepted as valid by the Warnock Report. In
response, that Report recommended 'that on reaching the
age of eighteen the child should have access to the basic
information about the donor's ethnic origin and genetic
health and that legislation be enacted to provide the
right of access to this' (Warnock,1985a:24-25). Note that
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the AID child is said to have the right to know basic
genetic information, but not the actual identity of the
genetic father. AID children are not seen as being in an
identical situation to adopted children.
The Warnock Report was able to recognise the general
drawbacks of maintaining AID as a family secret:
This secrecy amounts to more than a desire for
confidentiality and privacy, for the couple may
deceive their family and friends, and often the
child as well.. .However the sense that a secret
exists may undermine the whole network of family
relationships. AID children may feel obscurely that
they are being deceived by their parents, that they
are in some way different from their peers, and that
the men whom they regard as their fathers are not
their real fathers. We have little evidence on which
to judge this. But it would seem probable that the
impact on children of learning by accident that they
were born as a result of AID would be harmful - just
as it would be if they learned by accident that they
were adopted or illegitimate (ibid.,21).
The argument against shrouding AID in secrecy is one
which straddles the distinction between principled and
consequentialist approaches to the practice. On
principle, it seems unjust to 'live a lie' by not
mentioning something which may be regarded as central to
an individual's well-being - knowledge of his or her full
personal history. If it is important to know this then
there is an argument for a prima facie right to such
knowledge; if such knowledge is unimportant, then why
cover it up with implicit lies? Surely if the lie is
discovered this would do more harm than telling something
which is relatively unimportant (cf. Bok,1978:ch 14 for a
fine discussion of 'Paternalistic Lies'). From the
consequentialist point of view, experience does tend to
show the pain that follows from the living of untruths in
an intimate context. The more others are loved and
trusted, the more one counts on their honesty in personal
relationships. In fact, it seems most likely that recog-
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nition of the bad effects of telling untruths is the very-
basis of the moral principle forbidding this as a vice.
One should note, however, as Warnock does, that the
objection to AID on the basis of the secrecy it tends to
encourage, does not establish that AID is itself
necessarily damaging, only that the practice needs to be
pruned of some of its unhelpful aspects. This has to be
done to achieve a proper balance of rights between all
parties - recipients, donors, and children.
8.4 Artificial Insemination and the Language of Rights,
I have stressed throughout this work that rights-language
functions in first place to protect human participation
in certain goods. So attention is drawn at once to the
good itself and its relative importance in the life of
each person. But then further attention must be drawn to
the way in which others can be obliged to respect this
participation, in particular the correlative duties which
derive from these rights. Can I expect others to limit
their own freedom of action by coming to my aid, or is it
sufficient that they refrain from acting in a way that
would hinder my good?
Regarding the good of procreation, I have assumed in
this thesis that this good should be enjoyed only within
marriage (or at least through some stable and continuous
heterosexual relationship). I believe that there are
good natural law reasons as well as specifically
Christian reasons for accepting this assumption. In this
particular chapter, however, I have concentrated on the
means used to achieve pregnancy and found a family, and
have noted the controversy surrounding Artificial
Insemination as a means. How does the language of rights
apply to this connection between the procreative end and
the procreative means?
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A Claims and liberties
First, I will assume that AI (both AIH and AID) presents
no immediate moral problem for a couple. In other words,
for the sake of argument I assume that AI is a licit
means to achieve procreation. How then can one
characterise the rights of a childless couple in this
matter? The answer depends on the normative relationship
one thinks exists between a couple suffering in this way
and those in a position to help. My general position so
far has been that individuals have a human right against
the state and society to enter into a committed
relationship with a view to founding a family. That
relationship, in turn, involves special moral rights
whereby the partners have a general claim-right against
each other to attempt to have children at an appropriate
time. Whether the right of the partners to have children
is a claim or a liberty depends on the terms of the
marriage contract or covenant. Here I am following the
Christian tradition which holds that it is a duty of
marriage, other things being equal, not to eliminate the
possibility of having children, but to actually attempt
to found a family at some time. (Note the discussion of
voluntary childlessness in Choices in Childlessness, page
12, and the traditional Christian response in A,l,b, page
52) In other words, I am saying that procreation is a
mandatory right, not merely a discretionary one.
Secondarily, there is a claim-right against the state
not to interfere in this decision to procreate. This
claim-right also entails an entitlement to some positive
help from the state (in its health service) in terms of
general maternity care before and after birth. (Clearly
such a right may be of the 'manifesto' type in many parts
of the world.)
Regarding AI as a means of founding a family, if one
assumes that this method is licit there is at least a
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liberty-right on the part of the couple to take advantage
of this means i.e they have no duty not to benefit from
this means. It would be a further question, however, as
to the claims that the couple could exercise. With regard
to AIH, for instance, there should be a strong argument
for a claim-right against the state in the person of its
health service, depending on the medical resources needed
to assist subfertile men. I presume that AIH imposes
less of a drain on resources than AID, and that both
kinds of AI are not as expensive as in vitro
fertilisation. Regarding AID, one would expect this
practice to be relatively costly if used properly; for
instance, consider the cost of genetic and psychological
counselling for the recipient couple. So, even if AI is
to be regarded as a licit means to achieve procreation,
its status as a claim-right against the state depends
very much on the strength of competing claims on the
health service on the part of other citizens.
There is a further question here which concerns the
category into which one places the right of infertile
persons against the state. Is this a reproductive right
or a health right or both? In my opinion the rights
involved here have a place in both categories. If a
person were infertile and at the same time showed no
interest in founding a family, the fact that his or her
reproductive system was diseased might be irrelevant to
the person. Any right to treatment might easily have to
give way to the more pressing medical needs of others.
Overcoming infertility is a relevant right for those who
wish the option of founding a family. In fact, the
desire to have a child may contribute to the situation of
ill-health, especially at the psychological level. A
general point can be developed here: that health is most
often sought in order to enjoy goods or values which
require health as a basic condition. Thus, the level of
health one requires depends often on what one wants to
do, whether it be to run marathons or have babies.
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For those who want children, infertility is a serious
medical condition, and both state and society need to
recognise this insofar as there is some duty to alleviate
distress within the community. Moreover, it is arguable
that the rights of the infertile here are of the status
of claims in the technical sense, since the infertile
form one of the groups in society whose pain has not
received much practical sympathy in terms of medical
resources. In other words, rights against the state
regarding reproductive freedom appear to be stronger as
one moves from healthy couples who need little help from
the state to those who are 'handicapped' in various ways
in relation to their capacity to procreate.
Obviously, too, the claim-right against the health
services for AID does not include a strict claim-right
against others to act as donors. Because it is not
morally obligatory for a couple to refrain from using
AID, and because there is some claim-right against the
health services of the state to provide the possibility
of AID, this does not mean that men have a duty to
provide sperm. It seems to me that this practice of
giving sperm, assuming it to be morally licit, would be
an act of beneficence rather than an act of justice.
Thus, the claim-right against the state assumes the
presence of voluntary donors in this situation.
B Powers and Immunities
If there is a claim-right against the state in relation
to provision of AID services, it may still only mean that
a childless couple have a claim-right to be 'considered'
for AID. This is a controversial point, since it centres
on the power of the medical service to judge the
competence and suitability of couples for the reception
of AID. This is somewhat unusual, since society is
usually loathe to prevent couples from having children,
unless they are mentally incompetent. Now this kind of
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incompetence may be a criterion used by AI practitioners,
but it may be one of many, the others being an assembly
of rather controversial value judgements, on the basis of
which a couple may be permitted or forbidden to
procreate. According to present practice, it seems that
the criteria used to judge recipients as well as donors
may vary from practitioner to practitioner and this may
amount to the violation of the rights of particularly
vulnerable people. (Suggested criteria for accepting both
recipients and donors are found in Snowden &
Mitchell,1981:54ff,64)
Mary Warnock (1985b) is one person who thinks that
doctors should not take this role of judge of parental
competence on themselves. She discusses the part played
by 'counselling' in the process of deciding who is to be
given AI and who is to be excluded. It is clear that
some of this 'counselling' is a polite way of referring
to medical paternalism:
For all the claim that counselling is essentially
value-free, I doubt whether it can occur without some
message being picked up, perhaps mistakenly, by the
subject of the counselling, that one course of action
ought to be preferred to another. I have heard a
doctor claim that he always counsels those who come
to him for a cure for infertility; and he often
counsels them until they go away. Certainly, if
doctors have to decide which couples to treat, which
not, they are embarking on a course which is miles
away from 'medical ethics', but essentially
discriminatory, and discriminatory on social or moral
grounds. (Warnock,1985b;148)
In a liberal society the interference in personal
choice on the part of professional groups is regarded
with some suspicion, but one can hardly expect a complete
laissez-faire attitude on the part of the medical
profession in relation to a procedure which they have
developed and which they need to monitor. Granted that
medical staff do not have a monopoly of moral wisdom as
well as medical expertise, it is certain that they have a
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vital part to play in discerning the proper use of the
techniques in their hands. One must be careful of moving
from one extreme where 'doctor knows best - leave it in
his safe hands', to the other extreme where the doctor
simply serves the patient as 'customer' and where 'the
customer is always right'. The doctor has to attain a
balance between manipulating patients and standing aloof
from their moral and spiritual predicaments. The
Christian doctor, in particular, will recognise the
privileged position he is in to show forth Gospel values
by word and example.
Warnock, too, in spite of her reservations about the
value judgements of medical staff regarding parental
competence, accepts that some judgements of value have to
be made, and suggests that some common criteria for
judging recipients for AID should be established in order
to avoid idiosyncratic, personal criteria being foisted
on individual couples (Warnock,1985b:148). If common
criteria for judging AID recipients were established by
some centralised licensing body, couples might then have
strict claim-rights not to be discriminated against on
the basis of criteria not included in the established
list, e.g. on the basis of race, religion, political
allegiance, and so forth. One would expect, however, some
controversy regarding certain criteria for refusing AID
to some childless persons, e.g. single persons,
homosexuals, lesbians. Again, the opposition to such
parties receiving AID could be a matter of principle, or
an appeal to consequences, or a mixture of both. (For a
discussion of some of these issues,see 'Case Conference:
Lesbian Couples:should help extend to AID?' in
JME,1978,4:91-95; Golombok & Rust,1986).
From the point of view of the technical language of
rights, what is in question here is a conflict of powers.
I said that a power-right implies an ethical capacity to
enter or change a relationship with some other person.
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Within marriage the normal couple have the ethical
capacity to make each other a parent. Usually this
involves an immunity-right against others, cutting off
interference in the process of establishing or changing a
relationship. These types of rights have been noted
already with regard to the intervention of the state in
couples' decisions concerning family size, and in the
case of paternalism towards the mentally retarded. In
this situation pertaining to the childless seeking AID,
the discussion above has centred on the notion that AI
practitioners (and/or the state) may have a power-right
to judge which couples will be permitted to attempt
procreation by this means. In question, then, is whether
some external authority can impose itself on a marriage
relationship and limit the couple's power-right to become
parents.
C Mandatory and Discretionary Rights
If there were no moral problems associated with AI in
itself, would the right to AI be 'mandatory' or
'discretionary'? I mentioned that one point of view on
marriage states that couples have a strict duty to found
a family, other things being equal; thus the right to
have children and the duty to have children are perfectly
coincidental - this is the definition of a 'mandatory
right'. On the other hand, there is the position which
regards founding a family as essentially separate from
the decision to marry. According to this viewpoint,
having children is left to the couple's own discretion.
The couple have no duty not to have children, but at the
same time no positive duty to have children; this is the
meaning of 'discretionary right'. Presumably, the couple
who see procreation as a discretionary right will view AI
in the same light if there are no moral objections to AI
as such.
But what of the position of the couple who believe
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that procreation is a mandatory right? Are they obliged
to take advantage of AI, assuming there are no moral
objections to it as such? I do not want to discuss this
in detail. I just wish to point out that AIH or AID may
be regarded by some people as morally licit but
personally distasteful or burdensome. Thus in some cases,
one may be able to envisage a couple not wishing to take
advantage of AI for reasons that pertain to the feelings
of the other partner rather than to objections in
principle to the procedure. Arguably, AI could be seen
as an extraordinary means (in the sense of being
burdensome) which a couple would not be obliged to use to
achieve pregnancy.
D The Rights of Conscience
I noted above that one moral position may see no
objection to AI as such, while recognising certain moral
problems at times in relation to the competence of
recipients and the problem of scarce resources. What
happens if there is a difference of opinion on the moral
status of AI, either AIH or AID, between, say, husband
and wife? Does a woman have a right to have a child by
means of AI if her husband has moral objections to the
practice? Does a husband have a right to found a family
in this way if his wife objects morally? In my opinion
where there is a conflict between a person who in con¬
science recognises a strict obligation not to do X or to
cooperate in doing X, and another person who sees X as
permissible, but not obligatory, the negative obligation
takes precedence. In this case the partner who wants a
child, but does not see procreation as an obligation,
must respect the conscience of the partner who sees
procreation by AI as an immoral means to a good end. It
is a more difficult question to arbitrate between
partners who agree that procreation is a mandatory right
while disagreeing on the liceity of AI as a means. (In
any case, it may be argued that the existence of a basic
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conflict of interests among spouses should automatically
eliminate them from consideration for the reception of
AI.)
Following Wellman's translation of the Hohfeldian
legal distinctions to the ethical sphere, it could be
said that the right to do something which one's
conscience discerns as permissible is a basic claim-right
others have a correlative duty to respect one's
conscientious decisions within limits. However, in a
relationship such as marriage, which in itself is
established as an institution based on special moral
rights, one has to consider as well the conscience of
one's partner.
Now apply this to the situation where one of the
partners in a marriage relationship wants to exercise the
power to become a parent by means of AI, and puts this to
the other partner. And let me assume that the second
partner objects to the exercise of such a power on the
grounds of a conscientious decision which holds that it
would be wrong to procreate by this means. Then I feel
the conflict must be solved in favour of the claim of
conscience instead of the power-right - the former
'trumps' the latter. Regarding the status of the
relationship between the spouses the claims of conscience
give the dissenting spouse an immunity-right against the
other, thus maintaining the relationship unchanged. To
take an example, an infertile or subfertile husband would
not be justified in getting a doctor to inseminate his
wife if she was in a drugged or unconscious state,
especially if he knew that she had moral objections to
the practice. The husband has no power and no liberty to
act against his wife's conscience.
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E The Right Not to Procreate by AI
If a couple accept that AI is morally problematic, how
then does the language of rights apply? Most obviously,
the couple would have a strict claim-right not to be
pressurised into using the AI procedure. One can imagine
this right holding against the state, if it was worried
about underpopulation and was demanding that couples
produce more children. Less difficult to imagine is the
pressure put on couples by their own families and peer
group to have children. Being childless can be a social
stigma as well as a personal misfortune, hence the
pressure imposed, consciously and unconsciously, to have
children by any means. In the face of such pressure, each
spouse has a right against the other to support in facing
the temptation to water down their principles.
As was mentioned already, there is no right against
the fertile to act as donors, if the whole practice is
morally questionable. Likewise, doctors and medical
personnel have a right not to be forced to provide an AI
service if their conscience disapproves of it. In the
case of the potential donor, a man may refuse to give
sperm because he is opposed to the method of obtaining
sperm - masturbation - or because he has no right
(liberty or power) to waive his responsibility for the
child he would be helping to procreate, or even because
he has objections to AI as the beginning of a 'slippery
slope' towards unacceptable further developments. The
doctor may have similar objections at one remove, i.e.
his expertise is involved in helping others to fail in
their duties towards themselves and others.
Sometimes people talk about inalienable rights in
these situations. For instance, if part of the marriage
promises is the keeping of one's generative faculties
exclusively for the expression of love for one's partner,
the special moral right arising from this promise is of
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such importance for some that it is inalienable - it
cannot be waived or relinquished, just as one cannot
waive one's right to sexual fidelity in marriage. It is
suggested at times that AIH and AID are morally licit if
both partners consent to these practices, but the
stricter position on this within the Christian tradition
denies the ethical competence to either spouse to release
the other from the promise of generative fidelity. (One
of the main reasons for this position is that the Roman
Catholic tradition does not believe in the existence of a
strict right to have children, but to the generative acts
(i.e. sexual intercourse) which may lead to conception
and birth of a childjcf. Reidy,1982:132; Marshall, 1964:
47.) Recalling that inalienable rights are not logically
equivalent to absolute rights, since the former may in
some cases be forfeited, it would appear that the
doctrine on AI and generative fidelity of the Roman
Catholic magisterium and others comes closer to the
notion of an absolute right than an inalienable right.
(Note that 'generative fidelity' is related more to AID
than AIH; in the latter practice as well as in the former
the strict view insists on 'generative integrity' also,
i.e. procreation through sexual intercourse.)
8.5 The Christian Contribution to the Debate.
It may seem from the preceding discussion that there is
little hope of discovering the Christian contribution to
the debate on AI, since Christians seem to be pretty much
divided on the issues. Recall how Hauerwas pointed out
the confusion among Christians as to the reasons for
having children, and add to this a similar confusion
today concerning the means that may be legitimately used
to found a family (Hauerwas,1981:157) . True, there are
strong differences of opinion, but one must not ignore
the areas of agreement between and within the Christian
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moral traditions. Also, the very differences within the
Christian moral tradition can be instructive, revealing
the struggle of the pilgrim community to discern God's
will in this key area of human life.
A The Value of Honesty
Although the Roman Catholic opposition to AID is based on
principles which oppose the separation of procreation
from marital intercourse and the involvement of a third
party in the intimacy of married life, one can presume
that Catholic opposition will include the anxieties of
Protestant Christians concerning the secrecy surrounding
the AID procedure. All Christians must agree on the
vital importance of honesty in family life. There is good
sense in this statement from the Choices in Childlessness
Report:
Recent research into blood-groups has incidentally
revealed the fact that a significant number of
children born in wedlock cannot be the offspring of
their accepted father. It might be argued from this
that, if no obvious harm has befallen these children
through this deception, no obvious harm need befall
AID children if the facts are never disclosed. On
the other hand, truthfulness may be said to possess
a value of its own in human relationships apart from
its more obvious utilitarian value. (Choices,
1982:44)
The Christian moral tradition must make a united stand
against deception, whether this is done out of good
motives or out of bad motives. (For opposition to such
deceit,see Mitchell,1983:197; Winston,1987:171; Jones,
1987:176-177; Mahoney,1984a:291.) There is a paternal¬
istic type of dishonesty which can be as bad as the type
in which one misleads others for one's own gain. In AID
it may be difficult to separate these two types. Secrets
can be kept from children 'for their own good' as well as
for the benefit of parents. Taking into account human
propensity to sin, the Church of Christ must always warn
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its members, and others, of the command not to do evil
that good may come about (Rom.3:8).
B Rahner's Moral-Faith Instinct
It is noteworthy in the quotation just given, how the
reasoning for the wrongness of deception is a mixture of
principled and consequentialist types of argument. There
follows from this, I think, a requirement that Christian
ethicists take seriously the possibility that AI may be
wrong in principle, even though the bad effects of the
practice may not be obvious. If 'truthfulness may be
said to possess a value of its own in human relationships
apart from its more obvious utilitarian value'
(Choices,1982:44), then perhaps the same can be said for
the integrity of sexual intercourse in marriage, an act
of such significance that some Christians have called it
'the marriage act'.
The key point here, I think, is the need to recognise
that the harmful effects of some practices are
spectacularly clear, while in the case of other practices
such effects become clear only with careful discernment
over time. In other words, some principled arguments may
be based on intuitions as to the wrongness of certain
activities or practices, long before the bad effects of
those practices become apparent. I believe that this is
the point being made by Karl Rahner (1972), when in the
context of an essay on 'The Problem of Genetic
Manipulation', he has this to say:
...to adopt a term from the contemporary theology
of faith, there is also a moral instinct of faith,
i.e. a universal knowledge of right and wrong
belief. This 'instinctive' judgement cannot and
need not, however, be adequately subject to
analytic reflection. (Rahner, 1972:238)
In fact, according to Rahner, the expression of this
moral faith-instinct requires the use of 'the categories
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of rational analysis, 'reasons', conceptual arguments
etc.', which conceal its character (ibid.). Here is a
kind of moral 'knowledge' which does not depend on
analysis of effects and justifying reasons, but in some
way precedes them. Rahner recognises the possibilities of
abuse in this notion of moral faith-instinct. He accepts
the legitimacy of criticising this theory, while
insisting that 'such criticism must neither dispute nor
disregard the reality and rights of this universal
instinct in reason and faith, irrespective of what it is
to be called and how it is to be described and analysed
from the point of view of formal epistemology
(ibid.,239). If it is true that morality cannot be
reduced to discursive rationality alone, then the
Christian Church must be willing to take risks in
supporting positions which are not established by the
everyday wisdom. In relation to Artificial Insemination
this might mean accepting the value of AIH and rejecting
AID as a disvalue; or it might require a rejection of the
whole practice as fundamentally misguided; or even the
full acceptance of both AIH and AID, subject to certain
conditions.
It seems that the Christian Church in general does
express a fair degree of agreement on the rejection of
further developments of AI, in the areas of eugenics,
sperm-banks, and the commercial aspect of selling a
promise of 'perfect' children. While one can imagine the
bad effects of these developments, there does seem to be
a kind of instinct which prevents one from considering
these as legitimate. The attitude here is one which is
willing to allow some intervention in the process of
procreation for those who are desperate, but which wishes
to draw some strict lines lest this process go too far.
So there appears to be a wide agreement in the
Christian moral tradition which accepts that the ideal
form of procreation is the type that involves simply the
311
sexual intimacy of the couple, and that any departure
from this ideal must receive justification, and must be
monitored to avoid abuse. The notion of a 'moral faith-
instinct' is related to the grasp of basic goods and also
to the idea of 'vocation'. It is because Christians tend
to see procreation as firmly set within the context of
the vocation of marriage that AID gives rise to moral
doubts in the first place.
The moral faith instinct of Christians would, I
presume, reject out of hand the idea that a childless
couple might allow an anonymous donor to impregnate the
woman by sexual intercourse; but this instinct is
probably more developed and better backed up by actual
experience than the instinct which reacts against AID.
The very fact that some Christians have equated AID with
adultery shows the confusion which this instinct against
AID reflects. People have not had time to develop moral
language to express the instinct, and so have borrowed
judgements from the nearest related moral category. When
that kind of judgement is seen not to apply, the
temptation is to think that AID is justified, whereas in
fact the basic instinct has not received a satisfactory
expression and its value remains outside one's analytic
grasp for the present.
C Vocation
In any discussion of vocation within a Christian context,
I think it is important to take into account not just the
aptitudes and inclinations required if people are judged
to have a callng towards some state of life, but also the
competence of the Church to lay down the conditions for
the participation in the goods which form the basis of
the way of life. These conditions include the means used
to embrace a particular state. In relation to AI in
general, part of the Christian Church has officially
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stated that this is not a licit means towards parenthood
and that the vocation to found a family must be satisfied
in some other (licit) way. The Roman Catholic
magisterium, in other words, codifies its basic moral
faith-instinct in a normative form by rejecting the idea
that couples have a vocation to parenthood if the only
way this can be achieved is by means of AI. In
particular, many Christians would deny a vocation to
parenthood by means of AID, on the grounds that it
violates the inalienable rights of the couple to
exclusive use of each other's generative faculties. Other
Christians, of course, do not share this instinct, and
they hold that God may well be calling childless couples
to parenthood by either AIH or AID. Disagreement on the
licitness of the means leads to disagreement on the
presence of a vocation.
In spite of this disagreement on the discernment of
vocation to parenthood, there is some agreement between
and within the churches on the danger of obsessive
concentration on one's need for a child or children of
one's own. It is essential to point out other options for
people, which are also possible vocations; some of these
may even involve caring for children procreated by
others, as in teaching, nursing, or fostering/adoption.
An obsessive concentration on one single option may only
serve to blind one to other callings, and, worse still,
it may lead to a moral blindness whereby couples will
seek a child at any cost and by unscrupulous methods
(cf.Ramsey's arguments concerning ends and means
above,6.4,B.).
It should be recognised that there is a distinction
between 'vocation' and the 'will of God'. Now, in effect
this distinction is between two senses or applications of
the single term 'will of God'. To have a 'vocation' is to
be called to do God's will in a particular sphere of
life. But it can happen that a person may reject a
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calling and choose to enter some other state. For
instance, consider a person who receives a call to be a
single person but chooses instead to marry. Later, this
person realises his/her mistake, but cannot simply opt
out of the marriage that was entered into. In such a
situation one may wish to say that it is God's will that
a person adapt to a given situation, even though that
situation is not the place he or she was called to. (This
example is taken from Paul Quay,1974:1070.) In other
words, life does not come to an end when something goes
wrong with what one regards as one's vocational choice.
One can still operate within God's will no matter how
many vocational options are closed to one (cf. Clifford
Stevens,1975:140-144, especially 141).
Thus, the Christian Church must insist on the point
that, because vocational choice is fraught with all sorts
of personal uncertainties, people should not put all
their hopes on the attainment of some single option, as
if their total happiness depended on achieving that end.
In this way, the obsessional desire of some to have
children seems almost pathological, rather than a sign of
a strong calling. This implies, I think, that the notion
of vocation cannot be used by Christians to support
absolute right-claims to have children.
In conclusion, then, I would state that the Christian
Church as a whole has a basic moral faith-instinct about
marriage and parenthood as vocation. Part of this
instinct concerns the limits which surround the vocation
of parenthood in the Christian tradition, including the
means used to achieve parenthood. The ideal means to this
end is sexual intercourse, and whenever one moves away
from this ideal there must be a justifying reason - the
most obvious one being (in the case of AI) infertility.
Where nature has 'broken down', as it were, and a couple
cannot found a family through the marriage act, then
human stewardship may be enabled (morally) to supply for
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this deficiency. Where Christians disagree in this matter
is on the extent of stewardship. Clearly, a couple should
not attempt to achieve a good by attacking an equally
important good, but Christians disagree on whether
procreation in the 'natural' way (sexual intercourse) is
such a good that it can never be bypassed; and they also
disagree on the status of AID, on the question of the
involvement of a third party, even though impersonal, in
the procreative relationship. As in natural law theory
in general, where the further one descends to particular
norms in particular cases the more uncertain the
conclusions become, so in relation to the means used to
achieve parenthood one finds a good deal of moral
pluralism and a conflict of moral instincts.
The Christian Church as a whole has a right to express
its moral faith instinct on the vocation of parenthood.
It has to steer a course between 'interpreting the signs
of the times', listening to the world with its secular
wisdom, and offering a prophetic stance which criticises
secular wisdom as well as certain views within the
Church. However, since moral faith instincts are often in
need of development and are rarely, if ever, infallible,
the Church must be especially respectful of individual
dissent in this area.
8.6 Conclusion
The last three chapters have studied reproductive rights
in situations that are relatively unusual, situations
which depart from the norm. For instance, I considered
the rights of poor couples especially in the Third World
to decide on family size without state hindrance; the
rights of the mentally retarded to have children or to be
protected from this eventuality by society and the state;
and just now the rights of the infertile to use a
specific means to procreate. Though these cases are sorae-
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what unusual, they are important in underlining the
complex set of normative relationships possible when
reproductive rights are under discussion.
In the case of Artificial Insemination the right to
use this means to achieve pregnancy is controversial
mainly because of the alleged violation of rights
entailed by the process. The rights in question are
themselves controversial, for instance the (mandatory)
right to procreate only through 'natural' sexual
intercourse, and the further right to exclusive use of
the generative faculty of one's partner in marriage.
Such rights are supposed to be the special moral rights
arising from marriage and accorded to each other by the
spouses entering that relationship. However, in a
pluralistic society, and even in a Christian Church with
differing views on marriage and procreation, it is
difficult to get agreement on the exact conditions laid
down in the contract or covenant for eventualities such
as infertility. Certainly the majority of couples
getting married do not consider in advance the exercise
of their reproductive rights in relation to Artificial
Insemination.
It is also problematic to show how rights are violated
when AIH or AID are used as means to the end of founding
a family. In the case of AIH in particular, the pressing
need or desire to have a child tends to obscure the
weight that might be given to the idea that this process
is the first step on the road towards 'making or
manufacturing babies'. And, indeed, it is arguable that
when 'nature' breaks down in this way, human stewardship
over creation permits this use of technical means in
exceptional situations. There would appear to be a strong
case for making the use of AIH a discretionary right.
Because of the controversial nature of AIH one could
hardly make its use the object of a mandatory right.
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When one considers AID, however, there is greater
difficulty in showing that reproductive rights are in
conflict. Recalling that human procreation involves not
just the good of passing on life, but also the good of
sociability, the intimate relationship between the
partners in marriage, the introduction of a third party
(no matter how anonymous) into the relationship is a
strong point in favour of the view that reproductive
rights are being violated. The strict view on this, as
held by many Christians, does not accept that the consent
of the couple makes AID licit. The use of one's
generative faculty is not a right one can waive; it is an
inalienable right. (Remember the main fault of the Choice
theory of rights: it does not take into account
inalienable rights. On the other hand, the Benefit theory
claims that it is never in one's interest to waive
certain rights against others.) Again the point here
comes back to the conditions laid down in the institution
of marriage, which give rise to special moral rights.
Whether AID is adultery in some sense is one of the main
questions here.
(One of the major difficulties in seeing how the use of
AIH and AID necessarily violates reproductive rights lies
not just in the goodness of the end achieved, but in the
consensual nature of the process. Put simply, when a
couple really long for a child and consent to either AIH
or AID, and when the bad effects of this decision are not
easily discerned, it is hard to see how rights are
violated. In this way, the cases studied in previous
chapters are quite different. Regarding population
control one was dealing with involuntary control of
family size, limiting the number of children couples
could have, often against their will. Regarding the
sterilisation of the retarded, some of the handicapped
can be treated as unruly children and incompetent when
their condition is not all that serious. Possibilities of
abuse seem greater in these cases than in AI.)
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As well as considering the conflict of putative
reproductive rights in this chapter, I also devoted a
great deal of space to the various types of normative
relationship that are possible depending on the
particular circumstances. The technical Hohfeldian
distinctions highlight the possible connections between
rights and duties and the relationships between right-
holders and duty-bearers. This brings out the second key
point in any discussion of rights - given the importance
of this good for a person what kind of claim against
others is entailed? As one moves from AIH to AID, for
instance, new characters appear on the scene in relation
to whom the possibility of new rights and duties arise.
In relation to the alleged rights of the childless to
use AI, various normative relationships are possible:
between husband and wife; between the couple and the
state; between the couple and the AI practitioner;
between the couple and the donor; between the couple and
the AID child. In each case the parties may have to face
competing claims, for instance the state has to respond
to other claims on its resources with regard to health
needs. It is a particular substantive issue whether the
infertile have a strict claim against the state to obtain
help in founding a family, or whether they have a mere
liberty-right permitting them to seek help from 'private'
medicine.
It is also useful to use the language of powers and
immunities when discussing the rights of the childless.
Though all rights entail a normative relationship between
persons, the language of powers and immunities
concentrates attention on the ethical capacity of
individuals to maintain or change their relationships.
This is most important in the case of special moral
rights, the kind most central in the area of reproductive
rights. I would go so far to say that a power-right is
the core right of the cluster of rights which make up
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the category of reproductive rights. If one does not
have a power to marry or to procreate, the further
language of claims and liberties cannot be used. If a
power does exist, then it is a another question whether
this gives one claims or liberties against others.
The contribution of the Christian moral tradition to
this discussion is indeed controversial. Christians, like
those without any particular religious belief, disagree
on the scope of the reproductive rights of the childless,
mainly because God has not revealed what is to be done
when this eventuality occurs. It is left to human reason,
with the aid of general Christian values, to decide on
particular strategies for enabling people to procreate.
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Chapter 9
Reproductive Rights and In Vitro Fertilisation,
9.1 Introduction
The topic of this chapter follows logically from the
discussion presented in the preceding chapter. Again I
am dealing mainly with the plight of childless couples
and the means used to achieve pregnancy and found a
family. The central question, then, concerns the right to
use IVF and ET as a means of overcoming infertility.
However, I cannot ignore subsidiary questions concerning
the alleged right to experiment on embryos created
through IVF where the aim is the study of genetically
inherited conditions, or the study of infertility, or the
improvement of contraceptive techniques. Clearly, then,
IVF is both in continuity with Artificial Insemination
and also presents some new steps in the direction of
'making babies'(cf.Kass,1985). In continuity with AI,
IVF (and ET) can include homologous and heterologous
artificial fertilisation, i.e. it has some relation to
artificial insemination by husband and by donor,
depending on the circumstances. But where IVF differs
from AI is in the matter of the location of fertilisation
- outside the womb. For this it is necessary to remove an
ovum (or ova) from a woman by laparoscopy and to mix ova
and sperm in a petri dish (cf.Edwards,1986;Wood &
Westmore,1984:ch 5). Hence the title 'in vitro fer¬
tilisation' and the distinction between 'ijn vitro' and
'in vivo' fertilisation. In Artificial Insemination
fertilisation takes place 'in vivo', so it does not
involve the same degree of scientific intervention in
procreation.
All the moral issues arising from IVF follow on from
what has been just stated. The fact that a woman's egg or
eggs has to be removed from the womb and need not be
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returned to the same individual is a revolutionary step
in human reproduction; there is now a female equivalent
to AID in the concept of ovum donation . Whereas up to
this, a mother was always genetically related to the
child of her womb, this no longer need occur. A woman who
is unable to ovulate may still be able to receive an egg
from another woman and have it implanted after
fertilisation in her womb.(For further details about ovum
donation,cf.D.Gareth Jones,1987:194-195.) And a woman who
can ovulate, but has no womb to carry a resultant IVF
embryo, can now seek to use another woman's womb simply
to 'carry' the child up to birth. So there is a
revolution in the concept of parenthood taking place,
which goes beyond the simple distinction between genetic
and social parenthood that AID introduced. The
implications of this for individuals and for society can
hardly be ignored in any discussion of rights to
reproduce.
The second issue arising from IVF is of course the
separation of procreation from the 'normal' means
directed to that end - sexual intercourse. For some, the
contraceptive revolution separated the procreative 'end'
of marriage from the unitive 'end' by stressing the
latter, and the 'reproductive revolution' (cf.Singer &
Wells,1984) now separates procreation from sexual love by
stressing the former. I mentioned this already in
relation to AI, so I shall not repeat myself here.
The third issue which bothers many people about IVF
and ET is the experimental nature of the process. I have
been blithely talking about the IVF process in terms of
taking eggs from women, mixing sperm, and then returning
them to a woman's body as if it were as simple as baking
a cake. Obviously the technology behind the IVF process
is impressive, as one might expect when fertilisation
takes place outside the body of the female. As well as
being impressive, it is complex and developing. Robert
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Winston (1987) describes some of the complexities of the
process; for instance, the importance of removing an egg
or eggs at the right time:
At present, in vitro fertilization teams are able to
work only with mature eggs and the egg is fully
mature only about one hour before it is shed. The
egg is collected at this time by sucking out the
follicle, just before it would be released. If the
egg is obtained much earlier it cannot be
fertilized, so a great deal of effort goes into the
exact timing of this stage. (Winston,1987:156)
Even with hormone testing and ultrasound being used to
detect ovulation, sometimes the team misses ovulation in
a particular cycle and must wait another month. Then when
eggs are eventually collected, Winston describes the
further process of identifying them and putting them into
the right culture medium, incubating them at the right
temperature before they can be fertilised with sperm.
Great care is taken as well to wash the sperm in culture
fluid and to dilute the material. The resultant embryo is
allowed to grow up to a few cells and then must be
examined to see if it looks normal enough to be
transferred to the womb. And then comes the waiting, for
the embryo to implant. And this does not touch on the
complications of freezing eggs and embryos. What then are
the moral implications of this technology?
In first place one can point out the emotional strain
which the IVF procedure causes for the couple, especially
for the female partner. Winston stresses this more than
once and insists that couples know in advance what they
will have to go through:
Test-tube baby treatment requires a great deal of
commitment from the couple and from the staff
carrying it out. You may be asked to attend clinic
at very unsociable hours and at repeated intervals.
There is no doubt that you will be required to make
some sacrifices to have the best chance of success.
For example, it is very difficult to carry on
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working during a treatment cycle, (ibid.,153) The
strain is always worse than the couple expect. The
careful testing to time ovulation properly and the
waiting time for egg collection and then embryo
transfer requires fortitude. For the man, it may be
difficult to masturbate and produce sperm when it is
needed; the emotional tension at this moment is very
considerable, (ibid.,161-162))
The second moral issue that arises concerns the moral
status of the embryo which is produced outside the body.
If it is regarded as a human person with full personal
rights, then a question mark hangs over the whole IVF
process. This question mark relates firstly to the
development of the process which required experimentation
on embryos, involving their destruction. If one regards
embryos as persons, then it is widely accepted that
experimentation which is not related to the welfare of
the actual subject is morally wrong insofar as it treats
the embryo as a means to the ends of others. Secondly, a
moral question mark hangs over IVF in view of the effects
of the process on embryos which are returned to the womb.
If the process leads to an increased incidence of
handicap which is diagnosed while still in the womb, is
abortion in such cases justified? Should one allow
oneself to get into such a moral dilemma from the very
start by countenancing IVF? One can also ask at this
stage whether IVF and ET leads to more than usual
spontaneous abortions either before or after
implantation?
Thirdly, what about the long-term effects of the IVF
process on children born of it and who seem healthy
enough at birth? Presumably the answer to this question
requires a study of a large sample of IVF children right
up to adulthood, something which has not been possible
yet. And, of course there is the argument that such a
study would itself be morally wrong because of the risks
involved. In fourth place, IVF technology makes possible
experimentation on the origins of human life and develop-
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raent without having to consider the desires of childless
people to have children. Here I am talking about embryos
which are either created for experimentation or which are
'spare embryos' which are not needed for transfer to a
womb. In other words, I have in mind the embryos which
are not intended to develop their potentiality to birth
and adulthood. What right do researchers have to 'create'
embryos for this purpose? Finally, it can be argued that
experimental processes like IVF and ET are expensive in
terms of scarce medical resources and only serve to
divert attention from more serious medical problems.
In terms of the language of rights, IVF presents
particularly difficult questions of analysis. For
instance, the matter of changing the institution of
parenthood by introducing many novel kinds of
relationship between children and their 'parents' seems
to involve not just the rights of individuals but the
rights of society as a whole, since parenthood and family
life are widely regarded as key institutions in human
life. One may say that AID brings about the first real
change in the concept of parenthood, but IVF takes this
many steps further, at least in principle.
When one turns to the vexed question of the alleged
rights of embryos, one is confronted with the question of
personhood and rights. Are embryos human persons, or does
one have to qualify this to some degree, for instance,
by giving the label 'potential person'. If such a
qualification is accepted, then what rights, if any, can
be claimed by such 'persons', and what happens when their
rights come into conflict with those of 'actual' persons
- those already born? Since childless couples intend to
have their gametes fused and then returned to the body of
the female, there arises from the start the question of
the alleged rights of future persons, or perhaps one
should say 'the future rights of persons who have not yet
come into being even as potential persons. Do potential
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parents not have to consider the possible effects of the
IVF process on the children they insist on having by that
means? So it may be interesting to study the possible
conflicts between these various categories: actual
persons, potential persons, and future persons.
9.2 IVF:'The Simple Case'
Much of the opposition to IVF is often based on
expectations of the worst scenarios possible happening,
the slide into a 'Brave New World' of manipulation. But
it is only fair to give IVF a chance of being acceptable
by surrounding it with safeguards. These limits to the
development of IVF are the limits of the 'simple case' of
IVF. This is how Singer and Wells (1984) describe the
'simple case'; it is
...the case of the married, infertile couple, where
the egg is taken from the wife and the sperm from
the husband, and the embryo or embryos created are
all inserted into the womb of the wife. (Singer &
Wells,1984:35).
So long as one stops at the simple case of IVF, then,
one avoids the moral difficulties arising from the
involvement of third parties in marriage which comes with
heterologous artificial fertilisation. One avoids the
problem of the treatment of spare embryos and
experimentation on embryos with no intention of
transferring them to the womb. And one also avoids the
moral problems associated with surrogacy. But still one
is not morally in the clear, according to some positions.
In particular, the strict Roman Catholic position seems
to be as much opposed to the simple case of IVF as it is
to AIH (cf. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
Instruction (1987:21).)
I have already presented the principled opposition to
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artificial procreation on the part of the Roman Catholic
magisterium, so here I shall simply mention again the
view of Pius Xll:
Artificial fertilization goes beyond the limits of
the right which the spouses have acquired through
the marriage contract, namely, the right to fully
exercise their natural sexual capacity within the
natural performance of the marriage act. Their
marriage contract does not confer on them the right
to artificial fertilization, for such a right is in
no way included in the right to the natural marriage
act nor can it be deduced from it. (Pius Xll, 19
May,1956; cf. Kelly,1987:108-109).
Note in this passage the references to 'natural sexual
capacity' and 'natural performance of the marriage act'.
And although the contrast is between the 'natural' means
of procreation and the 'artificial' means of procreation,
the essential point is that from the moral point of view
one cannot separate the good of procreation from the
unitive good of marriage, both of which are tied to
sexual intercourse - the marriage act. Strictly speaking
from this point of view, fertilisation outside the
woman's body is wrong because it is a sign that sexual
intercourse has not taken place.
It is noteworthy too how the quoted passage from Pius
Xll uses the language of rights. There is a clear
refutation of an unlimited right to produce by just any
means. In fact, the means by which humans must reproduce
is through the 'natural sexual acts of marriage'. Here
again one encounters the claim on the part of the Roman
Catholic Church to lay down the conditions for
participation in the vocation of parenthood.
Objections to the simple case of IVF do go beyond the
insistence on the inseparability of the two basic goods
of marriage. People who accept the sundering of these
goods in principle, for example with reference to
contraception, can nevertheless oppose even the simple
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case of IVF. At this stage I shall examine some of the
further reasons for this opposition, starting with the
question of the moral status of the embryo.
9.3 The 'Rights' of Embryos.
A Two Basic Approaches
Much of the discussion on the moral status of embryos
rehearses arguments commonly put forward in the abortion
debate. So what follows covers pretty familiar ground.
Rather than go into a great deal of detail, I shall give
a summary of the issues as presented by the Personal
Origins Report. The Report deals with two main approaches
to human origins. First, one is asked to consider the
question of personal identity over time. Take, for
example, the contrast between a new-born baby and the old
lady eighty years later who has developed from that
childhood state. How can one say that one is dealing with
the same person? One answer to this question is as
follows:
We call the two the same, because behind every
presentation of the individual human phenomenon we
are accustomed to discern a subject, a 'someone'
whom we call by a name, who is the bearer of a
particular life-history...Starting from the con¬
viction that human beings are subjects, must we not,
the first school of thought asks, press back our
perception of the continuous subject as far as we
can see the objective grounds for doing so?... This
approach, then traces the individual story back as
far as fertilization, where the sheer contingency of
the meeting of those gametes, one possible meeting
out of millions, seems to constitute a wall of
arbitrariness behind which the story of the
individual cannot be taken any further. (Personal
Origins,1985:28)
So this position stresses personal continuity from
fertilisation on, even though the usual features of
personal life - consciousness, rationality, memory - are
327
not present from the beginning. What matters is genetic
continuity from the time of fertilisation. (This view is
held by numerous writers, e.g. Iglesias,1984; Lejeune,
1985; Torrance,1984; Atkinson,1987; Foster,1985; Reidy,
1982.)
The second approach mentioned by the Report argues
that the entity labelled an embryo, and later a fetus,
must have certain attributes before it can merit the
title 'person' and be given the rights of, say, a new¬
born child. This approach tends to pick out some
'particular threshold during pregnancy' when such
attributes present themselves to one's moral judgment. Of
course there are further variations within this overall
approach, as different people concentrate on different
stages of development. This is how the Report describes
this general approach:
To be a human is not merely to participate in one of
a multitude of forms of biological life, but it is
to be a subject of powers of mind and soul which set
human kind apart from other forms of life. At the
root of these powers is the phenomenon of
consciousness, and it is as the subject of
consciousness, the proponents of this view maintain,
that we value the human being most fundament¬
ally...Such a consciousness, at least in its human
form, is causally dependent upon certain physical
states, and in particular upon certain structures of
the central nervous system and the brain stem,
(ibid.,29-30).
In terms of the personal continuity of the conceptus
and the old lady mentioned at the start of this section
of the discussion, the proponents of this second approach
tend to locate the beginning of the process of personal
identity in the development of those parts of the body
which lead directly to sentience and consciousness, that
is, about forty days after conception, (cf. Lockwood,
1985:9-31; Singer & Wells,1984:94-98) Presumably one
could talk about a right to life at this stage of
development.
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The Personal Origins Report attempts to be as fair as
possible to the approaches treated above, but its authors
insist that no final, scientific solution can be
expected, which will settle once and for all the dispute
about the moral status of the beginning of human life:
Science, as such, can only report what happens; it
cannot interpret it. It cannot tell us whether the
genetic structures of individuality are more
important to our understanding of what it is to be
human than (say) the complexification of the nervous
system, or vice versa. A decision between the
approaches can only be made on theological or
philosophical grounds, (op.cit.,30)
A similar belief in the philosophical and theological
nature of the problem of personal origins is found in the
Vatican's Declaration on Procured Abortion (1974).
Although this document comes down in favour of the first
approach discussed, it allows a degree of uncertainty in
arriving at this conclusion,
This declaration expressly leaves aside the question
of the moment when the spiritual soul is infused.
There is not a unanimous tradition on this point and
authors are as yet in disagreement. For some it
dates from the first instant, for others it could
not at least precede nidation. It is not within the
competence of science to decide between these views,
because the existence of an immortal soul is not a
question in its field. (Declaration, in
Flannery,1983:l-13;p.7),
The Declaration advises one to adopt a conservative or
cautious approach in this matter, lest one takes 'the
risk of killing a man, not only waiting for, but already
in possession of his soul' (ibid.). In other words, one
is required to act on the basis of a moral certainty that
human life must be accorded basic rights, especially to
life, from fertilisation on. (Moral certainty, rather
than intellectual certainty of a type associated with
mathematics or 'hard' science, is most important in
making conscientious decisions; for a further distinction
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between 'strict' and 'wide' types see, Peschke,1975:161).
B Delayed Animation.
When the Declaration refuses to state dogmatically the
moment of animation or hominization, it recognises the
earlier tradition of Christianity which held the concept
of delayed animation. Bernard Haring (1974) explains the
different opinions. On one hand, there is St. Albert the
Great who held the position called 'instant or
simultaneous animation', while St. Thomas Aquinas and his
school held to the theory of 'successive animation'.
The majority of theologians have followed the
biologists and physicians who, over the last
centuries, have become more and more convinced that
the immortal principle of life was given at the time
or at the very moment of fertilization. It is only
of late that there no longer exists a consensus
among biologists and physicians. (Haring,1974:76)
The basic notion here is similar to the second
approach of the Personal Origins Report. Personal life is
manifested in consciousness and self-reflection, so there
must be some signs of an 'indispensable substratum' in
the cerebral cortex of the conceptus if one is to
recognise it as human. Some writers have applied this to
the body-soul relationship; take Haring for instance:
The soul is not pre-existent to the body; this is
the common conviction. Does it then come into
existence as a mere spiritual principle without a
minimum of development of the bodily sub-stratum?
The question concerns the beginning of a human
person existing in the body and through the body,
and prepared to express itself only in and with the
body, at least in this earthly life.
(Haring,1974:82)
The view in question seems to be that the personal
soul cannot enter into the body until the body is
prepared to receive it, and the development of the cereb-
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ral cortex is the earliest stage when animation would be
appropriate in the context of the approach which stresses
personal characteristics of rationality and
consciousness. Various problems arise concerning this
notion of delayed animation, in particular the
specification of the concept of soul and the underlying
dualism implied by the notion of delayed animation -
instead of the soul pre-existing the body, now the body
in some sense pre-exists the soul (cf.Singer &
Wells, 1984:92-94). Moreover, if a soul is seen in terms
of a principle of life, then it is ultimately mysterious
how the embryo develops to the stage when it can receive
an infused rational soul; it seems as if one is pushed
back into a theory of successive animation, where the
embryo begins life with a different kind of soul from the
personal-human one it will receive at a later stage of
development. All of this is quite mystifying, and it
seems questionable if the whole discussion of
'ensoulment' is very helpful either here or in the debate
on abortion.
(From the 'pastoral' point of view Christian theology
seems to find the doctrine of the soul useful in
reference to discussion of life after death. Since some
personal survival is demanded in Christian doctrine in
spite of the body's disintegration after death, the idea
of a spiritual soul presents an image of a sort that is
helpful in dealing with the questions raised by
believers, as long as one does not probe too deeply into
the image. However, it is easier to think of an immortal
soul continuing in existence after death than to think of
such an entity coming into being at the beginning of life
in relation to a human body. This seems to be an example
of an image helpful at one level but decidedly unhelpful
at another.)
Related to this view that questions whether personal
life is present from the 'first moment of conception', is
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the position held by some theologians which puts great
emphasis on the concept of individuation. Take, for
instance, the following position expressed by the Roman
Catholic theologian Kevin Kelly (1987):
As a Roman Catholic I feel it is important,
therefore, to take note of any scientific facts
which would seem to constitute 'contrary evidence'
to the position that fertilization is the key
moment, after which the embryo must be accorded full
human respect. Two pieces of contrary evidence are
frequently mentioned.
The first is the possibility of twinning and even
of consequent recombination during the first few
weeks. It seems that the possibility of twinning
actually occurring is statistically very small.
However, it also appears to be the case that it
would be at least theoretically possible by human
intervention to make it happen in every fertilized
ovum. This puts a large question-mark against the
claim that we are dealing with a human individual at
this early stage, since the stage of definitive
individuation has not yet been reached. Without
definitive individuality it seems impossible
philosophically to speak of a human being in the
proper sense of the word. (Kelly,1987:125-126)
Note that individuation or individuality here is not a
matter of personal self-consciousness - not even the new¬
born child has this characteristic - it is instead a
purely 'physical' differentiation of one entity from
another, even of one identical twin from another. This
seems to be more basic than self-conscious individuality
and a necessary step in that direction. Now if in the
earliest stages of human development one cannot identify
a separate individual, it makes it extremely difficult to
accord the embryo full human rights. (For theologians
holding such a view, see, Mahoney,198A:Ch. 3 ; Curran, 1982
:125-126; Lobo,1985:267)
The second point of 'contrary evidence' to the
established Roman Catholic view, according to Kelly, is
the well known matter of fetal wastage (ibid.,126-127).
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Kelly is not too interested in the rate of such wastage;
but he uses this phenomenon to underline the way in which
there appears to be a double standard regarding respect
for human life at this early stage and later on when the
fetus is developing. For instance, if spontaneous
abortion of early embryos is likened to a natural dis¬
aster, why the fatalistic attitude to it, and indeed, why
is fetal wastage not regarded as equally 'tragic'? Has
psychology so far triumphed over ontology in the
established view? Granted that no personal relationship
has developed between the mother and the early embryo in
many cases, surely the very existence of a human person
in the womb requires that one does something to save it
from extinction? But, says Kelly, 'I do not get the
impression that even the most committed 'anti-abortion'
doctors would adopt that approach to foetal wastage [that
it is a natural disaster which one should try to
overcome]. They and their medical colleagues do not
consider the prevention of foetal wastage to be a high
medical priority.' (ibid.,127;cf. Bok,1981:52 for the
logical conclusions of respecting life from conception.).
If no priority is given to saving the lives of human
persons from the first moment of their existence from the
ravages of nature, then what does this say about the
'rights' of these 'persons'? Either they have no strict
right to life, or their right to life is being violated
by the omission to initiate medical research into
preventing fetal wastage.
C Embryos as 'Potential Persons'
If personal identity is to be located sometime after
fertilisation - after individuation or after the
beginning of the development of the cerebral cortex - how
should one speak of the conceptus before these decisive
events? One response to this question is to speak of
embryos as 'potential persons'. Thus, three members of
the Warnock Committee expressed dissent on the use of
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human embryos in research saying that,
The special status of the human embryo and the
protection to be afforded it by law do not in our
view depend upon the decision as to when it becomes
a person. Clearly, once that status has been
accorded all moral principles and legal enactments
which relate to persons will apply. But before that
point has been reached the embryo has a special
status because of its potential for development to a
stage at which everyone would accord it the status
of a human person. It is in our view wrong to
create something with the potential for becoming a
person and then deliberately to destroy it.
(Carriline, Marshall, Walker, in Warnock,1985:90)
The key point here is that the embryo is not said to
have actual personal status but a 'special status'
connected with its potential to become a full human
person. This position logically implies that the whole
process leading to the development of IVF was morally
flawed, since embryos had to be created for
experimentation and for destruction. In other words,
some potential persons were sacrificed so that others
might be created for a relatively safe transfer to the
womb. The dissenting members state clearly, 'We would
therefore support the creation of embryos with a view to
their ultimate implantation in the uterus' (ibid.,91).
There are of course great difficulties in using the
concept of a 'potential person'. In part, the dissenting
members above recognise some of these. For instance, they
agree that ova and sperm are also potentially persons,
but their potentiality is different from that of the
embryo, since on their own, without any human inter¬
vention they cannot develop into human persons. It seems
that the act of fertilising the ovum makes a key
difference to the potentiality involved.
The American philosopher Joel Feinberg provides a
helpful discussion of the 'Paradoxes of Potentiality'
(Feinberg,1974:183-184). He draws a distinction between
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'direct or proximate potentialities' and those which are
'indirect or remote'. Thus, one criterion for proximate
potentiality is causal importance. One could say that
orange powder is potentially a brick: all one has to do
is to add water and cement. But orange powder is not
causally important in this process, certainly not as
important as the cement and the water. On the other hand,
orange powder is causally important if one is intending
to make an orange drink. In the case of the origin of
human life, it is arguable that both sperm and ova are
equally important causally, and that some act of fusing
the two is also essential within the causal nexus.
Just to say that the fusion of the gametes is causally
important, even essential, is not, however, to arrive at
the necessary conclusion that the embryo now has personal
status equal to a new-born child. Here one has to fall
back on the two main approaches to personal origins: one
which stresses genetic continuity and the other which
stresses the later stages of personal development. If one
holds the first view, then the later development of the
embryo into a fetus, also recognised as causally
important, is simply tagged on to the genetic criterion
which is regarded as primary. But if one holds the second
approach, then the genetic criterion, while recognised as
causally important, is not thought to be as important
causally as the later stages of development, when the
embryo-fetus begins to show 'real signs' of being a human
person. True enough, if one wishes to create a child, one
must begin with the fertilisation of gametes, but for
those who hold the second approach the kind of
potentiality possessed by the early embryo is not morally
compelling in all instances, and especially when the
needs of developed persons are in question. So the notion
of potential will be interpreted differently according to
the view one has of the nature and beginning of
personhood. (For further discussion of potentiality,cf.
Johnstone,1982 & Warren,1977.)
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The usefulness of the concept of potentiality has been
questioned by John Mahoney (1984b) in his Bioethics and
Belief for basically the same reasons as were given
above, and in particular because the term 'potential' can
be applied equally to the child at birth and to persons
at a later stage of personal development (cf.
Mahoney,1984b:55). In the modern personalis tic-
existentialist way of looking at human life there is a
tendency to say that persons are always in the process of
becoming. Thus, potentiality does not distinguish
sufficiently between human life before birth and after
birth.
Against this, however, it does seem possible to make
helpful distinctions between more basic and less basic
types of potentiality. It seems obvious to me that there
is quite a difference between the potentiality of an
adult to become 'more human' in a moral sense and the
potentiality of an embryo to become a self-conscious
individual of the human species. Not only is the second
type of potentiality chronologically primary, it is
different from the first type of potentiality in not
depending on the embryo's freedom (since it has none). In
other words, human potential to mature into adult persons
from a less mature (moral and psychological) state
depends to a great extent on a person's own free
decisions, whereas the development of the embryo depends
more often on circumstances beyond the embryo's control.
So it seems that one may be able after all to distinguish
between potentiality before and after birth, and
especially between the potentiality of the embryo and
that of the adult to become more mature.
The other problem with the notion of potentiality, of
course, is that it immediately puts the 'potential
person' into a weaker position vis-a-vis the 'actual
person' when interests conflict. One reason for this is
that the self-conscious person has interests in the sense
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of desires, wants, needs, whereas the potential person
(in this case the embryo) at its earliest stages cannot
have desires or wants or conscious needs; one can only
say that it may be in its interest to live, in view of
one's belief that life is good. Perhaps this is one of
the reasons why the Archbishops of Great Britain have
stated that 'Each new life is the life not of a potential
human being but of a human being with potential' (cf.
Flannery,1983:29). But of course this statement simply
assumes that a human being is present from the moment of
conception and is not essentially different from an adult
human being.
In fact, one can still say that an embryo is a
potential person while insistinghat what is in its
interests cannot automatically be subordinated to the
conscious interests of adults. After all, there are cases
where the conscious interests of adults should not
necessarily be respected, e.g. those of the chronically
depressed and suicidal. Here one may be justified in
taking a paternalistic approach by stressing what is in
the person's interest, even though the person may not be
interested in what is in his interest (cf.
White,1985:79ff.). What I am criticising here is the view
that rights are directly related to conscious interests
alone. The Benefit or Interest theory of rights must take
into account what is actually good for a person, what is
in the person's interest, while not forgetting freedom of
conscience and the right to do wrong.
D Risking the Life of the Embryo
From the discussion so far it must be clear that human
beings are unlikely to agree on the question of when
personhood begins, and, as a result, there will always be
some disagreement as to when rights are to be first
accorded to embryos and fetuses. With reference to the
simple case of IVF, then, one can expect some people to
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reject this procedure out of hand just because it
involves experimentation on embryos, the creation of
embryos with no intention to transfer them to a womb. On
the other hand, one can expect others to accept the
simple case of IVF on the grounds that embryos are
potential persons who may be sacrificed for serious
reasons. This view gains strength, as was seen, from the
evidence that individuation occurs about two weeks after
fertilisation, and the evidence that so many embryos
never develop their potential within the womb.
According to Richard McCormick (1981:330), the
experimental process leading to success in IVF can be
seen, not as replicating nature's disasters, so much as
replicating its achievements, while tolerating some
disvalues. One does not criticise couples who by their
sexual intercourse create embryos which spontaneously
abort in the course of nature, so why should one
criticise those who form embryos by IVF and who allow
embryos which are not developing properly to die? Just as
it is arguable that nature weeds out some of the more
potentially handicapped individuals before they see the
light of day, so it is arguable that man as a part of
nature can decide it would not be in the interest of some
embryos to be implanted, especially if they have been
damaged in the process of IVF. Or humankind may think
itself justified in allowing the greater risk of
spontaneous abortion after IVF, because of the continuity
between this and nature's own prodigality, as revealed in
the various figures given of fetal wastage.
There is, I think, some danger in personifying nature
as McCormick appears to do. 'Nature' does not act
consciously as man does. Nature cannot be self-centred or
vindictive as humans can be and often are. There is a
difference even between scientists returning an embryo to
the womb and then letting 'nature' take its course,
leading to birth or spontaneous abortion, and these same
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scientists deciding that some embryos are not worth
placing in the womb. Both situations are problematic from
the moral point of view, if only because it is doubtful
whether humanity 'replicates nature's achievements' all
that well. It seems to be the case, for instance, that
rates of spontaneous abortions are higher after IVF than
after 'natural' conception (cf. Edwards,1986:50) .
In the case of deciding which embryos to place in the
womb, the doctors seem to judge by the rate of growth of
the embryo (or what McLaren,1986:5 calls the 'pre-embryo)
up to two days after fertilisation. If the embryo appears
deformed, it is not put back into the patient. But
Winston recognises that mistakes are made here: 'All
workers in IVF can recall instances when apparently
diseased embryos were not replaced, but when they were
subsequently left in culture they developed into
perfectly normal blastocysts' (Winston,1987:71). On the
other hand, what seem to be normally dividing embryos
abort after implantation. If 'nature' is replaced by God
in this discussion, then it is open to one to say that
God's will that an embryo be allowed to develop has been
twarted in such cases. Because of the fear of deformity,
man's nerve fails him in these situations, but God or
nature never fail in this way - the embryo aborts, or is
born deformed, or is born healthy. The criticism in these
situations to the effect that man is 'playing God' is
based on the fact that human kind does not know what
God's will is in these situations. Thus there is some
doubt as to whether humanity is replicating 'nature'.
Kevin Kelly seems to be thinking along the same lines
as McCormick when he asks the question, 'Could causing
the death of an embryo ever be an expression of reverence
for life? (Kelly,1987:122). His answer is affirmative and
is based on the traditional approach in Roman Catholic
moral theology to conflict of life in birth-room
situations. Sometimes the life of an embryo or fetus can
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be taken indirectly in order to save the life of the
mother. For instance, if one is in a situation where both
mother and child will die unless the life of one is
taken, then life must be taken. 'Reverence for life,
therefore, is the dominant meaning of this action which
includes within it abortion as one of its constituent
elements' (Kelly,1987:124) . Kelly thinks that only after
weighing the conflicting goods and taking into account
the special circumstances, can one give the act its
proper moral evaluation and description - either abortion
or saving life. Taking the life of an embryo or fetus is
then in full accord with the position of full respect for
these entities, according to this author.
However, to say, as Kelly does, that indirect abortion
may be consonant with respect for life does not lead one
to the conclusion that IVF is justified. This is because
the values which have to be weighed in IVF are different
from those conflicts between lives involved in birth-room
situations. In IVF one has to weigh the lives of embryos
against the desires of couples to found a family, and it
is not clear from Kelly's discussion above that potential
life can be sacrificed for this reason, unless of course
one already holds the position that embryos are not full
persons. (One should also recognise that the traditional
application of the doctrine of double effect does not
simply allow one to abort the fetus when the mother's
life is in danger. For instance, craniotomy was regarded
as illicit, since it involves the intention to kill the
child as a means of saving the mother, and this is direct
killing according to the doctrine of double effect;
cf.Boyle,1977. Nor is there any important difference
morally between 'letting die' and 'killing' if embryos
are not replaced in the body and if they have some right
to develop their potentiality.)
Paul Ramsey (1984) is quite insistent that abortion in
the context of IVF is a different matter from the usual
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context where pregnancy is terminated.
Suppose we agree that the mother's life and health
broadly interpreted, that the family's economic and
other welfare, that the welfare of children already
born may be deprived by another child born into the
family, and that these are countervailing
considerations that are overriding and that justify
therapeutic abortion - in the broadest possible
meaning of "therapeutic" - all that in no degree
justifies creating a new human life at risks that
foreseeably may require subsequent abortion.
(Ramsey,1984:36).
Ramsey accepts as justified many cases of abortion
because they involve 'the concept of "necessity" in
conflict-of-life situations' (ibid.). But 'to continue on
the way of the new genesis of human lives involves no
such "necessity" - not in the genesis itself' (ibid.).
E The Ethics of Risk.
Even in the simple case of IVF which I have been
discussing so far, opponents of the procedure can point
out two kinds of risk which follow from its experimental
character. One is to do with the rate of spontaneous
abortion, which may be increased in the IVF process; the
other with the possible increase of deformity in children
born of the process. In the first case one might choose
to speak of potential persons having their potentiality
short-circuited by man's technological intervention
(though it must not be forgotten that even this potential
would be impossible if IVF were not available to
infertile couples.). In the second case, one might
consider referring to future persons and their interests,
given that some childless couples are intent on having a
child whatever the risk to the child's future health
which arises from the process. It is the second case
which interests Ramsey most, and it has the advantage of
side-stepping the issue of the moral status of the early
embryo - one may disagree on whether or not the embryo is
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a person from fertilisation on, but no one can afford to
ignore the health and welfare of children brought to
birth by IVF.
Ramsey takes a high moral view of the risk involved in
manipulating procreation by IVF. He insists that 'A human
experiment must be moral in its inception, not in its
outcome' (Ramsey,1984:33). The experimentation demanded
by IVF could not be moral in its inception, according to
Ramsey, because there is a gap between 'animal work' and
human trials, and because one cannot be sure of the long-
term effects on IVF children until about two to three
thousand children are born and develop to adulthood. But
this means treating such individuals as guinea-pigs, as
means to the end of satisfying the desires of childless
people. Ramsey thinks that his argument applies to
freezing semen, or ova, or embryos, of the human species.
And he concludes: 'No one needs to know that the figure
is 50 or 3000 or 30,000 successful test babies, to
sustain the argument I put forward.' (ibid.,34).
Ramsey's view on avoiding risk is not universally
accepted. Marc Lappe, for instance, writing in 1972
before the arrival of the first test-tube baby, comments
on public opinion with regard to risk-taking for the
unborn:
The current weight of public opinion and common
standards of medical practice regarding the
restoration of fertility to childless couples
greatly reduces the cogency of any argument which
would protect the in vitro embryo from any and all
potential risks of damage. Fertility drugs which
induce super-ovulation are used without regard to
the likelihood of multiple births and resulting
stunting of fetal growth, prematurity, and higher
risk of respiratory disease and death. Artificial
insemination with husband or donor semen is
practiced on an ever more regular basis without
knowledge of the possible increased incidence of
mutations as the result of sperm storage or other
uncertainties entailed in the insemination
procedure. (Lappe,1972:2).
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This, of course, is the weakest moral argument for
allowing risk, namely, that public opinion favours it;
but fortunately it is not the only argument mentioned by
Lappe. He is of the opinion that one can assess the risks
of IVF and arrive at an 'acceptable' level: 'In the case
of human babies produced by in vitro procedures,
prsumably this level would be one which was equivalent to
the risks normally undertaken in a "natural" pregnancy'
(Lappe,1972 : 2 ; cf. Kass,1981:454-45 & Iglesias,1985:93-94
for a more sceptical assessment of the advance of medical
science in this area). But this does not solve the
problem of arriving at the stage where one actually finds
that the risks of IVF are acceptable, since to do that
leaves one open to the charge of being willing to
sacrifice certain individuals on the basis of the
possibility that the risks may be unacceptable. In other
words, one is faced with Ramsey's principle that an
experiment on humans must be moral in its inception not
simply in its outcome.
From the beginning of the application of IVF to
humans, then, there must be some assurance that the risk
will be minimal. Hence Lappe declares that 'Recent
evidence of the resiliency of the early mammalian embryo
certainly indicates that fears of gross monstrosities are
probably unfounded.' (op.cit.,2). When it comes to loss
of embryos after implantation, Lappe refers to the
significant proportion of natural wastage, and suggests
that this is nature's way of disposing of abnormal
embryos, a kind of natural selection. As he puts it,
Although the exact proportion is incompletely known,
as many as 80% of all chromosomally abnormal embryos
may be lost during the first and second trimester of
pregnancy. Thus, there is reason to believe that
potentially abnormal human embryos developed in
vitro would be subject to a winnowing process which
would help reduce (but not necessarily eliminate)
abnormal embryos, (ibid.,3)
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It can be seen that Lappe does not deny the
possibility of some risk to potential and future persons
as a result of pursuing an experimental procedure like
IVF, but he does seem to make a strong case for
minimising risk to what might be regarded as an
acceptable level. Note that the degree of risk is a
scientific question, whereas the acceptability of this
risk once discovered is a question of values or of moral
theory.
One final point needs to be made here, and that
concerns the risks allowed already in procreation. I
refer here not just to the inherent risk of handicap when
any couple conceive a child, but also to the freedom
allowed to couples most clearly at risk in this area. On
this point Lappe states that 'Even in the most extreme
cases, for example among women with phenylketonuria,
whose offspring are virtually certain of receiving some
damage during gestation, no one has enjoined them for
procreating except by moral suasion' (ibid.). Again one
is faced with the concept of the right to do wrong; there
is no obligation to prevent all wrong actions happening
by every means at one's disposal. But is moral suasion
enough to protect future persons and potential persons
from the possible effects of IVF? If one regards embryos
as having some rights, especially rights to life and not
to be used as guinea pigs, should one not look for legal
protection for their rights? Yet again, it seems to me,
the answer to these questions depends on the view taken
of the moral status of embryos and the weight given to
the needs of childless couples.
*
9.4 Beyond the Simple Case
A The Revolution in Parent-Child Relationships
The closest analogy I could find to the simple case of
IVF was AIH. Gametes from husband and wife are fertil-
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fertilised in vitro and returned to the wife's womb. No
spare embryos are left over. All seems neat and well-
ordered. But then I had to take into account the road
taken to achieve this orderliness and the future risks
undertaken from the start. Now I must take another step,
recognising developments beyond the simple case which
will raise further hackles for many opponents of the
procedure.
If the simple case of IVF is something like AIH, one
has to consider other kinds of IVF where the procedure is
like AID. If a woman has blocked fallopian tubes but is
able to ovulate, and if her husband is subfertile or
azoospermic, then her ova may be removed in the usual way
and mixed with donor sperm before being placed in the
womb. This is the straightforward case of IVF combined
with AID. To the moral problems of AID discussed already
I add the moral problems related to the experimental
character of IVF. If the woman is infertile in the sense
of not being able to ovulate, and if her husband is
azoospermic, then the IVF process can involve donor ova
as well as donor sperm. This has presented great
difficulties for scientists, especially in the attempt to
synchronise the cycles of the the two women.
Such developments mean that a revolution has taken
place in the relationship between women and their
offspring. This is highlighted by the arrival on the
scene of the concept of 'surrogate mother' which implies
that the 'genetic' mother of a child need no longer be
the 'carrying' mother, and neither need be the 'social
mother'. If rights are to do with important interests of
human beings, then such changes in the relationships
making up family life must be carefully considered in
view of the possible damage to future generations who
will have these changes foisted upon them.
I think I have said enough about the risks of ex-
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perimentation relating to possible handicap in the last
section of this chapter, so let me explore further the
experimentation involved with the form of the family as a
result of gamete donation and surrogacy.
R. Snowden, G.D.Mitchell, and E.M.Snowden (1983b)
provide 'A Suggested Nomenclature' for the new
relationships between parents and their offspring as a
result of going beyond the simple case of IVF. One can
talk of the 'Genetic mother', which is the role played by
the woman who produces and matures the ovum. Then one can
refer to the 'Carrying mother', which centres on the
role of the woman in whose uterus the embryo implants and
develops into the growing fetus. Then one has the
'Nurturing mother' - the woman who will care for the baby
once it is born. The 'Complete mother' is the suggested
name for the woman who undertakes all three roles above.
On the other hand, one gives the label 'Genetic-Carrying
mother' to the woman who provides the ovum and the womb,
but does not nurture the child once born. The 'Genetic-
Nurturing mother' supplies the ovum to a surrogate and
then receives the child for nurturing. The 'Carrying-
Nurturing mother' receives an ovum from a donor, carries
the child in her womb and nurtures it after birth. This
is the closest one can get to a female version of AID.
On the father's side relationships are less complex.
There is the 'Genetic father' who provides the sperm or
male gametes. Then there is the 'Nurturing father',
usually the infertile husband in AID. And, finally, there
is the 'Complete father', which is the normal case of
fatherhood - the man is both genetically related to the
child and cares for it after birth along with the mother
(cf. Snowden, Mitchell, & Snowden,1983:32-35).
Now, in my discussion of AID I briefly touched on the
distinction between 'Genetic' and 'Nurturing' fathers. I
noted the traditional Christian objection to the
separation of the two, an opposition which is too some
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extent breaking down, especially within some Protestant
denominations. The objection on principle was to the
interference of a third party in the intimacy of marriage
and procreation and the dubious right of the donor to
give up responsibility for his seed to the 'Nurturing
father'. From a more consequentialist perspective,
objections centred on the right of AID children to know
at least the genetic identity of their donor fathers and
the right not to be lied to regarding their origins.
(Some have also pointed out the dangers of accidental
incest resulting from multiple donations of sperm, but
this risk can be greatly reduced by limiting the number
of donations from any one man; Warnock suggests a limit
of ten children per donor,1985:27.)
It seems to me that ovum donation replicates some of
these problems associated with AID. Now it is the woman
who can act as a donor of sex cells, remaining anonymous
and giving up responsibility for the care of the child
that will be produced. (Anonymity of ova donors is
problematic because of the need to synchronise fertility
cycles.) Again there are problems with the right of any
woman to relieve herself of such a responsibility, no
matter how good the intentions. There is not the same
problem relating to masturbation when one is speaking of
ovum donation, but, on the other hand, removal of ova
involves a more invasive technique than masturbation,
with greater personal risk to the woman.
One can also imagine some legal difficulties regarding
the legitimacy of children born as a result of ovum
donation. If there are problems from the point of view of
'Nurturing fathers' falsifying birth registers to wipe
out all trace of the 'Genetic father', can one not expect
parallel attempts to wipe out all trace of the ovum
donor? Indeed, there may be a greater temptation to do
this, since the recipient of the egg (duly fertilised by
her husband, let us suppose) then carries the developing
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embryo in her womb to birth, and that experience of
pregnancy may lead to a refusal to recognise the origin
of the child. This 'forgetfulness' about personal origins
can lead to deception in the family and deprivation of
the right of the child to know its genetic origins.
In ovum donation the 'Carrying mother' may feel
something like the infertile husband in the context of
AID - at least the child will be genetically related to
one of the spouses. However, the woman has the advantage
over the infertile husband, since she has the experience
of carrying the child to birth. She can feel that she is
contributing a great deal to the process of founding a
family. It is a different matter, of course, when one
considers embryo donation, where the embryo is not
genetically related to either of the recipient spouses.
Cases of this type have been called by some, for
example Carl Wood's team, 'pre-natal adoption' (cf.
Singer & Wells,1984:79). This title is given because in
adoption neither adopting parent is related genetically
to the child, and because in ordinary cases of adoption
the earlier a child can be adopted after birth the
better. Singer and Wells cite Roger Short as saying,
'You don't adopt a 10 year old child, you try and adopt a
newborn baby. Even better than adopting a newborn baby
is to adopt a fertilized egg' (Singer & Wells, ibid.). A
further advantage of this is that the donor couple
(supposing the donation to come from a husband and wife)
find it easier to give up an embryo than a child the wife
has carried to term. And, of course, the recipient
couple can have the experience of pregnancy as an added
bonus.
Some have not been so happy with the justification of
embryo donation in terms of adoption, pre-natal or
otherwise. Most trenchant in his critique of this concept
is Oliver O'Donovan (1984) in his work Begotten or Made ]_
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There he attacks in first place the notion that
Artificial Insemination is a kind of adoption in which
the couple adopt the sperm of the donor. (A similar point
could be made with regard to ovum donation.). In
adoption, he says, the adoptive parents simply represent
the genetic parents who cannot or will not take
responsibility for the child. But no such thing happens
in relation to the donation of gametes, since the act of
AI is the act of the couple, not of the donor - he has
not procreated. Adoption always has meant the taking over
of responsibility for the child that others have
procreated (0'Donovan,1984:36) .
But what of the case mentioned above of embryo
donation where the embryo is the result of the fusion of
gametes of a married couple who could be said to have
'procreated'? This case is likewise rejected by
O'Donovan. For one thing, it seems as though one is now
trafficking in children. Whatever one might say about the
notion that gametes are the property of human parents,
O'Donovan refuses to accept that embryos are such
property: 'The notion that one might undertake to become
the parent of a child in order to alienate one's parental
relation to another, implicitly converts the child from a
person to a commodity' (ibid.,37). Whether one 'gives
the child away' earlier or later is not of interest to
this author; because people find it psychologically
easier to give an embryo rather than a newborn baby does
not change the judgement that each is morally wrong,
given the argument O'Donovan presents.
Besides seeing the donation of embryos as a kind of
trafficking in children, O'Donovan points out that such
donation is unlike adoption because adoption is always
essentially an act of charity towards the genetic parents
on the part of the adoptive parents (though the uppermost
idea in the minds of the adoptive parents may still be
the longing for a child). But embryo donation and sur-
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rogacy change this relationship around. If one prescinds
from the commercial motivation of certain cases, many are
more sympathetic towards the kind of case where the
motivation is one of compassion and charity towards the
childless. Cases where sisters act as surrogates for
siblings are often highlighted as altruistic examples.
The main difference between such cases and adoption is
that a child is deliberately procreated with the
intention of giving it over to an infertile couple, and
this is very different from the normal case of adoption.
I have underlined the arguments for and against the
view that the new forms of procreating children with the
help of donors are really different forms of adoption. I
presume that efforts made to show that the new
reproductive technology is capable of being fitted into
some of the older categories of family life, albeit the
secondary institution of adoption, are partly an attempt
to forestall the objection that the new techniques
involve a radical experiment in the social sphere,
especially in the institution of the family. The
arguments of writers like 0'Donovan, which try to show
that such rationalisations fail, bring out clearly the
experimental nature of these novel developments and the
unease to which they give rise in the human heart.
Discussion of the nature and value of family life in
society is a topic I cannot discuss in detail in this
thesis. Clearly, many people today still regard the
family as a basic institution, and the Christian
tradition certainly upholds this evaluation. Others have
a more ambivalent attitude to the family. (Think, for
instance, of F.Mount,1982:1 for reference to the family
as a 'subversive organisation'; or D.Cooper,1972, for a
psychoanalytic critique of the nuclear family, echoed by
J. Mitchell,1986:ch 9.)
So, there are various attitudes to the family as in-
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stitution. Within the context of this thesis I am
assuming that the family is a good thing, a place where
both adults and children ideally find security and mutual
acceptance. It is where one finds one's personal roots,
and this is why one must be concerned with the
implications of IVF and surrogacy for the question of
personal origins. Yes, the family in history has
undergone certain changes and seems to be pretty
resilient, but one must not ignore the revolutionary
changes coming about as a result of this new technology,
which goes right to the heart of basic human relation¬
ships. Although much of public opinion, as well as
scholarly opinion, appears to place stress on the nur¬
turing relationship of parents to children rather than
on the genetic relationship, there is scant knowledge
about the effects which a radical tampering with the
genetic basis of the family will have on future
generations, especially on the psychological level. Thus,
one of the main objections against IVF beyond the simple
case, is that it involves a double degree of
experimentation - on the biological/physical level, and
on the social/ psycho-logical level.
Interestingly, the most dramatic of the new reprod¬
uctive techniques - IVF with surrogate motherhood - has
presented most difficulties, and this is not simply due
to the fact that the embryo in the womb of the 'Carrying
mother' need not be genetically related to her. What
strikes most people as problematic is the fact that a
woman can carry a child for nine months with the
intention of giving it up. In fact, a woman can in¬
tentionally get herself into this position, for the sake
of someone else. The problem is that people generally
expect a woman to develop a strong relationship with her
baby during the course of her pregnancy, and there is a
tendency to clearly distinguish this situation from the
donation of gametes, whether ova or sperm, or an embryo
for that matter. There is a widespread intuition, found
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equally in the controversy about abortion, which is
uncomfortable with breaking the intimate relationship
between a woman and the fruit of her womb. So attitudes
towards surrogate mothers are often mixed. On one hand,
many find it difficult to accept commercial surrogacy
arrangements (and the Warnock Report echoed this
disapproval), while on the other hand, many would
consider more altruistic examples as bordering on the
heroic. In all cases, one tends to judge the surrogate
negatively if she does not show signs of a strong
connection with the child of her womb.
In subtle, and not so subtle, ways, then, society
shows a certain disapproval of surrogacy. Regarding
commercial surrogacy, the woman is often criticised for
being involved in a kind of prostitution, where the term
is widened to include the introduction of economic values
to an intimate part of life where those values are out of
place (cf.Rassaby,1982:103; Ince,1984:99). The sacred and
the profane still do not mix, and in a developingly non-
religious world, perhaps the sphere of conception and
birth are among the few remaining 'sacred' areas where
the 'profane' world of mammon must stay outside.
Regarding altruistic surrogacy, the surrogate is seen
in a more favourable light, even in an heroic light. But
there can be a back-handed type of criticism of this type
of surrogacy, insofar as the pain of giving up a child is
still stressed, which leaves open the query 'What kind of
woman can bear such a pain?' A question-mark hangs over
the alleged 'heroism' of the surrogate mother. In terms
of rights, this means that society makes it difficult for
surrogacy to be claimed, since there is such a wide
disapproval of some of its basic aspects. In general, the
various legal wrangles that have developed in the U.S.
over surrogacy arrangements appears to support much of
the negative public opinion against commercial surrogacy
at least (cf. Ramsey,1984:27-30). It is doubtful whether
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anyone benefits from such acrimonious, public disputes.
B 'Slippery Slope' Arguments
Discussions of medical ethics seem most prone to the
onslaught of 'Slippery Slope' arguments. Even the title
of certain books suggest the argument, as in Richard
McCormick's How Brave A New World _? and David Rorvik's
Brave New Baby (Rorvik, 1978). The argument has other
names as well, as Samuel Gorovitz (1985) reminds his
readers: 'the primrose path argument, the thin end of the
wedge argument, and the camel's nose in the tent
argument. Its structure is familiar: once one starts
sliding down a slippery slope, things get out of control.
There is no stopping; disaster awaits us.' (Gorovitz,
1985:167).
Paul Ramsey (1984) seems to rely heavily on such an
argument in his opposition to IVF:
After all, Great Britain gave us George Orwell,
Aldous Huxley, and C.S.Lewis. The latter two -
writing in years still under the shadow of Nazism -
had the prescience to discern that the final assault
upon humanity was not to be from the abuse of
political power but of our knowledge of pharmacology
and genetics (op. cit.,21).
To establish his argument that the 'Brave New World'
is practically upon us, Ramsey places a good deal of em¬
phasis on the more dramatic and less-used features of
reproductive technology from 'inter-species fertilis¬
ation' to 'cloning'.
But how strong are such 'slippery slope' arguments in
general? Not very strong seems to be the common answer.
Gorovitz takes a refreshingly direct approach in
refuting Ramsey. He takes a practical example: 'No skier
thinks the argument is generally good; fortunately It is
often possible to start down a slippery slope and then to
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stop' (Gorovitz,1985:167). When it comes to negotiating
slippery slopes, much depends on how slippery the slope
is and on the kind of expertise one has. In other words,
slippery slope arguments depend for their cogency on
empirical arguments. Again, as Gorovitz puts it, 'Some
processes, like nuclear chain reactions or the spreading
of an epidemic, once begun are difficult or impossible to
stop. Others are not.' (ibid.) One has to turn to
experience to see if IVF or AID or Surrogacy form the
beginning of such a slippery slope. From the moral point
of view a slippery slope can exist strictly speaking only
if there is no morally relevant difference between the
moral positions on the slope.
One further point needs to be made, however, about
slippery slope arguments. It is one mentioned by the
philosopher Bernard Williams (1985) in his essay 'Which
Slopes are Slippery?'. He draws a distinction between a
situation where a difference between two moral positions
can be reasonably defended logically, but not effectively
defended 'as a matter of social or psychological fact'
(Williams,1985:127-128). In other words, some of the
differences between positions which would lead one to
avoid a slippery slope are so subtle, and some of the
positions taken up by individuals are so biased or
prejudiced, that certain persons are to be found out of
control on the slopes. This is important as a
qualification of Gorovitz's position, which tends to
assume that moral agents are always reasonable, if not
from the start, then at least after being given a
philosophical tutorial. In fact, it is common knowledge
that moral agents are not so easily divided into rational
and irrational agents; moral positions are often an
amalgam of reason and emotion. This point also fits in
well with the Christian intuition of the presence of sin
in human emotions and reason. Men and women are often
tempted to suppress morally relevant differences.
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Applying all of the preceding points to reproductive
technology, one can argue that there are morally relevant
differences which distinguish various steps along the way
from AIH to cloning, and as a result the alleged slopes
are not so slippery after all, once one tries to overcome
fears about what might happen and to think clearly.
If one takes the moral high-ground of course, as in
the case of Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
then AIH is the beginning of the slippery slope towards
1technologising' marriage (cf.McCormick,1981: 327). Al¬
ready one is separating the basic goods of love and
procreation, and further steps such as AID and IVF simply
repeat the same 'dehumanising' structure. Any further
differences are morally relevant, but secondarily so. The
original breach has been made, according to this
viewpoint, once procreation has been separated from
sexual intercourse. (In fact, some might say that
contraception itself is the 'real' beginning of the
slippery slope, since this was the first technological
move in separating the unitive and procreative goods.)
For others, the slippery slope begins with AID rather
than AIH, because this involves the involvement of a
third party in the intimacy of marriage and the attempt
to alienate rights which are strictly inalienable. The
fact that sexual intercourse between wife and donor does
not take place is beside the point here, since
reproductive rights apply to the use of the reproductive
faculty exclusively within marriage, not merely the use
of sex within marriage. Once AID is accepted, according
to this position, one has to accept in principle ovum
donation, and perhaps even embryo donation. It may also
be possible to accept AIH and AID, but reject all cases
of IVF, even the simple case, on the grounds that IVF
must involve some experimentation on embryos outside the
body of the female, and that much more technology is used
in contrast with AI. Then one can expect some people to
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accept the simple case of IVF, but reject developments
beyond this as I have chronicled them. This position
would accept a limited stewardship over creation, drawing
strict limits at a certain point. It is even possible to
accept IVF with surrogacy and yet reject the creation of
embryos for experimentation in areas which have nothing
to do with helping childless couples found a family. This
position would be motivated wholly by sympathy for the
infertile. Given these various possible cut-off
positions, it is doubtful whether one can speak of one
commonly accepted position which would amount to the
beginning of the slippery slope towards disaster. This is
because of the great number of different moral positions
which enable people to stop at definite, but different,
points. Therefore I find it difficult to accept the idea
of a right against all developments in the sphere of
reproductive technology on the basis of slippery slope
arguments.
9.5 The Application of Rights-Language
Since the basic model of rights I have followed has been
an Interest or Benefit theory, much of the discussion of
reproductive rights has concentrated on the conflicts of
interests which arise in this whole area. The primary
conflict will always be between the couple who want a
baby and the welfare of the child itself (at various
stages of the development of its 'potentiality'. But
further problems arise when third parties enter the
situation. IVF is especially significant in allowing this
to happen, when one passes beyond the simple case. Then
one can have a mixture of sperm donation, ovum donation,
and womb-leasing. Not only does this present possible
problems of identity for the child procreated as a result
of such arrangements, but these changes in personal
origins mean a revolutionary change in the institution of
the family. In general, too, IVF means a more radical
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move into the trend of introducing technology into the
intimate sphere of human procreation, at a time when the
family is being hailed by some as a haven of intimacy in
a heartless world (the phrase is from Lasch,1977). In
these various situations the interests of various people
are at stake, so one can say that possibly some rights
are at stake.
I shall treat first of all of the alleged right of
married, but childless, couples to have children by IVF,
confining myself to discussion of moral rights.
First, I can relate this present question to what I
said in the last chapter about the rights to use AI. The
'simple case' of IVF is somewhat similar to AIH insofar
as no third party is involved as a donor. If one's moral
objections to the right to use IVF are based on third
party interference, then the simple case of IVF might be
seen as at least a liberty-right and a power-right.
However, the matter is complicated even in the simple
case of IVF by the trebly-experimental character of the
procedure. Firstly, any success it has achieved has been
'at the expense' of embryos sacrificed in ex¬
perimentations to improve the method. Secondly, there
are signs that IVF embryos may spontaneously abort more
often than embryos conceived in vivo. And, thirdly, there
is some doubt about the future health and welfare of IVF
children.
Because of these features a couple may feel that they
have no liberty-right and no power-right to conceive by
IVF. The reasons may be either the conflict of rights
between the couple and any embryos they might produce by
this process, or a conflict of interests between
generations if one is considering 'future persons'.
(Before a couple decide to use IVF, the embryos and
children they might produce are such future persons;
since they do not exist yet, they have no rights, but a
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couple should consider their future interests.). If the
couple hold that embryos have strict rights either as
'actual human beings' or as 'potential persons', they may
then hold that their own right to found a family (which
is a qualified claim-right) is overridden by the claim-
right of the embryo-fetus to the best chance of
development within the womb. Although the future embryo
has no right not to be conceived, those who might
conceive it have perhaps some duties concerning it, but
not to it. This means that a couple may have a duty not
to conceive a child by IVF without the child having a
correlative right. The couple must consider the claim-
rights of the embryo once it comes into existence, and if
they believe in advance that it will be disadvantaged in
some way, they should avoid getting into the situation
where its rights will be violated.
If it is held that the risks to embryos and future
persons are exaggerated, and that they are in any case
justified in terms of human stewardship, then the simple
case of IVF may become a liberty-right and the key to a
power-right for the couple. (I say 'the key' here,
because a power-right refers to the capacity to change a
relationship without direct reference to the means.
However, a bad means can affect the power, while a good
means is 'a key which unlocks the power', so to speak.)
Any rights of embryos and the interests of future persons
are then overridden. However, while claim-rights imply
liberty-rights, the opposite is not the case, and
partners in marriage do not have claim-rights against
each other to use IVF, even if they regard procreation in
general as a mandatory right. This is because of the
immense strain on the couple entailed by the procedure as
mentioned by Winston above (including the invasive nature
of the techniques). Thus, if IVF is acceptable morally,
it is probably in the category of supererogatory actions.
All such actions are liberties, and no one else has the
claim-right against one to perform an heroic act (cf.
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Urmson,1958) . I think the same point can be applied to
both AIH and AID.
All of this assumes, of course, that one does not take
the strict Roman Catholic view that there is simply no
right to artificial fertilisation in any guise because it
separates basic goods. In holding such a view, a couple
would have no liberty, claim or power to found a family
even under the simple case of IVF
As to the question of claims against the state to
provide at least the simple case of IVF for infertile
couples, this is more controversial than provision of AI.
This is because of the extra expense in terms of
resources required to develop IVF. Regarding AIH and AID,
the technology involved is relatively simple compared
with IVF, and there is even mention of 'do-it-yourself-
kits' for those who wish AI (cf.Klein,1984). The question
of resources spent on IVF should not be confused with
resources spent on infertility treatment in general. In
fact, there is the danger that the value of IVF is
exaggerated (often due to media attention), and that this
tends to divert resources from other forms of infertility
treatment. It seems reasonable indeed to seek ways of
helping the infertile in ways that are least
controversial morally and legally.
As well as the problem of claim-rights against the
state, there are the parallel problems mentioned earlier
in relation to AID. Again, couples do not have any claim-
right to ova or embryos, especially since such donations
demand invasive techniques, as opposed to male
masturbation in the case of AID. Moreover, there is a
further difference between donating gametes and donating
embryos. Whether the latter in particular is a form of
'property' which one can give away, even from the best
motives, is highly controversial.
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Turning now to IVF beyond the simple case, it would
seem that the question of the rights of embryos and the
interests of future persons becomes even more problem¬
atic. For now one must face the issue of spare embryos
which are not returned to the woman's body and are either
experimented upon or frozen for later use. If one views
embryos as having a claim-right in first place to the
best possible development of their potentialities, then
obviously experimentation on embryos must be a violation
of their rights. (I tend to hold that the interests or
rights of embryos as existing human life takes precedence
over the interest of future persons to be protected from
handicap by such experimentation.) If embryos are frozen
with a view to later replacement, then there are the
further problems of risk associated with this process.
These may be risks of handicap, as well as risks
regarding the relationship to one's family (considering
that one was conceived perhaps years before one's birth).
Once one holds that embryos have basic claim-rights to
life, then the desires of couples (and their prima facie
rights) to have children must be overridden under these
conditions.
One of the further problems associated with the
developments of IVF beyond the 'simple case' concerns the
whole issue of parent-child relationships. These change
radically with the introduction of ovum donation, sperm
donation and surrogacy. Quite apart from the
experimentation which IVF involves on the biological/
physiological level, there is in this case a social
revolution in the concept of the family. The rights
involved here depend on how important the traditional
link between genetic and social relationships in the
family. On one hand is the position mentioned by
Warnock,1985b:150, 'provided children are brought up by a
grown-up who wants them and shows affection, it does not
really matter within what kind of group they live:
cosiness is all.' On the other hand, there is the
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criticism of the Warnock Report by Mahoney,1984a:291,
when he says that 'What is being countenanced, and will
therefore increase, is a certain element of biological
rootlessness in the human race.' Again, one has to pit
the desire to have children, which I believe is a right
in certain circumstances, against the interests of future
persons and the rights of the present generation not to
have a hallowed institution - the family - altered
radically without serious consideration of the effects.
In my discussion of the application of the Hohfeldian
terms in relation to population control (chapter 6), I
said that when moral positions are highly controversial,
the usual conflict of rights is a conflict of liberty-
rights, since these permit the maximum degree of freedom
for moral agents while respecting the consciences of
others. For instance, where a moral position derives its
justifying reasons on the natural law level from some
prediction of future events, e.g. world famine as a
result of overpopulation, and where such predictions are
uncertain, the parties in disagreement have a liberty-
right to hold their own positions and to attempt to win
others over to it. Neither party has the claim-right
against the other to abandon his or her position.
Something similar can be said, I think, in this matter
of IVF, except that the more controversial the issues
become, e.g. moving from the simple case on to the more
'Brave New World' positions, the less one should talk in
terms of conflicts of liberty-rights and the more one
should consider the claims and interests of both embryos
and wider society. In the simple case of IVF it appears
that a number of safeguards have been introduced to make
the procedure 'relatively' uncontroversial, and thus the
liberty-rights of couples should be taken seriously.
Beyond this level it is more difficult to argue for an
absence of duty on the part of others with respect to the
embryo and the common good. Though one has no duty to
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remove all one regards as wrong in the world, one has
some duty to attempt to remove the more serious wrongs,
insofar as that is within one's compass. Arguably, some
such duty and correlative rights are involved when one
goes beyond the simple case of IVF. For those who still
object to IVF, even at this level, there must be a
recognition of a 'right to do wrong', since the wrong in
these cases has already been minimised as much as is
possible in a pluralistic society.
Finally, it can be argued that couples have an
immunity-right against others not to be pressurised into
founding a family by using IVF. No one has the power-
right or ethical capacity to push a couple into having
children by this means. (This includes the right not to
be pressurised into donating ova or embryos, or entering
into a surrogacy arrangement cf.Singer & Wells,1984:77-
78) One could also call this right a claim-right on the
part of the couple, but it is valuable to maintain the
use of the language of powers and immunities because of
the fact that reproductive rights are essentially special
moral rights involving the maintenance of or change in
the relationship of the couple. (I think it may be
advantageous to use immunity-rights with regard to the
maintenance of relationships and to keep the language of
power-rights for decisions and actions which seek to
change relationships.)
9.6 Christian Insights into IVF and its Developments.
Much of what I said about Artificial Insemination from
the Christian perspective could be repeated usefully
here. I argued that there was a good deal of agreement
regarding the permissibility of AIH, but as one moves
towards AID, sperm banks, and eugenic approaches to
procreation, one meets with more disagreement, both
within and between the churches of the Christian tra-
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dition. With regard to IVF, then, one can expect more
approval for the simple case of IVF and more controversy
in relation to the further developments - ovum donation,
embryo donation and surrogacy. And this is exactly the
case: within the Roman Catholic church there is a strict,
negative approach which cuts off all possibilities of
accepting IVF, since even AIH is rejected as a wrong
means to the end of procreation. But even within that
church there are dissenting voices, usually the same ones
as were advocating the acceptance of AIH and questioning
the moral status of embryos from the moment of
conception.
A Application of Some Earlier Points
Some points made in earlier chapters relating to the
Christian contribution to the judgement on reproductive
freedom can be applied again here. For instance, in
chapter 7 reference was made to the Christian
consciousness of sin in the world, found hidden even in
good intentions. For all the talk, then, of compassion
for the infertile, especially on the part of the
scientific community, one must sound the warning
regarding the ubiquity of sin in human life. This can be
found to some extent, perhaps, in the ambitions of
researchers to make a name for themselves, such that the
reasons given for pursuing their projects at the expense
of respect for the rights and interests of the weakest
members of the moral community, are mere rationalisations
covering these less worthy motives.
One should recall as well a related point to the one
just made, namely, Ramsey's warning concerning obsession
with certain ends which are good in themselves. Once one
gets into the frame of mind that one must 'ensure' that a
good end be achieved, then there is the likelihood that
questionable means will be pressed into service. But
wrong means can achieve good ends, if at all, only at the
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expense of sacrificing other goods and rights. Thus, it
is sometimes better to leave a good end unachieved rather
than do evil to achieve it.
Having said that Christians ought to show concern that
the means used to achieve a good end be morally apt, one
has to remember that the work of discerning such a
relationship often involves risks. Still, the Christian
moral tradition has taken up this challenge in many
situations. The doctrine of double effect is one such
attempt to avoid moral paralysis, by working out a
proportion between good and bad effects and insisting
that the bad effect remain praeter intentionem
(cf.Mangan,1949). The doctrine of the 'just war' and the
more general permission to defend oneself, even against
innocent aggressors, are further examples of
Christianity's adopting 'risky' means to achieve good
ends (cf. Ford,1944, on 'The Morality of Obliteration
Bombing'). Given such examples, one wonders if some
present positions, especially within the Roman Catholic
tradition, are not too rigorous. This is one of the
dangers of a deontological approach when it divorces
itself from value-balancing and the experience of
suffering of individuals and groups.
B The Interaction Between Principles and Situations
Another way of expressing this argument is by reference
to the relationship between principles and situations. As
J. Mahoney (1985) has said:
[The] particular weakness of applying general moral
principles selectively to typical situations leads
into the main weakness of viewing moral reasoning as
simply applying principles: that it is conceived as
a logical one-way movement from principle to
situation. It allows no possibility for the
situation itself to influence the principle, and,in
fact, does not give sufficient consideration to the
origin of moral principles themselves (Mahoney,
1985:293).
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The argument that AIH is morally wrong because of the
principle that prohibits masturbation may well be an
example of this gap that has opened up between principles
and situations. And who knows what other new situations
in the realm of reproductive technology might ultimately,
if taken seriously, lead to an adaptation of traditional
principles? Arguably, Christian couples, and especially
the infertile, have a right to the best moral reasoning
the Church can provide. This, I think, is a prior right
of Christians,i.e. prior to their decision regarding the
use of their generative faculties.
There is in fact the danger of using the language of
rights in such a way as to violate rights. Most obviously
this can occur when certain actions and practices are
made the object of mandatory, inalienable and absolute
rights, when they ought to be the object of discretionary
rights. Such an approach is a translation of the position
which traditionally prefers the language of duty and
absolute principle applied stringently to each and every
case. But the advocates of this way of thinking may
conceal their absolutist tendencies under the guise of
the language of rights with its stress on freedom.
However, the only freedom is that of doing one's duty,
and the symptom of this style of thought is the rigid
limitation of discretionary rights. It would be
interesting to go back over the arguments against AI and
IVF in order to discern the balance between mandatory and
discretionary rights in Christian moral doctrine on these
topics.
C Highlighting General Principles and Values
In the earlier discussion (4.3,A&B) of specifically
Christian reasons for acting morally, I mentioned general
and particular reasons. At the general level, for
instance, Christians act morally out of gratitude to God
for creation and redemption. Christians are supposed to
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take Jesus Christ as their model in life, imitating his
spirit of love but not slavishly imitating his culturally
relative life-style. There should be a spirit of
detachment too, since the follower of Christ is living in
the 'last times', and there must be an eschatological
aspect to one's life.
At the particular level, the Christian can and must
borrow insights from divine revelation and through
theology (faith seeking understanding) try to develop
specifically Christian principles regarding how to
participate in certain basic goods. Thus, for instance,
the concept of marriage as reflecting the relationship
between Christ and his Church in Ephesians 5 should
provide the believer with a deeper reason for respecting
the basic human right to marry. Having children gains a
deeper justifying reason from the doctrine of Christian
hope and the idea that God calls persons to particular
states of life.
However, given all of this religious background to
procreation and the founding of a family, one must take
into account the great difficulty of making further
judgements on the specific ways in which procreation may
be achieved, the manner in which procreation and
fertility may be controlled, the risks that may be taken
in relation to the welfare of future persons, the
relationship between the needs of individuals, couples
and society at large regarding procreation, and so on. In
other words, the right to follow out some particular
vocation is largely dependent on moral discernment
involving natural law reasons in principle open to all
rational creatures.
I prefer to think that the Christian Church's special
contribution to the debate on IVF as an answer to
infertility must remain on the general level of
underlining the important values at stake. In the
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language of rights, this means that the Church must
uphold the right of all childless persons, including its
own members who share this burden, to have their needs
taken seriously, rather than passing over their pain in a
callous way. (I feel that Hauerwas (1986) is more than a
bit insensitive to the plight of the childless in his
negative judgement on IVF. He moves to the conclusion
that adoption is the best answer to the problems of
childlessness rather quickly and without much
argument,op.cit.,149.) More specifically this entails, I
believe, a willingness to embark upon an ongoing study of
the various aspects of treatment of infertility, with a
view to giving moral guidance to all persons of good
will. Such moral guidance should avoid being dogmatic in
the more controversial areas, where Christians are not
agreed on the moral principles involved and where the
effects or consequences of certain developments are still
unknown. Some room must be allowed for reasonable dissent
from 'official church' positions, taking into account not
just the strong feelings and needs of the childless, but
also the validity of the reasons for conflicting
positions.
9.7 Conclusion
It is difficult to summarise this long chapter in a few
lines. All I want to do is to underline some of the
distinctive points made in these pages.
This chapter has been a continuation of the discussion
begun in the last chapter on Artificial Insemination. It
takes up again the putative rights of the infertile,
rights that have to be taken seriously because of the
important good involved. I have not questioned the good
of the end in question (except to reject attempts to
absolutise it), nor the judgement that infertile couples
have a prima facie right to found a family. What I have
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questioned are the means appropriate to achieve that end.
If IVF is a wrong means to a good end, then there is an
argument that other important rights and interests are
being sacrificed for the good and right of procreation.
So this chapter has once again concentrated on conflicts
of putative rights.
Again, for those who take the moral high ground
regarding the necessary connection between procreation
and sexual love, all forms of IVF are illicit from the
moral point of view, just as AIH and AID are illicit. But
what makes this chapter different from the previous one
is the introduction of the notion of rights possessed by
embryos (or pre-embryos).
In earlier chapters the rights under discussion were
always the rights of individuals that were clearly
personal, even though some of the retarded lack some of
the distinctive endowment usually associated with full
personhood. It will be recalled how I rejected the view
that future persons have rights. Here in this chapter the
question has been, 'Are embryos sufficiently like persons
to merit saying that they have the rights (or some of the
rights) of persons?
This discussion took me into the realms of
metaphysics, for instance regarding the notion of
ensoulment, and the question of when human life merits
the protection of the language of rights. I argued
tentatively for the maintenance of the language of
'potential persons', especially for the embryo before
clear signs of individuation, and I refused to accept a_
priori the view that embryos' rights (as potential
persons) always give way to those of actual people.
In general I was more favourably disposed to claims of
rights in the so-called 'simple case' of IVF, than to
claims for the further developments. It seems to me that
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the rights of embryos and of wider society grow stronger
as against the rights of the childless when one begins to
consider ovum donation, surrogacy, and deliberate
experimentation on embryos with no intention of allowing
their potential to develop. I showed that distinctions
can be made between the various developments in
reproductive technology and that there was therefore no
need to argue for a right against all versions of
artificial fertilisation because of fears of a 'brave new
world' scenario.
Again I applied the Hohfeldian distinctions to show
the normative relationships associated with the con¬
flicting possibilities of participating in reproductive
goods. I stressed the claim-rights of embryos in certain
cases and the liberty-rights and power-rights of couples
in other cases. The core right is still a power-right in
relation to the infertile couple's ethical capacity to
become parents, but I said that the inappropriateness of
certain means can prevent the exercise of the power. Only
if there is a liberty or a claim to use some means can
the power-right be activated.
Finally, I repeated my arguments concerning the
limitations of the Christian moral tradition in
presenting specific justifying reasons for judging
certain means inappropriate for the good end of founding
a family. Christian reasons work at a deeper level, but
they remain important in pointing out the vital need not
to block the possibilities of procreation without serious
thought, and in particular without allowing situations




The best way I can think of to conclude this work is by
relating it to traditional moral theology, especially in
the Roman Catholic 'manual' approach. (For a short
history of this approach from the 'Institutiones morales'
of the 17th century to the modern 'manuals' of Tillman
and Haring, see Peschke,1975:53ff.) In that light, the
novelty of my approach will be seen as well as the
aspects of continuity with the tradition.
As is well known, the manuals were an attempt to
provide clergy with guidance in directing their flock,
especially in the confessional, hence their reputation
for casuistry. However, when one looks at some standard
manuals for a reference to method in moral theology, one
finds that, in theory at least, their authors were
interested in wider aspects of theology.
Take, for instance, A Handbook of Moral Theology
(1918), by Antony Koch (adapted and edited by Arthur
Preuss). In the first volume of this work there is a
chapter on 'The Methods of Moral Theology' (ch VIII) with
mention of three main methods: the 'Scholastic' or
'Speculative' method; the 'Practical' or 'Casuistic'
method; and the 'Ascetic' method. Koch states that, 'The
Church has prescribed none of the three methods
enumerated above for the study and teaching of Moral
Theology. As each method covers but a portion of the vast
field traversed by this science, all three should be
employed together.' (Koch-Preuss,1918:39). Reference to
these same methods are found in other standard manuals,
cf. Prummer,1956:1; and with some variation,
Noldin,1935:6.
The Scholastic or Speculative method is described by
Koch-Preuss as deriving its data from positive theology,
'that is to say, it examines the teaching of Scripture
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and Tradition and expounds the moral principles derived
from that teaching in the light of reason' (op.cit.,36).
He goes on to state that the purpose of this method is to
'set forth the eternal ideas of right and wrong as they
exist in the divine intellect, the ethical faculties of
man, and divine Revelation.' (ibid.,37).
The Practical or Casuistic method is defined as the
'technical instruction in the application of the general
principles of morality to special conditions and events'
(ibid.). The Ascetic method, according to this author,
'shows how the means of grace should be employed so as to
enable man to attain perfection.' (ibid.,38)
In practice, the manual approach to moral theology
concentrated on the enunciation of principles and the
application of these principles to particular situations.
Although the Scholastic-Speculative method would lead one
to expect a relatively deep analysis of the ways of God
in Scripture and Tradition, this is not apparent in most
of the manuals, where the interest is in the discovery of
proof texts which will back up principles. The bulk of
the manuals was then devoted to the Casuistic method,
applying the principles to cases. The Ascetic method was
not really stressed, except insofar as the manuals went
on to deal with the sacraments and pastoral theology. In
fact, some writers held that there should be a strict
separation between moral theology and ascetical theology.
Thus, Henry Davis (1935:4) insists that 'it is precisely
about law that Moral Theology is concerned. It is not a
mirror of perfection, showing man the way of perfection.'
And Garth Hallett comments on the separation of spiritual
and ascetical theology from the other branches in his
discussion of the distinction between precepts and
counsels (Hallett,1983:75). Even though the manuals treat
of the virtues in detail, the treatment is generally
legalistic. The hopes raised by this threefold method¬
ology tend to remain unfulfilled, and this is a pity
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considering the promise contained therein.
What then of my treatment of the language of rights -
how does it relate to the traditional methodology above?
Firstly, regarding the Scholastic/Speculative method,
there was some employment of this in the chapter on
normative moral scepticism concerning rights (ch 3) and
in the chapter on theological foundations (ch 4). In the
discussion of deeper justifying reasons for acting
morally, reference was made to the concept of gratitude
to God for creation and redemption. The fact that
Christians see morality as directed towards God and his
eschatological Kingdom was underlined; and the way in
which Christ acts as a model or exemplar of humanity was
not ignored, especially with regard to the meaning his
life, death and resurrection give to human suffering.
At a more particular level, I discussed the
appropriateness of referring the language of rights to
God, indicating the difficulties here in line with
traditional theism's view of God's attributes, especially
his irapassability. I felt that the best approach was to
view rights as gifts of God to humanity as a protection
against the effects of sin and destructive conflict.
(This implies that the right to found a family is neither
God's right against humanity, nor a right of humanity
against God.) They are necessary to maintain the sense of
relative dignity, which then acts as a springboard to the
understanding of man's absolute dignity - the valuation
which God himself puts on his human creation. Regarding
reproductive rights themselves, I placed these in the
context of marriage seen as a reflection of Christ's love
for his Church, and, furthermore, procreation itself was
linked to trinitarian doctrine. A brief mention was made
of the value of procreation as a 'revelation-faith
experience' in which couples gain some grasp of the
gracious Mystery in which they live because of their
giving birth to new life.
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But all of these points were made without any great
depth of discussion, and much more could have been said
from the point of view of this method. I could not dwell
on the speculative side of rights-language, because the
main aim of the thesis has been to provide a metaethical
foundation which would underpin the Casuistic method.
Note that while the second part of the thesis dealt in
some detail with normative questions on the level of
principles and situations, the importance of those pages
lay in presenting examples of how the distinctions and
clarifications made in the first part of the work might
apply when relating principles to situations and
situations to principles.
(It is interesting to note how the relevance of casuistry
has been recognised anew in modern Christian ethics. For
instance, Joseph Fletcher (1966) writes in his famous
work Situation Ethics: The New Morality that 'Casuistry
is the homage paid by legalism to the love of persons,
and to realism about life's relativities.'(ibid.,19). His
argument is that when casuistry is at the service of love
it is good, and that it is in fact indispensable as an
application of love as a criterion in judging situations.
More recently, Stanley Hauerwas (1984) has praised
casuistry in no uncertain terms;
[N]o community can or should try to avoid developing
a tradition of moral testing embodying the wisdom of
that community concerning sets of issues peculiar to
its nature. The question is not whether to have or
not to have casuistry, but what kind we should have
(Hauerwas,1984:130-131).
One should note further that Hauerwas's advocacy of
casuistry involves, not an individual consulting a text¬
book, but an attempt to remain faithful to the narrative
structure of his or her community. A Christian cannot cut
himself or herself off from the story of the community
and its ethical implications.)
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Since casuists often choose to discuss less typical
cases of moral deliberation where dilemmas and quandaries
abound, I have followed this example in studying the
putative rights of sections of humanity whose interests
have been, and are still, often either ignored or given
low priority - the poor families of the Third World and
the 'poor ghettoes' of the West; the mentally retarded;
the infertile and childless; and, some might say, the
weakest and most vulnerable of all - embryos and fetuses.
My interest has not been in solving conflicts, but in
attempting to show the issues involved (especially goods
and relationships) and to clarify these by means of
certain technical distinctions. My own use of these
distinctions has been relatively personal, and it is open
to others to make alternative distinctions and to relate
them differently to cases. Ultimately, however, the
application of the distinctions depends on prior
positions in normative ethics. This is seen, for
instance, in my policy of seeing reproductive rights as
tied to the special moral rights created by marriage,
such that reproductive rights are not primarily described
as human rights, though they are associated with the
human right to marry and are secondarily associated with
the general human right to maintain one's health. It is
because of this policy to stress special moral rights
that the language of power-rights and immunity-rights
takes on such importance, even though Hohfeld saw these
as secondary to claim-rights and liberty-rights.
When dealing with the language of rights the Casuistic
method has to take into account not just the goods in
conflict and the need to harmonise one's choice of goods,
but also the various normative relationships existing
between people. All rights involve normative relation¬
ships whereby the good of a person calls out to be
fulfilled and which consequently requires some limit on
the freedom of another. The question of the stringency of
various relationships is a substantive moral one, and not
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an easy one to answer. In particular, when one discusses
the category of human rights this problem arises, because
of the tension between this concept which attempts to
build bridges between strangers and the so-called 'ethics
of strangers' which has become prevalent today. Although
I am somewhat biased in the matter, I feel that the
Franciscan tradition with its emphasis on human
fraternity under God offers a fitting context or base for
the work of revealing the wider normative relationships
which bind God's creatures in one family.
Turning finally to the Ascetical method of moral
theology or Christian ethics, I must admit that this has
rarely appeared in this thesis, though that is not to
deny its importance in the context of a full treatment of
the language of rights in the Christian moral tradition.
One must not understand 'asceticism' here as referring to
the distinction between precept and counsel alone or to
heroic efforts to attain Christian perfection, though
these aspects are a part of ascetical theology. More
important is the study of the ways and means which
Christians use to respect and promote the rights of
humanity.
Included in this method is the proper understanding of
suffering in human life, including the mysterious problem
of evil. This implies, as I argued in chapter 3, a
critique of obsessive attempts to avoid suffering by
invoking the language of rights immoderately. There is a
sense, even, in which Christians have a right to 'share
in the fellowship of Christ's sufferings' for the
salvation of the world. This method also implies, I
think, a liturgical and prayer-centred context for the
Christian struggle to promote rights. Concern with
justice should enter into liturgical celebrations as
Christians pray for the promotion of rights and the
discernment to see the rights that are truly important. I
have argued in chapter 4 that prayer and sacraments must
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not be unduly 'spiritualised', but must be related to
human efforts to flourish in God's world.
In my opinion, the Ascetical method underlines concern
for the vital moral and religious categories of virtue
and character. Again in this thesis I have not dwelt much
on these topics. This is because I feel that the more
basic category in moral reasoning concerns the basic
goods which are the objects of obligations, rights, and
virtue. Of course virtue is essential, for without an
habitual will to maintain normative relationships
directed at human participation in basic goods, rights
will not be respected. Moreover, a Christian discussion
of the complex relationships between justice and love
would be of immense value in understanding the concerns
of the other methods mentioned above. An example which
comes to mind at once is the role sacrificial love might
play in the waiving of rights in conflict situations.
This would also reflect the limitations imposed by God's
love on his gift of rights to human beings. Christians
need to reflect on the need to discern occasions when his
gifts (such as rights) are not to be used when the
interests of others need to be promoted instead. (Cf.
Denis Carroll,1987:158-160, for a brief discussion of
'The Ascesis of Human Rights'.)
It seems that this conclusion has spoken more of what
is missing from my thesis with regard to a Christian
ethical approach to rights and rights-language than to
what I have managed to treat. But this is a necessary
admission in view of my quite limited intentions. Much of
my work has been a philosophical preparation for the use
of rights-language in theology. The amount of time spent
on refuting scepticism reveals what I regard as a
justified preoccupation with providing respectable
grounds for the use of rights-language. This is not to
say that theology has nothing to offer in return for the
analysis of rights provided by moral and legal
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philosophy. However, the theological contribution seems
most valuable in presenting deeper reasons for respecting
rights in general and in particular, rather than in
solving conflicts between rights at the level of
casuistry.
That the Christian Church should have a privileged
insight into the solution of moral conflicts between
rights must be seen as a rather odd position to hold in
the light of the whole second part of this thesis. Just
look at the complicated set of issues that has to be
explored in attempting to discern how best to respect
reproductive freedom, while respecting other important
interests. There are questions of prediction, both long-
term and short-term; e.g. how will population trends
develop over the next twenty or thirty or a hundred years
and how will the economy of the world cope?; will a
retarded person develop the level of competence which
will enable him or her to marry and/or raise a family?;
what are the possible consequences in the future arising
from the present use of AID and some developments of IVF
such as surrogacy? There are metaphysical questions
regarding the beginning of human life and concerning
which Christianity itself has developed a relatively
humble stance, e.g. in relation to the 'time of
ensoulment'. There are questions of ultimate principles
in morality, for instance in relation to the 'essence' of
a vocation such as marriage and parenthood. What freedom
does the marriage covenant or contract allow the
Christian couple in deciding on whether to found a
family, the size of the family, and the means used to
either limit family size or to overcome infertility? And
there are also questions related to the different
categories of persons whose 'interests' are affected by
the claim to be allowed to reproduce; there may be a
conflict of interests not only between existing
generations - parents and their children - but also
between existing generations and future generations. This
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question has a certain overlap with the problem mentioned
above regarding the beginning of human life. I pointed
out that one way of discussing that problem involves talk
of 'potential persons'. Thus, in discussing the language
of rights in the context of reproductive freedom, one has
to discern in what senses such language applies to these
categories.
This thesis has not been concerned with providing
definitive solutions to such problems. I have been
interested in revealing the complexity of the goods and
relationships involved in moral deliberation regarding
what seems to be an obvious right - the right to found a
family. I hope that the exploration of the issues and the
concentration on the various distinctions making up the
language of rights will be of help to theologians as they
try to discern God's will concerning the use of one of
his greatest gifts - procreation.
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